











Signifying Europe provides a systematic overview of the wide range of symbols 
used to represent Europe and Europeanness, both by the political elite and the 
broader public. Through a critical interpretation of the meanings of the various 
symbols—and their often contradictory or ambiguous dimensions—Johan Fornäs 
investigates how Europe currently identifies itself and is identified by others 
outside its borders. While the focus is on the European Union’s symbols, those 
symbols are also interpreted in relation to other symbols of Europe. Offering 
insight into the cultural dimensions of European unification, this volume will appeal 
to students, scholars and politicians interested in European policy issues, cultural 
studies, and postnational cultural identity.
Johan Fornäs is Professor at the Department of Media and Communication 
Studies at Södertörn University in Sweden, director of the Advanced Cultural 
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In January 2009, David Černý’s sculpture Entropa, commissioned to mark 
the Czech presidency of the Council of the European Union, was unveiled in the 
Brussels headquarters (Figure 0.1). The work consists of satirical versions of national 
stereotypes, mounted in a framework looking like plastic model kits. For instance, 
Černý depicted the Netherlands as flooded, with only minarets visible above the 
water surface; France with a big ‘strike’ sign; and Romania as a Dracula theme park. 
A heated debate ensued, as it turned out that Černý had faked other artists that were 
supposed to have contributed to the work, and also since Bulgaria got their depiction 
covered over as it had the form of a standing toilet, which was considered insulting.
The artist declared a wish to provoke official European Union-speak, but also 
to express Europe’s capacity of critical self-reflection. Through a playful analysis 
of national stereotypes, the intention was to expose the way Europeans tend to 
focus on differences between countries in terms of everyday habits: to ‘show how 
difficult and fragmented Europe as a whole can seem’ and to ‘point at the difficulty 
of communication’.1 The sculpture indicates that there is—and perhaps can be—no 
European unity. The name Entropa plays with the term ‘entropy’—a thermodynamic 
term often used metaphorically to signify an unstoppably increasing level of 
randomness and disorder in a system. The artwork depicts each nation as a closed 
unity, effectively cut off from all others, unable to fuse into a unified whole, emptying 
the European Union (EU) project of any hope for success. 
This is certainly in line with some apparent failures of the integration process. 
However, there is also a more problematic undertext in Černý’s work: it seems to imply 
that European nations are well-defined and closed units—at least infinitely more so 
than Europe as a whole. This naturalisation of national identity is untenable. European 
nations are all ‘imagined communities’ (Benedict Anderson) that with shifting success 
have been consolidated by economic and political institutions. So Europe is not alone 
in being a sociocultural construction with strong imaginary elements, and more of a 
project than an existing empirical fact. Such imaginary communities are not necessarily 
mere illusions. Communities need not be natural or eternal in order to exist and have 
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an effect in the world. Ideas and discourses have a kind of ‘reality effect’ that makes 
people act differently and thus make the imagined communities come alive. 
Politicians, philosophers or scholars have through the centuries drafted a European 
project, but they have not been alone. Various social strata have oriented themselves 
towards a real and imagined Europe, drawing up its contours in various sets of 
practices. Refugees and other migrants are attracted by imaginations of European 
welfare, social security, peace, human rights and liberties. Even as they react against 
the experienced shortcomings of harsh realities, their vernacular practices articulate 
certain recurrent elements of European identifications. Many are deeply disappointed 
by the deficits in how promises are (not) realised for them, but still the imagined 
European community remains in force—and it does not completely lack material 
basis. Other groups sustaining the European idea are exchange students looking 
for education, queer activists escaping homophobic threats, tourists appreciating 
European architecture and gastronomy, sports fans enjoying European football, 
and media audiences that in the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) develop dialogues 
between the regions of this continent.
Contemporary migrants and travellers move along historic routes. Backpackers and 
Erasmus students cross Europe in the footsteps of pilgrims and journeymen. There are 
functional networks on various levels, not only for trade and banks but also for people 
in movement. Such links also transcontinentally cross the outer boundaries of Europe, 
but they are particularly dense within the European interchange that underpins the 
notions of what Europe means. In Africa, Asia and the transatlantic ‘New World’, 
there are also certain prominent ways to identify what is perceived as European. 
Europe is no self-evident cultural or social unit. There is a deficit of channels for 
communication between its multinational citizens. A shared European public sphere is 
only in its infancy. But community may possibly not need to build on every member 
participating in exactly the same forum. Since the differentiation of television and 
other media forms into many divergent platforms and channels, this is not even true 
for any nation. Instead, Europe, like today’s nation states, is crystallised by loosely 
combined ‘spheres of publics’—networks of communication where no single medium 
or arena gathers all citizens but where their mutual exchanges produce a dynamic and 
heterogeneous totality, which is also not quite closed to the outside, but has permeable 
boundaries. This means that nations are not those self-sufficient enclaves suggested by 
Entropa: they are neither sealed off towards each other nor internally consistent units.
The complex diversity of Europe therefore need not necessarily annul the idea of a 
European identity. It only puts high demands on interpreting how elements of such 
an identity are spun around the symbols used for signifying what Europe means. 
This is the purpose of this study: mapping out the currently predominant meaning 
and identity of Europe—or rather the many meanings and identities linked to Europe 
through symbols developed for this purpose. 
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As Europe in particular undergoes radical transformations in its internal structure 
and global contexts, there is a renewed need to re-identify its meaning. A series of 
societal pro ces ses of transformation challenge inherited con cep tions of identity. 
Historical processes of culturalisation and mediatisation make meaning-making 
more central in many social spheres, including the political and economic domains. 
This creates a situation where collective identities in general are renegotiated and 
reconstructed in several different arenas, both by established insti tu tional actors and 
by practices and initia tives on a grass roots level. 
In the EU, as well as in other institutions, organisations and movements, and among 
citizens who live within or move across the boundaries of this continent, a range of 
mediated symbols are used for signifying Europe—branding it ‘from above’, making 
it a home or critically problematising it ‘from below’. New ways of sig ni fy ing Europe 
are born in a time when collective cultural identities are in rapid transformation, 
under the pressure of geopolitical reconfiguration of power relations on a global 
scale; marketisation and economic restructuring; new dynamics of inequality in 
terms of class, gender, generation and ethnicity; migration linked to the spread of 
multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism; and culturalising mediatisation linked to 
the proliferation of digital networks. Such processes create an intensified symbolic 
work of identifying Europe through modifying or reinterpreting its key symbols. This 
study will focus on the meanings of a variety of sym bols that today iden tify Europe 
as an idea, a geographical territory, a political–economic institution and a social 
community—highlighting the specificity of the five official EU symbols by selective 
comparisons with other federative, regional or national symbols. 
Symbols proposed by Europe’s own elites necessarily intend to represent the 
positive values and success of this unification. The interesting question is then how 
this is done: by which symbolic means is the success of the EU represented, and which 
specific qualities are ascribed to this union—in what way is this community described 
as strong and beneficial? Alternative symbols sometimes on the contrary critically 
depict Europe as weak or bad—as ridiculously fragmented or instead as dangerously 
powerful. They offer a useful sidelight that makes visible unintentional nuances in the 
official ones, helping to discern a range of hidden inner tensions and contradictions 
in the emerging European identity formation.
This study combines a cultural studies and a media and communication perspective, 
in an interdisciplinary mode of inquiry that combines tools from historical, political, 
sociological, media ethnographic, literary, visual and musical analysis in an interpretive 
framework where signifying and mediating practices form the main focus. This is 
motivated by a series of reasons. First, the meaning and identifying role of European 
symbols are the topic of an important discourse within the slowly emerging European 
public sphere. Second, European symbols are themselves integrated elements in 




be understood as media forms, even though media studies rarely regard for instance 
money as a medium. 
Further research would more systematically investigate a wider range of symbols, 
the institutional actors and processes behind the formation of such symbols, as well 
as the interpretations and uses of these symbols by wider sets of citizens in various 
regions, settings and strata. The intention is to start exploring this fascinating terrain 
and propose new perspectives on the ways in which Europe and Europeanness are 
currently reconstructed.
The main questions dealt with in this study are:
How is Europe given identity through the meaning-making interpretive use 
of symbols in signifying practices?
–  How are different symbols used, often in ambiguous or oppositional 
ways, to construct plural and sometimes contradictory sets of meaning 
that create an identity for Europe?
–  Which historical roots, experiences and values are central to the 
formation and continued existence of Europe as a political, economic, 
social and cultural community?
–  How is Europe identified through differences and similarities of its key 
symbols to those of other comparable geopolitical units?
–  How are these symbols integrated into multiple and sometimes competing 
founding narratives of Europe as a collective agency in the world?
–  Which main conflicts of interpretation may be discerned for each key 
symbol: which main meanings compete and are supported by which 
actors?
As an introduction to what follows, Chapter 1 scrutinises the name ‘Europe’, which 
is no official EU symbol but still has a primary identifying function, thus serving as a 
basis for all the subsequent symbols. This immediately leads to a series of myths that 
have been used for narratively expressing Europe’s meaning. After a brief discussion 
in Chapter 2 of theoretical definitions of the kind of identifying symbols studied here, 
Chapter 3 then offers a general historical background to the European unification and 
introduces the official set of European symbols. These are then scrutinised one by one 
in the core Chapters 4–8, investigating the main symbolic domains used for signifying 
Europe today, revealing how they in turn add new dimensions to the identity of 
Europe. The concluding Chapter 9 makes an effort to summarise and compare the 
meaning clusters accumulated by combining the various symbols, and to sum up 
what they indicate concerning what Europe means today.2
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Name and Myth
One of the most important symbols that identify an entity is its name. In many 
cases, names are often overlooked and taken for granted in ordinary usage. ‘Europe’ 
is a splendid example: it is never analysed or mentioned in official EU documents, as 
it can hardly be replaced—being inherited since antiquity, not seriously questioned 
or contested by any alternative name, and therefore not an object of political choice. 
Other geographic names may well be questioned—think for instance of Macedonia 
or Kurdistan. But there is an evident consensus on how to name this continent, even 
though its external boundaries are not fixed. 
Even so, the name of Europe is an important verbal symbol that carries specific 
associations, though they are today a matter of naturalised habit rather than of 
conscious interpretation. Being much older than the official EU symbols, it deserves 
to be treated first, as the latter cannot avoid being intertextually affected by the 
meanings attached to it—and to the mythological figure of Europa, to which the name 
is intrinsically linked.
What’s in a name—and in a myth? 
Juliet: ‘What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.’3 
It is not surprising that the first part of this famous quote from William Shakespeare’s 
Rome and Juliet has been widely used in a variety of contexts—from Umberto Eco’s 
philosophical detective novel The Name of the Rose to a range of contemporary texts 
on gender, race, nationality or other identity issues. Juliet’s optimistic position is 
effectively contradicted by the fate of the two lovers, as their family names doom their 




understood in cultural, social and linguistic theory, it is easy to see how two extreme 
positions have continued to struggle with each other. 
At one end, ‘nominalists’ consider names to be arbitrary labels bearing no 
necessary relation to what they identify. Juliet’s position suggests that names are 
only superficial conventions that do not affect the deeper meaning of existence. 
At the other extreme, ‘realists’ see names as strongly linked to objects and indeed 
crucial to their existence in the world. This is how Juliet’s and Romeo’s families 
might reason: for the Capulets and Montagues, names indeed meant everything, 
and at the end of the tragedy, the mortal fate of the lovers supports their position. 
By a strange twist, this is also what a third position would imply: ‘constructionists’ 
would argue that all social phenomena are the result of communicative discourses 
and have no separate existence outside them. Despite many mutual oppositions, 
a realist and a constructionist would agree that the question of what is a rose is 
impossible to even discuss without reference to the name of the rose: while one 
reduces language to a direct mirror of ‘reality’, the other in reverse reduces ‘reality’ 
to an effect of language use, whereas in contrast the nominalist understands name 
and reality as two separable entities.
In a general sense, names are words that in a given language denote and address 
something or someone, whether persons, collectives or things.4 On some relative level, 
each name requires and constructs a degree of unicity in its reference. The word ‘dog’ 
is thus a name for a unique family of animals, while ‘Dog’ may be used as name of 
a specific dog individual. Similarly, ‘association for cultural studies’ names a specific 
kind of associations, of which only one bears the name ‘Association for Cultural 
Studies’. The names discussed here are standardised and intersubjectively constituted 
condensed verbal labels identifying specific individuals, groups, institutions or other 
social or geopolitical entities (rather than for instance natural objects or abstract 
ideas). They do not provide full definitions or descriptions of what they name, but 
being widely used they contribute to rendering it meaningful, since they—as word 
combinations—semantically and pragmatically link the named phenomenon to 
certain sets of values and ideas. Interpreting a name therefore shows how people have 
interpreted or given meaning to someone or something.
Some human and social categories have such a prominent position that they not 
only get more or less unique names but also are surrounded by various mythical 
narratives that are sometimes wed to a particular name, forming a symbolic 
association between denoted subjects, names and myths that mutually identify each 
other in fascinating ways. Unique among world continents, this is the case with 
Europe, sharing name with the female protagonist of the ancient myth of Europa 
and the bull.
Tracing the cultural history of the concept of ‘myth’ is again at least as difficult.5 
A myth is a narrative of central value to a culture, binding people together in some 
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way, and is linked to various rituals.6 From Greek antiquity until today, together 
with neighbouring concepts like fable, legend, story and tale, myth has had a 
typically ambivalent status. It may be read in almost oppositional directions. In one 
reading, myths are thought to codify important truths about something—existential 
insights that cannot be expressed in other ways, transmitting through history a 
kind of inner essence of a community, linking it to universal or at least long-term 
human predicaments. The structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss sees myth 
as a transmittable symbolisation of virtually timeless structural truths of society’s 
fundamental but unconscious laws.7 Another example is when Karen Armstrong 
argues that ‘mythology is an art form that points beyond history to what is timeless 
in human existence, helping us to get beyond the chaotic flux of random events, and 
glimpse the core of reality’.8 
However, myth is on the other hand often taken as fiction describing impossible 
events and thus as the untrue antithesis of reason, history and factual knowledge. As 
Paul Ricoeur has noted, a long tradition of ideology critique and ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’ has worked to undermine mythical force, rather than affirmatively listening 
to it.9 Myths may be seen as sets of utterances forming communicative systems 
that produce meaning. As signifying practices they can be interpreted, but they are 
particular kinds of signifying practices, forming a metalanguage that reflexively 
thematises ‘ordinary’ communication about reality. Roland Barthes argues that myth 
steals from language, and that critical interpretation therefore can steal back from 
myth to uncover its hidden truths.10 This form of ideology critique has affinities with 
Karl Marx’ views on the critique of religion and bourgeois ideology, with Sigmund 
Freud’s dream analysis and not least with how Walter Benjamin understood the 
‘realization of dream elements, in the course of waking up’ as the ‘paradigm of 
dialectical thinking’.11
The fate of myth is thus to be revealing and/or deceptive: competing with rational 
understanding by either representing a deeper truth of reality than can be expressed in 
ordinary manners, or on the contrary a distorted ideology that hides that same reality. 
Indeed, one may even argue that it is this ambiguous position in-between reality and 
imagination that is the characteristic trait of mythical thinking and makes it capable of 
giving rise to an endlessly widening range of new interpretations.12 In such a reading, a 
myth is not necessarily either right or wrong. It is a narration that mediates that which 
people believe is a central meaning for somebody and something, that is, a narrative 
key symbol that in temporally sequential and dramatised form expresses deep-
seated shared meanings.13 Mythical narratives symbolically transform and transmit 
memories of past events in ways that unify real and/or imagined communities, giving 




Introducing and interpreting the name and myth of Europe
Not all names are also myths, but some names either derive from mythical narratives 
or have subsequently had myths spun around them, elaborating their inherited 
meanings. This is the case with Europe. Neither name nor myth is mentioned as a 
European symbol by EU documents; this is because they are ‘given’ from the past, 
rather than a deliberate choice in the present. Today no political institution could, 
with any credibility, formally decide on a completely different name or founding myth 
of Europe. In other cases, such decisions are sometimes made, for instance when a 
city or nation state changes its name: think of Bombay/Mumbai or Burma/Myanmar. 
In Europe’s case, the EU has named itself, but could only make a selection of the 
appropriate second term (‘Union’) and of the linguistic shape of the thus-composed 
name, while the concept of Europe itself has at this historical moment not been up 
for debate or had any serious competitors. It is always possible to reinterpret or deny 
a name or a myth, but in this case, no serious attempts have been made to invent or 
suggest a different name or founding myth.
As so often with old names, the origins of ‘Europe’ are unclear. It was used in ancient 
Greece, mentioned in writing in the seventh-century bc Catalogue of Women (falsely 
attributed to Hesiod); again in The Histories by the fifth-century bc Greek historian 
Herodotus; in Library and Epitome by Pseudo-Apollodorus in the first century bc; 
and in the Roman Ovidius’ Metamorphoses, written before year 8 ad.15 In the second 
century bc, the Syracusan poet Moschus clearly associated the myth of Europa and 
the bull to the continent.16 Visually, the mythical couple was depicted in vase paintings 
at least from the seventh century bc (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). These early sources link 
the name both to the landmass to the northwest of the Levant and to a woman in a 
specific, but somewhat puzzling, founding myth of Europe. 
Europa was said to have been a Phoenician princess or noblewoman who lived 
somewhere in the region of today’s Lebanon in the Middle East. She was the daughter 
of Agenor, King of Tyre, who came from Egypt as the son of Libya and Poseidon.17 
Her mother was his Egyptian wife Telephassa, and Europa thus had a mixed Asian 
and African heritage. Agenor also had sons: Cadmus, Phoenix, Cilix and possibly also 
Thasus and Phineas. (The Iliad instead suggests Europa to be the daughter of Phoenix, 
which would link her to a theme of death and resurrection, but this may rather be a 
misinterpretation of her roots in Phoenicia.) Zeus, the king of gods, fancied Europa 
and disguised himself as a white bull to be able to come near her more easily than he 
would in his mighty godlike appearance. Ovid stresses this dichotomy between power 
and love, and underlines the mildness of this bull, as it mingles with her father’s cattle. 
Gathering flowers with her female attendants, Europa noticed the bull, liked him 
and climbed onto his back. Zeus then ran away with her to the sea before she hardly 
noticed, and swam with her to the island of Crete. There, she gave birth to Zeus’ three 
9
sons, Minos, Rhadamanthus and Sarpedon, after which she married King Asterius 
and became the first queen of Crete. Zeus gave them miraculous gifts: a necklace, 
the bronze giant Talos, the hunting dog Laelaps and a javelin. The gifts were handed 
over to Minos when he inherited the throne. Zeus also constructed the Taurus star 
constellation to commemorate his adventure. 
Herodotus’ more prosaic version just states that it was the Minoans who kidnapped 
Europa to Crete without any divine intervention, but in any case she remains linked 
to the sacred bull that was worshipped in the Levant and notably on Crete. It is not 
difficult to see how such a narrative could be understood as a mythical vision of the 
first settlement of Crete, and by extension, of Europe at large.
The identity of Europa is complicated, and linked to the meaning of the name itself, 
for which several layers of signification have been proposed. A contested but often 
repeated idea is that it goes back to a Semitic word for the land of the sunset, that is 
the Occident. 
It is plausibly argued that Europa was a goddess of the night, since 
her name relates to the Semitic verb ‘to set’. A text from the Syrian 
city of Ugarit, a thriving commercial centre known to the Mycenaean 
Greeks before its destruction in about 1190 bc, speaks of ‘our Lady, the 
goddess, the veiled bride […] entering the sunset’. In essence, this is the 
myth of Europa, who was carried away far westward to be married.18
Most sources allude to this reference to sunset and thus to the land of the West, but 
also to a place of evening and night. Some argue that Europa might be ultimately 
identical with the moon goddess. Support for this thought is supposedly given by 
the etymology of the Greek name that combines euro (wide or broad) with op (eye(s) 
or face) to mean ‘broad-faced’, presumably like the lunar cow. Lacking traces of any 
cult of Europa, one may doubt if she was herself really a deity. Later interpretations 
suggested the name implied that Europa was also open-minded, which is easy to infer 
from her fondness for the bull and the fearlessness with which she embarks upon the 
travel adventure.19 
The origins of the name and myth of Europe are opaque, as are their core meanings. 
It is even hard to know for sure in which order the word, the myth and the identification 
of the specific territory appeared and were linked to each other. Was the myth spun 
around a spatial entity or did the latter evolve from the former? Did the myth crystallise 
out of a cluster of different myths in that region? Where and when was the name and/or 
the myth associated with the continent? These issues are difficult to assess, and actually 
not really decisive in this context. What is important here is rather which interpretations 
have been transmitted and used through history until today, as this speaks of the ways 




Europa was the result of a combination of Asian (her Levantine father) and African 
(her Egyptian mother) sources, but the myth focuses on her union with the animal/
god, resulting in a mixed offspring. The intervention of Zeus to transport her to Crete 
recalls other divine interactions with humans: from Prometheus’ gift of fire (to be 
further discussed below) and Zeus’ many amorous disguises to those in the Old and New 
Testaments. It implies a higher spirit as the originating cause of Europa’s settlement on 
European soil. The abduction and the subsequent founding of the Minoan dynasty is a 
move to the west, towards the European continent. Ovid stressed both the whiteness 
and the peaceful mildness of the bull. This gives a mythical explanation to the fair skin 
colour of Europeans and also lends a tranquil and peaceful aura to the abduction that 
can otherwise be understood as a violent kidnapping and raping of the poor princess. 
Instead, it is represented as an adventurous excursion, where both parties are in the 
older sources generally depicted as experiencing a kind of joy. Her position on top 
of the bull is depicted as giving her a certain degree of mobility and empowerment, 
complicating the element of violence and pain, as she is undoubtedly subjected to 
Zeus’ power: he restricts her movements, as she is dislocated to Crete against her own 
will and cannot return home to Phoenicia. The myth implies that she is abducted from 
her home and family, but not by brute violence. Instead, her encounter with the bull 
is full of pleasure and desire, bearing traits of a passionate romance, which may also 
contain an element of transformative self-abandonment and persuasive power play. 
She is involuntarily dislocated but not deprived of her life, health, pride or honour. 
Instead her liberation from inherited family bonds may be read as a metaphor for 
the passage to adulthood and forming one’s own destiny on a new territory, away 
from parents and siblings—all through the intervention of passionate relation with 
a foreign Other, in this instance Zeus as bull. Europa is a rather willing object of the 
god’s desire and manipulation, as she caresses the bull and lets him sweep her away 
across the sea. He awakens erotic lust in her that carries her away: not into alienated 
exile but rather into forming new relations on new ground. Interpretations of the 
balance between lust and force in this story vary between versions: whereas a 1632 
painting by Rembrandt shows Europa violently abducted from her company (Figure 
1.3), a twentieth century sculpture by Carl Milles depicts her as engaged in a love-
battle (Figure 1.4).
Myths of origin often imply a union of opposites, which may subsequently be 
articulated with later unifying projects, such as that of the EU. The form of union 
implicated by the Europa myth is that of a sexual love encounter where opposites join 
and are united in their diversity, to create a new social community. This can serve 
as a model for how European unification is conceived today. However, the image of 
her and the bull makes it difficult to decide with whom to identify as a European: 
is it Europa herself, the bull, their mutual union or the land of Crete to which they 
travel? In certain respects, male European elites may find it easier to identify with the 
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combined whiteness, eroticism, strength and smartness of the divine bull, but it is not 
he who bears the name of Europa. One might construct Europeans as bull/god and 
Europa as the land he loves, following a common idea of feminising the inhabited 
land, but this comparison halts here, as she is obviously more human than he. One 
could therefore instead identify with her and see him as some kind of higher fate 
placing Europeans in Europe, equipping them with divine gifts. Also, she does not 
appear quite as maternally nourishing as motherlands and mother goddesses tend 
to be, instead her marked geographic mobility affirms a central aspect of European 
history, from the Greek and Roman networks, over Crusades and colonial empires to 
the modern European forms of culture and communication that have always tended 
to be restlessly on the move, up until the expansive EU itself.
Herodotus and his Greek contemporaries in the fifth century bc divided their known 
inhabited world (‘ecumene’) into three main parts: Asia (or Persia), Libya (or Africa) 
and Europe. Some time before the year 24 ad, the Greek geographer Strabo also used 
the term ‘Europe’, but for several centuries, Europe was more a geographical than a 
cultural (or even less a political) entity: ‘The idea of a European identity had yet to be 
forged. Ethnoculturalism was in general focused on other reference points: Hellenism, 
Rome and the Christian church after the fourth century.’20 The European idea was truly 
born as a political and cultural project in the eighth century ad, when the Christian 
church used it as a name for Charlemagne’s Carolingian Empire. This identification 
closely linked Europe to Christendom in discourses constructing a genealogy that 
moved Europe another step to the west and made it the true but dislocated inheritor 
both of the biblical world and of Greek antiquity, as mediated through Hellenic and 
Arabic intermediaries. While Christendom was born outside Europe, it was there that 
its main developments subsequently took place, contributing Europe’s key sets of ethical 
principles for social interaction, which are still cherished as human rights emanating 
from this continent, though since the French revolution mostly in secularised versions. 
Europe’s main competitor had been Persia but now it was the expanding Islamic world, 
making it necessary to tone down mediaeval European culture’s total dependence on 
Arabic sources for reconnecting to the greatness of ancient Greece.21 While Europe had 
been a western borderland for the Greeks themselves, the emerging states inside the 
European continent had to translate the myth and its connotations in order to define 
themselves as the true heirs of the ancient golden age. ‘Christianity was effectively 
“Europeanised” from the eighth century onwards’, when the Carolingian Empire strived 
to build an ‘Imperium Christianum’.22 
Still, the word ‘Europe’ remained rarely used until the fifteenth century, as the 
continent was not a unified entity, but split in shifting fragments along several axes. 
Gerard Delanty argues that some kind of European identity became discernable 
first in the sixteenth century, as the idea of Europe was gradually liberated from that 
of Christianity and given a secular meaning. After that, there was a cumulatively 
Signifying Europe
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strengthened feeling that Europe had a particular affinity with modernity, progress 
and civilisation.23 The Christian theme in identifying Europe has little support in the 
name and the myth, as both are pre-Christian and make no references to biblical 
motifs; on the contrary, if Europa has affinities with Astarte, the myth is inscribed in 
a quite different Eastern Mediterranean and Oriental genealogy. 
An extremist Evangelic website makes a range of wild speculations on the EU 
symbols, linking them to apocalyptic visions of the Revelations.24 The combination 
of woman (Europa) and beast (bull) is seen as fulfilling St John the Theologian’s 
prophecy of the appearance of the great harlot of Babylon: a woman sitting upon ‘a 
scarlet coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns’. A 
common interpretation is that ecclesiastical Babylon rides the political and commercial 
Babylon. These fundamentalists see several signs of this vision to be realised in the 
EU, where the female whore is identified with the Vatican and its allegedly corrupt 
Catholicism. The origins in pre-Christian and non-biblical mythologies thus seem 
to stir up interpretive uncertainties, and problematise any attempt to understand 
those European institutions that have made use of these mythical symbols to identify 
themselves.
The upsurge of nationalist movements and nation-building projects in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries temporarily counteracted further geopolitical use 
of the concept of Europe, but after World War I, it was reinforced and channelled into 
the series of movements that will be described in a following chapter. German Nazism 
also integrated a European mission into its expansionist ideology—a hereditary chain 
that the EU is less keen on remembering.25
Today, the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ are frequently used but rarely reflected 
upon. The activities of the Council of Europe and the EU have made these uses 
even more ambiguous. On the one hand, each association of interstate cooperation 
includes only a limited part of the geographic continent, while usually also including 
certain territories that are elsewhere generally thought to be outside its boundaries. 
The Council of Europe organises considerably more member states than the EU 
(currently 47 against 27), but Belarus stands outside both, the eastern boundary of 
Europe is notoriously vague, and several old French colonial territories in Africa and 
Latin America are at least partly integrated in the EU despite being geographically far 
outside the European continent as it is commonly understood. In spite of this, both 
these organisations have taken as their mission to represent the whole of Europe and 
not least to strengthen its cultural identity beyond their own formal membership area. 
As will soon be shown, the EU symbols are officially presented as ‘symbols of Europe’ 
rather than of the EU only. Even the euro currency, which is bound to the limited 
number of states partaking in the European Monetary Union (EMU), suggests a wish 
to symbolically represent the whole of Europe. Whether this expansive ambition has a 
wider legitimacy outside the EU as well remains to be empirically tested.
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Luisa Passerini has shown how, in various phases of European history, the Europa 
myth has been activated to support efforts of peaceful unification, with elements 
of (courtly) love and desire as crucial elements.26 The Europa myth has also been a 
recurrent motif in European art history, as well as on stamps, coins and caricatures 
up until the present.27 Statues or illustrations presenting this striking event are 
found in many physical and virtual sites linked to EU institutions, for instance 
outside or inside buildings, or on websites. Outside the European Parliament 
building in Strasbourg, Nikos and Pandelis Sotiriadis have made the sculpture 
of The Abduction of Europa (Figure 1.5), and inside is Aligi Sassu’s monumental 
ceramic mural of The Myths of the Mediterranean, in which Europa and the bull 
have the central place. 
These depictions move between two main directions of interpretation of the 
myth, mirroring its inherent double character. This is a fundamental trait in strong 
myths, giving them a particularly wide and rich range of meaning, enabling them to 
function as key symbols, but sometimes also creating confusion. Stuart Hall finds 
this myth fascinating:  
This lunar goddess […] symbolizes […] the continuous movement 
westwards: the migratory drift from Asia, Egypt and the eastern 
Mediterranean, the diffusion of the alphabet and writing, the spread 
of agriculture into the fertile western European plain. Her very name 
derives from a Semitic root meaning ‘western’. She is indeed a prophetic 
figure for Europe: richly suggestive but difficult to decode. If she 
represents Europe, why is she from ‘elsewhere’? If this is ‘an allegory 
of love’, what has it to tell us about the European conception of the 
relation between love and seduction, sexual desire and marriage? And 
who or what, pray, is the bull?—deceptively white, but with a definite 
aura of ‘otherness’, of sexual power, male compulsion and patriarchal 
possessiveness, about him: something ‘dark’ and dangerous, who 
comes lumbering out of the European collective unconscious and 
steals Europa away to Crete?28
At one extreme, from Ovid’s poem to Sotiriadis’ sculpture, the abduction is depicted 
as a fun and victorious riding tour, where Europa enjoys the unexpected speed, length 
and adventurousness of the trip. Sotiriadis’ bull even appears to have stairs in its back 
so that Europa could easily climb up and have her seat, and she looks like some happy 
acrobat demonstrating the newly found power that the bull has given her. She is united 
with the divine bull and together they ride the seas to conquer new territories. This 
conforms to several aspects of the myth, and can today easily lend itself to support 




At the other extreme, from Herodotus to more critical current depictions, the 
event is rather understood as a kidnapping and even a rape, where Europa is a 
suffering victim, parallel to the rape of Lucretia or the kidnapping of the Sabine 
women. This interpretation mirrors EU-sceptical standpoints, as the bull might then 
be read as a symbol of European elites who mercilessly violate the will of common 
citizens. However, one should not forget the differences between Europa and the 
two other myths mentioned. The latter were violated by human males rather than a 
divine animal, and Europa is mostly depicted as welcoming the bull’s courting with 
a pleasure of her own, both in the initial phase of seduction on the meadow and in 
the final stage of dynastic formation on Crete. Most images also show her as much 
more active than the Sabines, whose flesh is passively exposed to the gaze of men 
both within the picture (to the soldiers) and in front of it (to spectators of these 
artworks). 
Michael Wintle shows that ‘very early Hellenic examples tended to emphasize 
the violence of the abduction, while around the fifth century bc a “laicization” 
took place in the representation, with a more consenting (and therefore erotically 
charged) Europa on her bull’.29 Later representations shift between these modes. As 
Europa becomes identified with the continent, her representations tend to confirm 
dominating understandings of this continent’s political situation, either as helpless 
martyr or as privileged queen. As Europe has gradually grown into a leading global 
actor, most versions tend to illustrate this success story, emphasising the bold and 
pleasant aspects of the event and its dynastic consequences.
The myth activates an ambivalent male/female contrast. Zeus’ bull displays a 
masculinity that wavers between power and lust, transforming divine power into 
a bodily beast force that in turn is performed as a sexuality that gives the woman 
pleasure in caressing the bull and riding him across the sea. The agency of the bull 
power therefore implies the emergence of an ordered masculine rule in the region, 
providing it with a phallic symbolic order that Europa on her own was not entrusted 
with, giving a political dimension to the myth.30 Likewise, the older myth of the Cretan 
Minotaur tells us that this beast was the prodigy of Poseidon’s white bull, seducing King 
Minos’ wife Pasiphae, which shows that these themes had a widespread resonance in 
that period and region.31 Europa combines positions of activity and passivity: she 
is conquered by the bull, but her links to Astarte and other Mediterranean fertility 
goddesses are reminiscent of a mythic prehistoric female power.32 While the gender 
aspect is always visible and has been actively taken up in contemporary artworks on 
this motif, the potential ethnic aspect is less apparent in most depictions of this myth. 
The bull is sometimes made white, as the myth prescribes, but following the European 
tradition of ‘Caucasianising’ biblical figures, Europa’s skin is generally also light, white 
or golden, rather than the darker colour that her mixed Egyptian and Middle East 
roots could have suggested.33
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Among the official EU symbols, this myth is explicitly referred to only on the €2 
Greek coin, even though one may find indirect associations to it elsewhere too, as will 
be mentioned in later chapters. The ambivalent obscurity of the myth complicates its 
use for self-asserting purposes, though this also makes it characteristic of Europe’s 
real history and self-identity. After all, ‘Europe’ has in most historical periods 
experienced itself to live in times of decline, deep crisis and internal strife, expressing 
a kind of metaphorical dislocation of identity, not residing securely in itself. The first 
Europeans did move across the Mediterranean from Africa and Asia Minor to settle 
in the new territories, and the Europa myth may well be read as the prototype for 
a stereotypical image of the voyage, capable of being extended and varied to cover 
several different forms of travelling and dislocation, from exile and migration to 
trade and tourism.34 
The genealogy of Europe as migrating to the northwest from the east and the south, 
and therefore being hereditarily linked to its Asian and African neighbours, implies 
a decentring and destabilising of Europe’s own identity, which can then never be self-
sufficient or firmly rooted in its own soil. Martin Bernal stresses the African roots 
of much of ancient Greek civilisation, with the Phoenician Europa and her brother 
Cadmus as examples.35 George Thomson sees parallels between Europa and Demeter, 
‘both being emanations of the Minoan mother-goddess’, and reads the myth as having 
a real background in Phoenician colonisation of Crete in the Middle Minoan period, 
supported by the existence of a parallel Phoenician myth of the bull god El and the 
mother goddess Asherat.36 Robert Graves connects ‘broad-faced’ Europa not only 
to the bull but also to the full moon and Middle-East moon goddesses, linked to 
the willow tree and orgiastic witchcraft, possibly with mediaeval ancestors in the 
European witches.37 This may be speculative, but testifies to an oppositional line of 
thought emerging from the historical settlement of the continent and symbolised 
by the Europa myth, though this thread is nowadays often repressed in dominant 
discourses.
Tzvetan Todorov has described Europe in the age of the American conquests as 
fundamentally dislocated:
European civilization of the period is ‘allocentric’ rather than egocentric: 
for centuries its sacred site, its symbolic center, Jerusalem, has been 
not only exterior to European territory but subject as well to a rival 
civilization (the Muslims). In the Renaissance, this spatial decentering 
is linked to a temporal version: the ideal age is neither the present nor 
the future but the past, and a past that is not even Christian: that of the 
Greeks and the Romans. The center is elsewhere, which opens up the 




Rémi Brague defines Europe as an ‘eccentric culture’, constituted by a series of divisions: 
Greeks/Persians, Christian/Islamic, Roman/Orthodox, Catholic/Protestant.39 He 
argues that the early Romans and the Europeans who succeeded them shared a cultural 
and linguistic inferiority complex, which made them respect what they integrated from 
the outside, mainly from classical Greek heritage and from Middle East monotheism. 
Europe was formed as a fusion of ‘Athens’, ‘Jerusalem’ and ‘Rome’, with the latter 
contributing less content than a form of innovative transmission. Europe was less self-
assured than the Arabs and other eastern civilisations, more aware of its own cultural 
shortcomings, and with a sense of self-defining dislocation, deriving its self-image 
from the outside. All cultures are of course indebted to their surrounding others, but 
Brague’s thesis is that European culture has made this ‘secondarity’ essential to its own 
identity. With colonialism, imperialism and industrialism, the dominant European 
self-image has strived for a much more self-assured and xenophobic position, but 
Brague still believes that traits of the basic original eccentricity remain even today. 
Similarly, Zygmunt Bauman argues that Europe is a culture of restless anxiety that 
emphatically lacks a fixed identity and is always unfinished and on the move.40 A 
similar belief is shared by many analysts of the current situation, including many who 
see the EU as an effort to get to grips with precisely such an experience of catastrophic 
self-destruction, and a wish to intensify rather than seal off communication with 
surrounding others. 
Since at least a couple of decades, one of the official documents that uses the 
myth symbolically is the EU residence permit for foreign visitors. The permits are 
decorated with a bull, charging through five horizontal stars. This is a good example 
of how the myth lends itself particularly well to illustrate mobilities, as the bull 
here represents migration agencies making possible the travel into Europe, just like 
Zeus once helped Europa move to Cretan soil. The persistent presence of migration 
in the contemporary globalising world further links this aspect to the idea of 
cosmopolitanism.41 Not only has Europe undergone waves of colonisation from east 
and south; these movements of people across the continent have continued to lend 
a mobile and diverse trait to European culture and identity, in spite of all efforts to 
reconstitute it in solid and unitary terms. Late modern identity discourses in the EU 
emphasise the value of flexibility, with nomadic diasporas emerging as avant-gardes 
rather than as discrepancies. One interesting example is the way Paul Gilroy and 
others have understood the ‘Black Atlantic’ diaspora as a vanguard for experiencing 
and expressing modernity, with structural affinities to the Jewish diaspora as well 
as to other more or less nomadic minorities.42 European integration policies must 
link transnational unification to issues of multicultural citizenship and polysemic 
identification to which these mobilities give rise.43
Still, after thousands of years of European empire-building efforts, culminating in 
colonialism and world domination, Europe can hardly be identified as a homeless 
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stranger. If anyone has abducted the treasures of other people, it is Europeans, having 
accumulated wealth by ravaging resources of other continents and having been, for 
almost a millennium, guilty masters rather than innocent victims of the abductions 
systematically organised by global slave trade. There still remains a tone of queer 
eroticism wildly crossing the borders between god, men and beasts, with echoes in 
the European anthem that are to be discussed below. 
Comparisons
None of the other major continents have names equally strongly linked to any 
specific myth. Peoples dwelling in North Africa near Carthage were named ‘afri’, and 
the Roman suffix ‘-ca’ denotes country or land. But the name may also have roots 
in the Phoenician ‘afar’ (dust), the Berber ‘ifri’ (cave), Abraham’s grandson Epher, 
the Latin word ‘aprica’ (sunny) or the Greek ‘aphrike’ (without cold). In the late 
nineteenth century, an even more speculative etymology went back to the Egyptian 
‘af-rui-ka’ (to turn towards the opening of the Ka, that is the womb or birthplace).44 
The first genealogies associate the name with geologic or climatic characteristics of 
North Africa, with its hot, sunny and sterile deserts, while the latter interpretation 
is inspired by how central African jungles underpin colonialist ideas of Africa as a 
dark continent of sexual fertility. Exoticising primitivist conceptions of Africa as the 
cradle of humanity have recently been revived by genetic findings locating the origin 
of homo sapiens in this continent.
In The Iliad, Homer mentioned both a Trojan ally and a marsh named Asios; the 
Greek word may derive from the fourteenth-century bc Assuwa confederation of states 
in Western Anatolia, possibly building on the Hittite word ‘assu’ (good). An alternative 
etymology goes back to the Akkadian ‘(w)asû(m)’, meaning to go outside or to ascend, 
referring to the sunrise in the Middle East and possibly related to the Phoenician ‘asa’ 
meaning east. That would form a pair with Europe, but the explanation is far from 
universally accepted since it remains a mystery how ‘Asia’ could then be associated 
with Anatolia that is west of Semitic speakers, if they did not position themselves as 
Phoenician sailors on the Mediterranean. Around 440 bc, Herodotus used the name 
to denote Anatolia or Persia in contrast to Greece and Egypt, in a tripartite vision of 
the then-known inhabited world: Asia–Europe–Libya/Africa. In Greek mythology, 
Apollodorus in the mid-second century bc gave the name ‘Asia’ to the wife of Zeus’ 
brother Iapetos. Among her children were Atlas and Prometheus, making her ancestor 
to humanity and linked to myths that will be further discussed below. However, she 
was previously and elsewhere known as Clymene; there was otherwise no influential 
mythical narrative linked to her, and several sources claim that she is not really related 




The other continents got their current names from European explorers much 
more recently. The terms ‘Arctic’ and ‘Antarctica’ began to be used in the second half 
of the fourteenth century. The Greek arktikos means ‘of the north’, but derives from 
arktos, meaning ‘bear’, referring to the northern star constellation called the Bear 
(Latin Ursus), while antarktikos then implied ‘opposite the north’. There had been 
speculations of a southern continent since antiquity, but the first reliably reported 
observations were made in 1820. The northern Arctic region is not a continent but an 
ocean covered with ice, and sometimes also includes the northern tips of its ‘shores’ 
(i.e. northern Europe, America and Asia).
As a term for the American landmass, ‘America’ was first used in 1507 near 
Strasbourg by a cartographer linked to the Duke of Lorraine; the name was a Latinised 
and feminised version of the explorer Amerigo Vespucci’s name, adhering to the praxis 
to let all continents have Latin feminine names. How this naming was established is 
unclear. ‘Amerigo’ is in turn an Italian form of mediaeval Latin Emericus, perhaps 
derived from Gothic Amalrich (‘work-ruler’) or Germanic Heinrich (‘the ruler of 
the house’), together anticipating the current position of the United States as world-
leading power. 
‘Australia’ derived from Latin Australis (southern). There had, since Roman times, 
been legends of an unknown land of the south, though Europeans did not explore 
the continent until the sixteenth century, and the first English usage of the name was 
in 1625. The term ‘Oceania’ for the islands in the Pacific Ocean was coined in 1831, 
though the word ‘ocean’ has ancient Greek origins (okeanos), denoting the big sea 
surrounding the Earth disc, in contrast to the centrally located Mediterranean.
In general, indigenous peoples rarely had a name for the whole continent they 
inhabited, since naming is a differential game that presupposes conscious and reflected 
encounters between one community and another. The Middle East area where Africa, 
Asia and Europe overlapped was such an area, explaining their long-established names, 
while other continent names are rather modern inventions, abstracting from local 
specificities and striving to make totalising divisions of the whole world. Compass 
directions often play a decisive role in this naming game, indirectly indicating a 
specific point of reference in the centre of the ancient world in Asia Minor. 
Europe thus differs from other continents by having its name also linked to a quite 
specific mythical narrative. Several nations around the world are likewise linked to 
important founding myths that provide narratives that can be activated to serve as 
key symbols for collective identification. However, as nation states are rather recent 
phenomena, these myths are elaborated long afterwards in response to later needs for 
legitimising nation building. They are modern fictions with clear political intentions, 
disguised as ancient myths but without any old mythical background, as elaborated by 
Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm through the terms ‘imagined communities’ 
and ‘invented traditions’.45 The etymological background to these names has shifting 
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relevance to contemporary inhabitants, and few of them offer any particularly rich 
node for mythical or symbolic elaboration. 
In the process of nation formation, particularly in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, several nations were equipped with national personifications providing an 
anthropomorphic image of the mother- or fatherland in question. These could be used 
positively in national propaganda or negatively in critical cartoons and caricatures. Many 
were constructed on the basis of Greek Athena or the corresponding Roman Minerva, 
who represented a combination of wisdom and war that was suitable for characterising 
the birth and ambitions of these new nations. They tended to use the Latin name of the 
ancient Roman province that roughly corresponded to the modern nation in question, 
such as Britannia (a personification going all the way back to Roman times) and 
Germania or Helvetia (who became personifications of Germany and Switzerland from 
the 1848 national liberation events onwards). The effect was to intimate an imaginary 
foundation in classical antiquity that suited the bourgeois elites who sought to legitimate 
emergent nation states and cancel previous associations to primitive barbarism with 
which Antique Romans identified natives of these provinces.46 
Parallel to these national personifications in classical style, other ones were also 
used, though they rarely had official status. Three examples are the British/English 
John Bull (created by Dr John Arbuthnot 1712), the French Marianne (popularised 
in the 1789 revolution, representing the republican values of the state) and Sweden’s 
Mother Svea (1672). Each has a specific history and identifying characteristics, but 
they also share many traits and are mostly notoriously vague, mainly just standing for 
the strength and stability that the nation was supposed to guarantee for its citizens. 
The same is true for the American couple Uncle Sam (invented in 1812) and Lady 
Liberty (1886). 
The majority of such national personifications are maternal or paternal figures, 
unlike Europa, whose main narrative—in spite of her three sons with Zeus and later 
offspring with Cretan king Asterius—depicts her as a daring young female, more akin 
to French Marianne than to Mother Russia. She is a much more complex figure than 
the others, with more complex layers of meaning accumulated, and thus symbolically 
contributing less to fixing than to destabilising of the concept of Europe. She does 
offer a comparably denser web of historically accumulated layers of signification than 
other continent myths. Already the very fact that Europe is the only continent with its 
name connected to an elaborate ancient myth narrative lends it a kind of magic aura, 
independent of the specific content of this myth.
The conflicts of interpretation surrounding Europe’s name are thus confined to 
how to understand that name, rather than suggesting alternative names. However, 
new myths are created all the time, and in the future there may well be alternative 




Phoenix, Prometheus and post-World War II resurrection
A range of other myths also resonate with Europa’s story and tinge the way Europe’s 
current quest is mythically identified, symbolising what have been perceived as key 
facets of Europe. Here, only a few examples will be mentioned, those that have lately 
surfaced in EU-related discourses.47
Europe has in the modern era claimed to be the prime source in the global establishment 
of progress and modernity, with rationalisation, secularisation and individualisation 
as elements manifesting a growing human control over external and internal nature. 
Philosophers like G. W. F. Hegel have seen the Renaissance and the Enlightenment 
as major steps in a longer historical perspective of a civilising emancipation of 
humankind from an amalgamation of natural, mythic and authoritarian bonds. The 
European variant of modernisation has posited itself as a hegemonic model for the rest 
of the world, in a tradition of colonial and imperialist Eurocentrism. The Renaissance 
myth of Europe as true inheritor to classical civilisation and the Enlightenment myth 
of Europe heralding universal progress leaned on capitalist expansion in geographical 
and economic terms, with unprecedented costs that other continents were forced 
to pay. The globalising and universalising impetus implied that its inheritance was 
never exclusively restricted to Europe alone, and it can be argued that key facets of 
modernisation were even more evident at the colonial margins of the great empires 
than in their centres. Consecutive waves of counter-histories have also continued to 
question this success story by pointing at the high costs for this hegemonic growth and 
at the decentering sources of allegedly ‘European’ values in processes outside of itself. 
The idea of Europe as carrying a unique global mission is deeply ambivalent: one 
understanding of expansionist colonial Eurocentrism leads to the Nazi myth of a 
reunited Third Reich, while another results in what could be named EU’s founding 
myth of a united Europe as a peace project. Such European discourses have regularly 
mobilised and accumulated a number of mythical narratives that seem fit to anchor 
European culture in history and identify it either critically as marked by fateful 
destructivity or affirmatively as inheritor of unique empowering qualities.
The phoenix was in classical mythology ‘a unique bird of the Arabian desert that 
burned itself on a funeral pyre every five or six centuries and rose from the ashes with 
renewed youth’.48 Its name is related to Phoenicia (and to a red-purple colour), and its 
ancestry also represents the dislocation implied by the myth of Europa, as the phoenix 
symbol has both Egyptian and Asian origins and counterparts. Its Chinese counterpart, 
Feng-huang, is a combination of male and female, sun and moon. The phoenix is itself 
not specifically European, but its early Christian articulation with the resurrection and 
eternal life after death of Christ—and of the Christian congregation in spite of Roman 
persecution—has linked to it a European chain of meanings. Its own trajectory has thus 
to some extent resonated with the Europa myth’s theme of dislocation from east to west.
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There are a number of stories associated with the phoenix, but its most common 
use has been as a general image of the unstoppable life cycle. Its applications usually 
combine cyclical repetition with linear progress. It is significant that the phoenix must 
burn in order to be born again, hinting at a cathartic narrative of crisis and salvation 
(Figure 1.6). One may compare with tales in the biblical Old Testament, where Adam 
and Eve were driven out of Paradise so that man may in a distant future possibly be let 
in again, and where the Jewish people had to pass through great sorrows and pains to 
eventually reach salvation. This theme was again implicitly recalled in the Christian 
master narrative of death and resurrection in the Easter Passion of the New Testament. 
Early Christian congregations could re-articulate their own perilous destiny with that 
of Christ as well as with the phoenix myth. 
With the gradual awakening of a sense of Europeanness, all these mythical 
narratives have in various phases, contexts and ways been articulated with the idea 
of modern Europe born through pain to victory. One example was Renaissance ideas 
of resurrecting classical greatness after centuries of Mediaeval darkness; another 
came with the French revolution as a resurrection after the dark rule of the absolute 
monarch. Heffernan speaks of ‘Europe’s optimists’ in the nineteenth century who, 
despite having observed the many disastrous wars that divided the continent, had ‘a 
remarkable capacity to imagine a golden future arising, Phoenix-like, from the ashes 
of each crisis’.49
A number of contemporary websites explicitly link the phoenix to Europe. In most 
cases, it is hard to discern any deeper meaning in the choice of names, for instance 
the French transport firm called Phoenix Europe Express S.A.50 The phoenix seems 
particularly attractive in contexts of education and healthcare, probably as a means of 
calling forth the capacity of rejuvenation. For instance, Horizon Phoenix Europe is an 
Ireland-based healthcare provider, whereas Phoenix Institute Europe is a spiritually 
engaged Dutch foundation for ‘education, leadership and friendship’.51 
Elements from these stories echo what may perhaps be seen as the dominant myth 
of the EU itself, which is again and again repeated as an underlying theme behind the 
other symbols. This is the story of how European unity and dignity resulted from a 
specific kind of resurrection: a reconstitution of Europe after ages of internal strife 
and finally the catastrophic mid-twentieth century fascist rule and fatal wars. The EU 
consistently describes itself as a project of peace, security and welfare, to be built on 
the ruins of inter-European destruction. No wonder that the phoenix was issued on 
a Belgian-minted €10 coin in 2005, ‘as a representation of a new Europe post 1945, 
celebrating 60 years of peace and freedom in the continent’!52 
The phoenix is understood as a metaphor for vital resurrection through destruction; 
this suits well for a continent where Christian traditions dominate and where a series 
of destructive catastrophes have finally given birth to a will to start again. Elevation 




preceded by the deepest anguish and terror, suggestive of how the nymph Europa could 
found her own divinely legitimised dynasty after having suffered the violent abduction 
from her Middle East homelands. The theme of elevation is also associated to the fact 
that the phoenix is a bird: a species that can lift itself up into the sky. By its Egyptian, 
Asian or Arabic origin, the phoenix also confirms Europa’s trope of dislocation. 
In Greek mythology, Prometheus was a Titan who played a series of tricks against the 
main god Zeus, the last of which was to steal fire from the gods and give it to the human 
race (Figure 1.7). Zeus punished him severely by having him chained to a Caucasian 
cliff and letting a huge eagle eat his liver in a daily repeated torture.53 There is a thematic 
affinity with the phoenix myth in Prometheus’ eternal punishment, as his liver is thus 
magically ‘resurrected’ on a daily basis. Prometheus is a very ambiguous figure, a 
‘trickster’ who mixes good and bad, standing halfway between gods and men. He has 
been seen as a benefactor of human civilisation, cleverly helping humanity master the 
civilising tool of fire, which gave humans an advantage over animals by enabling them 
to make weapons and tools. On the other hand, he was responsible for an irreversible 
rift between mankind and gods, since his activities stirred up anger among the latter 
and put an end to an era where boundaries between gods and humans were still 
permeable: a kind of Fall of Man from divine protection to having to rely mainly on his 
own capabilities.54 No wonder the Enlightenment eagerly resurrected Prometheus!
There was also another mythical Prometheus ‘plasticator’, who had created and 
animated mankind out of clay. These two myths eventually fused. The fire that 
Prometheus had stolen was then the fire of life with which he animated his clay models, 
and due to the ‘creating’ aspect, Prometheus became a symbol for the creating artist 
in the eighteenth century.
Prometheus’ Greek name literally means ‘fore-thought’, and his cunning intelligence 
has been read as characteristic of a major stream in European industrial and scientific 
progress as well, thematised in shifting ways by, for instance, G. W. F. Hegel, Karl 
Marx and Max Weber. One might say that Prometheus was metaphorically set free 
from Zeus’ mythical and tradi tional bonds by the Enlightenment and indus trial 
revolution, when he came to symbolise both the engineering inventor and the cre-
ating artist. Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound (1820) advocated a Copernican shift 
to emancipate humanity from its self-inflicted tutelage, as in Kant’s famous dictum.55 
In Shelley’s lyrical drama, Prometheus says: ‘He gave man speech, and speech created 
thought, / Which is the measure of the universe; / And Science struck the thrones of 
earth and heaven, / Which shook, but fell not.’ This stirs up fears in the ruling god 
Jupiter/Zeus: 
  The soul of man, like unextinguished fire,
  Yet burns towards heaven with fierce reproach, and doubt,
  And lamentation, and reluctant prayer,
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  Hurling up insurrection, which might make
  Our antique empire insecure, though built
  On eldest faith, and hell’s coeval, fear.56 
For this, both Prometheus and the humans are punished—the latter by 
excommunication with the gods, reminiscent of how Adam and Eve were driven out 
from Edenic Paradise after having tasted the fruit of knowledge.
The Prometheus figure became a common metaphor for western industrialisation’s 
combination of technological and economic growth.57 In a book typically titled The 
Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western 
Europe (1969), David S. Landes for instance stressed the links between technological 
change and a generalised creative human spirit of free-ranging imagination, with 
Prometheus as a bridge between these otherwise separate realms of hardcore 
technology and humanist arts. He saw the leap into Promethean modernity as 
irreversible, just like in the myth, adding yet another mythical layer by noting that 
‘the Industrial Revolution has been like in effect to Eve’s tasting of the forbidden fruit 
of the tree of knowledge: the world has never been the same’.58
This irrevocability also heightens the sense of contradiction and danger in this new 
era: ‘Change is demonic; it creates, but it also destroys, and the victims of the Industrial 
Revolution were numbered in the hundreds of thousands or even millions.’59 Karl Marx 
also pointed at this double character of modern capitalist society as both civilising and 
catastrophic, and there were in the nineteenth century no lack of dystopic narratives 
seeking to come to grips with this flip side of modernisation. In his own preface to the 
lyrical drama, Percy Shelley mentioned that Prometheus had certain affinities with Satan, 
indicating the ambivalence of this figure, wavering between good and evil, generosity 
and evil self-interest. A dark sibling to Prometheus was created by Mary Woll stonecraft 
Shelley in Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus (1818), where Victor Frankenstein 
defied the gods by creating life himself.60 Instead of just being the created, Victor takes 
God’s place and becomes creator. He gets his punishment, but while Prometheus was 
punished by the god whose power he revolted against, Victor is instead punished by 
his own creation, who turns against him and ruins all his good ambitions. A creation of 
humanised Promethean spirit run wild, Frankenstein’s mon ster came to signify the vices 
of technology that became increasingly ob vious, echoed in the philosophies of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Adorno and Horkheimer, as well as in dystopian science fiction narratives. 
The ancient and the modern Prometheus have merged and been reinterpreted by 
later technocritical philosophies, fictions and computer games. First bound by myth 
and traditional customs, then liberated by the modern revolutions from Romanticism 
to ‘risk society’, the modern Prometheus is under stood as ambiguous, at once liber-
ating hero and lethal villain. This reflexive insight often made culture and aesthetics 




modern Prometheus following the classical one of civilisation and the early modern 
one of technology, culture was long fettered in strict structures of spheres and sectors, 
but is now said to have escaped from its enclosed field and appears to be unbound, 
expanding across every border. After science, technology and industrialism, a new 
Prometheus seems to be unbound in the globalised, mediatised, late modern and post-
industrial world. Linked to processes like modernisation, secularisation, urbanisation, 
aestheticisation, mediatisa tion and reflexivisation, each with its own genealogy and 
implications, claims of such changes may be termed ‘culturalisation’. It too implies a 
kind of human hubris, where new forms of ‘makeability’ tend to understand almost 
everything as a controllable project rather than as fate or destiny. Such perspectives lend 
a dark shadow to the European self-understanding as a cultural mover in the world.
To this day, someone or something ‘Promethean’ is daring and skilful. The double-
edged Promethean image has been used to characterise creative western ‘geniuses’, 
who struggled for high values against tough odds, whether in the artistic or the 
scientific arena. One often-cited example with particularly strong ties to later European 
identifications is Ludwig van Beethoven (see Chapter 7). In spite of his accelerating 
deafness, illness, loneliness and despair, and in a climate of conservative post-
Napoleonic restoration, his musical work is heard as expressing high humanist values 
and hopes, for instance in the Third (Eroica) or Fifth (Fate) symphonies, the ballet The 
Creatures of Prometheus and the opera Fidelio, where revolutionary Leonore liberates 
her beloved from the dungeons of oppression, making great sacrifices to liberate 
humankind from its own tutelage, to quote Kant’s definition of Enlightenment.61 
Arbitrarily chosen examples of how Prometheus is today used in connection with 
European initiatives indicate a rather diluted sphere of meanings, where creative 
development is painted in much less complex terms than the myth itself may justify, 
mainly stressing the beneficial aspects of technological enterprise. For instance, 
the EUREKA Prometheus Project (‘PROgraMme for a European Traffic of Highest 
Efficiency and Unprecedented Safety’) was in 1987–95 the largest research and 
development project ever in the field of driverless cars.62 Prometheus Europe Ltd 
declares as its mission to ‘provide superior procurement, supply and advisory services 
to principals in all parts of the developing world on a strictly independent basis’.63 
PROMeTHEUS (‘Health PROfessional Mobility in THe European Union Study’) is 
a project based at the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, and 
founded by EU’s Seventh Frame Programme from 2009.64 ‘Prometheus: European 
Union Studies’ is the title of a course programme at the University of Tartu.65 
In contrast, websites combining Frankenstein with Europe are—expectedly—fewer 
and mostly critical. While relatively more acceptable on other continents, genetically 
modified ‘Frankenstein foods’ have for instance raised considerable European fears.66 
The reception of these two narratives thus tends to split the ambiguous figure into a 
consistently good Prometheus and an evil Frankenstein.
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Both Prometheus and Frankenstein fit into the theme of emancipating elevation 
that was reactivated by the Enlightenment, as they depict humans striving to rise 
above the animal world by conquering divine powers. As with Europa more than in 
the phoenix myth, there is also a strong element of desire, in this case for knowledge 
and power, and there is a kind of hybridity in the mixture of man, god and technology 
(fire or Frankenstein’s robot). 
Another line of quasi-mythical narratives that emphasise the ambivalence, and 
not least the dangers, inherent in western developments includes the legend of 
Doctor Faustus, developed in chapbooks from 1583 onwards, in plays by Christopher 
Marlowe (The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, c. 1604) and J. W. Goethe (Faust 
I-II, 1808 and 1832), in Gounod’s opera Faust (1859) and again in Thomas Mann’s 
novel Doktor Faustus (1947). This story is less similar to the phoenix or Prometheus 
than to Frankenstein.67 In The Decline of the West (1926–28), Oswald Spengler talked 
of Europe’s ‘Faustian culture’, believing that just as Faust had sold his soul to the devil 
for power, western man had sold his soul to technology.68 Such an interpretation 
obviously links Faust to Frankenstein, but there is little left to remind of the Europa 
myth, since Europa never had to pay any noticeable future costs for her intercourse 
with Zeus. Something similar may be said of Richard Wagner’s ‘ring’ tetralogy (1869–
76) and J. R. R. Tolkien’s ‘ring’ novels (1954–55). 
Faust shares with Prometheus and Frankenstein the desire for elevation and power. 
The ‘ring’ narratives (inspired by legends of the Holy Grail, with mixed Celtic and 
Catholic origins) additionally contain elements of dislocation and hybridity similar 
to those found in the Europa myth. They are all full of ambivalences. When used to 
construct a mythical narrative for Europe, this narrative is equally contradictory, and 
far from linear or univocal. The phoenix burns and is born again; Prometheus gives 
vital forces to humankind but is eternally punished for it; Frankenstein’s monster is a 
masterpiece with fatal flaws; Faust achieves great success but to immense ethical costs; 
and the fatal ring comes with an equally grim prediction of where human, capitalist 
and in particular also European quests for universal power and riches may lead.
None of these myths has an officially acknowledged status as providing symbols 
of Europe. They have sometimes been mobilised for signifying Europe, but all have 
a more global or even ‘universal’ reach than that. It is easy to find examples of how 
the phoenix, Prometheus, Faust and Frankenstein are all used in American, Asian 
or African contexts as well. The phoenix is actually even more strongly anchored in 
Asia than in Europe, and it is for instance no coincidence that a Mandarin Chinese-
language television channel based in Hong Kong and launched in 1996 by the 
Australian Rupert Murdoch in collaboration with mainland Chinese interests was 
named Phoenix Television (Figure 1.8). As for Prometheus, the Harlem Renaissance 
poet Walter E. Hawkins linked him to Africa: ‘Hail, Prometheus, glad to meet you, / 




and weather.’69 Asia has a leading role in Shelley’s lyrical drama, and ‘Prometheus 
Asia’ is the name of a ‘data mining’ company.70 However, as for example a biography 
of the atom physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer is named American Prometheus, this 
indicates that Prometheus normally is thought of as European.71 A simple quantitative 
test on the Internet shows that the phoenix, Prometheus, Frankenstein and Faust are 
as often linked to America, Africa and Asia as to Europe, but in qualitative terms, 
they all appear to have a certain European bias. Still, only the Europa myth remains 
specifically bound to Europe’s destiny, based both on the name and on the geographical 
setting. It cannot be applied to any other continent, and is also the only myth officially 
recognised as having a bearing on how to signify Europe.
Doctor Faust was based on a historically real person, and the ancient versions of 
myths such as those of Europa and of Prometheus may in prehistorical times possibly 
have been believed to have a reality substance. However, during the last few centuries of 
their use and elaboration, they have all been understood as in a strong sense fictional: 
as expressing some deeper layer of human existence but not as any precise description 
of what has actually happened. Other kinds of myths are considered to be more ‘real’, 
even though their truth value may well also be questioned. The ways in which ‘real 
events’ are recounted and interpreted strongly contribute to the formation of modern 
ideologies, as Roland Barthes has shown.72 By being embedded in a dense web of 
symbolisms and legends like those mentioned so far, the memories and histories of 
the recent past also obtain a mythical quality.
One such ‘real’—but precisely therefore no less ideological—myth is the EU master 
narrative that tells how Europe has been united. Its main outline is that Europe is a 
chosen continent endowed with the most extraordinary powers of the creative mind, 
giving her a strong and important task to benefit humanity at large, but at the same time 
also the capability to do much evil—yes, even to eradicate all humanity and potentially 
even all life on earth. Europe has risen from poverty and false beliefs, conquered 
intelligence and a unique artistic heritage, and used this to build just political and 
social institutions side by side with a capitalist economy that is able to spread welfare 
across the world and link it together by modern systems of communication. This 
double-edged capacity has led to an accelerating spiral that oscillates between positive 
achievements and the most terrifying disasters. Each revival after a dark period has 
brought new hopes for creating a solid and just social order to prevent future wars, 
and the most decisive of these historical turns was the end of World War II, which also 
brought the Nazi terror to an end. In a series of steps after 1945, most importantly the 
‘Schuman Declaration’, Europe has finally made a firm decision to use its capacities 
for the common good, strengthening the mutual ties of friendship between European 
peoples and also opening up for peaceful dialogue with the rest of the world. 
This is a brief summary of an historical narrative that is retold as a kind of 
foundational myth for the European Union. It is not necessarily all ‘wrong’, as there is an 
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inner core of truth in most existing ideological myths, but it makes a specific selection 
from the many processes, forces and motives associated with the current European 
project—thus also silencing alternative perspectives. ‘Myth does not deny things, on 
the contrary, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and 
eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that 
of a statement of fact.’73 This particular myth gives the EU a universally emancipatory 
and empowering role, thereby blocking oppositional interpretations that might for 
instance instead emphasise imperialist expansion or efforts to control and regulate 
European space in the face of globalisation and migration.74 By focusing on the 
will to peace as the core driving force behind the EU, and depicting economic and 
geopolitical strength as secondary means to achieve that goal, this myth consolidates 
a favourable perspective that in turn may be countered by critical readings based on 
reversed priorities. The tale of how Europe has united on the ruins of its own disasters 
has dramatic qualities that lift the political up to a universal and existential level, 
lending ‘natural and eternal justification’ to a political process which is badly in need 
of such an underpinning in order to legitimise decisions that have often turned out to 
be unpopular among citizens. 
Yet, this does not reduce any of these myths to just ideological illusions or plain lies, 
constructed only to hide evil intentions and legitimise an oppressive social order. To 
Paul Ricoeur, there is no way to effectively destruct all myths, and myths continue to 
be worth interpreting, as they codify in symbolic form the key issues of any society. 
The symbolic language of myths is needed for people to share otherwise individual 
and mute experiences, and these mythical ‘symbols give rise to thought’, rather than 
prevent it.75 Ricoeur argues that ‘precisely because we are living and thinking after 
the separation of myth and history, the demythization of our history can become the 
other side of an understanding of myth as myth, and the conquest, for the first time 
in the history of culture, of the mythical dimension’.76 Interpreting these myths not 
as immediate truths but as instructive narratives makes it possible to understand key 
mechanisms of cultural and collective identification.
Captain Euro
Among the more recent efforts to revitalise this mythical tradition in Europe, 
one quasi-mythical narrative is particularly instructive for understanding European 
signification in its very failure as a modern myth ‘artificially’ constructed for 
instrumental reasons (Figure 1.9). Inspired by the famous local resistance of Asterix 
and his brave fellow Gallics against the Roman Empire, the nationalist superhero 
Capitan Italia in the late 1990s had an evil enemy by the name of Euroman, from whom 




a positive counter-image. The superhero Captain Euro was a comic production aimed 
at children, with a plethora of signifying hooks.77 The figure was created in 1998 on 
commission for the EU by the Spanish marketing expert Nicolas De Santis of the 
consulting firm Corporate Vision Strategists with its Twelve Stars Communications, 
whose blue logo has twelve yellow stars that do not form a circle but a rectangle. With a 
wide range of influential customers, this firm has made several projects for the EU. The 
idea was to construct a project that would test and improve young citizens’ attitudes 
to issues of European identity and citizenship in the Union, as the firm’s analysis had 
concluded that the official EU symbols failed to resonate with most Europeans, and 
some more popular alternatives were therefore needed to prepare for the introduction 
of the euro currency. Captain Euro was made to be a counterpart to Captain America 
(created by Joe Simon and Jack Kirby, and launched by Marvel Comics in 1941), and 
for a short while attracted media coverage but also critical attention from sceptics. It is 
interesting to scrutinise the ways in which Captain Euro was constructed as typically 
European, using the standardised genre of superhero comics to present for a young 
audience some key features of the European project.
The Captain Euro website offers two animated adventures, summary of lead figures 
and their various gadgets, plus a Euro currency converter tool and some meta-
information on how this superhero is intended as a marketing device. This ‘super-
hero of Europe’ is described as ‘the protector of Europe who holds out for justice, who 
promotes peace and carries the message of goodwill around the world’, his ‘Twelve 
Stars’ team ‘bringing together millions of Europeans and protecting wildlife and the 
environment’: ‘Wherever they are, everyone recognises their distinctive European 
branding’ that ‘makes everyone proud to be European’.
The website paints the dawning twenty-first century as a ‘world of change’ where 
‘old structures are disappearing as new ones take their place, bringing with them 
uncertainty for the future’: ‘In this climate of constant change the European Union, a 
Union of prosperity and innovation, has emerged as a global superpower. The Twelve 
Stars organisation has been set up to defend the security of Europe and uphold the 
values of the Union.’ The fictive organisation’s emblem is ‘a five-pointed yellow star in 
a clear blue sky with the ‘E’ of Europe at its centre—the shining symbol of strength 
through unity’. Captain Euro and his team are ‘the new ambassadors of global peace 
[…] bearing the European message with them wherever they go […] solving problems 
and averting the threat of danger’. Luckily ‘Europe’s most advanced technology is at 
their disposal’, but there is a hidden threat: an evil organisation works against Europe’s 
unity, led by the criminal Dr D. Vider who wants ‘to divide Europe and create his own 
empire’. The battle takes place in areas such as sports and the arts, from where Dr D. 
Vider wishes to shut out the public.
The Twelve Stars team leader Captain Euro is dressed in a typical superhero costume, 
clearly reminiscent of Captain America but featuring European elements like the 
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blue and yellow colours and the twelve stars of the EU flag. He is presented as Adam 
Andros, son of a famous European ambassador and a professor of palaeontology. 
Having travelled around the world, he is a polyglot with strong social skills. ‘Captain 
Euro is a diplomatic hero—the symbol of European unity and values’, who strives to 
use only ‘intellect, culture and logic—not violence’ to fulfil his benevolent mission. He 
has studied information technology so that he can combine ‘language and technology 
skills with his international “savoir faire” and his natural investigative curiosity, to 
protect Europe and carry Europe’s message of goodwill around the world’. He also has 
the relaxing hobby of painting European landscapes! A motor accident forced him to 
replace one knee with a metal joint, but otherwise he is ‘in peak physical condition’. 
His Twelve Stars team has its headquarters in the Atomium somewhere in 
Europe. It is fronted by Europa, alias Donna Eden (sometimes spelt ‘Eaden’), an 
archaeologist and expert in ancient written languages. Her ‘expertise in the Gaeia 
theory and her love of the natural world’ made her a committed environmentalist 
and a scuba diving oceanographer who has explored ‘the darkest depths of the 
oceans’. She forms a sporty pair with the Captain. All other sidekicks add new traits 
to the team. Blond, blue-eyed Erik the pilot manages space science and science 
fiction ‘by Jules Verne and the whole school of European writers’. The dark-haired 
elite gymnast and dancer Helen coordinates the team’s ‘cultural, media and sport 
activities’ and personally favours flamenco and waltz. The dark-skinned Marcus 
invents technological gadgets and is machine-like enough to almost never need 
any sleep. He plays chess with Pythagoras 1—a humanoid supercomputer that is 
surrounded by nine rotating balls and enjoys Greek philosophy, math and music 
(seventeenth-century fugues in particular!). Finally, the East Carpathian grey wolf 
Lupo uses his stunning intuitional skills to support the Captain. There is also a 
description of the team’s gadgets, a play on the technological desires typical of young 
men, and of the nine areas of the Atomium, named the Conference, Control, Hi-
Tech, Environmental, Space, Cyber, Media, Sport and Knowledge Spheres, roughly 
corresponding to main areas of cooperation in the European Union.
The bad guys are led by David Viderius, alias Dr D. Vider. He is a financier, 
speculator, curator and collector of ancient curiosities, but also an excellent cook: 
a multimillionaire in control of hundreds of businesses across Europe. His aim is 
to make money without any scruples, using the Global Touring Circus (GTC), a 
travelling company where he recruits new members from all over the world, as his 
base. Vider’s son Junior is presented as an elegantly dressed sociopath and an expert 
on hypnosis and other circus tricks. The beautiful Mala Glamora has a showbiz 
background, collects jewellery and shoes, and is secretly in love with Captain Euro. 
Ninot, the human cannonball, also knows many tricks, collects hats and likes animals 
but fears Lupo. The Twins Castor and Pollux are contortionists and pilots who often 




taste for foods. This nasty team also has a set of gadgets, and the GTC megacircus 
consists of five tents, one of which is secret and closed to the public, but all of them 
full of traps, cameras and other secret devices. There is a map engraved in the central 
smoked glass dome, ‘representing a world without boundaries where no country is 
favoured—or spared!’
The first animated adventure, ‘The Origins’, starts when Swedish scientists in a ship 
on the frozen Baltic lake suddenly spot a Viking ship of steel coming out of an iceberg. 
Meanwhile on a sunny Greek island, the archaeology Professor Donna Eden searches 
for Agamemnon’s last resting place but is surprised by two hands emerging from the 
underground. Among deadly spiders she finds an engraved stone when an earthquake 
almost makes her female colleague fall down into the abyss. Led by a dark-haired man 
who later turns out to be Adam Andros, a third team of explorers in the giant caves of 
Arta in Majorca are likewise endangered when a crack opens, and they almost drown in 
flooding water. Bikini girls sunbathing on a Mediterranean cliff-top are shocked when 
the Majorcan cave explorers appear from underground, having dug themselves out 
with a magic double axe they found in the depths, and which gives them superhuman 
powers. At home with his pet cat and exclaiming ‘Merciful Minerva!’, Adam tells his 
story over the phone to his father, who turns out to be the leader of the Swedish 
expedition. A week later, father and son visit the mysterious Baltic Viking ship by 
helicopter. A wolf has been watching them since the ship arrived, and the father says: 
‘He’s a European wolf.’ On a dog sled, Donna comes across the ice to help them solve 
their ‘frozen mystery’. The dragon carvings on the axe handle show her that it is ‘very 
early Celt, probably Welsh’, as they bear the inscription: ‘in Avagddu’s name, Creiwry 
the Witch and Elfin the Prince shall be avenged!’ (All geographic places exist in real 
life, and each name also links to an existing history or mythology. For example, in the 
Welsh myth of Taliesin, Avagddu is the son of Ceridwen and Tegid Veol, while Elfin is 
found in the Scottish tradition.)
In the next scene, the ‘ruthless speculator, curator and ancient curiosity collector 
David Viderius’ is informed by Mala and the rest of his ‘surveillance team’ of what 
the three good guys have found, including a message on the Baltic ship from Thor, 
the Norse god of death and destruction. When on that ship the three speculate about 
the ‘three messages from the gods of Europe’, suddenly the old stone plate bursts into 
fragments that form twelve stars: ‘a magic number!’ Adam falls into the Viking ship 
and discovers a sarcophagus that opens and releases a young golden goddess with a 
five-pointed star for a heart. She mysteriously speaks: 
I am the arms of your mother. The wood and earth walls of your 
first shelter… I am the stone of the home you left behind…! I am the 
hollowed trees and woven plants from which you tried to tame the seas 
and harness the winds… I am the pigment in your paintings, the paper 
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of the pages of past books, the pixels on your computer screens… I am 
art and truth… I am justice and knowledge and the warmth of love. I 
am all that is good. 
Adam and Donna admire her beauty, but then she changes and becomes a dead 
skull: 
And I am the dust thrown in another man’s face. The flint fashioned 
to cut and kill… I am the poison that flows through every watery 
artery… I am the turbulence that sucks out your air… I am the fire 
that burns inside every blackened heart. I am all that is evil and I am 
all that is good. I am the spirit of Europe!
She points at ‘the golden star of Europe’ and before she melts away, she explains that 
whoever has it possesses the greatest power in the world: ‘Take it and use it wisely!’ 
A helicopter arrives with Mala and Dr D. Vider who start a fight where Adam’s father 
falls overboard and Vider grabs the star. ‘What power!’, he exclaims, to a Black Metal 
soundtrack. The wolf attacks him and howls to the moon so that sharp icicles fall 
down from heaven and injure David. The evil couple escapes but threaten to be back 
for the star. Adam asserts that his father is now dead, and so are Adam Andros and 
Donna Eaden as well: 
From now on we must fight for the memory of my father… We will 
fight for truth and justice… We must use the golden star of Europe 
as a force for good and use its powers for the benefit of humankind… 
From now on we shall be known as… Captain Euro, Europa & 
Lupo. 
This ends the first adventure.
The second of the two adventures is called ‘The Grand Canal’. It opens in the 
Twelve Stars’ headquarters Atomium, where Captain Euro at work among European 
maps is visited by a figure with mask and red cape. It turns out to be Europa who 
says that Adam needs a break and is invited with her to the Venice carnival. They 
admire paintings in ‘Galleria Dell’Accademia’, where D. Vider is also present. He is 
‘more of a performance art man’ and is about to stage some ‘cultural sabotage!’ In his 
penthouse, he explains his plans to Mala, ‘my European beauty’. He sends Ninot to 
manipulate the water, so that gondolas get stuck in the mud. Adam, dressed in a blue 
T-shirt with ‘European Sport Power’ in yellow text, notes the sudden shortage of tap 
water in the hotel room. Marcus gives a scientific explanation of the drainage that will 




watch the Venetian despair through a telescope. In mediaeval carnival dresses, Ninot 
and Mala start shrinking museum palaces with a special gun, while Marcus with his 
scientific skills manages to figure out where the water is sucked out. Europa wins a 
fistfight with Castor and Pollux. Mala hides the now miniscule Venetian treasures as 
jewellery on her body. Next, Venetians are struck by panic by what appear to be UFOs 
from another world. From their big blue truck, Europa and Euro distribute ‘weapons’ 
that turn out to be blue umbrellas with the Twelve Star logo. Marcus explains that 
the UFOs were his invention to transport Antarctic ice to Venice ‘and refloat the city 
in one rainy day!’ The ensuing rain explains the need for umbrellas. Mala and Ninot 
continue to steal art treasures from the Palazzo Ducale. People shout ‘Viva Europa’ 
but it is too early to celebrate victory. Euro’s team hunts the villains on water bikes. 
Mala is proud of having conquered ‘million of euros of irreplaceable art’ when Europa 
enters and starts a fight where Mala drops her palace miniature on the cobbled street, 
while Ninot escapes down into the sewers. Europa saves the miniaturised museum. 
Mala and Vider are both disappointed with their failure, and scenes from a toilet and 
the filthy underground finally show how Ninot is trapped in the sewers, crying out to 
his boss for help.
Captain Euro has been presented in detail here, not only because it is a little known 
and amusing phenomenon, but also because it testifies to difficulties in elaborating a 
modern European myth. It is easy to see how every inch of this superhero concept is 
full of references to identifying traits of Europe and the EU. The density of stereotypes 
in the comic strip narratives is partly related to the intended juvenile audience and 
partly to the branding purpose. This naive unidimensionality does not exclude a series 
of inner contradictions, some of which unintentionally result from inherent problems 
in the European identity project.
The most emphasised value suggested for Europe here is that of unity. The whole 
format is geared towards ‘strength through unity’, which is the expressed motto, and 
the enemy ‘D. Vider’ wishes to divide Europe, with even his name, when read as one 
word, sounding out his wish to be a great ‘divider’. His evilness is also confirmed 
by the name’s likeness to the dreadful Darth Vader of Star Wars. Besides unity and 
strength, the basic narrative composed by the website as a whole, including the two 
adventures and the side information, mentions prosperity, science and technology, 
security and environmental protection as key values. Favoured activity areas are 
technology, sports, arts and media, rather than political or economic practices. 
The heroes fight for culture and civilisation, as all action heroes as well as all 
politicians tend to do. A strong emphasis is put on communication and information 
technologies that link the social and artistic skills of language to the ‘hard’ capacities 
of natural science and technology. Each of the two heroes combines natural and 
cultural interests, physical and mental skills, with history and communication as 
bridging competence fields. 
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These featured values are well in line with the policies and symbolic practices of 
the EU at large. The twelve stars of the flag and the euro are repeatedly hinted at. The 
presence of a euro currency converter here links the fiction to the practical economic 
aspects of the EU, and one adventure also mentioned the euro currency several years 
before its real life introduction. The other EU symbols are notably absent. There may be 
many explanations for why the Atomium consists of nine spheres while the evil circus 
has five tents, including a very far-fetched reference to 9 May as Europe Day, but this is 
far from evident. The anthem is neither heard on the soundtrack nor alluded to in any 
other obvious way. As for the motto, it is implicitly present in the diversity of the Twelve 
Stars team, but the emphasis is clearly on unity rather than diversity, though elements of 
diversity persist and on several levels give rise to ambiguities. The adventures consistently 
demonstrate the strength of the united goodies as against the internally divided baddies. 
There is a higher degree of differentiation in the traits of the good guys than of the bad 
ones, but their actions contrast in the opposite manner, as the Twelve Stars are always 
united while the GTC members often quarrel among themselves. Each of the good guys 
possesses stereotypical characteristics that together represent a set of acceptable identity 
positions for Europeans, but never open up for any internal conflicts or even tensions 
within the team. It is also interesting to note how the ‘Origins’ adventure moves around 
the borders of Europe—Sweden, Romania, Greece, Italy, Spain, Wales—rather than into 
its centre around Benelux, France, Germany, Switzerland or Austria, but from all these 
parts of Europe’s circumference comes the same divine message, once again confirming 
the unity rather than diversity of Europe.78
Captain Euro piles up so many references to the EU that it becomes hard to discern 
exactly which of them are supposed to be the key symbols: the Captain himself, his 
partner Europa, the whole Twelve Stars team, the Atomium or the golden star(s) 
inherited from the ancient European gods? Each of these elements can be said to 
contribute a different aspect of what Europe means: its agency, its territory, its social 
community, its institutions and its imagined immanent spirit.
The plots and the leading characters display a strikingly unproblematised male 
dominance, which is underlined by the names of the two heroes, when ‘Andros’ 
(Greek word for ‘man’) leads ‘Donna’ just like the evil David dominates Mala. This 
is different from the Greek myth where Europa has a key role and cannot quite be 
reduced to a passive ‘feminine’ position. Captain Euro’s name combines military 
and financial associations, whereas his main sidekick Europa is linked more to civic 
culture and citizenship, in line with a rather conventional gender hierarchy.
The contrast between heroes and villains reinforces and specifies the image the 
former construct of European identity. Dr D. Vider is a businessman and his team 
combines global speculation with the nomadic showbiz of circus. This can easily be 
read as a struggle between EU politics against globalising forces that combine free 




Ethnically, the Captain and his main sidekicks are white: Caucasian or even Aryan; 
several critics have inferred and even found crypto-Nazi implications in this typical 
superhero trait. His black team member Marcus is dehumanised when described 
as being almost like a machine, needing no sleep and always talking in technical 
terms, making him more of a loyal tool for his white master than an autonomous 
subject. The villain twins look like Russian Cossacks or secret agents, adding a West–
East tension. More importantly, critics have contrasted Captain Euro’s Aryan traits 
with David’s Jewish looks. His name also invites such a reading, and his interests in 
banking and collecting antiques easily fit a quite problematic genealogy back to an 
anti-Semitic tradition, from the Wandering Jew through Shakespeare’s Shylock to 
contemporary racist caricatures. The megacircus and its artists can also be associated 
to Europe’s traditional nomadic tribes, notably the Romanies (Gypsies). 
This ethnic dimension is directly linked to a chain of other levels of interpretation, 
with anti-globalisation as one of its important facets. David as a kind of Wandering 
Jew then represents mobile finance capital, his circus and its artists are eminently 
global, and the tent dome map is described as ‘representing a world without 
boundaries’. The good team is firmly located in Atomium, and they obviously 
defend the external borders of Europe and presumably also respect the national 
boundaries inside it, just like the EU is supposed to do. The fear of nomadism and 
borderlessness contrasts to the simultaneously emphasised uniting will. There are 
strong reasons to read the narrative as confirming the securing of a unified European 
fortress against the rest of the world, and rinsing this inner territory of the deviant 
nomadic elements, whether they are speculating sharks, showbiz artists or migrant 
ethnic groups.
The genre of childish superhero comics itself leans towards the low side of the 
high/low divide, but this narrative clearly favours high arts to popular culture. The 
Twelve Stars team has in many ways a higher cultural profile than the villains. It is 
often stated that the former prefer the arts: from chess to landscape painting and 
seventeenth-century fugues. The villains instead are all engaged in showbiz, Mala’s 
surname is Glamora, and D. Vider characterises himself as ‘a performance art man’ 
who likes action more than works of art and engages in ‘cultural sabotage’. They want 
to dethrone and level all high values, including aesthetic ones, never respecting any 
sacred ideals such as truth, justice or beauty. One can thus discern a distinction 
between the two camps: state power, stable and well-defined European roles and high 
culture on the good side and evil market forces, ethnic nomads and popular culture 
on the other. This conforms to a common stereotype of Old Europe’s preference for 
high arts while the American New World stands for trendy popular culture. However, 
if Captain Euro was meant to offer European images with a potential to be more 
popular than the official EU symbols, this elitist content of the website does not seem 
to serve the purpose.
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Most components of Captain Euro are structurally similar to other male, action 
superhero stories, such as Captain America. It is mainly the European references 
and the elements of high culture preference that seem slightly unique. The narrative 
focuses on protecting inherited values against cultural sabotage that wishes to divide 
Europe and steal its riches. It makes no obvious references to the myth of Europa and 
the bull. There are no abductions, nor any erotic play between the heroes. Instead, 
what dominates is the eternal struggle between good and evil, together with allusions 
to another widespread myth in popular culture and the high arts, notably in a range 
of Holy Grail myths in Celtic cultures and Mediaeval Christianity, and in Richard 
Wagner’s and J. R. R. Tolkien’s ring cycles. Captain Euro’s ‘ring’ is the sacred and 
powerful European star, and like so many other good men, he inherits from past 
gods a quest and a force that is highly ambivalent. The intervention of the gods to 
help humankind has narrative kinship not only to Zeus’ many interactions with 
humans but also to the Greek myth of Prometheus or Mary Woll stonecraft Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. The guiding star can also claim a Christian heritage in the star that 
guided the wise men to the newborn infant’s cradle in Bethlehem. There is thus a 
very mixed set of meanings in this symbolism, even though the narrative does little 
to differentiate or prioritise between them, or to further develop this ‘archaeological’ 
line of interpretation.79
The first adventure talks of ‘the gods of Europe’ and makes explicit references to 
Greek, Celtic and Nordic divinities. But there are also plenty of hidden but actually 
very important elements from biblical and Christian mythology and imagery. One 
example of this biblical-Christian subtext is found in the lead characters’ names, 
Adam Andros and Donna E(a)den. Both Captain Euro adventures mention some 
kind of rain, which may also be associated with the flood.
As is already clear, many elements are hard to interpret. The reason for naming 
the evil twins Castor and Pollux is not altogether evident, neither is the signifying 
impact of this choice. Still, in a so carefully designed narrative, every element tends to 
become meaningful, which creates certain problems with the details that do not simply 
confirm established clichés. How come Dr D. Vider is a cook and why does Ninot 
love animals? Could this potentially stir up unwanted opposition among gastronomic 
lobbyists or those animal protection movements that have launched campaigns to 
point at deficits in EU’s food production practices? The Venice adventure likewise 
invites unintended readings as the twenty-first century climate crisis has, since it was 
published, made the strategy of melting Antarctic ice rather problematic, to say the 
least, thus destabilising the story’s strict borders between good and evil. This hints 
at the problems inherent in the construction of a specific content or narrative that 
expresses cherished values and provides key symbols and at the same time attempts 
to preclude any elements that contradict the intended values, or which may through 




In his emphasis on stability and uniformity, Captain Euro seems strangely old-
fashioned. Many other popular narratives today make almost the opposite metaphorical 
construction of good and evil. One such striking example is the 2003–05 HBO TV 
series Carnivàle which chose the reverse roles: the ‘good’ camp being a touring funfair 
whereas ‘evil’ resided in a fixed church.80 Depicting mobilities (of money and of 
people) as a threat to prosperity goes against late modern ideas of nomadic mobility 
as a progressive resource, cherished both by neo-liberalism and the radical left. One 
may indeed argue that it is the mobile (from markets to migrants) that contribute 
more to unification and equality than the static, who tend to strongly differentiate 
themselves from others, often in hierarchic terms. Captain Euro claims to defend 
the famous EU freedoms or mobilities of goods, services, people and money, but is 
constructed in a way that actually prioritises static stability, while it is his primary 
enemy who embodies precisely those mobilities. This striking contradiction to core 
European and EU values partly explains why the comic hero has failed. This deeply 
conservative, new ‘pseudo-myth’ contradicts both neo-liberal and leftist visions of 
Europe and is unable to empower practices, rituals and meanings that could make it 
a real, living myth. 
It should of course be kept in mind that Captain Euro is geared towards children 
and not to be taken too seriously. Still, it was commissioned by the EU and motivated 
by a perceived need to develop more popular representations of what it means to be 
European, and to encourage future citizens to identify as such. Designer Nicolas De 
Santis himself argues that he and his team ‘consider the project a total success for 
what we aimed at the time’.81 A reception study would be needed to know whether this 
goal was reached in the intended target group, but evidence indicates a lack of lasting 
success. The website has not been updated much, and most commentaries seem to be 
negative. 
Blog comments lend support to my interpretations. In the liberal left-wing The 
Guardian 1999, Dan Glaister was suspicious of Captain Euro’s hidden agenda, arguing 
that ‘Captain Euro is devoted to persuading all good young Europeans of the virtues 
of integration in time for the advent of the single European currency in 2002’, and that 
‘with his strong jaw and clean-cut morals’, Captain Euro may actually be ‘a proponent 
of fortress Europe, an us-and-them world, secure for the haves and inaccessible to the 
have-nots’, the latter notably including asylum-seekers.82 A libertarian conservative blog 
by Scottish-American Aaron in 2003 found Captain Euro ‘just too damn funny’ and 
was annoyed by its flamboyant Eurocentrism: ‘When will this crazy “United Europe” 
merry-go-round of international comedy ever end?!’83 The British Tory MEP in 2006 
Daniel Hannan considered the EU marketing efforts to reach out to children an utter 
failure, and pointed at the problematic Jewish traits of the villain Dr D. Vider.84 Captain 
Euro seems to have failed both on the right and the left on the political spectrum, and 
one of the main points of criticism concerns the racial implications of the series. In 
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2007, the blogger Helen agreed that ‘the intrepid and distinctly Aryan looking fighter 
for peace, harmony and European integration’ has ‘failed miserably’. She dislikes that 
the evil guy is a businessman: ‘The man who creates employment, provides financial 
services and adds to the wealth of wherever he happens to be (incidentally, what is 
wrong with international business which breaks down national barriers?) is evil, evil, 
evil. The goodies are people who prat around as parasites on the body politic, financed 
by the taxpayer.’ Luckily ‘the idea did not take off ’, mainly because of the too clean 
looks of the characters, which both had racist implications and failed according to the 
generic rules of comic books: ‘Captain Euro and his cohorts are superb specimens of 
physical attraction mostly on the Aryan side. Even the scientist is sexy and attractive. 
Their main enemy Dr D. Vider has a distinctly Semitic look and resembles the villains 
of cartoons in Der Stürmer of evil memory. He is assisted by “moustachioed, dusky-
skinned cohorts”. Ooops! Setting aside the political problem there, the creation shows 
a certain lack of knowledge. Comic heroes are not handsome.’ The harsh conclusion is 
‘Maybe the creators of Captain Euro should have spent less time in focus groups and 
more time reading successful comics.’85 Other blogs and discussion forums have also 
made fun of the implicit racism and even drawn parallels to Nazi dreams of a united 
Europe.86
This debate highlights the inherent problem in trying to construct symbols and 
myths supposed to be widely used and convey deep layers of meaning. It usually 
takes a long time and a series of interconnected collective experiences to chisel out 
such symbols that are deeply meaningful to people. When this is done in instant 
projects like this, it tends to fail because of inner contradictions and lack of legitimacy 
among citizens. This form of political correctness can be double edged, as it makes 
the representations too clean and neat, and thus boring. As soon as they dare do 
something extra that could make them memorable, like melting the Antarctic ice or 
preferring landscape painting or fugues, they risk creating an unintended and clearly 
unfavourable interpretation (as climate destroyers or elitist snobs) that effectively 
hinders their wider acceptance and just makes them ridiculous.
Conclusions
The Europa myth remains the primary symbolic resource of wide reach and 
validity today, but with an ambiguous status. On the one hand it gives Europe much 
more of a mythic background than any other continent, providing a narrative that 
plays with dislocation, desire, elevation and hybridity. On the other hand, it offers no 
clear direction to the European project. Still, its hidden layers and signifiers resonate 




With Europa, Europe is at first glance identified as in some sense feminine. As 
has been mentioned in the section on comparisons above, it is common for national 
personifications in modern times to likewise be female rather than male, with Uncle 
Sam as an exception to that rule. One common instance of gender stereotyping 
depicts the soil of a geographically defined land area as a ‘mother’ of a male-identified 
culture and civilisation, a mothering source of existence and nurture but also a 
feminised object of metaphorically masculinised activities like ploughing, sewing, 
mining, travelling or exploring. Europa eventually becomes a mother of sons (and 
significantly no daughters) who found a civilisation, but the most cherished parts 
of the myth tend to portray her as a young and attractive mistress. The feminisation 
of Europe plays a role in the modern play of identifications between Europe and 
America, where gender stereotypes are often ambiguous.87 One trope makes Europe 
old, elite and female, in contrast to America as young, popular and masculine, but 
with modernism’s denouncement of mass culture as feminised and feminising, there 
are also reversals of these roles. Captain Euro is male, and has a female sidekick; 
among the baddies gender is balanced in the same manner, while identifying Europe 
as culturally elevated. In gender terms then, the old myth tends to feminise Europe, 
while the recent (failed) effort struggles to ‘lift’ her up to a more masculine status. 
Which are otherwise the most striking identifying meanings that the myth has 
offered for contemporary Europe to nourish? The etymology of the word ‘Europe’ 
and the interrelated myth of Europa have attracted a number of interpretations of 
what Europeanness might mean. Four themes appear to be central. The recently 
fabricated Captain Euro narrative differs radically on all but one, indicating a set of 
inherent tensions in Europe’s perceived identity today. The themes summarise the 
above readings of the myths, but also follow a rudimentary narrative structure, in a 
movement from past to future combined with a play on two levels, concerning both the 
position and the composition of Europe. The first theme thus relates to the positional 
origins of Europe, the second to the main driving force propelling its development, 
the third to its direction and aim, while the fourth concerns the result: what kind of 
being has Europe become?
1.  Europa was forced into exile, abducted against her will from her family, even 
though she also turned out to have much to gain from it both in the beginning 
(lust) and in the end (founding her own dynasty on Crete). Europa’s origin was 
clearly elsewhere, in a trope of ‘eccentricity’ that has been taken up repeatedly 
through history. The dislocation across the waters from east to west is a unique 
feature in this myth. The Europa myth is centred on horizontal movement, voyage 
and by extension migration, and these indeed remain essential experiences in 
today’s Europe. Starting with Herodotus, this trait of the mythical narrative 
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has often been read as a symbolic representation of real, material movements 
of peoples and cultures in that same direction, since it has long been known 
that Europe was populated and its social and cultural achievements likewise 
developed through a series of westward transitions. The myth describes 
Europe’s roots in Africa and Asia, and a will to be uprooted and move to the 
west. Both the myth and the proposed (though questionable) etymology of the 
name indicate a will to identify as a western outpost, a land of the future, to 
which civilisation moves and where it matures, rather than its original cradle. In 
this way, a key element of non-identity and alterity is firmly placed at the heart 
of European identity. This identity of Europe as western was in turn shaken 
by the conquest of America as the new ‘New World’, even farther to the west. 
But it still resonates with the innovative pioneering spirit of the Enlightenment, 
and with the idea of the intrinsic value of progress and mobility, which has in 
late modern societies become a global lodestar and that reappears in the euro 
currency, as will later be shown. But dislocation as a founding element also 
means that Europe is in essence a migrant culture: not with firm roots to its 
place of birth, but always on the move: mobile, transient. This element also has 
clear potentials in relation to late modern visions of empowering and liberating 
mobility that flourish in both neo-liberal and left-wing thought. However, one 
should bear in mind that Europa’s mobility is restricted by the force of the god/
bull: she cannot move freely but is forced by a higher power in a specific north-
westbound direction. But then, late modern mobility too is not as free as neo-
liberal ideologies portray it to be. Captain Euro speaks more of anchorage and a 
safe home than of dislocation, which is instead conceived as a threat embodied 
by the Global Touring Circus. Yet, dislocation is present there too, not only as a 
threat from the villains but also in the necessity for the heroes to always move 
around Europe’s various corners in a quest for unity that demands never-ending 
mobility. Still, the difference indicates a contradiction deep in the European 
project, that between an inescapable dislocation and a strong wish for feeling 
at home in a given space—an inherent tension between values of mobility and 
of stability. After all, dislocation is also an opportunity to start anew—to make 
oneself at home on new ground, which even without any geographical travel 
suits well the self-image of a continent that wants to find a fresh basis for itself 
on a soil marked with ruins and blood from past atrocities.
2.  A driving force of desire and pleasure is everywhere in this myth, and on both 
parts, lending a specific mood to the narrative. The abduction is often depicted 
more as lustful seduction than as violent rape, and Europa is often shown carried 
away in an apparently happy and adventurous mood. What propels Zeus as 




herself loose in a daring and brave adventure where she throws herself out into 
the sea and is immersed in the water with the god, without any secure control. 
Her archaeological links to Astarte, the moon goddess of orgiastic fertility, play 
a role here, as does the carnal, animal eroticism of the bull in many Middle East 
traditions. The combination with the water element adds an oceanic dimension 
that on the one hand has a geopolitical aspect, as it combines the Middle East 
(and later European) land-based communities with the Phoenician and Greek 
sea-based civilisations, and on the other hand also has a deep mythical and 
experiential anchorage in the infant’s earliest experiences as they are nourished 
in the mother–child symbiosis. The aspect of enjoyment might also resonate 
with the message of inter-human love and generosity in Christianity, based on 
the life and teachings of Jesus. The implicit result of eroticism and love is also 
significant, as the combination of this and Europa’s fertility inevitably results 
in an offspring that by settlement can found a selected hereditary dynasty 
and a geographic community. To Captain Euro and his crew, instead of self-
abandoning love-play, all seems to be about control and safety, whereas it is the 
villains who go for boundary-dissolving pleasure and entertainment. It seems as 
if Europe has to use much energy to wrestle with its inner impulses and desires, 
striving to reduce chaos and bring rational order and discipline in a messy 
territory. The good Captain’s team fights for ‘truth and justice’ rather than love 
or happiness, using ‘intellect, culture and logic’ rather than care or compassion 
to reach their goals. In spite of his interest in information and high arts, he does 
not really seem to master the communicative ethos needed for developing the 
‘soft power’ asked for in contemporary politics. This points at a deep ambivalence 
in European identifications between soft values of communication and love on 
one side and hard values of control and mastery on the other.
3.  The myth also has a direction into the future, and this relates to a vertical exchange 
between god, woman and animal. There is the focal element of selectedness 
and elevation in that Europa is united with the mightiest and highest god Zeus; 
a selected human creature has intimate contact with divinity, resulting in a 
noble offspring where Minos founds a Cretan dynasty, and by extension, Greek 
and European civilisation. This elevatory element (that is further emphasised 
by Europa sitting up on the back of the bull) suits Europeans who wish to 
understand themselves as blessed with special gifts, just like those precious 
magic gifts Zeus gave Europa at the end: Europe as the cradle of high culture, 
intellectual life, education and enlightenment. This element of humans offered 
contact with divinity and elevation into sacredness again returns in the myth of 
Jesus as God’s son, which the Christian tradition has found possible to reconcile 
with an idea of all-absorbing love and thus allowed for ways to reconcile the 
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element of erotic desire with that of divine elevation. The whiteness of the bull 
links to the purity and intellectuality of the high ideals and could in modern 
times simultaneously offer a racist celebration of the Caucasian male. This 
first aspect of the Europa myth is also found in that of Captain Euro, where 
past gods have left a treasure and a quest for Europe to inherit and be loyal to. 
This links to what was previously said about the comparative resource Europe 
has in having any founding myth at all, since it may strengthen the feelings of 
supremacy that Europeans, in line with their colonial heritage, can still cherish: 
convictions of possessing a special status in the world, a higher destiny or at 
least a place in the centre of global events. This links to the ‘myth’ of progressive 
perfection, cumulative regeneration and civilising development mentioned 
before, in resonance with the status of the bastion of high culture that seems to 
be a widespread attribute of Europe, both in the self-understanding of European 
elites and in the eyes of many external observers. Even though this is a point 
that the two myths (that of Europa and that of Captain Euro) seem to share, 
it has ambiguous implications, as Europe has to struggle to balance the hubris 
resulting from sacredness with a more humble secularity that is asked for since 
the Enlightenment but can also find support in Europa’s vernacular play with 
the bull in the water.
4.  The result of the recounted narrative can be discussed in terms of inner texture 
and character. In contrast to the other related myths, that of Europa is different 
in its many mixtures—of East and West, high and low, male and female. The 
result is a marked hybridity, not least in Europa’s sons, where human, divine and 
animal traits combine into a new and versatile strength. The myth is on many 
levels full of otherness and mixture: of Africa and Asia; god, animal and human; 
male and female; white and dark; land and sea. The combination of animal and 
human produces three gifted sons, not the Minotaur monstrosity later born 
from another similar combination on the same island of Crete. It is particularly 
interesting to note how it depicts the East–West mixture of ancient Greek culture 
as the cradle of European civilisation. This aspect is often disguised and pushed 
into the background, in phases and camps where Europeans have wished to 
conceal and deny any dependence on that Arab culture and Islamic world 
that has in fact been essential in administrating, developing and transferring 
the rich tradition from ancient Greece into mediaeval European culture. The 
Europa myth is in many ways ambiguous and ambivalent, continually shifting 
perspectives between its characters. This has affinities with multicultural values 
of ethnic and national diversity, but like with the previous couple of traits, it is 
controversial and not universally accepted among Europeans, which may partly 




landscape. Instead of hybridity, Captain Euro prefers to speak for a seamless 
unity, but he too remains haunted by ambiguities and tries desperately to 
integrate as many identity positions as possible into his team, so that diversity 
and heterogeneity continue to haunt his naive desire for strength in unity. The 
fact that Captain Euro prefers diplomacy to violence and loves language and 
communication is on the other hand at least a faint echo of the communicative 
elements in the Europa myth. There is again a clear tension in European identity, 
between diversity and unity. This is far from unique to Europe; it is in fact a 
problem faced everywhere, but as will be shown, Europe has found specific 
ways to deal with this tension.
  Based in the Europa myth and highlighted by the other older myths linked 
to Europe’s destiny, dislocation and mobility seem to be a unique spatial 
characteristic of Europa, while her mythical competitors tend to be more static. 
The driving force behind this process is lustful desire and passion, creating a 
mood of attraction and adventure, in contrast to for instance hatred, sorrow, 
longing or friendship that are encountered in other myths not related to Europe. 
Europe is mythically elevated, where the phoenix instead offers to Asia a more 
archaic, repetitively cyclical time process. Both Europa and Prometheus (as well 
as Captain Euro) emphasise a temporal and vertical element of lifting human 
beings up by communication with higher spirits. And Europa’s mythical process 
charts a transformation from a female to a markedly hybrid identity, which is a 
fascinating trait that keeps the limits and boundaries of her human identity open 
to further hybridisations as well. Elevation combined with tensions between 
desire–welfare, mobility–sovereignty and hybridity–unity: these then appear 
to be key elements in the investigated mythical narratives of Europe. Which 
interpretation of each of these points is today closest to European identification 
remains to be seen when analysing the remaining symbols.
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Identifying Symbols
Before analysing symbols any further, it is necessary first to take a step back 
and consider the conceptual foundations of this enterprise. As tools for col lective 
identification, symbols serve as clues to how communities are formed, though the 
symbolic realm is too often neglected by social research. Identities are here understood 
as meanings attached to human individuals or collectives, in interaction among them-
selves and with surrounding others. Iden ti ties are formed by signification processes 
spun around specific individuals or groups, where people in thought and action link 
somebody or something to a range of meanings representing characteristic traits and 
values for that person or collective. 
Meanings and identities do not exist only as mental phenomena ‘inside’ people. 
They always arise and deve lop by the mediation of material tokens or signs of some 
kind: words, images, sounds or other per ceptible ex ternal marks organised into 
various forms of artefacts, texts, works, genres and dis courses. There are many possible 
vocabularies for these processes, depending on theoretical perspect ive. I will here use 
a range of theories, with the critical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur in focus, but also 
incorporating elements from the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce and early twentieth 
century works by Ernst Cassirer, George H. Mead and Susanne K. Langer. Along 
with Ricoeur, I will also make use of ideas from psychoanalytical hermeneutics (here 
primarily Hanna Segal and Alfred Lorenzer) as well as from structuralism and post-
structuralist deconstruction. One obvious source of inspiration is social anthropology, 
especially the works of Sherry B. Ortner, Anthony P. Cohen and others. The conceptual 
analysis proceeds in a series of steps, each adding new aspects, by moving from 






Europe is given meaning by being understood as a meaningful text, that is, as an 
entity which means something, points at something else, not simply as its cause of 
existence (the way indexes do, for instance when a smoke indicates a fire), but due to 
a convention whereby people tend to associate Europe with certain ideas or values of 
some kind. Europe as meaningful implies that it is constructed and understood as a 
cultural entity: a text composed of signs, in the wide sense of both words, denoting 
any conglomerate of material marks used for carrying meaning. Europe is not (only) a 
text, but when people give it meaning, they approach it as if it was and thus construct 
Europe as a cultural category.
Meanings are not pure mental and subjective constructs. They are intersubjective, 
constituted by the interplay between people (subjects) in social settings where they 
ascribe meaning to various phenomena, from things to events and practices. As tools 
for signifying practices, these phenomena imbued with meaning then function as signs, 
and through discourses linking signs to statements, and statements to works of higher 
complexity, signs are combined into texts. Signs are ‘expressions that communicate a 
meaning’: ‘Every sign aims at something beyond itself and stands for that something’, 
says Paul Ricoeur.88 These terms have been developed by a rich tradition of semiotic 
theory that will not be further explicated here, but which goes back to the semiotics of 
Charles S. Peirce: ‘A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity’.89 
A first approximation of the concept of symbol (‘symbol1’) is that it is a sign, 
something that points towards or stands for something else, by way of its meaning. 
A second specification is that a symbol (‘symbol2’) is a particular type of sign, with 
a conventional rather than natural relation between the mark and its meaning.90 A 
symbol2 is then a basic material unit for making meaning by attaching meaning to it 
in socially contextualised interactive, intersubjective and interpretive practices. This 
is how Charles S. Peirce defines symbols as signs whose meanings are the result of 
conventional interpretation deriving from their use in social practices, rather than 
from any law of nature.91 His other two categories of signs are the icon, which is in 
some way simply similar to what it represents, and the index, which is caused by what 
it represents. The first works by resemblance, the second by causation; by contrast, 
the symbol’s relation to what it represents is wholly conventional, decided by social 
and historical processes that happen to link them. In a sense, only symbols have true 
meanings, since icons rather have similarities and indexes have causes.
Others who also use the term ‘symbol’ in a general sense as almost equivalent to 
‘sign’ are Ernst Cassirer who talks of ‘the universal symbolic function’ and Susanne K. 
Langer who conceives symbols as all signs used ‘not only to indicate things, but also 
to represent them’, which she sees as a unique human capacity of formal abstraction.92 
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Norbert Elias has a similar perspective: ‘Symbols are not pictures or mirrors of the 
world; they are neither windows nor curtains. They have not an imitative, pictorial, 
but a representational function.’93 
Also, in the pragmatic and interactional tradition of social psychology, George H. 
Mead discusses ‘significant symbols’ as gestures that create meaning through being 
used in interpersonal interaction, thus constituting language.94 Like the others, he 
also stresses that thinking and mental life is anchored in the (‘inner’) use of symbols: 
‘Actually, our thinking always takes place by means of some sort of symbols’.95 This has 
been further developed by interaction-oriented psychological and psychoanalytical 
thinkers such as Hanna Segal, who links symbol formation to communication, 
wherein she includes not only communication with the external world but also 
‘internal communication’ by means of symbols, such as ‘verbal thinking’ which uses 
words to, among other things, integrate ‘earlier desires, anxieties, and phantasies 
into the later stages of development by symbolization’.96 This particular function is of 
course derived from a psychoanalytical perspective on how individual human beings 
build their adult selves on remnants from their relational childhood experiences. But 
it may also be transferred to the collective domain, where for instance communities of 
Europe use symbolic processes in order to integrate historical experiences and ideals 
into their currently shared self-understanding.
In this sense, then, a symbol2 (or a symbolic sign) is a conventional representation 
of something absent, making it virtually present (‘re-present’): an object or a process 
that is recalled by signifying practices that forge interpretive chains of association. As 
core units in all webs of culture, signs are material marks that stand for something 
else (meaning) to some people (interpretive com munity) in certain settings (context). 
They are tokens that for certain people in certain settings (organised by daily practices) 
tend to ‘point at’ something outside themselves. 
The word ‘symbol’ derives from the Greek symbállein, meaning ‘throw together’.97 
Symbolic signs are indeed integrating, combinatory or linking devices in at least 
three ways: they join inter act ing people in a shared un derstanding of mean ings, they 
integrate internal subjective experience with external material objects, and they join 
present signs and texts with absent but virtually re-presented mean ings, thereby 
linking near and far as well as present and past. All symbols2 are therefore mediating 
cultural phenomena, circulating through a wide range of com munication media. 
Taking inspiration from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ theory, Alfred 
Lorenzer stresses how symbols as constituents of language use mediate between 
physical nature and societal history as well as between consciousness and behaviour, 
by serving as tools for intersubjective coordination as well as for developing the 
individual mind.98  Close to Peirce’s sign concept, Lorenzer argues that symbols 
integrate language (cultural world) and practice (social world) by uniting three 




subject, context and text.99 Material or ‘external’ symbols carry meaning anchored in 
‘inner’ symbols that form a specific level of individual (as well as collective) subjects, 
mediating between sensory experience and mental imagination, as basis of identity.100 
I will soon return to this point, but for now conclude that symbols2 are conventional 
or cultural signs. 
Interpretations
What is then interpretation? It is an interaction between texts and their users 
(‘readers’), where the meanings implied by the textual combinations of signs are 
reconstructed. Critical hermeneutics is the reflective theory of how such processes of 
interpretation develop in a dialectical interplay between understanding (tentatively 
approaching and appropriating the textual universe) and explanation (systematically 
testing interpretive hypotheses by analysing textual structures and other ‘distancing’ 
practices). 
The kind of hermeneutics which I now favour starts from the 
recognition of the objective meaning of the text as distinct from 
the subjective intention of the author. This objective meaning is not 
something hidden behind the text. Rather it is a requirement addressed 
to the reader. The interpretation accordingly is a kind of obedience to 
this injunction starting from the text. This […] means that what has 
to be interpreted in a text is what it says and what it speaks about, i.e., 
the kind of world which it opens up or discloses. […] This shift within 
hermeneutics from a ‘romanticist’ trend to a more ‘objectivist’ trend is 
the result of this long travel through structuralism.101
‘The sense of a text is not behind the text, but in front of it. It is not something hidden, 
but something disclosed’, Ricoeur continues in another text.102 This is a welcome 
improvement of older, romanticist notions of interpretation, where textual meanings 
were seen as residing in the minds of authors. Ricoeur’s development of critical 
hermeneutics thus productively responds to the structuralist critique of hermeneutics, 
including that voiced by Michel Foucault and others in his footsteps, making their 
‘anti-hermeneutical’ critique largely irrelevant.
Several problems in this analysis of meaning, sign and text cannot be fully solved 
here. One such problem concerns the notion of ‘convention’. Based on Saussure’s 
linguistics, a strong version of structuralist semiotics has stressed that all links 
between signs and what they represent are totally arbitrary, and that all meanings 
only result out of the juxtapositioning of signs in a symbolic order that is thus in a 
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way cut off from any ‘real’ world ‘out there’. But it seems important not to totally reify 
this symbolic order, but remember how it is linked to concrete and situated histories 
of social experiences and practices. This means that at any given moment, signs 
in real everyday lifeworlds (as opposed to the technically specialised symbolisms 
constructed for instance in mathematics) are never totally arbitrary, but bound to 
human experience, combining biological-natural with historical-social elements. 
‘Thus in a variety of ways symbolic activity lacks autonomy. It is a bound activity’, 
says Ricoeur. ‘This bound character of symbols makes all the difference between a 
symbol and a metaphor. The latter is a free invention of discourse; the former is 
bound to the cosmos. […] Symbols have roots. Symbols plunge us into the shadowy 
experience of power’.103
This also reminds us that it is important not to draw any line of division between 
interpretive and critical studies. Hermeneutics acknowledges the centrality of the 
signifying and interpretive practices of communication in human and social life, 
but this quest for meaning is not beyond the struggles of power and critique. Some 
proponents of structuralism and of critical cultural studies have constructed a polarity 
between understanding and resistance. In this, they distance themselves from an 
already outdated romantic version of hermeneutics. To Ricoeur, ‘what is peculiar to 
modern hermeneutics is that it remains in the line of critical thought’.104 It is true that 
he often seems to emphasise the element of restoration and tradition, for instance 
when arguing for acknowledging the tradition also of revolutionary ideas. But he 
repeatedly also asserts the necessity of a critical dissolution of founding myths. 
Thus, the time of restoration is not a different time from that of 
criticism; we are in every way children of criticism, and we seek to go 
beyond criticism by means of criticism, by a criticism that is no longer 
reductive but restorative.105
In fact, one may on the basis of a critical hermeneutics give equal weight to both sides. 
On the one hand, if an interpretation is to understand the meanings of any cultural 
phenomenon, it needs to make use of a series of distancing and critical detours that will 
enrich this understanding by highlighting how symbols, texts and myths are linked 
to various forms of power. On the other hand, no critique can be efficient if it does 
not proceed through an understanding of what the criticised phenomenon actually 
means; else it won’t even hit its intended target. The present study of Europe symbols 
will strive to uphold an unreductive dialectics between moments of understanding 
and of critique, keeping different ways of using these symbols open as far as possible, 
exposing their links to problematic aspects of European history and identity without 





Another problem concerns the priority of verbal language, based in speech. Much 
meaning theory is derived from linguistic or literary theory, and tends to see verbal 
language, especially speech, as the preferential symbolic mode, seeing other forms 
of expression (such as pictures or music) as fundamentally different. I will here not 
stick to such a model, but instead consider all symbolic modes as equally involved 
in signifying practices, even though they organise meaning-production in different 
ways.106
Meanings never exist a priori, but are always made and recreated in situated 
practices, in interpretive communities. Peirce expresses this in an almost poetic 
manner: ‘Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs […]. 
We think only in signs. […] A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In 
use and in experience, its meaning grows.’107 In a similar spirit, Clifford Geertz argues 
that ‘meaning is use, or more carefully, arises from use’.108 The meanings of symbols and 
texts must therefore be interpreted by participating in the communicative practices 
and language games where they circulate. Cultural research therefore always demands 
moments of immersive participation into the symbolic worlds to be studied.109
Meanings—including that of Europe—are always constructed in an intertextual 
play with similarity and difference. Texts and meanings form—and are constituted 
in—networks that give rise to dynamic signifying systems. For instance, Europe’s 
meanings are shaped by comparisons to other units, such as other continents (Africa, 
Asia, America), but also other artefacts that in myths, narratives or images are linked 
to Europe in terms of similarity or contrast: animals, flowers, etc. As Bo Stråth among 
others has understood, ‘Europe is seen in the mirror of the Other’.110 As Stuart Hall 
has shown, this interplay is unavoidable but entails certain trappings, including the 
risk of sticking to ideological combinations of polarisation (exaggerating contrasts 
between ‘the west and the rest’) and stereotyping (erasing internal differences on 
both sides of the divide).111 This is important to remember when making comparative 
interpretations of European and other symbols.
Polysemies
All that is true for signs is also valid for symbols, since a symbol is a kind of sign. 
It has already been said that symbols2 are conventional signs, constituting a symbolic 
order. But for the purpose of this study, the concept of symbol needs to be narrowed 
down still more, in three further steps. The first qualification was that a symbol1 is a 
sign, the second that a symbol2 is a conventional sign, which filters away those signs 
that are for instance merely physical traces or indices of something. The term ‘symbol’ 
is then reserved to those truly cultural signs that are dependent on human interaction 
and interpretation.
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The third approximation of the concept of symbol is that a ‘symbol3’ may be defined 
as a particularly complex conventional sign that is charged with a ‘double meaning’, to 
borrow Ricoeur’s expression. Symbols3 in this sense are emphatically polysemic and 
notoriously open to plural readings. 
Thus, contrary to perfectly transparent technical signs, which say only 
what they want to say in positing that which they signify, symbolic 
signs are opaque, because the first, literal, obvious meaning itself 
points analogically to a second meaning which is not given otherwise 
than in it […]. This opacity constitutes the depth of the symbol, which, 
it will be said, is inexhaustible.112
‘To mean something other than what is said—this is the symbolic function’, says 
Ricoeur in another context.113 ‘I define “symbol” as any structure of signification in 
which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning 
which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can be apprehended only 
through the first’.114 
It should be noted that even in this sense, symbols3 may still retain elements of 
iconicity and/or indexicality. For instance, if a drawing depicts a fire by combining 
some vertical wave lines, it has both an iconic element in that these lines are supposed 
to look like ascending smoke, and an indexical element in that smoke is supposedly 
an effect of fire.
Symbols3 are therefore intrinsically linked to the need of interpretation through 
the ‘hermeneutic problem’ they pose, since ‘there is something astonishing and even 
scandalous about the use of symbols’:
1. The symbol remains opaque, not transparent, since it is given by 
means of an analogy based on a literal signification. The symbol is 
thus endowed with concrete roots and a certain material density and 
opacity.
2. The symbol is a prisoner of the diversity of languages and cultures 
and, for this reason, remains contingent: Why these symbols rather 
than any others?
3. The symbol is given to thought only by way of an interpretation which 
remains inherently problematical. There is no myth without exegesis, 
no exegesis without contestation. […] Opacity, cultural contingency, 
and dependency on a problematical interpretation—such are the 
three deficiencies of the symbol as measured by the ideal of clarity, 




This outlines very well the task implied in trying to understand how various symbols 
identify Europe. It includes carefully reconstructing (1) the ‘concrete roots’ of these 
symbols—where they come from, historically as well as socially; (2) the various 
symbolisations found competing with each other in various cultural contexts; and (3) 
the possible critical and oppositional readings against the grain of the intended and 
official meanings suggested by dominant European institutions. 
Identities
It is necessary to qualify the meaning of an entity like Europe by adding the 
concept of identity. What has been said so far may perhaps suffice to start interpreting 
the meaning of the word ‘Europe’, or of the corresponding geographic formation 
of the European continent as such. But this is not an issue here, or rather this is 
just a step towards understanding what Europe means as a political and cultural 
community—a collective of human subjects who identify themselves as members of 
this community. Texts have meanings, but the meanings of human subjects (whether 
as single individuals or as collectives grouped into communities) are different, as they 
are used for self-identification. They therefore deserve a special name: identities. In 
order to differentiate collective and symbolically mediated identities from personal or 
subjective ones, one often talks about ‘cultural identities’. 
In this sense, identities are meanings people attach to themselves and to others, 
to identify them as something characteristic. Individually as well as collectively, in 
constellations on every level, from intimate core groups to humanity as a whole, people 
identify as something, by interpreting themselves in terms of values or characteristics 
that are like meanings attached to acting subjects. This capacity of being ‘inhabited’ 
makes identities special. It is related to the fact that meanings are not pre-existing in any 
text, but always ‘made’ in signifying practices involving human subjects. In a reflexive 
mode, these subjects can turn their meaning-making capacity towards themselves (and 
others), and construct identities for selves and others, making them meaningful.
Identity does not suggest a complete unity, neither in time nor in space. This is true 
for individual as well as for collective identities. It is obvious that a person as well as 
a group is always to some extent internally divided, containing different sides. It is 
obvious that subjects are never in stasis, but always change and develop in various 
ways. The concept of identity only denotes and presupposes a relative coherence across 
time (stability) and space (coherence), and—borrowing an idea from Wittgenstein—
there is more of a ‘family likeness’ than a total uniformity between what somebody is 
between moments.116
Ricoeur distinguishes two aspects of identity: ‘on one side, identity as sameness 
(Latin idem, German Gleichheit, French mêmeté); on the other, identity as selfhood 
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(Latin ipse, German Selbstheit, French ipséité)’.117 Only the former is characterised 
by numerical ‘oneness’ and ‘permanence in time’ in a strong and strict sense, and is 
applicable also to dead objects, whereas identity as selfhood is of key relevance to all 
forms of personal and cultural identity. These are constructed by narratives, by telling 
stories that locate individuals and groups in space and time, conferring meaning to 
them. Subjects are never given from the start but grow through their exchanges with 
texts of all kinds, used to identify the world, others and themselves. ‘In place of an ego 
enamoured of itself arises a self instructed by cultural symbols, the first among which 
are the narratives handed down in our literary tradition. And these narratives give us 
a unity which is not substantial but narrative’, says Ricoeur.118 He underlines that 
the self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by the 
detour of the cultural signs of all sorts which are articulated on the 
symbolic mediations which always already articulate action and, 
among them, the narratives of everyday life. Narrative mediation 
underlines this remarkable characteristic of self-knowledge—that it is 
self-interpretation.119
All this also applies to collective selves, such as nations. 
It is at this radical level that ideology is constituted. It seems related to 
the need every group has to give itself an image of itself, to ‘represent’ 
itself, in the theatrical sense of the word, to put itself on stage, to play 
itself. Perhaps no social group can exist without this indirect relation 
to its own being through a representation of itself.120
On this basis, Ricoeur sums up the task of critical hermeneutics in regard to identities 
as combining three interrelated problematics: ‘1. the indirect approach of reflection 
through the detour of analysis; 2. the first determination of selfhood by way of its 
contrast with sameness; 3. the second determination of selfhood by way of its dialectic 
with otherness.’121 Applied to the task of understanding European identity, this implies 
(1) that it must be approached by indirect way through analysis of its expressions in 
various symbolic realms; (2) that it needs to be outlined not by simple and univocal 
definitions but by tracing the narratives through which it is told and lived; and (3) that 
it always unfolds in a complex interaction with surrounding others. 
In the last sense, identity adds to the interplay of unity and difference a dimension 
of (practices of) inclusion and exclusion, which has been discussed by Anthony P. 
Cohen. ‘The most striking feature of the symbolic construction of the community 
and its boundaries is its oppositional character. The boundaries are relational rather 




People’s sense of their Europeanness (or other wise) is al ways intertwined with other 
identities, including those involving nation ality, eth ni city, class, age, ge ne ration, 
gender, sexuality, religion and poli tic al affiliation.123 European identity is also formed 
and must be interpreted rela tionally through differences to various ‘others’, notably 
Islam, Asia, Africa and the United States.
Cohen approaches social communities from an explicitly cultural perspective, in 
focusing on how people give meaning to social boundaries.124 The use of the word 
‘community’ implies 
that the members of a group of people (a) have something in common 
with each other, which (b) distinguishes them in a significant way 
from the members of other putative groups. ‘Community’ thus seems 
to imply simultaneously both similarity and difference. The word thus 
expresses a relational idea […]. We are talking here about what the 
boundary means to people, or, more precisely, about the meanings 
they give to it. This is the symbolic aspect of community boundary.125
This interplay between meanings, symbols, identity and community is essential to the 
study of Europe symbols, since it makes the latter highly important to social action: 
‘People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of 
meaning, and a referent of their identity’.126 Benedict Anderson has studied the nation 
as precisely such an ‘imagined political community’, which is imagined since each of 
its members will never meet more than a minority of other members, but still nourish 
an image of their community—as a symbolic construction.127 This is not to say that 
it is a pure fiction, since when people act according to such imagination, they make 
it as real as anyone can ask for, and also they underpin this symbolic construction 
by effective social institutions (customs and other border limitations, national state 
authorities etc.). In this study, it is the symbolic identification of Europe as a supra-, 
trans- or even post-national community that is at stake.
Identifiers
This leads to a fourth step, which narrows down the concept of symbol even further, 
especially in this particular study which looks at specific signs that are symbols of a 
particular social entity. The fourth approximation of symbols (‘symbol4’) is that they 
are identity markers or identifiers in a more specific way than other signs. The Europe 
symbols to be discussed here are all of this particular kind: they are emblems of a 
community or group—in this case Europe. Europe as a thing, a word or a physically 
defined geographic area does not necessarily require such identifying symbols4, since 
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they have meanings but no identity in the sense discussed above. But Europe as a 
(political, social or cultural) community does, since such collective identities can 
only be constructed and understood through mediation, that is, via a detour through 
texts—and such identifying texts are symbols4 in an even more qualified and precise 
sense than any of those mentioned so far. 
Such symbols4 not only have double but at least triple meanings. A symbol4 is first a 
particular sign with a primary meaning (‘meaning1’), for instance a flag depicting a set 
of stars. Secondly, these stars are agreed to implicitly indicate a certain set of values or 
characteristics, for instance a harmonic relation between units (‘meaning2’). Third, as 
this sign with its double meaning is linked to a certain community, for instance Europe, 
it identifies this community as sharing these intended values, thereby knitting a third 
layer into its web of signification (‘meaning3’). For a European flag, meaning1 is what 
it literally depicts; meaning2 is its secondary meanings, that is, an implied set of values 
or characteristics; and meaning3 is Europe. The signifying process involves linking 
the symbol to its primary meaning (deciphering what it is supposed to represent); 
then linking this to some secondary meaning which it indirectly and ‘symbolically’ 
represents; and finally constituting a bond between this secondary sphere of meanings 
and the entity for which the symbol is meant to serve as an identifier.
As is the case with the more simple meanings discussed above, all these complex 
operations—linking a symbol4 to its triple meanings and thus ultimately identifying 
a community as something particular, constructing its identity—are dependent on 
socially situated interpretive or signifying practices, that is, on the practical uses of 
symbols4 in discourses where meanings are tested and challenged. This signifying 
process is vulnerable and can be broken off in all steps. First, the symbol may lose its 
force by losing its capacity to indicate something specific and either be perceived as 
a meaningless bundle of elements or be misinterpreted to represent something else 
that is irrelevant to its uses. For instance, people could stop understanding the stars 
as stars, just experiencing them as irregular golden dots, or fail to think of the blue 
background as having anything to do with heaven. This way, meaning1 gets lost or is 
reconstructed in ways that distort the initially intended significance of the symbol. 
Second, crucial elements of the customary secondary meaning2 can be lost, for 
instance if people tend to interpret a circular form as implying not unified perfection 
but instead closure or narcissistic circularity. Third, if people fail to understand that 
the symbol is meant to identify Europe, its whole point again gets lost.
Whether individual or collective, identities are not fixed, stable or unified entities, 
as for instance Stuart Hall has repeatedly stressed: 
[I]dentities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly 
fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed 




practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization, 
and are constantly in the process of change and transformation.128
In a similar vein, Julia Kristeva talks of the ‘subject-in-process’, and Paul Ricoeur of 
‘oneself as another’.129 Such an approach is common in literature on Europe, which is 
full of formulations such as this: ‘Europe is not a fixed essence but labile and in a flux. 
European—and national—identities are always fluid and contextual, contested and 
contingent, and discursively shaped under various forms of inclusion and exclusion.’130 
This is also my position here.
Building on ideas from Antonio Gramsci and Ernesto Laclau, Stuart Hall elaborated 
on the concept of articulation in a way that seems applicable here.131 He makes use of 
the intrinsic double meaning of this concept. On the one hand, it means to utter, to 
express and put into language, as when speakers articulate words. On the other hand, 
it is also used to denote phenomena where something is connected or combined with 
something else. This latter is for instance used by dentists for describing how the 
jaws combine, and Hall takes the example of an articulated lorry or truck that under 
specific conditions connects a cab to a trailer. ‘An articulation is thus the form of the 
connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. 
It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time.’ 
This idea directs the focus of attention to the circumstances that make possible for 
a discourse to articulate distinct elements that have no necessary, logical, natural or 
universal relation. 
Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how 
ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere 
together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do 
not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political 
subjects. 
This is a useful way of putting it, since it shows that while what the combination 
symbols make of elements (sign and meaning, or representation and reference) is 
always context-dependent, it need not be completely arbitrary in a strong sense, but 
conditioned by the historical and social circumstances where symbols circulate and 
are used. The concept of articulation invites studying how symbols are combined 
with plural meanings in socially situated signifying practices, and in particular to 
understand how those meanings that are attached to subjects as their identities also 
are context-dependent. This is highly relevant to the study of Europe symbols.
The symbols of Europe have—or are continuously ascribed—meanings. By being 
linked to Europe, they establish a shared set of interpretations of the identity of 
Europe. When a flag is used to identify Europe—for its own citizens, who thereby 
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identify as Europeans, but also for outsiders who simultaneously associate European 
people with corresponding characteristics and values—the meaning of the flag is 
linked to that of Europe, and some properties of the flag are agreed to be similar to 
those of Europe. It is of course not every property of the symbol that becomes valid 
in this signifying process. The most concrete material traits of a flag, such as having a 
specific size or being made of cloth, is irrelevant to Europeanness, since they are the 
same for all flags and do not differ between flags. What is relevant is instead what the 
symbol signifies, its meanings. A certain design is understood to imply a certain set of 
values, and the use of such a symbol to identify a community then serves to establish 
an interpretation of that community as sharing those values.
The meaning of a symbol4, like a flag, is then triple. The design of the symbol invites 
its users to construct its meaning: a star is not just a star but perhaps also stands for 
a member of some confederate unity. But through the use of the flag to identify a 
community, a third level of signification is added, by which the flag also means Europe, 
and through its own (second-level) meaning projects identity to that community. 
Through being used as a symbol for Europe, the flag links the characteristics of its 
own second-level meaning to Europe, so that the flag on this third level is said to both 
signify and identify Europe. 
Compared to a simple thing or unitary sign, a full text or larger conglomerate both 
widens and narrows the range of interpretations. A complex composite unity like 
Europe can never have one single meaning/identity, not only because it (like all signs) 
as a totality is polysemic and can be understood differently from different perspectives, 
but also because it is a highly differentiated conglomerate of different elements that 
may be selected, combined and therefore also understood in various ways. On the 
other hand, a very simple unitary sign leaves large room for interpretation, while 
a complex text in many respects tends to fix and stabilise its interpretations. For 
instance, a short quote or motto may invite lots of divergent interpretations, but if it is 
read in a larger context, this contextualisation specifies which of these interpretations 
are most reasonable and legitimate. 
Therefore, no symbols have once and for all a completely fixed meaning, and this 
openness to subjective or oppositional reinterpretation is actually part of their living 
force: ‘Symbols are effective because they are imprecise’, says Anthony P. Cohen.132 This 
is particularly essential in relation to symbols4 used for identifying communities, as all 
identities are always also (if in shifting ways and degrees) transient and multiple: 
Community is just such a boundary-expressing symbol. As a symbol, it is 
held in common by its members; but its meaning varies with its members’ 
unique orientations to it. In the face of this variability of meaning, the 
consciousness of community has to be kept alive through manipulation 




found in community need not be a uniformity. It does not clone behaviour 
or ideas. It is a commonality of forms (ways of behaving) whose content 
(meanings) may vary considerably among its members.133
Studying the meanings of Europe symbols to see how they identify Europe as 
a community can therefore never result in a once-and-for-all explanation but is a 
continuing process where each interpretation can always be challenged by new events 
and reinterpretations, and where different actors—Europeans as well as outsiders—
may construct this collective cultural identity differently.
Keys
Fifth, among these emphatic symbols one may discern some (‘symbol5’) that are more 
crucial than others in a given society. Europe’s meaning and identity is constructed 
by practices where it is linked to other and more simple and clear signs regarded as 
condensation of the core values of Europe, thus functioning as key symbols in a most 
distinct sense. Such key ‘symbols5’ are particularly charged with many layers of meaning 
through their use as central tools of iden tification in practices of signification, and 
they are widely acknowledged as carrying values central to the whole community. A 
Europe symbol in this most strict sense would refer to a generally honoured condensed 
expression in any symbolic mode or genre of what is understood as charac ter istic of 
Europe and what it may mean to be European.
The social anthropologist Sherry B. Ortner has analysed the concept of key 
symbols, distinguishing between ‘summarizing’ and ‘elaborating’ symbols.134 The first 
are often sacred, synthesising, standing for the social system as a whole, whereas the 
latter are analytic and have a more limited application. ‘Symbols with great conceptual 
elaborating power’ are ‘root metaphors which provide categories for the ordering of 
conceptual experience’, whereas ‘key scenarios’ ‘provide strategies for organizing 
action experience’. There are thus two broad types of key symbols: 
Summarizing symbols are primarily objects of attention and cultural 
respect; they synthesize or ‘collapse’ complex experience, and relate the 
respondent to the grounds of the system as a whole. They include the 
most importantly sacred symbols in the traditional sense. Elaborating 
symbols, on the other hand, are symbols valued for their contribution 
to the ordering or ‘sorting out’ of experience. Within this are symbols 
valued primarily for the ordering of conceptual experience, i.e., for 
providing cultural ‘orientations,’ and those valued primarily for the 
ordering of action, i.e., for providing cultural ‘strategies.’135
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Ricoeur also talks of ‘root metaphors’ that ‘assemble subordinate images together’ 
and serve as ‘a junction between the symbolic level with its slow evolution and 
the more volatile metaphorical level’.136 He comes up with a slightly different 
categorisation:
I suggest that we distinguish various levels of creativity of symbols 
[…]. At the lowest level we come upon sedimented symbolism: here 
we find various stereotyped and fragmented remains of symbols, 
symbols so commonplace and worn with use that they have nothing 
but a past. […] At a second level we come upon the symbols that 
function in everyday life; these are the symbols that are useful and 
are actually utilized, that have a past and a present, and that in the 
clockwork of a given society serve as a token for the nexus of social 
pacts […]. At a higher level come the prospective symbols; these are 
creations of meaning that take up the traditional symbols with their 
multiple significations and serve as the vehicles of new meanings. 
This creation of meaning reflects the living substrate of symbolism, a 
substrate that is not the result of social sedimentation.137
Europe symbols are presumably to be found on all these levels. When taken up and 
accepted by a community a metaphor tends to become first trivial and then a ‘dead’ 
metaphor, while true symbols ‘plunge their roots into the durable constellations of life, 
feeling, and the universe’, achieving an incredible stability that gives the impression 
that ‘a symbol never dies, it is only transformed’.138
The psychoanalyst Alfred Lorenzer differentiates between symbols as conscious 
representations and clichés as non-symbolic structures.139 When experiences 
are repressed, they become unconscious but still continue to affect people’s lives 
and behaviour. In that process, representations also become desymbolised or 
excommunicated, and degenerate into clichés working like irrational stereotypes or 
prejudices to distort communication. There is a two-way dynamics at play here, in 
that the formation of symbols in a symbolic order crystallises them out of a circle of 
what Lorenzer calls ‘protosymbols’, that is, a halo of vague and only partly conscious 
images and representations that form a nourishing ground out of which symbolic 
representations develop. 
Ricoeur likewise alludes to a cloud of not-yet-crystallised meanings that 
enrich the significance of a symbol or a work and support its potential for plural 
interpretations:
The secondary meanings, as in the case of the horizon, which 




may even be said that these readings are ruled by the prescriptions of 
meaning belonging to the margins of potential meaning surrounding 
the semantic nucleus of the work.140
This may also be applicable to Europe symbols, where it may be expected that formally 
acknowledged official symbols have core meanings that are also surrounded by open 
sets of secondary meanings inviting long chains of interpretations. There is no way to 
step out of this signifying crosscurrent. Responding to any text or symbol with silence 
will not diminish the force of the meanings that surround it, nor is there any fixed point 
of reference that would once and for all dissolve all differences of interpretation. With 
Ricoeur, I thus agree that the only way to go against bad or ideologically problematic 
readings is instead to suggest other and better interpretations, contributing to the 
endless conflict of interpretations that is basically what human culture is about: ‘It 
is because absolute knowledge is impossible that the conflict of interpretations is 
insurmountable and inescapable.’141 
In one of his last texts, Ricoeur returns to the role of symbolic mediation and 
representation for constituting social bonds and modes of identity:
This connection between representations and social practices is 
expressed through the role of symbolic mediation these representations 
exercise when there is something specific at stake with regard to the 
social practices, namely, instituting the social bond and the modes of 
identity attached to it. Representations are not therefore abstract ideas 
floating in some autonomous space, but, as said, symbolic mediations 
contributing to the instituting of the social bond. What they symbolize 
is identities that confer a particular configuration on those social 
bonds as they are formed.142
This also reminds us that symbols may be increasingly important in times of 
historical change that challenges customary social bonds. This conclusion is drawn 
by Anthony P. Cohen as well: ‘We have found that as the structural bases of the 
boundary become undermined or weakened as a consequence of social change, so 
people resort increasingly to symbolic behaviour to reconstitute the boundary.’143 He 
believes that ‘the diminution of the geographical bases of community boundaries 
has led to their renewed assertion in symbolic terms’.144 This is certainly applicable to 




Analysing the ‘values peculiar to a nation’, Paul Ricoeur asks: ‘What constitutes 
the creative nucleus of a civilization?’ In many ways, this quest may be translated 
to the transnational level as well. Ricoeur concludes that they need to be sought 
out ‘on several different levels’, as a ‘multiplicity of successive layers’.145 Customs 
and traditions do not constitute this creative nucleus, as they represent inertia and 
reproduction. 
At a less superficial level, these values are manifested by means of 
traditional institutions, but these institutions are themselves only a 
reflection of the state of thought, will, and feeling of a human group 
at a certain point in history. The institutions are always abstract signs 
which need to be deciphered. It seems to me that if one wishes to 
attain the cultural nucleus, one has to cut through to that layer of 
images and symbols which make up the basic ideals of a nation. […] 
Images and symbols constitute what might be called the awakened 
dream of a historical group. It is in this sense that I speak of the 
ethico-mythical nucleus which constitutes the cultural resources of 
a nation.146
There are thus plenty of good reasons to take European symbols seriously. By 
way of summarising what has been said so far, symbols are thus tools used in the 
fields where identities are cultivated through signifying processes of identification. 
But these fields are at the same time also battlefields where actors forge symbolic 
weapons to challenge others and promote their own interests. A first approximation 
is that a symbol is a sign, something that points towards or stands for something 
else, by way of its meaning. A second specification is that a symbol is a particular 
type of sign with a conventional rather than natural relation between the mark and 
its meaning; a conventional representation of something absent, making it virtually 
present, ‘re-presenting’ it by signifying practices that forge interpretive chains of 
association linked to that which is signified. A third and more precise approximation 
is that a symbol is a particularly complex conventional sign that is charged with 
multiple meanings, notoriously polysemic and open to plural readings. Fourthly, the 
symbols discussed here are identity markers or identifiers that serve as emblems of a 
community or group. Collective identities can only be constructed and understood 
through mediation, that is, via a detour through texts, that is, through symbols in 
an even more qualified sense than those mentioned so far. Fifth and finally, among 
these emphatic symbols one may discern some that are more crucial than others in 




shared core values of Europe, for instance. A Europe symbol in this most strict sense 
would refer to a generally honoured condensed expression in any symbolic mode or 
genre of what is understood as charac ter istic of Europe and what it may mean to be 
European.
The Europe symbols to be studied here mostly move between the last two levels 
mentioned above, that is, the fourth and fifth approximation of the symbol concept 
(symbols4 and symbols5). The EU institutions strive to establish official symbols that 
will serve as key symbols for European citizens, while some other symbols discussed 
for comparisons are also in various ways emblems for some European community or 
organisation but do not possess that wide legitimacy that would make them true key 
symbols.
Contemporary Europe symbols are artefactual, textual, visual, aural or gestural 
compounds that serve as crys tallisers of meaning around Europeanness; they are 
the polysemically charged nodal points in discourses and prac tices where Europe 
is constructed and interpreted. They are in a sense ‘opaque’, carrying con tested and 
con tradictory meanings, and deserve to be taken seriously by interdisciplinary 
cultural research that focuses on sym bolic dimensions that otherwise often tend to be 
neglected in social science work on European identity formation. At the same time, 
such symbols should always be contextualised in relation to communicative prac-
tices and social contexts. Europe and Euro pean ness are contradictory, contested and 
dynamic concepts, involving issues of power and politics. There could never be one 
single identity for Europe, but always multiple and contested identities, developing 
in overlapping interpretive com munities by means of interlacing commu ni ca tive 
networks, underpinned by a growing range of digital technologies. Official efforts to 
consciously and intentionally define Europeanness from the top down inter sect with 
bottom-up signifying prac tices of multifarious kinds. Also, Europe is internally divided 
between north and south, east and west, new and old nations and regions, making 
it essential to acknowledge the hete ro geneous patterns of identification in play. For 
example, Europe may be depicted as male or female, old or youthful, globally strong 
or weak, linked to critical enlightenment or hyper-bureaucracy. Symbols across the 
different areas of cultural activity may refer to religious myths and rituals, historical 
events, political and eco nomic practices and institutions, science and technology and 
the arts. There may be traces of Christian heri tage, colonial history, Enlightenment 
ideas of progress, experiences of war, or reference to old and new transnational 
connections. These various representations have implications for people’s under-
standings and ex periences of being European. 
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Symbols of a Union
More than half of Europe’s citizens are said to identify themselves as Europeans, 
and younger citizens increasingly so, alongside their sense of national belonging.147 
With a growing set of shared institutions, Europe is an increasingly relevant 
concept. Still, identification of and with shared European meanings seems to remain 
comparably weak, in the absence of effective cross-European public spheres, spaces of 
communication and cultural networks that allow for both diversity and commonality. 
The success of projects of economic–political integration depends on their being 
acknowledged as legitimate by an emergent wider European public with symbolic 
resources for signifying what Europe and Europeanness means. Studies indicate that 
the use of symbols may serve to strengthen a sense of civic and cultural European 
identity.148 Cris Shore has described the cultural politics of European integration in 
the following terms:
The role that symbols play in the articulation and formation of patterns 
of consciousness and identity is crucial to understanding how Europe 
is being constructed as a political community. Most of the fundamental 
categories and concepts pertaining to European integration, like those 
which gave flesh and form to the idea of nationhood, are represented 
through symbols. It is only through symbols that the meanings and 
‘reality’ of ideas such as ‘state’, ‘nation’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘Europe’ 
itself can be rendered tangible and comprehensible. There is still a 
common tendency in much of the thinking and writing on European 
integration to dismiss symbols as ‘cosmetic’ and to argue that they 
are of secondary importance—or worse, simply window-dressing—
in contrast to the eradication of those ‘real’ barriers to integration 
which involve legal and economic restrictions on the free movement 




mistake to underestimate the importance of symbols and the role they 
play in mobilising sentiment and public opinion. Indeed, symbols do 
much more than this.149 
Shore goes on to argue that ‘political reality is itself symbolically constructed’: ‘It is 
through symbols that people come to know about the structures that unite and divide 
them. Symbols do not simply represent political reality; they actively create it.’150 Even 
though established symbols mostly play a marginal role in political as well as everyday 
life, they form a network of orienting and motivating meanings that guide this 
political and social practice. In the case of Europe, the expressions of such a collective 
identity in narratives, rituals and symbols have been found too few and too abstract 
to sufficiently underpin citizens’ shared interests.151 Michael Heffernan concludes that 
‘the EU has still not developed beyond a relatively narrow economic agenda and has 
also singularly failed to capture the imagination of the European peoples’. While every 
European nation has a plethora of symbols ‘which mark out the cultural landscape of 
nationhood’, there is as yet ‘no such symbolic landscape for Europe as a whole’.152 This 
is what the EU symbols were conceived to change. Have they succeeded, and, more 
importantly, what kind of identity do they together construct for Europe?
The 2004 draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe referred to Europe as 
‘a continent that has brought forth civilisation’, with inhabitants ‘arriving in successive 
waves from earliest times’, who ‘have gradually developed the values underlying 
humanism: equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason’.153 It drew inspiration from 
the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, the values 
of which, still present in its heritage, have embedded within the life of 
society the central role of the human person and his or her inviolable 
and inalienable rights, and respect for law.
It was committed to a belief
that reunited Europe intends to continue along the path of civilisation, 
progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants, including 
the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent 
open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it wishes to 
deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to 
strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world.
And it expressed a conviction that ‘while remaining proud of their own national 
identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient 
divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny’. Thus ‘united in 
63
its diversity’, Europe was said to offer ‘the best chance of pursuing, with due regard 
for the rights of each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards 
future generations and the Earth, the great venture which makes of it a special area 
of human hope’. With this background, the constitution founded the EU, ‘reflecting 
the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future’ and based 
on ‘the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights’ in a shared ‘society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and non-discrimination’, with the main aim to ‘promote peace, its values 
and the well-being of its peoples’. It offers its citizens ‘an area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal frontiers, and a single market where competition is free 
and undistorted’, while promising to ‘respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity’, 
and ensuring that ‘Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced’. The draft 
constitution explicitly specified five ‘symbols of the Union’:
The flag of the Union shall be a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue 
background.
The anthem of the Union shall be based on the Ode to Joy from the 
Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven.
The motto of the Union shall be: United in diversity.
The currency of the Union shall be the euro.
9 May shall be celebrated throughout the Union as Europe day.154
These symbols were later deleted from the final version of the constitution, but are 
still widely used all over Europe, and have an official status after in several steps having 
been accepted both by the Council of Europe and by the EU, as will be specified below. 
Though the above was cited from a draft, similar formulations appear in lots of official 
documents, expressing a typical way of politically defining Europe’s destiny.
Five symbolic keys to Europe, thus a flag, an anthem, a motto, a currency and a day. 
Not a very dense web of meanings to identify the EU project, but at least a start. They 
jointly identify the political, economic and cultural entity of Europe from the EU’s 
top-level perspective. They are integrated in a standard stock of national symbols, and 
combine to work on several levels: one visual, one aural, one verbal, one economic 
and one temporal. While the flag, anthem, day and motto have a purely symbolic or 
discursive use, money has a double function as both a symbolic and a material tool 
of integration.155 
Before scrutinising each of these symbols in greater detail, it may be useful to 
first briefly overview their immediate context in terms of the history of Europe and 
European identity from antiquity to the establishment and growth of the EU.156
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The emergence of Europe
Europe is the second smallest of the continents, its 10,180,000 km2 comprising only 
one-fifth of the Eurasian landmass and 6.8 per cent of all land on earth. Only Australia 
is slightly smaller, and Europe’s area is roughly only half of that of either South or 
North America, and a third of Africa’s. However, its population of 731 million (in 
2009), corresponding to 11 per cent of the global population, is the third biggest (after 
Asia 60 per cent and Africa 14 per cent), making its population density the second 
largest, only slightly lower than that of Asia (70 and 87 people per km2, respectively).
Europe has no strict borders to the east, and its southern boundary is also 
permeable. There were always numerous transitional links to the Asian landmass, 
while the Mediterranean was more of a communication network than a dividing 
moat, especially at a time when seas were easier to cross than most land areas. There 
are therefore an unlimited number of ways to visually map its geopolitical terrain, 
depending on from which perspective the mapping is done and which criteria it 
applies (Figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). There is currently a continuing expansion of 
the EU and other European organisations to the east but also to the south. Take for 
instance the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC), which currently includes Cyprus, Turkey, 
Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, all of which often used to fall outside 
traditional maps of the continent.
Today, Europe consists of more than 40 independent nations, states or countries. 
These three terms have different but overlapping meanings. The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary defines a ‘nation’ as ‘a large body of people united by common descent, 
culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory’. American Indians or 
Nordic Sami people may thus form ‘nations’ within or overlapping the borders of a 
particular state, but still the most common usage of the term, for instance in forms 
like ‘national’, tends to identify ‘nation’ with the total population of a specific state. 
A ‘state’ is in the corresponding sense of the word defined as ‘a nation or territory 
considered as an organized political community under one government’, but may for 
instance also denote ‘the civil government of a country’. A ‘country’ is ‘a nation with 
its own government, occupying a territory’, though this less strictly defined term may 
sometimes also be used for certain natural landscapes or for regional communities 
within nations. While the three concepts often cover roughly the same entities, at 
least within Europe, the composite term ‘nation state’, denoting ‘a sovereign state of 
which most of the citizens or subjects also share factors such as language or common 
descent’, indicates some of the correspondences, complexities and contradictions 
inherent in these terms, which will not be further interrogated here.157 
The many countries or nation states of Europe use a great number of different 
languages, few of them being national language for more than one, and several 
countries subdivided into regions with populations who can hardly understand each 
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others’ mother tongues. This internal diversity has its counterpart in other parts of 
culture as well, where customs, tastes and traditions differ considerably across the 
continent. Unifying factors include the use of English language as a lingua franca, 
similar to how Latin functioned for parts of the European population in the Middle 
Ages, but then, this is almost a global rather than just a European glue, and it is 
surprisingly hard to pin down other truly common and exclusive denominators.
Contemporary efforts to establish a shared identity for Europeans tend to look 
back through history in order to establish the defining specificities of social life 
on this continent, as developed through a series of key historical moments with a 
unifying impact. Through such linking mechanisms, a mutually shared horizon of 
experience has germinated, with the Roman Empire, Christianity, the Renaissance, 
the Enlightenment, colonialism and industrial capitalism as bridging factors. Still, 
one cannot talk of any continuous existence of the concept of Europe, since even an 
embryonic European identity has only been a lived and acknowledged experience for 
some people in some regions during some time periods.158
Historically, Europe was distinct from the older advanced cultures formed around 
the Nile, Eufrat, Tigris and Ganges, in that its population was more mobile and thus 
had closer contacts with others across greater areas. This mobility was enhanced by 
climate and geography, as the many seas, lakes and rivers offered useful ways to connect 
by boat. This is one of the motors behind European powers’ globally competitive and 
expansive character, laying the foundation for spreading universalising Enlightenment 
values as well as a colonial world market. The current diversity and communicative 
openness of Europe thus has a long genealogy. Heffernan talks of Europe as emerging 
from an ‘intellectual palimpsest of competing geopolitical visions; a layering of 
differing meanings’.159
Little is known of cross-continental communications during the earliest time, 
except that the then sparsely populated area was scarcely accessible until the end of 
the last ice age some 12,000 years ago. There is no evidence of any strong prehistoric 
networks comprising larger parts of the area, and it is even less probable that there 
may have existed any self-understanding of its inhabitants as sharing any form of 
proto-European identity. The Phoenician culture and sea power that flourished from 
around 1200 to 800 bc is sometimes mentioned as an early impetus, with its invention 
of the alphabet and its trading links all across the Mediterranean. But it is three other 
fundamental pillars of early European civilisation that are mostly emphasised: ancient 
Greek culture, the Roman Empire and Christianity hold a privileged place in the 
currently dominant conceptions of its history and self-identity. 
Classical Greek culture with its peak in the fifth century bc is considered the cradle 
of European democracy, culture, arts, philosophy and science. Roman culture during 
an equally long period around the first century ad contributed key elements of law and 
technology, but also an empire stretching over a great part of south and west Europe, 
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thus for the first time binding considerable land areas together under a centralised 
rule. Christianity not only added the religion that still dominates the continent and 
today has a dominant worldwide presence (followed in size by Islam, Hinduism and 
Buddhism), but also built an effective network of churches, monasteries and other 
institutionalised practices that after the fall of Roman Empire continued to keep a 
growing part of the continent interconnected into and through mediaeval times. 
Though internally increasingly divided, first along the east/west axis (Orthodox/
Catholic) and then between north and south (with the advent of Protestantism), 
Christianity continued to have a major unifying impact, for instance on the growth 
of schools and higher education, and with Latin used as the first transcontinental 
language. 
The Church often worked hand in hand with secular state rulers, already from the 
last part of the Roman times, with the eighth century ad Carolingian Empire as a 
prime example. Charlemagne’s Imperium Christianum from 800 ad was soon again 
subdivided, but the Holy Roman Empire survived at least nominally into the early 
nineteenth century. Charlemagne was sometimes referred to as ‘Pater Europae’, which 
is why the Carolingian time is often seen as a key moment when Europe started to 
exist as an at least imagined political community.160 While there was still in effect 
little political unity across Europe in this period, the impressive transcontinental 
dissemination from the end of the Middle Age of artistic and intellectual movements 
such as the Renaissance, Baroque, Classicism, Enlightenment and Romanticism 
indicated the density of communicative networks that increasingly served to integrate 
European culture. 
Heffernan agrees with most historians when stating that Europe did not really 
become a valid geopolitical concept until the modern era: 
The notion of Europe, or of any land continent, had little significance 
in classical or Medieval geography. […] A concern with global 
continental divisions emerged only in the post-Roman, Christian era, 
particularly from the seventh century ad when any residual sense of 
Mediterranean unity was shattered by the first great wave of Muslim 
expansion.161 
For centuries thereafter Europe remained subsumed under the idea of Christendom, 
and ‘a sense of common “Europeanness” was still relatively weak’, as new divisions 
split the continent vertically (Catholic/Orthodox) and horizontally (from Christian/
Pagan to Catholic/Protestant).162 Mediaeval Europe’s feudal geopolitics still had a 
‘weakly developed sense of territoriality’ and ‘spatial fluidity’ that made the identity 
of the continent a non-issue. It was in the early modern period that ideas of Europe 
started to emerge, with roots in the earlier Mediaeval ideas of Christendom, and 
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the seventeenth century saw a new ‘“territorialisation” of power’ and a ‘“fixing” of 
national spaces on the European map’, says Heffernan.163 The following centuries were 
filled with efforts to balance different local, regional and increasingly also national 
powers against each others, oscillating between violent wars and peace treaties from 
Westphalia (1648) to Vienna (1815) and onwards.
The bourgeois revolutions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
together with the Napoleonic wars resulting in the 1815 Vienna Congress, gave 
new force to political visions of a less divided Europe, both among radicals and 
conservatives. A counteracting factor was the new system of competing nation 
states, whose strengthening and internal integration temporarily prevented further 
European cohesion, except through precarious treaties between independent national 
governments. European powers were simultaneously increasingly expansive in their 
worldwide quest for wealth and control, with exploration, mission, conquest and 
slavery as tools. Colonialism and imperialism accumulated resources in Europe while 
enslaving other peoples. By a kind of Hegelian master–slave dialectics, this brought 
change to the world and gave rise to independence movements that in the twentieth 
century further spread political, social and cultural resources and models of European 
origin. These processes took place through a close interaction between Europe and 
other continents, so that what may appear as a linear dissemination was actually a 
complex circulation and mediation of ideas and institutions in shifting paths and 
networks across the globe. Modern philosophy, science, technology, industry, 
parliamentary democracy, human rights and values are today recognised as global 
rather than European, as they all originated through dialogues between continents 
and are today relevant in most world regions, while their positively charged values are 
on the other hand far from secured in every European region.
Up until the mid-twentieth century, Europe seemed stuck in a rather strict division 
of fiercely competing nation states, using shifting alliances to combat each other rather 
than aim at any long-term association.164 When most of the rest of the world had been 
cut up in colonial territories, the competitive thrust led to a series of disastrous wars, 
with immense loss of human lives and infrastructures, including the Franco-Prussian 
war of 1870–1 (almost 200,000 killed), World War I 1914–18 (over 15 million dead) 
and World War II 1939–45 (over 70 million killed). The terrifying escalation of 
unequalled human-made catastrophes fed renewed efforts of peace, disarmament, 
reconciliation and cooperation between the peoples of Europe.
The period between the two World Wars, 1918–39, saw the growth of a series of 
initiatives and movements nourishing new visions of a united Europe, both in right- 
and left-wing versions.165 The Paneuropean Union founded in 1923 belonged to the 
former, looking nostalgically back to the imagined Christian unity of Middle Ages. In 
the socialist camp, the French Minister Aristide Briand in 1930 proposed to the League 
of Nations the organisation of a European federal union. In 1948, the Vatican Pope, 
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wishing to defend western Christianity against Communism and restore the spirit of 
the Middle Ages, officially supported European federalism. This vision of a ‘Vatican 
Europe’ was heralded by the 1947 elevation of St Benedict to ‘Patron Saint of all Europe’. 
This was not favourably received by socialists and social democrats, but soon the two 
camps converged in a more inclusive version of the unification programme. 
The task of uniting Europe presented a difficult dialectic, as great wars tended to 
start with some large powers wanting control over the whole of Europe, and clashing 
with others with competing ambitions. Hitler’s dream of the Third Reich was in an 
awkward way parallel to more peaceful visions of a united Europe. The form and 
method of unification was essential. In order to avoid new disasters, unification 
must respect the will of citizens in all countries, that is, be based on consensus and 
democratic decisions, where nation states were not erased but could retain a high 
degree of autonomy within the newly created totality. This task was urgent after the 
end of World War II, when Europe was in ruins, having been at once the cause, stake, 
perpetrator and victim of this global disaster. Time was ripe to start building forms of 
cooperation that would not once again cause a similar wave of destruction. Hence, the 
idea of a united Europe moved to the top of the agenda. 
At least this is the official version: a favourite founding myth of the EU, repeated 
again and again in documents and public history. There certainly were (and still 
are) also several other motives and interests behind the unification process and the 
post-war wish for peace. Equally influential demands for economic welfare and 
imperialist power expansion are forgotten by the legitimating ideology of the EU as 
an idealistic peace project aiming for the happiness of everyone. On the other hand, 
this ideology is not just a false cover up for hidden real and less altruistic ambitions. 
The great twentieth-century European wars were no doubt enormous traumas, and 
there was a true and deeply felt need for concerted efforts to heal the wounds, among 
the elites as well as the masses, who experienced the devastating weight of the mass 
destruction Europe was capable of, and the need to find other ways to deal with 
mutual differences.
The European unification project had to avoid being inscribed into any more 
specific agenda, be it conservative, liberal or socialist, and instead forge a long-term 
alliance between a wide range of interest groups to the right as well as to the left. It had 
to be able to accommodate many different aspects without repelling any significant 
interest groups. Heffernan describes how the new European institutions built around 
the Council of Europe had to be compatible both with the US Atlantic system of 
the Cold War and with the interests of the national governments.166 This made it 
impossible to copy US federalism, and necessary to respect the existing subdivision 
into autonomous nation states, so that the intergovernmentalist strategy continued to 
be hegemonic, with federalists functioning as idealist activists propelling integration 
forward but never being allowed to take over.
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One keystone came to be the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ that guaranteed decisions 
being made on a lower, local or national level whenever there was no obvious 
advantage for federal institutions to take charge. A balance had to be struck between 
maximum and minimum ambitions regarding which areas to regulate jointly, for 
instance selecting if cooperation should include economic, political, military, social 
or cultural issues, or leave some of these outside, at least temporarily. As history came 
to show, it was also important to develop the federal resources in a reasonable order, 
so that each step could prepare for the next and breed a legitimate trust in the whole 
project among citizens and elites of all regions.
The principle of subsidiarity was related to another principle, which was only gradually 
established through experiences of the failures of unification proposals. It was never 
formalised or officially named, but could be called a ‘principle of diversity’. Previous 
efforts often had an element of equalisation, of striving to make Europe one, with strong 
similarities between its constituents. Take the presumably universalising French ideals 
spread by the Napoleonic wars, the Germanic expansionism of the Third Reich, or the 
Christian resurrection envisioned by ‘Vatican Europe’. In all cases, such homogenising 
efforts provoked hostile resistance. The post-World War II unifiers had learned the 
lesson; a more successful strategy was to avoid moving too fast towards sociocultural 
homogeneity. Instead, if Europe was to be united in a political and economic sense, it 
was pivotal that this unity had to respect the radical differences between its regions in 
other dimensions. Those unifying measures that did succeed offered specific pragmatic 
tools for enhancing welfare, communication and mobility across the continent, while not 
forcing everyone to become similar. Every time the elements of making Europe internally 
more homogenous sneaked in, there grew an immediate risk of failure. Unification had 
to start on a formal meta-level, unifying instruments for mutual exchange rather than 
the actual contents of public provisions in each country.
However, respecting subsidiarity and diversity were no easy principles, but a matter 
of precarious balance. Without any delegation of power whatsoever from regions and 
nation states to the federal level, nothing would ever change; and without at least 
some minimal kind of common social and cultural ground, the economic and political 
measures would encounter a deficit of legitimacy among European citizens. This was 
how European identity became a key issue.
There were several ups and downs in the unifying process, of which only some few 
milestones will be mentioned here. In a Zurich speech in 1946, Britain’s former Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill spoke in favour of ‘a kind of United States of Europe’, navigating 
a third way between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
From 1946 onwards, a series of movements and organisations were formed in support 
of a European federation, having varying roles in the formation process. The Union 
of European Federalists (UEF, founded 1946) coordinated some 50 national federalist 
movements, with almost a total of 100,000 members, but was split in different fractions. 
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Against the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (MSEUE, founded 1946) 
stood the Christian Democratic Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (New International 
Teams, NEI, 1947; renamed European Union of Christian Democrats, EUCD, 1965), 
both marked by the emerging Cold War agenda. The European League for Economic 
Cooperation (ELEC, 1946) was a pressure group of industrialists and financiers bridging 
the economic, political and administrative elites. A series of federalist congresses were held 
in the late 1940s, including the Hague Congress in May 1948, which led to the formation 
of the influential European Movement (EM) where many of the other associations were 
brought together. The Brussels Political Congress in February 1949 proposed a European 
Charter of Human Rights and a European Court, while the December 1949 European 
Conference on Culture in Lausanne resulted in the establishment in 1950 of the College 
of Europe in Bruges and the European Centre for Culture in Geneva.
A particularly important step was the establishment of the Council of Europe, 
which came into existence on 5 May 1949 with ten founding countries. All European 
countries that undertake to ‘respect human rights and the rule of law’ are now welcome 
to join, and the Council of Europe today covers most of the continent. It functions 
as a highly active forum for dialogue and cooperation—a motor for strengthening 
European identity and furthering other and more substantial forms of unification.167
Economic cooperation was from the beginning a crucial task in particular, as much 
of Europe’s material and industrial infrastructure was in great need of reconstruction 
after the war. EU’s official founding myth places the Schuman Declaration, presented 
by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in Paris on 9 May 1950, at the origin 
of this process. This was a carefully prepared and staged event, intended to initiate a 
series of key moves to establish the first keystones of an effective European cooperation. 
The peace question was explicitly in focus, promoting reconciliation between France 
and Germany—the two big powers that had repeatedly clashed so violently through 
the last hundred years. European peace presupposed a new friendship between those 
peoples, and it was important to avoid the fate of the post-World War I humiliation 
of the loser, Germany, which had fuelled the dissatisfaction that had only led to a 
new and multiply worse disaster. The significant idea was to build cooperation from 
coordinating precisely those industries that had fuelled the previous wars: coal and 
steel. This would create a crucial economic and material basis for European welfare, 
but also had a symbolic value in that it linked to mythical, almost biblical images 
of melting cannons to forge ploughshares, transforming destructive forces into 
nourishing sources of mutual solidarity and welfare. 
World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative 
efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution 
which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is 
indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. […]
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Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. 
It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de 
facto solidarity. The rassemblement of the nations of Europe requires 
the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany.168 
Schuman and the French Government proposed to ‘place Franco-German production 
of coal and steel as a whole under a common higher authority, within the framework 
of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe’: 
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide 
for the setting up of common foundations for economic development 
as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies 
of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture 
of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant 
victims.
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain 
that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely 
unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting-up of this powerful 
productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound 
ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements 
of industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation 
for their economic unification. This production will be offered to the 
world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of 
contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful 
achievements. Europe, with new means at her disposal, will be able to 
pursue the realisation of one of her essential tasks: the development of 
the African Continent.
In this way there will be realised simply and speedily that fusion 
of interests which is indispensable to the establishment of a common 
economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider 
and deeper community between countries long opposed to one 
another by sanguinary divisions. By pooling basic production and by 
instituting a new higher authority, whose decisions will bind France, 
Germany, and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the 
realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation 
indispensable to the preservation of peace. 
On this basis, Schuman suggested the creation of a ‘common higher authority’ to 
secure ‘the modernization of production’, a fair and equal supply of coal and steel ‘to 
the French and German markets, as well as to the markets of other member countries’, 
Symbols of a Union
Signifying Europe
72
enhanced ‘exports to other countries’, and ‘the equalization and improvement of 
the living conditions of workers in these industries’. Modernisation of production, 
economic balance between the European powers, a free trade market and a perspective 
towards secure welfare for European citizens—this was the prescription to cure the 
convalescent and still suffering continent. 
It soon proved successful, as six core West European countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) signed the Treaty constituting the 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on 18 April 1951.169 This treaty repeated the key 
elements of the Schuman Declaration, arguing for instance that ‘world peace may 
be safeguarded only by creative efforts equal to the dangers which menace it’; that 
‘the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can bring to civilization is 
indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations’; that ‘Europe can be built only 
by concrete actions which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common 
bases for economic development’, and so forth. Its double goal was ‘the expansion of 
their basic production in raising the standard of living and in furthering the works of 
peace’. The ECSC was meant ‘to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential 
interests; to establish, by creating an economic community, the foundation of a broad 
and independent community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to 
lay the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny’. 
The mission of the European Coal and Steel Community is to contribute 
to economic expansion, the development of employment and the 
improvement of the standard of living in the participating countries 
through the institution, in harmony with the general economy of the 
member States, of a common market […].
Safeguarding ‘the most rational distribution of production at the highest possible level 
of productivity’, the ‘continuity of employment’ and economic stability were the key 
goals. The tools were to create a common market with equal access for all countries to 
coal and steel resources, furthering industrial modernisation and international trade. 
Again, ‘the improvement of the living and working conditions of the labor force’ was 
also mentioned. 
A set of practical steps were selected and motivated to ensure acceptance and 
legitimacy for the Treaty. Explicitly ideological formulations were strictly limited to 
the almost universal basics of securing world peace with general and equal welfare. 
The provisions made concentrated on supporting rational modernisation and 
building a basis for stability and shared fortune. No blame was put on anyone, and 
no external or internal enemies were even indirectly identified, thus avoiding the trap 
of the Christian federalists who could never gain popular backing for any proposals 
for defending Europe against the Communist East or resurrecting a Catholic past. 
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By including provisions for improving workers’ conditions, the Treaty could also be 
accepted by the Socialist Left.
In the international dimension, it is first characteristic that both these documents 
use American rather than British English, mirroring the crucial US support for 
the reconstruction of Europe, as codified in the Marshall Plan (1947). Second, it 
is interesting that Schuman, but not the Treaty, mentioned that Europe needs her 
regained strength in order to realise ‘one of her essential tasks: the development of the 
African Continent’. This pointed towards the links of the modern European project 
to colonialism and decolonisation. This aspect is today rarely touched upon in official 
documents and histories, since it hints at a less dignified motor behind unification 
than the wish to secure peace and general welfare. Decolonisation was a difficult and 
often violent process where both symbolic and material interests clashed. All the 
main colonial powers were European, which meant that Europe could not be unified 
without in some way solving the colonial problem. Talking of ‘the development of the 
African Continent’ as one of Europe’s ‘essential tasks’ could be read as a humanitarian 
care for an impoverished neighbour, but on the other hand also as an echo of the 
old imperial idea of the Third World as the ‘White Man’s Burden’ (the infamous title 
of a highly Eurocentric poem by Rudyard Kipling, 1899). In such perspective, the 
talk of development, modernisation and civilisation was also a pretext for prolonged 
dependence, dominance and exploitation. 
A series of independence wars, the most violent ones in Algeria, made grand-
scale European colonial rule impossible, though its effects will last for long. The 1957 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) had a Protocol on its 
‘relation to Algeria and overseas departments of the French Republic’, stating a will to 
negotiate these problems in a peaceful spirit. Early maps of the community indicate 
that being formally a French overseas department, Algeria was part of the EEC. Its 
independence in 1962 brought an end to that, as with other former colonies, but up 
until today, the EU also contains a set of overseas territories that remain under French 
rule. Those with a good eyesight can discern them as microscopic dots in the margins 
of all EU maps, including the small ones on the euro coins.170
Some who worked for European unification surely had a hidden agenda to resurrect 
Europe’s leading role in the world and also more specifically to save what could be 
saved of her decomposing colonial empires. This was particularly obvious in the case 
of France, but could also be seen among some of the other colonial powers such as 
Britain, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands. But these interests had to be balanced 
against the wish for stability and peace in the rest of Europe, and the independence 
wars showed that entertaining colonial rule had too great costs to be worthwhile 
in the long run. The European project was thus the outcome of a dynamic struggle 
between different camps, and cannot be reduced to either a prolongation of European 
imperialism or a pure peace effort.
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Going back to the establishment of the Council of Europe (1949) and the ECSC 
(1950), the former became an important ideological force to push integration forward, 
while the second was an example of what could be achieved by economic cooperation. 
Together, the two initiated a series of steps towards a geographically as well as sectorially 
more comprehensive cooperation. Only the main traits of this process will be briefly 
summarised here. The EEC was funded by the Rome Treaty in 1957 by the six ECSC 
countries (‘the inner six’), while the less far-reaching European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) was funded by seven other countries of Western Europe in 1960 (‘the outer 
seven’: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom). Finland and Iceland also soon joined the EFTA, and from the 1970s onwards, 
the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal moved from EFTA to the EEC. 
In the 1980s, mutual cooperation between the two organisations gradually deepened, 
until the EU was finally established by the Treaty of Maastricht 1993. Its original twelve 
member states were the ‘inner six’ plus Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. In just a couple of years, Austria, Finland and Sweden entered as 
well, and with the integration of the former Eastern Bloc after 1989, the number has 
grown to 27, plus further candidates eagerly waiting their turn. 
This rough outline of European unification history has several deficits. First, it 
underplays the influence of the United States, which was simultaneously political, 
military, technological, economic, social and cultural. For instance, the military 
bloc of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was since its establishment 
in 1949 also an important factor for European development. In 1955, a proposal to 
install a European army, named the European Defence Community (EDC), failed, 
and instead a much weaker Western European Union (WEU) was formed to establish 
rudimentary military cooperation. Second, the description is seriously biased, with 
a western perspective, as there was a parallel unifying movement in Eastern Europe 
as well, though with more coercive means and controlled by the USSR. In January 
1949, responding to the Marshall Plan, the USSR created a programme of economic 
cooperation between Soviet bloc countries, called the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). NATO’s military counterpart was the Warsaw Pact, 
signed in 1955, comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and the USSR, with the German Democratic Republic entering one year 
later. Both Comecon and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated in 1991, and many of its states 
have subsequently become EU (and in several cases even NATO) members.
The impetus for European integration thus came from many directions. It had 
shifting motives in east and west, north and south, in political and economic terms. 
From the first germs of the idea soon after World War II, it took roughly half a century 
until the greater part of the continent had developed a reasonably firm common 
platform in the enlarged EU. The expansion has so far primarily been directed to 
the east, besides efforts to make singular remaining non-members like Norway or 
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Switzerland join too. This reflects the notoriously unstable geographic and political 
division between Europe and Asia, with no easy method to decide to which continent 
countries like Russia or Turkey belong. The other particularly contested border, 
to the south, has remained relatively constant. In 1987, Morocco’s application for 
membership was rejected as it was not considered a European country. On the other 
hand, the remaining French and Spanish colonial tentacles in northern Africa and 
Latin America continue to blur the continent’s geopolitical boundaries.
The EEC aimed to create a common market and draw up common policies, 
notably in agriculture and transports, securing the free movement of goods, 
services, people and money (or capital). These ‘four freedoms’ remained a focal 
concern of the EU, and will prove important for how the European symbols were 
designed. The EU was constructed around three ‘pillars’ or areas of responsibility: 
(a) the primarily economic European community policy; (b) a common foreign and 
security policy; and (c) cooperation on police and judicial matters. The former was 
most important for supranational integration, while the other two were in practice 
more intergovernmental. The goal of the EU was ‘an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’—a vague expression used already in 1949 in the Statute of the 
intergovernmental Council of Europe. The United Kingdom managed to avoid 
any explicit references to a ‘federal purpose’, though several Treaty goals had such 
overtones: single currency, citizenship, common foreign and security policy. While 
talking of abolishing internal frontiers, the Treaty also stated that the ‘Union shall 
respect the national identities of its Member States’. The principle of subsidiarity 
prevented the community from intervening when the objectives of the union could 
as well be attained by a member state acting on its own. Democratic reform gave 
more power to the directly elected European Parliament. A European passport had 
been introduced already in 1985, and the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht established 
European citizenship not to replace national citizenship but to supplement it by 
granting the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European and municipal 
elections in the member state in which a citizen resides (not only in the country of 
origin), the right to petition the European Parliament and to submit a complaint to 
the Ombudsman, etc. These European citizenship rights aimed at heightening the 
public awareness of European identity and thus strengthening identification with the 
European unification project.171
The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht was not yet a full EU constitution, but just a 
preamble of a more complete and binding regulative document. Then followed the 
complicated integration of East Europe into the EU, and then after the millennium 
shift the efforts intensified to construct a constitution for Europe that would make 
the union both efficient and more democratic in its functioning. This has so far 
turned out to be difficult, and the result remains an open question. In 2004, the 
25 EU countries signed a Treaty establishing a European Constitution, designed 
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to rationalise decision-making and management in the radically expanded union. 
However, referendums in France and the Netherlands rejected the new Constitution, 
forcing a temporary halt in the process. Intense negotiations resulted in a revised 
version formulated in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which was finally ratified by all 
member states in 2009. 
Introducing the EU symbols
The issue of a shared European identity has proven to be one of the key obstacles 
to success. Social and cultural issues were often placed on a national rather than 
supranational level, by a combination of the subsidiarity and the diversity principles. 
There were for instance only feeble efforts to create joint European policies concerning 
the arts and the cultural industries. Still, cultural aspects were never far away. There 
were symbolic aspects already in the grounding of a community in precisely the coal 
and steel industries. The establishment in 1950 of a College of Europe and a European 
Centre for Culture, resulting from the 1949 European Conference on Culture, was 
another example, and since the Eurobarometer published its first data in 1974, it has 
had multiple functions, enabling practical economic coordination but also offering a 
tangible representation of Europe as a unity, thus with a cultural function as well. On 
many levels there was thus a cultural and symbolic dimension present even where 
decisions on the surface just talked about trade statistics or governing bodies. The 
explicit regulation of identifying symbols of Europe was just the tip of an iceberg, but 
as such, it draws attention to a wider set of cultural facets, with far-reaching roots and 
implications.
Federalist movements had flags expressing in condensed form how they conceived 
the meaning of Europe. For instance, the Paneuropean Union had since 1923 used a 
golden sun on a blue background with a red cross in the middle of the sun, while the 
European Movement, founded in 1947, used a big green ‘E’ on white background.172 
Even though the ECSC and the EEC emphasised economic and legal aspects, there 
were always also cultural or symbolic elements involved. Selecting names and 
logotypes for associations is one such cultural act that is far from innocent, since such 
symbols propose an interpretation of Europe for Europeans to identify with. 
Inheriting some of its spirit from the agenda of the federalist movements, the 
Council of Europe served as a testing ground for new ideas and was from the start 
particularly interested in matters concerning European identity and citizenship rights, 
helping to prepare the ground for effective measures later taken by other bodies on a 
political, economic and military level. The Council of Europe has therefore been the 
main motor behind the formalisation of the current symbols of Europe, which will in 
turn be presented and analysed in the following chapters. 
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In 1951, the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe produced a memorandum 
on the European flag, opening with the characteristic words: ‘There are no ideals, 
however exalted in nature, which can afford to do without a symbol.’ In 1955, the 
Committee of Ministers adopted a blue flag with a circle of stars, and in 1972 an 
anthem followed. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was much talk of widening the 
‘Traders’ Europe’ of the EEC common market into something considerably more far-
reaching and complex: a ‘People’s Europe’ for which the issue of a European identity 
was essential. At a 1973 Copenhagen Summit, the then nine Foreign Ministers of the 
EEC published a ‘Document on The European Identity’, where they ‘decided to define 
the European Identity’ and clarify the EEC members’ responsibilities in relation to 
other countries. 
The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, 
political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich 
variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes 
to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures 
up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the 
principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social 
justice—which is the ultimate goal of economic progress—and of 
respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the 
European Identity.173
Several similar formulations returned in the 2004 draft Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. Speaking of ‘the’ European identity as a given and 
unproblematic unity was an idealisation with little support in European realities. The 
document emphasised Europe’s political will to strengthen relations to the rest of the 
world as well as the value of diversity: 
The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European 
civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the 
increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having 
specific interests in common and the determination to take part in 
the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its 
originality and its own dynamism.174
Measures were taken to remove obstacles for mobility and improve life conditions 
for European citizens in everyday life. At the Fontainebleau European Council 
meeting on 25–26 June 1984, the idea of a ‘People’s Europe’ was further specified: 
‘the Community should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by 
adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its 
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citizens and for the rest of the world’. Among the specific measures suggested was 
to create ‘symbols of the Community’s existence, such as a flag and an anthem’, but 
also ‘European sports teams’ and ‘a European coinage’. A report to the European 
Council in Milan on 28–29 June 1985 by a Committee on a People’s Europe, led 
by Pietro Adonnino, presented a much more detailed list of measures to enhance 
European integration in the cultural domain, including citizens rights; culture and 
communication (with a focus on television); information; youth, education and 
sport; volunteer work in the Third World; health, security and drugs; twinning of 
towns and cities; and ‘strengthening of the Community’s image and identity’. This last 
point is particularly relevant here. European stamps were mentioned as a possibility, 
but the two main symbols discussed were the flag and the anthem, to which later 
chapters will return. 
In June 1985, the Milan European Council approved the adoption of the flag and 
the anthem as official emblems of the European communities, and also agreed to 
establish a Europe Day. A key moment was when the 2004 draft Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe recognised the flag, motto, anthem, day and euro as being 
official in the EU. The Treaty only listed the symbols without any further ideological 
explication or provisions on how they were to be used. 
On 12 January 2005, the European Parliament approved this Constitutional Treaty 
by an overwhelming majority of 500 votes in favour, 137 against and 40 abstentions. 
Communists, the European People’s Party and the far right were against, though 
it was clearly more the rationalisation and strengthening of EU’s institutions than 
the symbols that provoked resistance. The Czech Republic, Poland and the United 
Kingdom had a majority against the Treaty. However, all member states had to ratify 
the Treaty before it was valid. This process was scheduled so that the Constitution 
would have entered into force on 1 November 2006. As referendums in France and the 
Netherlands voted against it, the process was halted, resulting in a deep crisis through 
which the Constitution was revised in a prolonged negotiation process.
In articles I:1–2, the resulting 2007 Lisbon Constitutional Treaty states that 
‘inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe’ has made 
it possible to develop ‘the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of 
the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.175
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‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’, 
offering its citizens ‘an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers’. 
It is these kinds of values that the EU system wishes its symbols to express and anchor 
among citizens. Even though the symbols were never the main issue, the effort to 
constitute a shared cultural identity through official symbols was not favourably 
received. The revised version in the Treaty of Lisbon only mentions the euro as the 
official currency but not any of the other symbols. In spite of this, they continued 
to be used roughly as before, just like so many nations use flags and other insignia 
without any legal consolidation of them. After all, they had in turn been approved by 
both the Council of Europe and the EU. In 2007, sixteen member states also signed a 
declaration on the symbols, which was included at the end of the Treaty of Lisbon:
Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia 
and the Slovak Republic declare that the flag with a circle of twelve 
golden stars on a blue background, the anthem based on the ‘Ode to 
Joy’ from the Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven, the motto 
‘United in diversity’, the euro as the currency of the European Union 
and Europe Day on 9 May will for them continue as symbols to express 
the sense of community of the people in the European Union and their 
allegiance to it.176
Note some of the absences: it is not surprising that the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom did not sign up, since they have been hesitant about the new 
constitution and/or less enthusiastic about inventing European symbols. A working 
hypothesis that goes way beyond the scope of what can be shown here might be 
that scepticism towards symbols may be strongest in northern areas with a quasi-
iconoclastic Protestant heritage and a high degree of secular individualisation, whereas 
icons and other symbols are more respected in Catholic and Orthodox regions.
In spite of these reservations, there are strong interest groups that favour these 
symbols. Also, the European Parliament has in the process repeatedly expressed a will 
to use the symbols more often, presenting the flag at all meetings and in all rooms, 
playing the anthem regularly, printing the motto on official documents and formally 
recognising Europe Day. ‘Symbols are vital elements of any communication process’, 
according to the EU Parliament, as they ‘convey an emotional image of the underlying 
values of the organisations they represent’.177 
On 9 October 2008, an overwhelming majority of European Parliament members 
(503 to 96 with 15 abstentions) voted for continuing to use the EU symbols.178 
Even though their legal status remains unclear in the EU, they are thus in practice 
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accepted and used everywhere, and their importance is repeatedly stated in public EU 
documents. For instance, the European Navigator website has a large section on ‘The 
Symbols of the European Union’, which depicts the importance of these symbols:179 
The purpose of the political symbols of the State (flag, emblem, motto, 
anthem, currency, national public holiday) is obviously to provide an 
identity. 
They crystallise national identity by making it tangible; in other 
words, they codify the subjective nature of the nation. The nation is 
in practice an invisible concept and therefore has to be symbolised 
if it is to be seen and acclaimed if it is to be loved. It is precisely in 
this way that the symbol provides identity: it shows citizens what 
is theirs and encourages them to be loyal (affectio societatis) to the 
sign representing the nation. The use of symbols consequently has a 
unifying and federating power.
When they sing the same anthem, honour the same flag, use 
the same currency or celebrate the same public holiday, citizens 
are all sharing a common sentiment. Every political symbol is 
therefore a tangible sign of identity which codifies the shared values 
which the symbol represents and which are generally detailed in a 
constitution. 
The purpose of political symbols is to provide an identity for the 
European Union as well as for its Member States. They are the external 
signs of that constitutional patriotism—to take up Habermas—through 
which European citizens, aware of their belonging, can be influenced 
to leave aside their differences and act in the common public good and, 
therefore, to perceive the European Union as their home or Heimat.
Understood in this way, symbols may help to consolidate the 
fledgling European demos. They should undoubtedly not do so in 
opposition to the national demoi but as a synthesis of the specific and 
shared values of a highly integrated area such as the European Union. 
The Community methods and participative democracy launched by 
the Constitutional Treaty could help the European Union to emerge as 
a new post-national political system based precisely on shared values 
where the national interest coincides with the European interest. The 
political symbols such as the flag, the anthem, the motto, the currency 
and Europe Day may therefore help, by creating emotive images and 
rites, even subliminally, to make the European Union more legitimate 
in the eyes of its citizens and help them to identify with the plan for 
a common destiny. In other words, they help to construct a political 
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identity, where a set of values which identify us as belonging to the 
same community are felt to be binding. […]
The role of the symbols in forging an awareness and an identity of 
the European Union as a political community is therefore crucial. It is 
in practice true that most of the basic categories and concepts relating 
to European integration and, in particular, those breathing life into the 
notion of belonging, are represented by symbols which make the very 
notion of citizenship tangible, real and comprehensive. […]
The symbols therefore, far from playing a ‘cosmetic’ function, 
secondary in importance to the function of the four freedoms or of 
Community policies, express the deep-seated values of the European 
Union. They are also able to mobilise the sentiments of European public 
opinion. They do not just breathe life into the notion of belonging, 
but help actively to support it, thereby helping the fledgling European 
demos to put down roots.
Even fierce opponents of the EU and/or the proposed symbols of Europe tend to put 
considerable faith in the force of symbols—perhaps it is actually this faith that makes 
them so fiercely critical. A nationalist Danish website for instance argues as follows: 
Identity is inextricably connected with symbolism of some kind. […] 
Symbols are the first things we connect with identity—and the last 
things to perish—even when ideology has removed any contents of 
the word. […] So, there [are reasons] to take the EU symbols very, very 
seriously: They are the New World Order’s intermediar[ies] conveying 
to us […] a New international identity to replace our ancient, Christian 
national identities.180
Other critics do not fear any ‘European statehood sneaking in again through the 
back door’ together with these symbols; according to these critics they do not result 
from dangerous ideological manipulation but rather from stupid ‘managerialism’ and 
‘second-rate branding consultants’: 
What we’re seeing isn’t a threat, but a self-regarding waste of time and 
public money. You can manage taxes and borders and subsidies and 
rebates and bureaucratic structures, fine. But you can’t manage the 
collective unconscious. […] People cleave to the symbols that arise 
out of political identity; but you can’t start with a set of symbols and 
hope to reverse-engineer an identity from them.181
Symbols of a Union
Signifying Europe
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Many believe that European symbols are meaningless, unrelated to any European 
identity or feeling of community, unanchored in any pan-European public sphere or any 
wider public of citizens, and in several cases (particularly with Europe Day) unknown 
by most citizens. Aware of these criticisms, Hartmut Kaelble still argues that European 
symbols have a history that is well worth studying, that they are not at all meaningless, 
that they tend to evoke a European citizenship and a European identity, and that they are 
communicated in a (multilingual, multinational and yet incomplete but still emerging 
and growing) European public sphere.182 The symbols can be seen as tools for developing 
and strengthening the shared pan-European public sphere that has for years been an 
important goal for EU’s communication policy, aiming to close the gap between the 
union and its citizens, with inclusiveness, diversity and participation as key values.183 
Though the symbols were withdrawn from the final Treaty of Lisbon, they obviously 
continue to be widely used and debated. However, their failure to be included in the 
European Constitution has cast some doubt on the efforts of ratifying a handy set of 
symbolic signifiers for shared values and a sense of European identity giving Europe 
‘a soul’ that would help citizens to better identify with the union, as EU officials used 
to argue. In itself, this indicates that the issue is a difficult and contested one.
Against this backdrop, it is well worth scrutinising these and other official Europe 
symbols, in order to investigate what meanings they attach to European identity, 
which inner and mutual tensions they present, how they have been interpreted 
and which alternative symbols circulate in various contexts. Sources will include 
websites presented by the EU itself, by nation states inside and outside Europe, and 
by citizens, groups and movements in civil society. The aim is to uncover conflicts of 
interpretation in each symbolic realm. While the EU and its member states seek to 
provide official symbols to bind citizens together in Europeanness, there are equally 
important unofficial, ‘bottom-up’ cultural practices that contribute to the emergence 
of European identities and communicative spaces, if often in a critical vein.184 
Comparisons will also be made with symbols of entities other than Europe, but with 
Europe symbols deriving from elsewhere than the EU too, as well as some of those 
competing symbols that were rejected as the EU selected its official set. This is a way 
to outline the meanings of Europe through comparative interpretations that consider 
a wider cloud of meanings that surrounds it.185 
Identifying symbols depict Europe as something, and there are two main sides to 
this signification. Formally, they must signal and prescribe in which symbolic genre 
they are to be inscribed. They are designed in ways that cause them to be interpreted 
as signifying a geopolitical unit rather than anything else, such as for instance a 
private company, a social movement or a clan. It is interesting to see how they indicate 
that they signify a union of member states, and how do they through various formal 
arrangements characterise the particularities of the ways in which Europe (and in this 
case the EU) unites its constituents into a specific kind of social community. 
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At the same time, the contents of the symbols indicate in many other ways what it 
may mean to be European. It is interesting to look for other themes that do not simply 
express the formal union trope but strive to characterise this entity as such: what 
it means to be European. The two are not strictly distinct, since Europe’s inherent 
qualities are inseparably linked to the way it is formally constituted—and the form 
of unification indicates how Europe and Europeans are supposed to be. Each symbol 
combines the two sides with a shifting balance and in a specific manner.
The order of presentation will not follow the historical chronology, but instead move 
from the most abstract to the more concrete symbols, thus adding in each chapter 
wider and more specific layers of meaning: day—motto—flag—anthem—currency. 





It is common for nations and communal causes to have a particular day in the 
calendar. These are intended to be used to each year recall and cherish the entities, 
events or causes in question, and are therefore closely linked to ritual activities enacted 
on these dates. A Europe Day has been decided upon, occasioning celebrations that 
aim to strengthen the feeling of community and collective identity. However, this day 
is relatively little known or venerated among citizens, particularly in north, west and 
central Europe. This chapter will scrutinise its development, uses and meanings.
What’s in a day?
A day may seem simple enough, but actually is both an abstract and a complex 
phenomenon. In itself, it is just a unit of time, but it is charged with meaning by 
signifying practices that name and relate it to other, surrounding or contrasting, dates 
within an organised calendric structure.186 According to Paul Ricoeur, the practice 
of dating events is one of the cultural tools that create a ‘third time’, bridging lived 
(subjective, experiential, concrete) and universal (objective, cosmological, abstract) 
time, and that thereby ‘cosmologizes lived time and humanizes cosmic time’.187 This 
mediating historical or cultural time is shaped by techniques, narratives and rituals 
that connect lived and universal time: the calendar, the successions of generations, 
archives, documents and traces. 
Calendars are media for storing as well as narratively ‘storying’ time. By choosing 
and ritually celebrating specific dates, people make the flow of time meaningful, both 
by just constructing the particular node in their shared calendar and by enacting a set 
of collective rituals each year on that specific date. A day thus opens up not only issues 
of time consciousness and the writing of history, but also those of understandings of 




built around a specified date in the annual calendar that organises the flow of time 
on the basis of cultural interpretations that humanise time and mediate between the 
individual and the cosmological. When a thus marked date occurs on a given day 
in a year, people who respect that date organise ritual activities (meetings, marches, 
festivals, concerts etc., on sites decorated with flags and emblems) to manifest their 
mutual recognition of the importance of whatever the date is meant to celebrate—past 
events, historical experiences and shared values. 
Annually recurrent days of commemoration and celebration thus add a cyclical 
element to time experience and construct a temporal universe of collectively shared 
identifying values tied to specific events: the historically unique celebrated event as well 
as the regularly repeated celebrating events that are staged every year, with ritualistic 
components but also each time with new variations that express the dynamics of the 
unfolding interpretive community that thereby celebrates itself.
These ritualised activities linked to a day of celebration exemplify those ‘invented 
traditions’ that over time tend to get naturalised and regarded as more ancient and 
original than they actually are. Eric Hobsbawm defines ‘invented tradition’ as ‘a set 
of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or 
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’.189 Anette Warring 
shows how days of commemoration are used to form a shared interpretation of 
the past among what she calls ‘communities of memory’.190 But such days are also 
directed towards the present and the future, in gathering those communities around 
contemporary activities that reinforce social cohesion and constructing a moment in 
time for reflecting on one’s shared tasks and potentials.
John R. Gillis distinguishes three broad periods of national commemorations: the 
pre-national era, the national era from 1789–1960, and the current post-national 
era.191 Hobsbawm sees Europe 1870–1914 as a mass-producer of such traditions, 
which were closely bound to the consolidating system of nation-states that had become 
the ultimate focus and arena of political life: ‘State, nation and society converged’.192 
However, the key European symbols discussed here would belong to the post-national 
period, where there is supposedly a shift from national to new combinations of local 
and global frameworks. The persistent returns of national and nationalist sentiments 
have problematised such simplistic schematics, but there seems to be at least an 
element of truth in that diagnosis. Even where national identifications seem as strong 
as ever, this could well be the defensive response to a more fundamental weakening 
of the national system that came into being in the nineteenth century. In general, one 
may assume that times of intense historical transformation would increase citizens’ 
needs for actively constructing memory and continuity.193 Modernity at large is an era 
constituted on the basis of continual transformation and change, so this is true for all 
of the modern era. It may be particularly true of decades where economic, political, 
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social and cultural change was felt to be intensified. For various reasons, this was true 
for many Europeans in the 1960s as well as around 1990. William M. Johnston talks 
of a current ‘cult of anniversaries’ that is underpinned by a ‘commemoration industry’, 
operating on local, regional and national levels.194 No wonder that determining a 
Europe day became a prime task for the expanding pan-European institutions in the 
expansive 1960s and then again after the 1989 fall of the iron curtain.
Dating is a way of inhabiting time and giving it meaning. The celebration of a day 
signifies a geopolitical community like Europe in three main ways. (a) First, looking 
backwards, a celebratory day that is reminiscent of something that once happened, 
commemorating a unique past event of founding importance to a community or an 
institution. (b) Second, looking forwards towards the future, such a date expresses 
how a social collective intends to direct its joint action along a set of cherished core 
values. (c) Third, in the present, as the day returns every year, through the cyclical 
aspect of the calendar, it gives a community the occasion to jointly celebrate and 
display its unity and its values in specific ceremonial rituals enacted that day, offering 
annually ritualised time for communal activities that serve as a symbolic model for 
collective practices to unite people and integrate them in a shared social and cultural 
sphere of meaning. Through such mechanisms, celebrations of jubilees, memorials, 
festivals and anniversaries stabilise collective memory and strengthen cultural identity. 
Annual commemoration days serve to remind of important past events, often of a 
foundational character, but also to regularly manifest a persisting community through 
the enactment of various ceremonial rituals that help constructing the meaning and 
thus identity of that community. This is evidently true of national days, but also of 
religious holidays and various kinds of anniversaries. David McCrone and Gayle 
McPherson stress that as regularly recurring dates, ‘National Days give the nation a 
heartbeat—a calendric rhythm of self-awareness and pride’, but also that this universal 
mechanism is the basis for great variations between different national days, testifying 
to the flexibility of these practices, serving different functions for different people.195
This is how the European Navigator explains the general function of such days:
As we know, with the advent of monarchies, feast days of a civil or 
dynastic nature began to be celebrated, although many included a 
religious element (coronations, sovereign’s weddings, birth of the heir 
to the throne, etc.). These feast days were generally accompanied by 
tournaments, jousts, cavalcades and hunting parties. After the French 
revolution, however, civil feast days of a popular and national type 
began to become important with a view to celebrating the achievement 
of liberty from domestic privilege (France) or from subjection to 
foreign rule (in the case of the Americas). In the Member States, one 




way of preserving memory, and help periodically to naturalise an 
eclectic heritage, to keep awareness of the past alive and to unify 
relational networks. The national public holiday is often the day on 
which the State became independent, and in some cases it celebrates 
the patron saint or another event that is particularly meaningful for 
the nation.196
Europe is no nation or nation state, nor has it stated any wish to become one. Still, 
European policy-makers saw a need for a day to celebrate the emerging transnational 
community of Europe, and called for determining a Europe Day.
Introducing Europe Day
The European Union’s Europe Day is 9 May. It is supposed to commemorate 9 May 
1950, when the French Foreign Minis ter Robert Schuman presented the Schuman 
Declaration, in which he expressed a wish to maintain peaceful relations in light 
of the grim experiences of two disastrous European wars. He therefore proposed 
that European countries, with France and Germany as the central axis, should pool 
together their coal and steel production as ‘the first concrete foundation of a European 
federation’.197 It was precisely this industry sector that formed the basis of military 
power, and for those countries that had recently fought a horrible war against each 
other, resulting in vast material and moral desolation, this was an important step 
towards an organised Europe.
From 1955 to the early 1960s, there were several proposals and recommendations 
that called for the institution of a Europe Day to strengthen the ‘feelings of fellowship 
among Europeans’.198 Some proposed the first Wednesday in March; others 21 March. 
The need for such a day was ‘psychological and educational’, as it was supposed to be 
a tool for teaching Europeans to feel European through awakening a mass movement 
for the unification of Europe. That such movement may well have been needed or at 
least missing seems obvious from the insight that the leading institutions—in spite of 
the strong ideological will—had about a lack of support for these ideas in the public 
opinion of many countries, which made it hard to come to any decision. It remained 
difficult to choose a specific date, and a European Conference on Local Authorities 
in March 1962 advocated the institution of a Europe Day but could only propose ‘a 
provisional date’ for it. That same year for instance, the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe stated that the date chosen must have ‘a symbolic and historical 
significance’. At that moment, some day in early May seems to have been the first 
option. Both 1 and 5 May were mentioned on various occasions, but soon the latter 
date became the main alternative, for instance when the Committee of Ministers in 
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1964 recommended that governments of member countries should ‘arrange for Europe 
Day to be celebrated, if possible, on 5 May’ (my emphasis). Brochures were distributed 
widely, and every year, renewed efforts were made to establish the day properly, but 
under the celebratory surface, documents hint at a certain disappointment at the lack 
of enthusiasm in the general public of many member states—and probably also among 
several of their leading politicians. A European Committee for Europe Day set up in 
1970, chaired by Jacques Chaban-Delmas, proposed to ‘organise in the week of 5 May 
great demonstrations of popular support for the European cause’, asking the people 
of Europe to use the opportunity to stop for a moment, ‘to think of their common 
heritage, of their joint interests, their shared hopes and destiny’.199 In spite of all these 
efforts and declarations, the Committee of Ministers again and again found reason to 
repeat its solemn commitment to make the Europe Day celebration ‘a major event in 
the lives of the peoples of Europe’.200 
The process was thus slow, partly because there was no real consensus on which date 
to choose. However, the European Council in Milan 28–29 June 1985 decided to adopt 
the flag, the anthem and the day, by confirming a report from an ‘ad hoc Committee 
on a People’s Europe’, the so-called Adonnino Committee, which proposed 9 May as 
Europe Day.201 Since then, this is Europe Day according to the EU, even though the 
Council of Europe continued to have other preferences. 9 May was among the official 
EU symbols included in the 2004/2005 Constitutional Treaty and was also mentioned 
by the sixteen member states who in 2007 wished to express a loyalty with the symbols 
that had after the defeat of the draft been expelled from the Lisbon treaty. This means 
that 9 May is today the main candidate for Europe Day, with an at least semi-official 
status within the EU.
Europe Day remains a contested symbol, as the dating issue is still not quite 
resolved. The 9 May Europe Day has been seen by some critics as ‘a unilaterally 
French act’, ‘politically calculated, and not resulting from the overwhelming will of 
the European peoples’.202 In 1997, French history and geography teacher Yves Depoux 
proposed 25 March as an alternative date, in order to avoid collision with the 8 May 
celebration of the end of World War II. 25 March is also Annunciation Day, which 
Depoux found suitable for symbolising the calling of Europe to its elevating cause.203 
This Christian sphere of association has a certain rootedness in large parts of Europe, 
but has for decades been avoided in the name of building a secular political order 
that fully respects the separation of church and state. Still, as will be shown, there are 
echoes of this religious universe in some of the other symbols.
More importantly, the Council of Europe has since 1964 continued to celebrate 5 
May as Europe Day, celebrating its own founding on 5 May 1949. It is striking that 
different print and web sources choose to present either 5 or 9 May as the only existing 
and obvious one, without mentioning the other alternative. Those who do mention 




Wikipedia article on ‘Symbols of Europe’ informs that 5 May ‘is still observed by 
some Europeans because of the CoE’s role in defending human rights, parliamentary 
democracy and the rule of law, whereas the Schuman Declaration was merely 
proposing the pooling of French and German coal and steel’.204 This seems to lend 
5 May a more idealistic, ethical and social aura, while 9 May would then rather lean 
towards economic and industrial aspects of the European project. However, this is not 
quite as simple as it may sound, as the opposition can be read as either one between 
idealistic elites and down-to-earth pragmatists, or on the contrary between democratic 
ideals and market-based capitalist power. The issue is further complicated by the 
idealist aspects found also in the Schuman Declaration, which combines industrial 
pooling with a wish for international peace and social welfare. Here is an interesting 
case of conflict of interpretation where two alternative and mutually excluding dates 
compete. Such discord between leading European institutions certainly does not 
make it any easier to anchor any Europe Day among European citizens! 
Interpreting Europe Day
The 9 May commemoration is clearly meant to celebrate the historical foundation of 
the unifying project while simultaneously expressing its future-oriented core values:
The celebration of 9 May is not just the celebration of the founding 
document of the process of European integration. It also provides an 
opportunity to reflect on the current and real situation which changes 
daily. The reality of life in a European Union based on the principles of 
the rule of law, which possesses a democratic order based on popular 
sovereignty and on values which are now accepted and shared by the 
vast majority of European people. The meaning of the celebration lies in 
its commemoration of the path that had to be taken to consolidate these 
principles and values, without taking for granted the victories won.205
The Adonnino Committee report that the European Council supported in Milan 
28–29 June 1985 had proposed 
confirming 9 May of each year as Europe Day with a view to creating 
awareness and giving information in schools in particular as well as 
on television and in the other media. The date of 9 May, which is of 
great significance to the Community, will fit in with similar initiatives 
taken by the Council of Europe.206 
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The Milan Summit thus emphasised the foundation of the EU in values of peace and 
solidarity that ‘find expression through economic and social development embracing 
environmental and regional dimen sions which are the guarantees of a decent standard 
of living for all citizens’.207 In agreement with the Schuman Declaration, the EU 
continues to believe that in order not to repeat the tragedies of history, and instead 
of building on the conquest and domination of one group or power, there is a need 
to unite Europe around rules and institutions that respect ‘freedom and the identity 
of all of the people which compose it’, in order to ‘control the mastery of its destiny 
and develop a positive role in the world’. ‘The European Union is at the service of its 
citizens. While keeping their own specific values, customs and language, European 
citizens should feel at ease in the “European home.”’ 
This talk of Europe as a ‘home’ for its citizens can be employed by both a conservative 
paternalistic and a socialist or social democratic welfare state model. In Sweden for 
instance, it was the Social Democratic PM Per Albin Hansson who in a famous 1928 
speech formulated the influential po litical ideology of the folkhem (people’s home), 
refer ring to society and the state as a shared home for all its citizens, where all were 
both held responsible and taken good care of, and which was based on commu nity, 
equality, care and cooperation, breaking down social and eco nomic divisions. This 
egalitarian but slightly paternalistic vision of an all-encompassing social contract 
echoes in the Schuman Declaration as well as in several EU policies.
Europe Day thus has a direct link to the EU foundation myth, of which the Schuman 
Declaration is a key example. Its stress on replacing internal differences with mutual 
peace and unity that guarantees stability places it closer to Captain Euro than to the 
Greek Europa myth. Europe Day is meant to cherish the foundational values of peace and 
mutual solidarity ‘through economic and social development embracing environmental 
and regional dimensions’.208 It thus aims to combine several spheres of values, from 
high ethical standards to more material values related to economic prosperity, social 
welfare and ecological sustainability. These value spheres are clearly interconnected. 
For instance, the ‘blue’ (liberal or conservative) values of economic strength have in 
modern European history been productively combined with ‘red’ values of social 
welfare (anchored in a socialist or social democratic tradition), the two mutually 
boosting each other, and to this alliance have recently been recruited the ‘green’ values 
of the ecological and environmental movements. These sets of values can certainly often 
clash and contradict each other, but efforts are made to see how they instead may be 
linked to and support each other, for instance by making climate attention a tool for 
strengthening and modernising industrial and post-industrial production. It is evident 
from the Schuman Declaration that Europe Day is meant to celebrate a combination of 
economic prosperity, social welfare, political unity and mutual understanding across 
different nations and cultures—a combination which is not easily accomplished and 




William M. Johnston has found that the vast majority of European anniversaries 
celebrate modern secular figures and can therefore be seen as celebrations of 
modernity itself, rather than being traditionalist.209 This is relevant for Europe 
Day too. Even though it is not an anniversary celebrating a particular individual, 
it commemorates a high-modern event that was enacted by a forward-looking and 
secular politician. Johnston further argues that while most anniversaries in the United 
States concern specific events, those in Europe tend more often to celebrate ‘creative 
geniuses’, explaining this by the overwhelming number of such great individuals that 
have accumulated through the centuries.210 The effect is to forge a ‘Golden Chain 
of Genius, stretching back through the Renaissance and Middle Ages to antiquity’, 
and thereby constructing a distinctly European heritage, highly useful to boosting 
its shared but unique cultural identity, particularly in the presently ongoing process 
of integration that ‘encourages commemorating pan-European luminaries’ who 
‘personify pan-European heritage’, so that this cult of anniversaries function ‘as a 
modern substitute for the cult of ancestors’.211 Robert Schuman is just one example; 
others will be mentioned later, from patron saints to the personalities honoured on 
euro coins. Europe Day belongs to that category of anniversaries that respond to 
the fact that today ‘Europeans need emblems of uniqueness’.212 In 1991, Johnston 
predicted that this process would become increasingly transnationalised, which has 
since been confirmed.213
Michael E. Geisler argues that national days are ‘unstable signifiers’: while other 
national symbols work through ‘over-determination’, establishing a complex web of 
signification by being integrated into everyday life practices, national days happen 
just once a year and are then instead meant to be explicitly noticed.214 They are never 
examples of the ‘unwaved’ symbols of ‘banal nationalism’ that Michael Billig has 
shown to be so effective, since they are not ‘time-in culture’, to borrow a phrase from 
Klaus Bruhn Jensen, but rather ‘time-out culture’, separated from the ordinary flow 
of history.215 Europe day has another kind of function than most symbols analysed 
in later chapters, as it organises focused activities that tend to combine all those 
other symbols in a dense node of experience for citizens. The meaning of the day will 
therefore also evolve through its actual use, making it difficult to interpret in isolation 
from all those annually renewed practices.
Comparisons and commentary
There is a kind of ‘intertextual’ interference between both the European Days and 
the dates for celebrating the end of World War II in Europe. 9 May coincides with 
Victory Day, celebrating the end of World War II in East Europe, while Victory Day 
happens to be celebrated either on 5 or 8 May in West Europe. This collision can be 
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a negative competition that contributes to the neglect of Europe Day, particularly in 
East Europe where Victory Day remains important, but there may (in both cases) also 
be gains in connecting the two, as it may give the celebration a polysemic meaning 
that strongly identifies European unification as a peace project.
Another intertextuality is of course with national days: those specific dates that are 
often national holidays and on which celebrations mark the nationhood of a country. 
They tend to be most intensely celebrated when they go back to not too distant 
dates of liberation, independence or other key constitutional events that have made 
national sovereignty important for the citizens of a nation. The Irish St Patrick’s Day 
of 17 March, the US 4 July and the French 14 July are all connected to key moments 
in their national histories and are usually celebrated on a grand scale, whereas for 
instance the UK countries England, Scotland and Wales pay scarce attention to their 
patron saints’ days and do not even have any shared national day.216 This reflects the 
diminished role of the Church for modern nation’s identity, as well as the importance 
for a people of having sufficiently recently gone through a process of liberation from 
oppression, whether by foreign imperialist colonisation or by domestic autocracy. This 
is for instance why Norway celebrates its sovereign constitution after liberation from 
Denmark on 17 May 1814 (though followed by a royal union with Sweden until 7 June 
1905) much more emphatically than Sweden marks its 6 June, which did not become a 
holiday until 2005 and which relatively few Swedes recognise as a commemoration of 
how Swedish nobility in 1523 made Gustav Vasa their king and thus in a sense marked 
the foundation of Sweden as a modern nation state. It is also relevant to note that 
celebrations of Denmark’s National Day were intensified in periods where European 
integration and migration were problematised by emergent nationalist movements 
in the early 1970s and again in the late 1990s.217 In Spain, one may almost talk of a 
reversed celebration, as the Hispanic Day of 12 October marks when Christopher 
Columbus first set foot in the Americas in 1492, thus commemorating an event that 
certainly vastly expanded the territory and wealth of Spain, but as this colonial empire 
has since long collapsed, it gives the Spanish National Day an ambiguous aura of 
nostalgic loss and—from a postcolonial perspective—rather problematic overtones.
With two exceptions, neither of the two Europe Days seriously collides with another 
well-known celebration. The British Channel Islands use 9 May as their national day, 
commemorating the liberation from Nazi German occupation in 1945. In a similar 
spirit, besides their Queensday on 30 April, the Netherlands celebrates Liberation Day 
on 5 May. 
Among the other continents, Australia is the only one that is also a nation state. 
Since 1808, Australia Day 26 January celebrates the proclamation of British sovereignty 
over Sydney and the east coast of Australia in 1788, but is controversial and since 1988 
opposed by aborigines who rename it ‘Invasion Day’, which has resulted in debates 




the 25 May 1963 founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which in 
2002 transformed into the African Union.219 Considering the cultural and political 
divisions of Asia and the Americas, it is unlikely that they will follow the same path 
in the near future. The US federation may be seen as the closest comparison, but 
while EU’s Europe consists of sovereign nations, the United States is one single and 
considerably more homogenised nation, even if it consists of separate states—but 
then so does Germany, for instance.
The whole Europe Day discourse shows how closely it links the past to the future: 
the meaning of the 1950 Schuman Declaration has a bearing on the shared values, 
hopes, promises and goals that the EU and presumably a majority of Europeans 
are supposed to strive for. However, every such memorable day also, and most 
importantly, has a third dimension: that of the present—the actual event that unfolds 
each 9 May. A day of celebration is of course nothing without celebrations. It is 
made to be actively used for recurrent ritual practices, and its full meaning only 
develops through such use. Europe Day has little meaning if it is not actively used 
for ceremonial collective activities. Confusion between contesting dates and lack of 
knowledge or interest is therefore an obvious problem in this case. The actual uses of 
Europe Day—or indeed of any of the other official symbols—have not been precisely 
regulated in any binding treaty, though a set of practices has been established over 
the years. 
EU sources thus explain that Europe Day is intended to be used for ‘activities and 
festivities that bring Europe closer to its citizens and peoples of the Union closer 
to one another’, celebrating its basic values.220 This was why a date with symbolic 
significance was to be selected, and already in the early 1960s, the Council of Europe 
suggested that governments and local authorities should use the new European flag 
colours for public decorations that day.221 It was during the following decade also 
proposed that other European events, such as the release of Europe stamps, should 
be focused around early May, and even that ‘great demonstrations of popular support 
for the European cause’ should be organised that week, so as to create a momentum 
around Europe Day.222
Europe Day on 9 May offers a yearly opportunity to bring Europe 
closer to its citizens. It is a day of information, guidance and discussion 
of European Union themes, especially, but not just, in schools and 
universities, with events of a particular cultural and educational 
content. Europe Day must also be an opportunity to forge closer ties 
between the citizens of Europe and overcome the sense of distance, 
indifference and even disaffection that they feel for the European 
institutions. It is a time at which the most can be made of the Union’s 
symbols. As in the case of a national day, what is needed is a good 
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showing of European flags, not only at places at which events are being 
held but also, and in particular, at windows. Lastly, 9 May should be 
a day of public holiday where men and women from different cities, 
regions and countries of our Europe can meet.223
9 May is an official public holiday in only a handful of smaller nations, including 
Kosovo. Celebrations have in most regions remained rather limited and few European 
citizens are aware of them or indeed of the significance of this date, as even the official 
EU website has to admit.224 In some places and some years, there have admittedly been 
a considerable wealth of activities that day, for instance in France 2006, which was the 
twentieth time Europe Day was celebrated, and therefore a great number of festivities 
were organised all over Paris.225 However, that tends to be an exception, and it is difficult 
to describe the reception and use of this day as a success story. It is interesting to note 
that the only mention of Europe day in a recent volume on European national days 
is that it is ‘an invented supra-national tradition’ that is ‘dubious and not popular’.226 
One difficulty derives from the confusion around which date to celebrate, but there is 
also a more general and problematic difficulty of constructing a really suitable ritual 
practice to gather European citizens around shared values. Some examples from 
recent years indicate the main issues involved in operationalising the day to boost 
European identification.
In 2009, websites reported rather small-scale celebrations, mainly by officials and 
politicians, both in Europe and outside, with scattered speeches, conferences and 
concerts. Reports came from EU member states but also from Turkey, Palestine, 
Armenia, Canada, US, Caribbean Dominica, Gambia, New Zealand, China and 
Taiwan, where EU delegations and/or local organisations for Europeans organised 
minor events, stressing Europe’s positive role for the country in question. Celebrations 
were more actively reported in regions where EU issues were high on the agenda, 
as for instance in Ukraine 2009, where the EU is used as a kind of shield against 
Russian domination. A news agency reported that ‘Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko has congratulated Ukrainian citizens on Europe Day’, with the following 
words:
It is pleasant to note that celebrations of Europe Day have already 
become a tradition in all of the country’s regions, both in the west and 
the east. The Ukrainian people is united in its being an integral part of 
European civilization.227 
The article then concludes by telling that Ukraine since 2003 celebrates Europe Day 
on the third Saturday of May, which is a bit paradoxical considering the divergence 




In 2009, a British pro-Europe web magazine, European Lifestyle, asked a dozen 
people in the street and none knew that 9 May is Europe Day or what it is meant to 
celebrate. ‘The problem is the European Union never actively promotes it very much 
to those whom its rules directly impact.’ The argument here was that too little was 
done to advertise this actually quite important event: ‘It all comes down to image’. This 
website was one of the few that really spoke of the EU symbols: ‘The symbols, which 
Europe has adopted to promote itself with, makes the EU far more obvious than any 
background organisation ever has, save the UN.’ With more information, there would 
be a better understanding of the importance of the European project: ‘When that 
happens we can all expect the flags, celebrations and parties of Europe Day to become 
second nature’.228
An Irish pro-EU blogger likewise wished for more people to take the day 
seriously: 
So next time that the 9th of May is the day, you do not have to sing the 
‘Ode of Joy’, you do not have to be dressed in blue from head to toe 
or wave the EU flag, but simply go to any happenings for the day near 
your area, meet and talk to people from all over Europe living there, 
share ideas, express your disappointment if you wish and tell where 
EU has failed you, exchange and discuss topics about your culture, 
your country, what you love about the country you live or come from, 
what you love about living in EU and how it has helped you and your 
country, what must be done for EU to be better and what vision do 
you have for it for the future. That is what the 9th of May should be all 
about, that is how you must celebrate it, and I am sure that it will make 
a difference for you if you do so.229
In 2009, most others were considerably more sceptical. On 9 May, an amusement park 
in Helsinki, Finland, was the stage for a couple of speeches and a panel discussion 
among MEPs. ‘Only one was missing—the audience’, a blogger ironically reported and 
mentioned that another Europe Day event in Helsinki got more visitors—one with the 
theme of European Wine Culture: ‘Also here the “Europeanization” of Finns got some 
setback as in cold weather the participants desired a bit stronger drinks. Also some 
Wine experts missed more Wines from Australia, America etc instead of Wines from 
Europe.’ The gloomy experience led to the conclusion that EU is not on the top of the 
average Finnish taxpayer’s priorities.230
A Lebanese website reported on celebrations in Brussels, interviewing visitors from 
a range of countries and focusing on the ‘lack of engagement between EU institutions 
and the European public’. Thousands of people were reported to stream through the 
doors of the EU institutions in Brussels, but ‘the crowds seemed blissfully unaware’ of 
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what Europe Day is. A Belgian MEP complained that it is ‘very difficult to get people 
interested in European issues’, since ‘they are interested in their own problems’: ‘People 
say that Europe is too complicated.’231
A cosmopolitan blog with a ‘European perspective’ agreed that ‘most people in Europe 
are not aware of it’, and considered ‘if it would make sense to have 9 May as a public 
holiday throughout Europe, in order to raise awareness and celebrate the European 
project’, but added that ‘EU symbolism is not very popular at the moment’ and found 
the main obstacle to be that this would be too expensive in the current economic crisis: 
‘Nobody wants to get rid of “National days” in favour of a European one’.232
On the same occasion, Swedish EU commissioner Margot Wallström published a 
text about ‘The subtle pleasures of Europe Day’, where she tried to portray it as an event 
worthy of serious consideration and suggest its importance without forgetting the 
difficulties in making it a meaningful event. She argued that Schuman’s vision of how to 
prevent further European wars ‘seems to have worked’ and that ‘all those authoritarian 
governments’ with their ‘dictators, communists and colonels’ are now gone:
So what? Many people say. They see a blue flag with 12 stars. Does it 
evoke passion? In a small minority, perhaps. Some see it as a symbol 
of good, a tiny minority detest it, but to most, it is a symbol that is 
just not relevant to them. The EU is a bit like the insulation in your 
house—it’s useful and good to know it’s there but the average person 
does not go around thinking or worrying about it all the time. And yet, 
maybe that is its greatest success. 
The EU doesn’t really do passion. If anything, the EU flag stands 
for boring reason over passion […]. And yet the EU does stuff that is 
highly relevant to us. […] No need to wave a flag. But when you think 
about the positive and useful everyday work that European countries 
now do together, maybe it’s a nice idea to remember the day in 1950 
when one man, looking out over a continent that had been the world’s 
greatest battlefield only five years previously, suggested that he might 
have a way of making sure it never happened again.233 
Wallström thus emphasised the small steps to a better life that the EU makes possible, 
but is sceptical towards the value of its symbols: ‘No need to wave a flag.’ It is notable 
that Wallström’s chronicle was not very successful even in her Swedish homeland, 
where there was in the largest Swedish newspaper, the liberal Dagens Nyheter, on 
that same day 9 May 2009 not a single mention of Europe Day, even though the 
imminent European Parliament election was mentioned in various places. The single 
exception was in a comic strip expressing a regret on Europe’s inability to defend the 




same was the case in 2010, with lots of information about the Russian World War II 
memorial day and the ongoing financial crisis but no word on Europe day except in 
that same comic strip (Figure 4.1).234
It has already been mentioned that for historical and political reasons, attention 
to Europe Day tends to be greater and more positive in East Europe, where 
occasions to celebrate European values play a pragmatic role in efforts to reinforce 
progressive Europeanisation, not least in those countries that continue to aspire for 
EU membership. However, even for the ex-Yugoslavian region, a 2010 report offers 
a mixed picture. The report refers to High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy of the European Union, Catherine Ashton, having ‘noted that Europe 
Day was a symbol of new beginning, free and successful cooperation between 
sovereign countries, on basis of common values and interests—democracy, peace, 
solidarity, welfare and rule of law’.235 On this by now well-known basis, the report 
mentions the complicating issue that there are actually two European days (5 and 
9 May), and that they collide with celebrations of victory over fascism. Examples 
from each country in the region are then given of how state institutions organise 
events but also how sometimes civil society organisations ‘join the band-wagon’. 
Formal events included public speeches by government officials, presentation stands 
by EU member states or brass concerts where presumably the European anthem 
was performed. Less formal celebrations were often marked by activities that would 
possibly have happened anyhow, but that were now linked to Europe Day, such as 
students’ sports tournaments or openings of youth centres. Here is a typical example 
of the mixed activities that people participated in:
In Macedonia, the Government Secretariat for European Affairs 
(SEA) organized the multimedia event ‘The More the Merrier’, in 
cooperation with the Municipality of Centar (Skopje), to inform and 
educate Macedonian children, through games and fun, what EU was 
about and what values it stands for. The traditional ‘Skopje Marathon’ 
was held on Europe Day, with participation of over 2,000 runners, 
who completed the distances of 5000 metres, half-Marathon and full 
Marathon race. EU Ambassador to Macedonia Erwan Fouere was 
present at the traditional ‘Waiter’s Race’ in down-town Skopje, and 
at the performance by the Orchestra of the Youth Cultural Centre in 
front of the Memorial Home of Mother Theresa.236
Creativity was also striking in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with awards for 
‘European Friend of BiH for 2010’ and ‘The Most-European Citizens of BiH for 
2010’, as well as ‘setting the new Guinness Record for most people simultaneously 
dancing the waltz in Tuzla’. In Sarajevo, a 4 km ‘Race to Europe’ was held, as well as 
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a European Film programme. In some countries, anti-fascist organisations took the 
opportunity to organise events linking Europe Day to Victory Day, and in Albania and 
Macedonia, the report noted that oppositional groups staged mass demonstrations 
demanding democratic reforms and propagating accelerated integration in the EU. 
But these Balkan phenomena on both sides of the current EU border are exceptions 
to the general rule. It is only in ‘new Europe’ that Europe Day(s) has (have) a presence 
and even urgency for at least some state bodies and sections of the public sphere 
and civil society, with an emphasis on activities for children and young people, and 
often cleverly combining the European theme with other events that thereby become 
articulated with Europeanness without being by any means necessarily bound to it. 
Citizens of the old and more sceptical west and north tend to be considerably more 
ignorant.
Conclusions
In the beginning of this chapter, it was mentioned how identifying days have three main 
directions: anchoring a socio-political unity in a historic past, expressing its orientation 
towards the future, and giving occasions for collectively celebrating its community in 
the present. These dimensions are always interwoven. This is true for Europe Day as 
well. It is similar to many other such days, in that it connects to a founding moment in 
the (recent) history of the European unification project, with links back to the fateful 
experiences of the two world wars. The release and liberation is here thus not so much 
from external or illegitimate autocratic rule, as is the case with a majority of the most 
intensely celebrated national days. The autonomy and sovereignty commemorated each 
May is rather a kind of liberation from internal division and strife. 
Commemorating particular heritage also motivates what is perceived as the specific 
calling and thus acknowledged goal and task of a unified Europe. This constructs a 
meaning for Europe that identifies it as a project of peace and prosperity, of unity and 
welfare. The Schuman Declaration and its many elaborations so often repeated in official 
explanations all underline this overcoming of mutual conflicts and the building of a safe, 
responsible and successful joint future as the core of the EU project. It was shown how 
the EU discourses strive to make Europe Day link to a set of strong political ideologies, 
by constructing a kind of alliance between what was here called blue, red and green 
values: liberal and conservative aims for solid prosperity, socialist demands for equal 
social welfare, and ecological values of sustainable development that does not disrupt 
the ecosystem. These values are co-articulated in the discourses around the other EU 
symbols as well. It is yet difficult to clearly discern their priority order or relative strength, 
as they are differently articulated in different settings, and there is an ongoing process 




official proclamations tend to first of all emphasise issues of peace and solidarity, taking 
Europe Day to reinforce unity and community, forging closer ties between peoples 
but with full respect for their national, regional and individual identities. Rule of law, 
sovereignty and democratic order is to be the way for Europe to achieve mastery of its 
own destiny in the world. Economic and social development for securing a solid and 
increasing living standard is the second priority in rhetorics, whereas critical readings 
may well suspect that in fact economic expansion may for many influential actors be 
the hidden core interest, with peace, democracy and social security as means of global 
competition rather than as goals in themselves. Likewise, environmental sustainability 
is to some groups in civil society the top priority, while for others it can rather be seen 
as a currently efficient tool for renewed economic development.
However, for the day of Europe, the main difficulty that has been generally 
acknowledged and discussed lies in the third dimension: that of the present. This 
is the aspect that most evidently fails in many West European nations today. The 
intention is that it should serve as a recurring occasion to ritually reconstruct social 
bonds in empowering, community-reinforcing practices. In practice, local activities 
and communal rituals celebrating Europeanness happen that day all over Europe, but 
attendance and attention is scarce, and the media coverage they get is mainly negative 
these days, focusing on the deficits or even failure of Europe Day itself, whereas only a 
limited number of enthusiasts continue to try and reconstruct this as a success story.
It is thus possible to deconstruct various contradictions and hidden implications 
in the historical and teleological dimensions of Europe Day, and discern even more 
evident problematics in its contemporary pragmatic uses. Its signifying aspects may 
thus be summed up as follows, in comparison with the corresponding interpretation 
of the myth and name.
1.  The ancient Europa myth was characterised by multiple dislocations, homological 
with the historical origins and continual development of European settlements 
and culture. The more recent Captain Euro alternative on the contrary stood for 
a safe rootedness. My conclusion was that there is a persistent tension between 
values of mobility and stability. Here, Europe Day is not that clear, even though 
sovereignty, autonomy and control appear to be more central than dislocation. By 
not explicitly foregrounding dislocation or mobility, taking the fixed localisation 
and settlement of Europeans in Europe and its various nation states for granted, it 
tends to favour the opposite and take for granted that Europe is (in) a fixed place. 
However, the Schuman Declaration can also be read to hint at another kind of 
dislocation: an historical (rather than geographic) disjuncture whereby Europe at 
a given moment decides to do things otherwise—a promise to change irreversibly 
by being open to the differences of the other within and outside itself, respecting 
diversity and building solidarity on that respect rather than by conquering the 
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other. The day does not specify an origin involving geographic migration or 
transport, but it does convey a sense of not being comfortably at home and thus of 
metaphorical or mental dislocation. Still, the day makes a centring movement, by 
building one united Europe from its previously divided core. Spatial fixity in the 
spirit of Captain Euro is thereby combined with temporal disjuncture and a kind 
of enlightening awakening which has certain affinities with the Europa myth.
2.  There was a striking polarity between the two myths in terms of values of 
communication and of control. There is little pleasure in the motivation for the 
day, except that the desire for world peace is in itself a kind of loving and caring 
pleasure, opposed to aggression and domination. From the Schuman Declaration 
to current EU practices, cool rationality is more characteristic of the celebrations 
than hot passion, even if some intensity can be noted in a few formulations. 
Welfare and prosperity tend to be more focused upon on Europe Day than 
pleasure as such, which is left to citizens to fulfil in their lifeworlds. Some efforts 
are made to introduce fun and enjoyable elements in its annual celebration. 
Commissioner Margot Wallström’s formulations on the honourable lack of 
passion in the EU project hints at a hidden tension between on the one hand the 
more pragmatic north European standpoints, perhaps rooted in Protestantism 
and reformist popular movements, and on the other more demagogic South 
European ideologies, with links to Catholic ideals which in this respect may 
be closer to the Europa myth. Here, the overall tension between the two facets 
remains in play. The prominent desire for peace theme echoes Europa’s pleasures, 
though the main emphasis is on calculated control, as a means to fulfil a wish to 
make change in history by putting an end to suffering.
3.  The theme of elevation was the only one that was central to both the analysed myths, 
and it is present in Europe Day as well, as it is implies a kind of lifting of Europe 
and its peoples from greedy and violent self-interests to higher ideals. Europe Day’s 
past and future dimensions signify a wish for ethical and political elevation from 
war and destruction to tolerance and cooperation, but also a material elevation 
from ruins to a prosperous welfare society. However, the lack of imagination, in 
inventing ways in which to realise and symbolise this elevating thrust in annual 
rituals for community-building in the present dimension, and the many ironic or 
even ridiculing comments, which existing efforts receive in various media, disclose 
a difficulty in realising this aspect of identity in actual practice.
4.  Europe Day is once again closer to Captain Euro’s preference for homogeneity 
than to the hybridisation signified by Europa. In the past and present, it focuses 




with unification as an ongoing project and task rather than a fact. The balance 
weighs towards overcoming division, forgiving past grievances and joining 
hands to peacefully build unity, but the efforts to uphold tolerance and respect 
for national, regional and individual identities shows that the tension again 
persists—as least as much as in other comparable socio-political units. The 
emphasis is on the unifying thrust, with diversity more as a starting-point or 
even an obstacle to be overcome: introducing a higher level of unity and shared 
efforts across internal differences.
  Europe Day thus connects to the characteristic tension of values that was 
discovered in the combination of the myth of Europa and that of Captain Euro, 
reinforcing the dominance of the latter, that is, of elevation, rationality, fixity 




Among EU’s symbols, the motto ‘United in diversity’ (Latin: In varietate concordia) 
is the most abstract and maximally condensed form of verbally expressing the idea 
of Europe as a union. Mottos are formulated by many social actors, such as royalties 
or businesses. Before approaching the content of the EU motto, one should consider 
what a motto is used for.
What’s in a motto?
Standard lexicon definitions state that a motto (sixteenth century Italian for ‘word’) 
is a short phrase meant to formally encapsulate the beliefs, ideals, motivations or 
intentions of a social group or organisation, generally linked to some kind of heraldic 
design. In more traditional contexts, it is often formulated in Latin, and is typically 
used in heraldry (combined with a symbolic image) but also in literature (usually 
in the form of a quote that signals the essence or key ideas of the following main 
text). Germanic languages also have access to synonyms such as those that might 
be rephrased as ‘elected saying’ (German Wahlspruch, etc.), which emphasises that 
a motto is something individuals or representatives of a social group or institution 
actively choose to stand for their main goals. A motto thus conveys an active will, the 
future-oriented intentions of an agency: a word of wisdom that somebody has chosen 
to represent certain leading ideals or goals. A motto is a kind of verbal key symbol 
for a community or an individual, which differs from other verbal expressions (such 
as descriptions, laws, poems, novels) in that it formulates a promise or an intention, 
often in a striking manner. A motto is closely related to a slogan (the word derived 
from the Gaelic sluagh, ‘army’ + gairm, ‘shout’), which is a short and memorable 
(written or chanted) phrase used for propaganda or marketing to socially express an 




The relation between a myth and a motto can be seen as one of archaeology versus 
teleology. While a myth is inherited and binds to the past, a motto is emphatically not 
inherited but consciously and intentionally constructed or at least selected among a 
stock of standard formulations in this peculiar genre, in order to convey the goals 
of an agency—a subject such as the ruler of a nation or an institution like the EU. 
A motto is not primarily a description of its bearer’s past achievements and present 
characteristics, but a promise for the future. However, while mainly presenting the 
future-oriented promise of an agency, a motto always nods to the past and the present as 
well—directly or indirectly. First, mottos usually also tend to describe how that agency 
understands itself, that is, its own self-image. Second, they always also indirectly hint at 
the character of the agency, in the same way as any future vision, for instance in science 
fiction narratives or in political utopias or dystopias, discloses key current traits and 
tendencies in the agency and time of its author. The intentions of any (individual or 
collective) subject are always mutually implicated in its background and character, due 
to the crucial link between agency and intentionality. What somebody declares as her 
will does after all say much about who she is, ‘positively’ by the style in which she 
formulates her intentions, which bears the mark of her identity, as well as ‘negatively’ 
by her wish to in the future come to grips with her past shortcomings. For instance, a 
strong will to unite can hint both at community formation as a long-term characteristic 
of a region, and at a current internal division that is felt as problematic and in need of 
decisive counter-measures.
Monarchs, warriors, sports teams and business firms are some of those agencies 
that sometimes tend to put up significant mottos. In times of intensified competition, 
mottos and slogans are multiplied as symbolic weapons in the struggle for recognition 
and proliferation, for instance when increasingly many towns today develop more or 
less successful slogans as aggressive marketing tools of city branding. For instance 
Stockholm has for some years now marketed itself as ‘the Capital of Scandinavia’, 
predictably provoking the rivalling Danish and Norwegian neighbours Copenhagen 
and Oslo. As tools for branding, mottos are today abundant, being used for publicly 
showing that a particular institution is a major player in a specific field of activity. 
Some gain widespread recognition and are often cited; others are ridiculed or quickly 
forgotten. Coca Cola and other firms have been successful examples, whereas the 
efforts by smaller cities often have scant success.
Introducing the European motto
The European motto ‘united in diversity’ is the youngest of EU’s five symbols. 
Though little known among ordinary people, it appears on official EU websites and is 
increasingly often used or at least implied in the official EU rhetoric. 
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‘United in diversity’ had actually been used by the European communists from 1964 
until the rise of Eurocommunism in the late 1970s, as a way of reconciling national 
parties’ autonomy with the support of the Soviet Union.237 This forerunner seems not 
to have been directly referred to in the new EU usage. Mostly in a slightly different 
form—‘unity in difference’—the slogan had been used in the EU sphere at least since 
the mid-1960s, as a way of recognising both the plurality of independent nation states 
and their shared general interests.238 It had for instance since the 1990s been the 
official slogan of the European Bureau for the Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL). If any 
formulation was used to identify the EU, that was it, but it had yet no formal status for 
the EU system as a whole.
In 1998, French journalist Patrick La Prairie at the newspaper Ouest-France started 
organising a competition among school pupils, engaging 40 newspapers from EU 
member states. September 1999 to January 2000, some 80,000, 10–19 years old pupils 
sent in more than 2000 different proposals to a website (www.devise-europe.org). 
Fifteen national juries each selected ten mottoes. Selecting among them, a European 
media panel in April 2000 presented a shortlist of seven alternatives. On 4 May 2000 in 
Brussels, ‘unity in difference’ (proposed by Luxembourg school kids) was selected by 
a grand jury consisting of fifteen ‘eminent European personalities’, chaired by Jacques 
Delors, and aided by a lexicometric survey.239 
It is a bit strange to note that such a complex selection process resulted in precisely 
that motto that had already been most used among European institutions. But the 
history of all these symbols is full of similar ‘coincidences’, related to the need for 
each decision to be in a certain manner ‘overdetermined’, that is, anchored at once on 
several different levels and by divergent mechanisms that together may ensure a kind 
of consensus or at least legitimacy of the chosen motto. 
A second curiosity is that the selected motto was then modified into ‘united in 
diversity’, before it was accepted by the President of the European Parliament, Nicole 
Fontaine, and officially written into the European Constitution draft of 2004, with 
an authorised translation into all the 23 official EU languages, as well as in Latin: ‘In 
varietate concordia’. It is striking that publicly available EU sources do not offer any 
substantial explanation of the motives behind this modification. Research is needed 
in order to clarify this interesting change, and explain how the change could be so 
swiftly made without disturbing the legitimacy effect. It is not difficult to imagine a 
range of possible reasons. The change from ‘unity’ to ‘united’ might possibly reflect a 
wish to emphasise that Europe’s unity is no initially given fact, but the outcome of a 
painful historical process. The change from ‘difference’ to ‘diversity’ could indicate a 
wish to connect more strongly to the politically anchored discourse around ethnic 
multiculture. Finally, the whole modified construction seems able to stress a more 
crucial interdependence of unification and diversity: where ‘unity in difference’ could 




more clearly leans towards the interpretation that it is diversity that is the very basis of 
unity. This interpretation will be analysed in greater detail below.
Interpreting the European motto
Europe can be conceived in many different ways—as a geographic continent, a politico-
economic actor or a sociocultural community. However, the EU is primarily a union of 
nation states, and its symbols will therefore necessarily express an understanding of 
what it means to be such a federation. It is almost self-evident that a union needs a 
motto that in some way expresses its character of being precisely a union, overcoming 
differences. But nuances are therefore of essence. European Union symbols (but not 
necessarily every other European symbol) will always elaborate on the theme of uniting 
different constituents into a strong whole. The question is how this is done. 
A first observation is that it is not always quite obvious whose motto this actually 
is. It is put forward by the EU, which is the major economic and political actor in this 
continent, but it does not organise all the countries and states in this geographic area. 
Even so, the union is obviously strong enough to dare to propose symbols that are 
supposed to be valid for the whole continent. Like the other symbols, the slogan is 
officially presented as ‘the European motto’, rather than ‘the European Union motto’. 
This invites an empirical investigation of how Europeans who are not in the EU relate 
to this motto, which falls outside the scope of this study. 
A second and related problem concerns what kind of unification is implied. From 
the EU perspective, the unification is primarily political and economic, but the whole 
involvement with symbols indicates an effort to also extend this unification to include 
cultural elements, in particular communicative resources that may build a common 
European public sphere where citizens and networks can interact and form a truly 
transnational polity.
A third question asks which diversities are intended. One possible interpretation 
relates to the plurality of EU structures, but two other, more plausible, meanings are 
relevant. One is to the maintenance of the relatively independent national identity and 
mutually exclusive political authority of each member state. The diversity would then be 
national and political. The other reading focuses on the more inclusive ethnical diversity 
of cultures that need not coincide with nation states but may either be sub-national or 
transnationally regional, all relating to the protection of minority rights.240 The EU as a 
political and economic institutional project activates the first topic, while Europe as a 
cultural and social community may equally well make the second one relevant.
Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford distinguish four ways to conceive the relation 
between unity and diversity: (1) diversity as derivative of unity (as in ideas of a 
historical heritage of Greek-Roman and Christian culture); (2) unity as derivative of 
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diversity (in the cultural policy project of overcoming differences through intercultural 
understanding and cosmopolitanism); (3) unity as diversity (where diversity itself is not 
to be overcome but rather to be acknowledged in a postmodernist fashion); and (4) a 
self-limiting unity (a post-national position where a minimal kind of unity is formed out 
of an active engagement with diversity).241 Position 1 was in the mid-twentieth century 
common among Christian conservative circles but is today more often encountered 
among right-wing extremists, while EU policy-makers tend to waver between positions 
2 and 3, none of which seem to have much popular support, according to Delanty and 
Rumford. Position 4 is what for instance Habermas proposes, when emphasising the 
role of communicative mechanisms rather than any underlying cultural identity.
Current thinking seems to point towards a view of unity in diversity 
as an accomplished fact and that therefore the only unity possible is 
that which is built on the basis of whatever common values can be 
found in the various European identities. A European identity is then 
not an over-riding identity but only the common expression of those 
values that presently exist. This might suggest that it is unlikely that 
European identity can rest on stronger values, in a way comparable to, 
for example, American values.242
Delanty and Rumford are deeply sceptical towards ‘the unity in diversity myth’ that 
‘denies the possibility of a European identity since this will always be in danger of 
undermining national diversity’; they even argue that it is ‘close to a legitimation of 
xenophobic nationalism’.243 Instead, they see (political, class, gender and lifestyle) 
differences within nations as greater than those between nations, and argue for 
creating new spaces for communication that do not fix identities but rather open up 
for an unfinished project of social justice, cosmopolitan identity and dialogue.244
The validation of diversity may be seen as a necessary concession to the antifederalist 
sceptics who in many nations slowed down the integration process, but it still has 
important signifying consequences. When it became a leading EU policy keyword, 
it had been updated by a series of theoretical ideas on hybrid identity and multiple 
citizenship that gained impetus from the mid-1980s, not least in central Europe.245
A commentary text on the European motto, published by the European Navigator, 
offers an insight into how leading EU authorities think about the motto. Quoting Jack 
Lang, Ortega y Gasset and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, it spends considerable effort on 
arguing for the need to avoid both fragmentation and implosion. There is on the one 
hand a perceived need for convergence, standardisation, integration and unification. 
On the other hand, there must also always be a necessary respect for the national 




Striking a balance between unity and diversity is crucial. Too much unity 
would run the risk of standardisation and therefore of the destruction of 
national identities. Too much diversity could easily prevent intentions 
from converging and, in the long term, undermine the construction of 
a re-united Europe. […] It therefore seems crucial to seek unity in basic 
values and the combined presence of unity and difference. 
The ‘dominant culture within the institutions in Brussels systematically underestimates 
diversity, viewing it as an obstacle to the further standardisation of Europe’, European 
Navigator continues. But a key lesson from a difficult historical experience is that ‘diversity 
is the genetic heritage of our continent in which unifying factors such as a single language, 
a common religion or a central power able to impose a uniform European model are 
lacking’. Differently from China or the United States, Europe cannot build its identity 
on any dominant uniformity, whether linguistic, religious or ethnic. ‘Europe has to be 
organised from its diversity and not against its diversity. A reasonable balance therefore 
has to be struck between the needs of diversity and the need to form a coherent whole.’246 
This is the pronounced motivation behind the selected motto, in concordance with the 
EU Constitutional Treaty, based on principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, meant 
to carefully respect the sovereignty of each national member state. No wonder the motto 
is increasingly often used in official documents and declarations. It can also be found 
quoted or indirectly alluded to in other European websites, songs and other kinds of 
texts that thematise Europeanness today. 
Comparisons and commentary
It should first be noted that there is a strong homology between the motto and 
the day, and also the myth. The intercourse between Europa and Zeus-as-bull is a 
form of unification in diversity, as the theme of hybridity expresses: human-woman 
travelling together with divine-animal-man and creating an offspring whose strength 
supposedly derived from precisely that diverse genealogy. Also, when 9 May celebrates 
the first formation of a European union, it does so by emphasising how enormous 
internal differences could not only be overcome but also preserved and respected in 
this new entity that was to develop into the EU.
The meaning of the motto can be further elaborated through a detour over a 
comparison with other mottos. Across previous periods, it is difficult to speak of 
any clear motto for Europe. ‘The Senate and People of Rome’ (‘Senatus Populusque 
Romanus’, abbreviated SPQR) pointed back at the two main bodies constituting the 
Roman Republic and the Roman Empire in which this motto was used. Today, nobody 
would be satisfied with a motto that just named the institutions and people of Europe, 
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without offering a sense of direction forward. Charlemagne’s motto was ‘renewal of the 
Roman Empire’ (‘renovatio imperii Romani’), which is much too backward-looking or 
even reactionary to be reused in modern times, where future-oriented progress is the 
main narrative. Later actors striving to create a transnational European power—for 
instance Napoleon or Nazi Germany—had several different mottos linked to them, 
none of which really got any general status in the larger territory.
The African Union still has no official motto, though the need for creating such pan-
African symbols has been discussed in that union. Both Indonesia and South Africa 
use an almost similar national motto as the EU, ‘unity in diversity’. In their case, the 
word ‘unity’ stresses the goal of unity more strongly than the more processual ‘united’ 
of the EU, and—as these states are no federations of formally separate states (though 
South Africa was a ‘Union’ until 1961)—‘diversity’ refers not to different nationalities 
but to the subnational plurality of ethnic groups. In the EU case, the latter term is 
intended to be much broader, including not only cultural and ethnic but also and 
prominently political and national diversity, since the Union is bound to respect the 
relative autonomy of each member state. 
Since 1956, the official US motto is ‘In God We Trust’, derived from the lyrics of 
the American national anthem: ‘The Star Spangled Banner’, written in 1814. However, 
since before that, and still in widespread use today, has been the more secular ‘e 
pluribus unum’ (‘out of many, one’, ‘one for many’ or ‘one from many [parts]’). It is 
said to derive from a Roman poem called ‘Moretum’, sometimes attributed to Virgil, 
and where it describes how different colours are blended into one. It was included on 
the 1776 Seal of the United States, adopted by an Act of Congress in 1782 and used 
on US coins since 1786. As it was never codified by law, the Congress in 1956 decided 
to instead officially adopt ‘In God We Trust’, but it has still remained in use until 
recent times, for instance on dollar coins.247 Like the motto of most federations, the 
US one states that many different merge into one single, united whole. It was actually 
used by European politicians in the late 1950s for stressing the necessary balance 
between individual states and a common identity. In the 1993 De Clercq report, it 
was modified into ‘In uno plures’ in order to strike a distance from the US melting-pot 
approach.248 The US motto conforms to the melting-pot image of the US federation, 
where plurality disappears for the benefit of unity. It refers to the welding of a single 
federal state from a group of individual political units—originally colonies and now 
states. The EU motto instead makes a key point that it is precisely diversity that is the 
main resource for the ongoing process of unifying European nations, more in line with 
a multicultural ‘salad-bowl’ interpretation of diversity, though transposed from ethnic 
to national relations.249 It is more explicitly diversity-friendly, stressing that it is the 
internal plurality of the union that is its defining characteristic. This also corresponds 
to the extraordinarily many linguistic and cultural differences within Europe, which 




a positive source of strength. ‘Whereas the US motto aims at [a] unity created from a 
diversity of states, the EU puts any further unity under the condition of a maintained 
diversity amongst the states’, as Toggenburg formulates it.250 An interpretation would 
seem to indicate that the motto expresses a kind of balance between the polarities 
represented by the two myths mentioned before, making the combination of diversity 
and unity a key resource of Europe.
Few criticisms of the motto are found on the Internet. Most seem rather happy 
about it. For instance, someone at the Leicester Intercultural Communication and 
Leadership School (ICLS) found this motto helpful: 
For a start, the EU’s motto is ‘United in Diversity’, a motto I can 
fully relate to working for ICLS in Leicester. It helped me start 
to overcome a few of my prejudices. Like many Brits, I had not 
considered myself a European, mainly because of media influences 
and our ‘island mentality’. However, after speaking with my new 
friends from Rotterdam, Berlin and Rome, I realised that Europe is 
a strong coalition that can exert pressure (for better of worse) when 
engaged in international negotiations. It seems to me that this is the 
best reason to remain and become more engaged in the EU, because 
as a democratic institution we can encourage it to use its power in a 
globally responsible way.251
Some websites question if there is any real unity, if it is at all possible, or if it is a 
welcome vision for the future. Some have made fun of the abstract and slightly 
paradoxical character of the motto, and of the way it was created: 
That, of course, means no more than ‘diversity through unity’ would 
mean. Or ‘sameness through difference’, ‘white through black’ or 
‘one through zero’. And it will have exactly as much effect as any of 
those slogans would on our ‘identification of or with’ and ‘emotional 
attachment to’ Europe. […] This slogan is the bland expression of an 
abstract contradiction. It was arrived at through a quasi-democratic 
process; and then unilaterally altered by people who decided they knew 
better in order to get a result they preferred. It is, as the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs so elegantly puts it, ‘the perfect definition of the 
essence of the European project’.252
This is witty, but at least the accusation of being contradictory is basically flawed: 
‘United in diversity’ is not synonymous with ‘white through black’ or any other 
paradox, as the analysis here should already have made evident. Compared to the fate 
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of the flag and the anthem, to be discussed in following chapters, the motto has met 
strikingly little strong substantial opposition or fewer alternative proposals, except 
that some still after so many years refer to the EU motto in its initial form, ‘unity in 
difference’, and others passingly mention various other slogans that circulate in Europe, 
including shifting combinations of keywords like ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘solidarity’—
or some other variation on the French Revolution’s ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’—but 
without really confronting the official one.
Since back in 1958, the Council of the European Union has a presidency that rotates 
among member states every six months. This ‘EU Presidency’ often comes with a 
particular motto and logo that aim to reflect the particularly important current tasks, 
but also shed some new light on how Europe is identified. For instance, in spring 
2006, Austria used ‘Partnership for a social future’, and in spring 2007, Germany used 
three different slogans: ‘Europe—succeeding together’, ‘Living Europe safely’ and 
‘Europe—a partner for sustainable global development’. Portugal in autumn 2007 
had ‘A stronger Union for a better world’, Slovenia in spring 2008 talked of ‘Si.nergy 
for Europe’, France in autumn 2008 promoted the considerably more controversial 
and Captain Euro-like ‘a more protective Europe’, and the Czech presidency in spring 
2009 opened up again with ‘A Europe without barriers’, which Sweden in autumn 
2009 connected to by its ‘Openness, effectiveness and dialogue’. Sweden also made 
use of a ‘Me-We’ formula striving to balance and link an individualised perspective 
to a collective belonging and institutional underpinning in formulations like ‘Me-We: 
Your contribution times half a billion—what a force!’ All these slogans are clearly 
conjunctural and bound to particular tasks deriving from the situation of that specific 
period. Together, they indicate that in these last years, the widening and strengthening 
of the Union has been a primary goal, where different countries and/or periods put 
emphasis either on openness or on safety.
Many nations have mottos that promote the individual country in question, 
highlighting its strengths or formulating a task to make it stronger in relation to 
others. A typical example is the current Swedish king Carl XVI Gustaf with his ‘For 
Sweden—With the times’ (‘För Sverige—i tiden’). Some nations include a certain 
measure of transnational orientation, such as Turkey who since Atatürk’s time uses 
‘Peace at home, peace in the world’ (‘Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh’). In comparison, the 
European motto is turned more inwards. It acknowledges plurality within itself, but 
does not in any way thematise its relations to the rest of the world.
One may find several variations on the European motto in use by different 
associations and companies. To take just one single example of the latter, the WSP 
Group, established in the United Kingdom in the 1970s, is today ‘a global business 
providing management and consultancy services to the built and natural environment’ 
with 9000 employees worldwide.253 Its presentation material uses a plethora of visionary 




and passion’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘innovation’. Their main slogan leans heavily on EU 
rhetoric: 
We don’t suppress individuality or the different needs of our clients 
and our teams. Though we are united by our shared pride, passion 
and desire to collaborate, we have very different areas of expertise, 
specialism and innovation. Put it all together and we can be the very best 
to work with and work for. We call it: ‘United by our difference’.254 
This repeated slogan carries a similar message as that of the EU, only more openly 
and simply stated: ‘Ultimately being United by our difference means our people 
flourish in an environment that allows them to produce and be their very best.’ This 
is presumably also the intention behind the EU, and the ideological transfer shows 
how compatible such a motto is not only with interstate collaboration but also with 
corporate marketing.
Conclusions
The motto is a highly abstract and compressed verbal symbol of Europe. It is framed 
by a genre of mottos that express the intended goals and responsibilities of a social 
actor. This actor is in this case a union of sovereign nation states, and even though 
the EU claims to represent the whole of Europe, it is therefore not surprising that its 
motto focuses on the form and process of unification itself, rather than on any other 
aspect of European identity. Each term in the motto is crucial. ‘United’ indicates an 
accomplishment resulting from a process rather than given by definition: a decisive 
step has been taken, namely, the formation of the EU that has united Europe’s nations 
into something stronger than a simple gathering, without eradicating their mutual 
differences by fusing them into one single state. ‘Diversity’ signals a cultural and 
political plurality rather than an inner contradiction or polar otherness. And the word 
‘in’ seems to combine aspects of a ‘through’ and ‘by’, making diversity a sustainable and 
respected feature of the accomplished unification, rather than just an initial condition 
or starting point. Here, the four aspects analysed in the previous symbols seem only 
partially valid.
1.  The motto is rather neutral in relation to the first aspect, involving the polarity 
of dislocation and fixity. The processual term ‘united’ instead of ‘unity’ does 
contribute a certain sense of dislocation, namely from a state of inner division 
and fragmentation to another situation where diversity remains but does not 
any longer block and prevent unification, since unity has been redefined so that 
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it does not demand standardised uniformity. This is apparently possible in the 
present, late modern time where individualisation and flexible specialisation 
have enabled new and more open ways of connecting, also alluded to in terms 
like glocalisation (combining globalisation and localisation).255
2.  As for desire, it is possible to conceive the unification of diverse agencies as 
something that creates joy and satisfaction, whether allusions are made 
specifically to (hetero)sexual intercourse or just to intersubjective or intercultural 
communication in general. The motto talks of a desire for otherness or for internal 
difference, with affinities to the Zeus–Europa encounter. The talk of unification 
at the same time has a loose affinity with the complementary value of rational 
control. The motto can therefore be said to—equally much as the day—balance 
these two poles that Europa and Captain Euro represented.
3.  The motto has a very faint connection to a theme found both in the Europa 
myth and in Europe Day: that of elevation. The processual character of the term 
‘united’ may indicate some kind of civilising historical accomplishment (or task 
ahead). This would have been more evident had the formulation been more like 
that of the United States, which depicts plurality as developing into unity. In 
the EU case, diversity is never abandoned, so that unity and difference remain 
equally valid for Europe today. It is therefore hard to point at a clear elevation to 
some kind of higher level, in the way that princess Europa was temporarily lifted 
up by the god Zeus. Still, one may possibly stretch the interpretation a little bit 
and consider the depiction of inner diversity, as the main and identifying asset 
of this union, to be a kind of uplifting self-image: Europe is supposedly to some 
extent unique (a) in containing such a vast number of ethnicities, religions, 
languages, cultural communities and political nation states, and (b) in regarding 
this inner division as a positive resource, which carries over to the fourth aspect 
below. Still, these embryonic meanings seem rather weak, and on the whole, the 
motto appears to be rather neutral and does not to contribute much along this 
dimension of elevation.
4.  The motto thus only faintly takes up the first three themes found in the previous 
symbols. However, the fourth aspect of hybridity may well be seen as almost 
synonymous to the motto. In a way, hybridity is another term for precisely the 
fusion of unity and diversity: differences that persist even though they are unified 
into one new kind of body. Harmonious unity and diversity compete, with 
shifting balance, in all the different symbolic domains. From this perspective, the 
complex diversity of Europe need not defeat the idea of a European community. 




language, religion, ethnicity or political rule—is a challenge that demands an 
intense building of bridges in all directions, but it is no final contradiction of the 
European project as such. The EU motto ‘united in diversity’ suggests that the 
irreducible plurality may be the strength of this project. Instead of substituting 
diversity with unity, it is the diversity itself that forms the basis of Europe: in 
Étienne Balibar’s words, Europe’s dense history of superimposed differences has 
lent it a particular capacity to act ‘as the interpreter of the world, translating 
languages and cultures in all directions’.256
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Flag
The most prominent visual symbol of the EU is its flag with twelve golden stars in 
a perfect circle on a blue background. This is probably also the most familiar of these 
symbols to most people inside and outside Europe, since it is widely visible both on 
flagpoles and in various print and electronic material related to the EU. In this way, it 
is a kind of logotype that fulfils a quite traditional role of flags.
What’s in a flag?
A flag is a piece of cloth, usually attached to a pole and designed to identify and 
symbolise a community or an office. The term may fall back on the verb form ‘to flag’, 
which is probably derived from an old Nordic onomatopoeic expression of something 
flapping in the wind. It is actually used both for the piece of cloth itself, and for the 
graphic design or emblem that it shows, and which may also be depicted in print, on 
the Internet or in any other visual medium. Flags may have widely different shapes 
and sizes (from standards and banners to pennons or streamers), but most are oblong 
and carry an easily recognisable colourful design. Wording and verbal elements are 
often avoided in flag design, since they are linguistically limited and tend to disturb 
the need for simplicity and symmetry, especially since flags are made of thin cloths.257 
The most relevant type here is the national flag, but there are also flags for provinces, 
cities, organisations and businesses, as well as flags used for signalling or decoration. 
A flag thus works like a kind of logo—a graphical emblem or icon forms a trademark 
or brand of a company, together with the designed typeface that is its logotype. But 





The earliest forms of flags were used at sea and as insignia of leadership in warfare. 
They developed from what in vexillology (the study of flags) is called ‘vexilloids’, or 
proto-flags: prehistoric decorative signs (but not yet coloured pieces of cloth) that serve 
as marks of office for a leader of a community, for instance those used by the classical 
Romans as well as by the Mongolian invaders. Before that, the Chinese invention of 
silk between 6000 and 3000 bc enabled the introduction of cloth flags, probably in 
that same period. Most Chinese flags were monochrome, but some showed birds, 
tigers or dragons. Flags were equally important in India, and were probably brought 
to Europe by the Saracens, whose more abstractly designed military banners used 
by Muslim Arabs in battles inspired the crusaders to make similar flags, often based 
on crosses with specific colour combinations. Their designs became increasingly 
organised with the development of heraldry in the tenth century ad. The first national 
flags were introduced at sea by the Italian city republics of Genova and Venice in the 
early eleventh century ad. The Danish flag ‘Dannebrogen’—red with a white cross—
derives from that time and is thereby the oldest national state flag still in use. A more 
extensive use of national flags with a fixed and elaborate system for their use (for 
instance raising flags on fortresses) was developed with the journeys of discovery in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
Even though flags thus have a long history, some elements of their uses that are 
today experienced as quasi-natural actually are rather recent ‘inventions’. Flags were 
for instance traditionally used as signs for state authority, and it was only with the 
French revolution in 1789 that a national flag, the Tricolour, became used by citizens 
in movements of liberation, both in European and in Latin American countries’ 
struggle for independence in the early nineteenth century. And it was not until around 
1900 that national flags started to be generally flown by individual citizens. All this 
implies that even though flags in general have an ancient history, the focus on flags 
as national symbols used by ordinary citizens for identification with their country is 
something relatively recent, which may explain that it became quite a difficult issue in 
the European unification process after World War II.
European national flags are intertextually related to each other, forming a kind of 
traditional ‘flag families’, of which the Christian cross banners (the Nordic countries, 
Greece, Switzerland, England and the United Kingdom) are the oldest; coats of arms of 
royal houses (Liechtenstein, San Marino) or at least their colours (Belgium, Germany, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, Monaco, Poland and Spain) survive particularly in monarchies, 
while countries with stronger republican traditions usually have a tricolor inspired by 
the Netherlands (horizontal) or France (vertical).258 The EU flag is of a different kind. 
What flags mean depends not only on their design but also on their uses: which 
values and emotions are invested in them varies a lot between nations (or other 
organisations whom they symbolise). Some are consciously used as strong and 
sometimes controversial identity markers, while others are more routinely used in the 
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background, ‘unwaved’ bearers of ‘banal nationalism’, according to Michael Billig.259 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen has argued that the most influential flags fulfil three demands: 
they symbolise a shared identity that is based on more than just the flag; they are 
empty vessels that allow people to fill them with many different meanings; and this 
ambiguity vanishes at the boundaries of a nation, where their contrasts to surrounding 
others must be clear.260 As will soon be shown, the European flag easily lives up to the 
third criterion, as it is rather unique in the world, but it has greater problems with 
the first two ones. As it is still most actively waved from above, by central institutions 
rather than by committed citizens, the existence of a shared European identity to 
back it up remains uncertain, and many seem to feel that its signifying power is too 
fixed. However, it may not hopelessly have lost this battle for recognition, and a closer 
interpretation will open up a number of options for how to read it.
Introducing the European flag
Whereas the motto is a newcomer, the European flag has been used for quite long 
(Figure 6.1). It was instituted in a series of steps starting in 1951 and ending with its 
establishment by the Council of Europe on 8 December 1955. Its heraldic description 
declares that it shows ‘on an azure field, a circle of twelve golden mullets, their points 
not touching’, and with an official symbolic description stating that ‘against the 
background of blue sky, twelve golden stars form a circle representing the union of the 
peoples of Europe; the number of stars is fixed, twelve being the symbol of perfection 
and unity’.261 It is instructive to scrutinise how this flag was established, even though 
the minute details of inventors, copyrights and datings will not be discussed here, and 
alternative designs used earlier or in parallel will be discussed later. 
During the period from the convocation of the Congress of Hague 1948 and the 
formation of the Council of Europe in 1949 to its 1955 adoption of the final flag 
design, a complex process took place through which this design was established. In the 
beginning, there was no simple consensus, but several different designs were proposed 
by various European organisations and activists, in particular by the Paneuropean 
Union with its red cross on a yellow sun with a blue background, and by the European 
Movement with its green ‘E’ on white (these designs will be further discussed below). 
In a July 1951 memorandum from the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe 
on the European flag, a wide range of proposals were summarised and discussed. The 
rivalry between existing designs was mentioned, as was the fact that they remained 
‘private emblems’ of organisation and had no official status or even use in practice 
within the emerging European institutions. A flag was needed as a tool ‘to make 
the peoples of Europe more directly aware of their unity’, but there was no existing 




memorandum argued. ‘A completely new flag must be designed’, meeting some basic 
requirements: ‘(a) Sufficient symbolical significance; (b) Simplicity; (c) Legibility; (d) 
Harmony; (e) Pleased appearance; (f) Orthodox heraldic design’.262
A range of proposed symbols were classified: a cross; the letter ‘E’; a white star in 
a circle (used in 1944–5 by the armies of liberation); multiple stars equivalent to the 
number of member states in the Council of Europe (green stars on white, or white 
on red ground); the coat-of-arms of the Town of Strasbourg (symbolising the seat of 
the Council of Europe); a sun (dawning hope); or a triangle (representing culture). 
Various conflicting arguments were made concerning the main colours green, white 
and blue. Priority was given to visual recognition, excluding too intricate designs, 
clashing colour combinations and multicoloured emblems on the diagonal (as being 
too reminiscent of shipping companies’ house flags). No less than twelve different 
‘main proposals’ were outlined, but none of them was even remotely similar to the 
eventual outcome four years later; none had blue background, and the only one with 
multiple stars, suggested by Lucien Philippe, presented fifteen green stars in three 
rows on a white ground, which was indeed far from the current EU flag.
An intense discussion went on for a couple of years, where the Paneuropean 
Union’s sun-cross was increasingly questioned, since it could not be accepted by 
Muslim members—and Turkey was since 1949 member of the Council of Europe. In 
December 1951, Salvador de Madariaga, Spanish founder of the College of Europe 
in Bruges, proposed an azure flag with a constellation of stars representing European 
capitals, with Strasbourg as the Council of Europe seat having a larger star. In 1952, 
Arsène Heitz, working for the Council’s Mail Service, started developing the flag 
design that was to be the final official choice.
In September 1953, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted 
as its emblem a blue flag with a circle of fifteen stars, corresponding to the number 
of member states at the time. ‘The complete circle symbolises unity, whereas the stars 
shining in the firmament symbolise the hope of our nations’, said the report by Mr 
Bichet, who had prepared the proposal. However, this demanded that Saar was counted, 
which Germany could not accept. Also, it was foreseen that the future expansion of the 
union would cause recurrent redesign problems. It took a new round of negotiations 
and redesigns by Arsène Heitz, so that in January 1955 the two remaining alternatives 
were those of Madariaga and Heitz. It was the latter that won, and the flag was finally 
adopted by a Council of Europe Assembly decision on 25 October 1955, confirmed by 
the Committee of Ministers on 8 December that same year. The number of stars had 
then been reduced to twelve, and they were not anymore (like for instance the stars in 
the US flag) linked to the number of member states, but intended to signify perfection 
and harmony in a more general sense.
The flag was thus to represent the whole of Europe, but it was only formally adopted 
by the Council of Europe. For three decades it remained not yet officially sanctioned 
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by the rest of the EU system, but that did not prevent it from being widely used. The 
Adonnino Committee report to the European Council meeting in Milan on 28–29 
June 1985 suggested the establishment of a visual image identifying Europe:
There is clearly a need, for both practical and symbolic reasons, for a 
flag and an emblem to be used at national and international events, 
exhibitions and other occasions where the existence of the Community 
needs to be brought to public attention. 
The Committee proposed that the European Community emblem and flag should 
be ‘a blue rectangle with, in the centre, a circle of 12 five-pointed gold stars which do 
not touch, surrounding a gold letter E’—corresponding to the final result adopted 
later, except that the ‘E’ was again omitted, possibly conforming to the general rule 
of avoiding wording in flags, but also in effect suppressing the name of ‘Europe’ and 
purifying the visual imagery. With the 1955 shape and design, the Flag of Europe was 
finally adopted by the EU institutions in 1986.263 
The European flag thus evolved through a complex interplay between top politicians, 
European movements and designers. Like with Europe Day, key decisions were taken 
in the relevant EU bodies, but there was never any Europe-wide competition or voting 
as was at least to a limited extent the case with the European motto. 
The flag functions as a logo, and it is not only found on pieces of cloth hanging 
on flagpoles outside official buildings in the EU member states, but also on websites 
and printed material related to the union.264 Wherever infrastructures or regional 
backwaters are improved with EU support, the logo is visible to remind people that 
this welcome development could only be done by shared efforts, spreading badly 
needed goodwill around the emergent community-formation. One may also find the 
star circle on various tourist items and destinations, again to express transnational 
linkages, but much still remains to be done before it is as widely spread and used 
in popular media culture as for instance the US stars and stripes or the Union Jack. 
The logo is also displayed at number plates on all member states’ cars. This secures 
wide distribution of the symbol all over the union, along its roads and autostradas, 
almost like blood circulation with the roads as veins and arteries, and Brussels as the 
pumping heart. The mobility of cars has been a key symbol for the mobility of modern 
life, ever since the early and mid-twentieth century. Today these mobile carriers of the 
EU symbol help symbolising the single market and at least the first three of the four 
key mobilities or freedoms of the EU itself—the free movement of goods, services, 





Interpreting the European flag
Various EU texts declare that the flag is meant to symbolise ‘Europe’s unity and 
identity’, through a circle of gold stars representing ‘solidarity and harmony between 
the peo ples of Europe’ or ‘the ideal of unity among the peoples of Europe’.265 In order 
to investigate its layers of meaning, I will here in rather arbitrary order discuss its 
main features: the blue and golden yellow colours; the stars; the number twelve; and 
the symmetric and circular shape of the star constellation.
The choice of the colours golden on blue is far from arbitrary. It is often said that 
blue is traditionally used to represent the European continent, and it is true that 
blue is included in several European flags since at least the nineteenth century (see 
below). Conventional classification, inspired by racist thinking, has linked Africa 
to black colour, Asia to yellow and (north) America to red while Australia has 
been associated with green.266 With a similar race metaphor, Europe could actually 
as well have been conceived as white, but this has in practice rarely been the case, 
perhaps indicating that the dominant ‘race’ does not see itself in racial terms, but 
as universal man. Seen from the earth through its nearest atmosphere, blue is the 
natural background to stars: ‘the colour of the sky and the universe’.267 Blue is used 
symbolically to represent sky and water, and by extension as the background to 
symbols for nations or continents surrounded by seas, such as Australia or Europe. 
However, this argument is rather weak, since all continents are, by definition at 
least, surrounded by water, so this does not explain why Europe could have a special 
affinity to the colour blue. Actually Europe and Asia are the continents with least sea 
boundaries, as their shared land boundary takes up much higher percentage of their 
total periphery than for any other continent. But blue has also come to represent the 
West, in contrast to the red East. In medieval Europe, it became associated with the 
Virgin Mary, being the colour of her mantle and of her sapphire stone. In the twelfth 
century it became a royal colour.268 
Another argument has been that all colours other than blue were already occupied 
by some widely recognised special meaning: red for socialism and communism, green 
for Islam, black for mourning, yellow for quarantine and white for capitulation. In 
contrast, blue was free to use, as it has not been used to signify any other continent 
or been to tightly linked to any specific but unsuitable general concept. A website 
summarising popular perceptions of colour meaning states that dark blue represents 
‘knowledge, power, integrity, and seriousness’:
Blue is the color of the sky and sea. It is often associated with depth 
and stability. It symbolizes trust, loyalty, wisdom, confidence, 
intelligence, faith, truth, and heaven. […] Blue is strongly associated 
with tranquility and calmness. In heraldry, blue is used to symbolize 
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piety and sincerity. […] As opposed to emotionally warm colors 
like red, orange, and yellow; blue is linked to consciousness and 
intellect. […] Blue is a masculine color; according to studies, it 
is highly accepted among males. Dark blue is associated with 
depth, expertise, and stability; it is a preferred color for corporate 
America.269
The cited EU sources display a politically and socially biased perspective in interpreting 
the red colour as evidently socialist and thus problematic for general use, while the 
blue colour is seen as sufficiently ‘neutral’. The royal and aristocratic uses of the blue 
colour are homological with its associations of the sky and heavens with highness 
in general, and also with the modern link to male gender identity—with pink as 
the female counterpart, according to a widespread cliché, for instance in children’s 
dress. This ideologically ‘dominant’ relative positioning of blue may in turn explain 
its current associations with institutional stability, high nobility and elites with liberal 
or conservative ideas. It is no wonder that it is a favoured colour when political and 
economic elites wish to symbolise reliable institutions. 
Expressions such as ‘blue eyed’ or ‘out of the blue’ critically express the weak spot 
of such self-elevation, by materialistically underlining the emptiness of the upper 
stratosphere. The use of blue for a kind of melancholic feeling, for instance in the blue 
notes and moods of jazz and blues, is an exception to the rule, forming an alternative 
genealogy of interpretation that also has long historical roots, as already Chaucer 
in the late fourteenth century had used ‘blue’ for ‘sad’ and the seventeenth century 
had its ‘blue devil’. There may be a connection to the skin colour of people in fear or 
depression, but the main understandings of blueness in modern times sticks with the 
other, dominant line of identification with highness and stability.
Not forgetting any of the other implications mentioned so far, I conclude that a 
main reason for—and effect of—the choice of blue and golden colours is that they 
allow the signification of some kind of elevation, since they remind of (a) heavens and 
stars and also to some extent of (b) the precious metal of gold, which for ages has been 
an ultimate image of refined wealth and nobility.
This is then also the main explanation of the fact that the objects appearing on the 
blue background are stars and not for instance just dots or circles, or arrows, flowers, 
trees or anything else. Not all flags depict specific objects: some are monochrome, 
while some others just contain a couple of contrasting colour fields. But when objects 
are shown, stars are the most common ones. The star constellation lends the flag a 
‘cosmic dimension’ representing the ‘hopes and elevated values’ of these European 
peoples, EU sources agree.270 The stars ‘light the night sky and orbit around the polar 




In flags, the star illustrates independence, unity, liberty, renewal 
and hope. It is not by chance that the flags of many former colonies 
contain stars together, in many Islamic countries, with the crescent. 
[…] One of the features of the stars of the European flag is that they 
have five points which do not touch one another, also known as a 
pentagram or pentacle. Since five-points stars can be drawn with a 
single, interwoven closed line, the Pythagoreans gave them a mystical 
meaning of perfection. In the European flag, the pentagram fits in well 
with the circle which is also a symbol of perfection. The five-point star 
is also the symbol of man as an individual possessing five fingers and 
toes, five senses and five limbs.271
This interpretation offered by EU sources stresses the meaning of a star with five points 
as a specific kind of individuality: a perfect subjectivity or spirit that is at once cosmic and 
human. Six-pointed stars would have given unwanted Jewish associations, four points 
would remind too much of a Christian cross, while fewer points are more difficult to 
see as a star, so that five points work as the simplest geometric version of a star with 
rays around a central body, and the star shape also has a long history in European 
heraldry. Stars are incredibly hot and lucid, full of intense energy, hinting at Europe’s 
states and citizens being supposedly likewise strong, enlightened and dynamic agents 
in the world. At the same time they are incredibly fixed in the sky, in the same manner 
as the EU wants to be a guarantee of stability, and Europe as a whole to be seen as a 
global fixpoint and reliable basis for enlightenment. Again, this confirms the theme of 
human elevation or even divination or sacralisation. The stars are intended to stand for 
Europe’s constituents—peoples and nations—and they are thus depicted as if they are all 
by themselves perfect creatures stretching out into the sky and shining like superb stars. 
The latter ‘if ’ is perhaps not quite innocent. Most interpreters seem to take almost 
for granted that the stars stand for European member states, since a flag of a union 
is generally supposed to contain symbols of the basic entities that are united, and the 
EU is after all still more a union of member states than for instance of regions or of 
citizens. But a star constellation in a blue sky could also signify a guiding ideal, like 
the star over Bethlehem in the New Testament of the Christian Bible directed the 
three wise men to the stable where Jesus was born. This would make the flag more 
like the motto, an expression of the will and intent of the EU: a wish to strive for 
elevation or perfection perhaps. Still, it is difficult to avoid the interpretation of the 
stars as symbolising the basic entities that this union unites, that is, the European 
nation states that are members of the EU.
So, why are there precisely twelve stars, and not just one, three, or for instance as 
many as there happen to be member states in the EU?
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When there is more than one star, they generally represent a unit of 
measurement, i.e. they number federal states (United States), provinces 
(Costa Rica, Venezuela), geographical areas (Philippines), parishes 
(Grenada), islands (Comoros, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe) 
and peoples (Burundi, Burma).272
But the number of stars in the EU flag has nothing to do with the number of member 
states. The number twelve was chosen as a traditional ‘symbol of perfection, completeness 
and unity’, the EU information sites explain. Twelve is the number of months in a year 
and the number of hours shown on a clock face, thus connoting the dynamism of time.
Twelve is considered to be an ideal number. It provided the foundation 
of the Babylonian numerical system (called duodecimal for that reason). 
There are 12 signs of the zodiac which therefore represent the universe. 
There are 12 months of the year, 12 hours of the day and 12 hours of the 
night, 12 Egyptian gods, 12 Olympian deities which formed the Greek 
pantheon from the 5th century B.C., 12 laps in the chariot races of ancient 
Greece, 12 labours of Hercules in Greek mythology, 12 tables making up 
the first codification of Roman law, 12 knights of King Arthur’s Round 
Table in Celtic tradition and 12 gates of Paradise in Scandinavia.
Twelve is also a number in Judaeo-Christian symbolism. The tree 
of life has 12 fruits; there are 12 sons of Jacob, 12 patriarchs, 12 tribes 
of Israel and 12 gates of the New Jerusalem. Moses sent 12 explorers 
to the lands of Canaan, the bread multiplied by Jesus was placed in 12 
baskets and Jesus talks of 12 legions of angels after the kiss of Judas; 
lastly, there are 12 apostles. The number 12 is also the product of 
multiplying three, always a divine number (the trinity), by four, the 
number of the earth with its four cardinal points; 12 is therefore the 
symbol ‘of the union between the divine and the terrestrial world’ 
which, as we know, embodies the central mystery of Christianity.273
This speaks again of perfection, but combined with a more specific reference to time, 
and to a temporal aspect of Europe as an historical project rather than a static fixpoint.
Finally, what does the particular circular, symmetric and uniform shape of the star 
constellation imply? The choice of a perfectly symmetric circle of stars where each 
star is exactly identical, of equal size and shape, is meant to signify en egalitarian 
union of peoples or nations. ‘The complete circle symbolises unity, whereas the stars 
shining in the firmament symbolise the hope of our nations’ said the report that in 




A circle has no beginning or end, no direction or orientation and is 
homogeneous, perfect and indivisible. A circle leads back to itself and is 
therefore a symbol of unity, of the absolute and of perfection. In a circle, 
all the points of the circumference are equidistant from the centre. For 
this reason it is a good illustration of the union of the peoples of Europe 
to which the official symbolic description refers. However, it is just as 
good an illustration of the parity of the Member States.274
The circle is often used as a symbol of unity, and the circular pattern reinforces the 
already mentioned association of the stars to perfection and elevation. It was previously 
said that each star could be seen as an individual constituent of Europe. Alternatively, 
the symbol could depict Europe itself, though absent in the centre of the circle, 
stretching up into the heavens and being encircled by stars. Star images have ancient 
roots and therefore a wide resonance around the world, but it has often been pointed 
out that there is also a more specific Christian subtext here, in that the star circle looks 
like a halo or nimbus around a saint. The design of the star circle is often said to have 
been inspired by—or at least reminiscent of—the nimbus of a Catholic St Mary image, 
possibly in a church of Paris or Strasbourg.275 This would be consistent with the choice 
of the blue colour that is also since medieval times associated with the Virgin Mary, and 
thus with the human being that becomes elevated through an intimate contact with the 
divine being—in resonance with the mythical fate of Europa in her encounter with 
Zeus, and thus strengthening the symbolic ties between Europe and the flag design.
The flag’s main designer Arsène Heitz himself, looking back in 1987, admitted that 
his design had Christian inspiration, claiming that ‘the flag of Europe is the flag of 
Our Lady’, and it is often thought that the precise inspiration stemmed from a fresco 
by Pietro Berrettini da Cortona in the Grand Salon of Palazzo Barberini in Rome, 
where a huge figure of Immortality holds a crown with twelve shining stars (Figure 
6.2). However, Carlo Curti Gialdino is sceptical towards this theory: 
Even though this is an attractive theory, as it would enable the design 
of the European flag to be associated with fundamental human rights, 
it seems a somewhat unlikely solution, dreamed up after the event and 
perhaps just a ‘trick of memory.’276 
Curti Gialdino’s own alternative (but admittedly unsupported) hypothesis is that the 
design was instead inspired by an early US flag with a circle on stars in the blue canton, 
adopted in 1777 (Figure 6.5). This flag may in turn have been inspired by the halo of 
stars in Giovanni Battista Tiepolo’s painting The Immaculate Conception, painted a 
decade earlier (Figure 6.3).277 Curti Gialdino points at the difficulty with admitting 
any US inspiration at all, since it could risk stirring up an accusation of federalism 
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that remains a highly controversial issue in the EU. One may also add that the EU is 
unwilling to admit any inspiration from its so far main global competitor. So many 
saints have traditionally been depicted with a star halo that the detour over the United 
States may not be needed: see for instance the many popular ‘médailles miraculeuses’ 
featuring the Madonna thus illuminated (Figure 6.4).
Irrespective of its credibility, the Catholic connection is often repeated in comments 
to the flag design. A UK website for fundamentalist Christian but anti-Catholic Bible 
prophecy caters to those who find a deeper meaning in that the flag was supposedly 
inspired by the halo of twelve stars around Catholic Madonna pictures, representing 
either her son’s twelve disciples or the twelve tribes of Israel, relating to a passage in 
Revelation 12:1: ‘A great and wondrous sign appeared in heaven: a woman clothed 
with the sun, with the moon under her feet and a crown of twelve stars on her head.’278 
The European Navigator also confesses to that inspiration: ‘Twelve together with stars, 
the crown of stars, reflects, as has been said, the vision of the Virgin Mary of the 
Revelation (12,1) and is the symbol par excellence of popular Marian iconography.’279 
In all interpretations, an almost sacral elevation seems to be a main implication of the 
twelve star circle.
The Virgin Mary connection can also be generalised in that the circular shape with 
the central ‘hole’ in several ways connote femininity, far from any phallic masculinity. 
Julia Kristeva has used Plato’s concept of the rhythmically pulsating ‘chora’ (receptacle) 
to analyse a maternally derived pre-semantic level in language use, working like a void 
container and lending the origin of communication a gendered dimension.280 Both 
in a material and a metaphorical sense, the open circle seems to construct Europe as 
female gendered, in tune with the Europa myth.
A partly related association that has been made to the star circle is Jesus Christ’s 
crown of thorns, as mentioned in the Bible Gospels and depicted in endless numbers 
of sculptures and paintings since then. Thorns in Christian symbolism represent sins 
and trials, and the martyr crown of thorns is a strong symbolism for many saints’ 
victory over torture and death. Making a crown out of something so painful creates 
a double meaning: supposedly intended by the evil to mock the martyr, but inverted 
by Christians as a sign of elevation from the deepest agony to eternal sacredness. 
The association of the star circle to the thorn crown is not purely accidental, since 
Christian interpreters have also argued that Mary as Queen of Heaven and Mother 
of Sorrows (Mater Dolorosa) symbolically wears her son’s martyr crown in a kind of 
refiguration, transposed from painfully bodily thorns to heavenly lucid stars. Already 
in the artworks that originally may have inspired the Europe flag design, the twelve 
five-pointed stars together form a shape that may well remind not only of cosmic 
dignity but also of being raised through the most fearsome material disaster to this 
sacral position. This would then be perfectly homologous to the key post-war narrative 




perished from internal strife and catastrophes is now rising in peace and unity. This 
almost mythical turn from the deepest darkness up to blessed light is a classical one, 
well in tune with how the European Enlightenment regarded itself as a climbing up 
from Mediaeval darkness to universal rationality, so the thorn/star image can well also 
be transposed to a secular level. This interpretation certainly adds to the complexity of 
the initially simple visual symbol.
Another possible association of the golden circle is to the ring motif, famous 
from Wagner’s and Tolkien’s already mentioned quasi-mythical narratives. In such 
a reading, the golden ring of stars could be reinterpreted as a rather mixed blessing: 
an object of immense desire that brings a fatal curse to its owner. This would confirm 
the suspicion among sceptics that the perfect harmony sought for by the EU is in 
reality a too heavy burden to carry for its member states, an alluring image that fools 
politicians astray into some kind of catastrophe. This is of course not the intended or 
preferred reading of the flag, nor is it often actualised in the debates I have found. 
The harmonious perfection of the circle at the same time has the disadvantage of 
appearing closed and self-sufficient, not opening up very much to the external world, 
and also being quite static.281 This symbol of unitary harmony leaves little space for 
difference. The closed form appears like a wall around an empty void in the middle, 
with each star shining as a perfect, separate individual shape, each exactly same as the 
other. The flag in this reading thus presents the EU as a monolith, with no space for 
real multicul tural diversity. What speaks against this critical reading might perhaps 
be the fact that the circle is not a fully closed ring but an open circle of stars with 
permeable space in between:
If the points of the star do not touch, this means that the circle is open. 
Symbolically, therefore, the European Union is not a closed society; 
it is not, as is often said with a negative connotation, a fortress; in 
contrast, the European Union is above all open to the accession of 
the States of Europe and is also an active member of the international 
community, is open to the outside world and plays its part in the life 
of international relations.282
In this reading, it is thus crucial that the star circle is not a closed ring: there are 
openings between the stars, which thus do not form an inaccessible fortress but 
perhaps a hospitable space. Also, the crown of thorns reading mentioned above 
contradicts any fortress-interpretation, as such thorns are primarily delivering pain 
inward to the bearer of the crown, while the edges of a fortress wall are turned outside. 
The star points are as sharp in both directions, making either interpretation possible, 
but it is difficult to univocally pin down the flag’s meaning to just the closed circle 
metaphor.
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In this interpretive direction, there is a key secular and political aspect to the star 
formation. The uniformity and equidistance of the stars may be understood to symbolise 
the basic equality needed for a just democratic rule. Such an argument may be based 
on Jean-Pierre Vernant’s studies of the circular metaphor in ancient Greek cosmology 
and politics, in Myth and Thought among the Greeks.283 Carefully analysing the close 
links between a geometric cosmology, urban space and political life, Vernant shows 
how Anaximander’s (c. 610 bc–546 bc) circular cosmology, reorganising physical 
space in a circular fashion around an immobile earth, systematically corresponds to 
Kleisthenes’ constitutional reform of the city of Athens 508–507 bc, where the agora 
as a kind of common or ‘public hearth’ likewise became the centre around which all 
citizens of the polis were placed at equidistance (Figure 6.6 and 6.7).284 In this first 
democratic and secularised organisation, all parts ‘were clearly similar, symmetrical, 
and fundamentally equivalent in their common relationship with the single center’, 
which ‘expressed in spatial terms no longer the notions of differentiation and hierarchy 
but rather those of homogeneity and equality’.285 
This rather abstract circular metaphor may well be applied to the EU flag. It may 
be interpreted as depicting European political space as an open and egalitarian agora 
(of member states or, by extension, of individual citizens), parallel to how civil society 
can also be understood as structured by modern public sphere. The term ‘public 
sphere’ is particularly suitable here, as a ‘sphere’ is likewise a circular metaphor: it 
constitutes a perfectly symmetric and egalitarian abstract space where all surface 
points have the same distance to the void centre. The public sphere has a centre, but, 
unlike the role of the absolute monarch in the feudal representative public domain, 
nobody permanently occupies it. The centre around which modern democratic 
citizens are ideally and in principle equidistantly placed is a stage for interaction and 
dialogic exchange of ideas and opinions. This normative ideal is never fully realised in 
practice, as hierarchies remain in full force, along several dimensions of identity, but it 
is a key symbolic norm against which modern societies tend to be measured. The 2011 
events on Tahir Square in Cairo (at the start of the Arab revolutions) and Syntagma 
Square in Athens (protesting against the financial crisis) indicated how the symbol 
and space of an open square is still fundamental to late modern democratic ideals. 
In this reading, the emptiness of the centre is no accident but a deliberate choice. 
It is an image of a civil society centered on a communicative network that does not 
allow single individuals to place themselves as fixed autocrats in the middle. This is at 
least one possible interpretation of the circular symbol, based on an important line of 
European history.
Egality is in this reading thus a ‘higher’, more civilised and refined political order 
than the authoritarian societies that a hierarchic pyramid would signify. The circle 
would then imply a secular form of perfection, suitable for the democratic system that 




Besides the rather obvious aspect of (sacral or geometric) elevation, then, the 
circular constellation also seems to indicate some sort of openness, which in turn 
may be understood either negatively or positively. To sceptical critics, the empty circle 
may represent Europe as a void, a nothingness, a chiasm, indicating that something 
is missing in its centre, conforming to the problematisation of the allegedly alienating 
abstractness of all EU symbols. 
But the circle could on the other hand equally well signify the opening of a space, 
a stage for actors to enter, an agora for interaction, a kind of new public sphere to be 
filled with communication. An early idea when the flag design was discussed was 
that each European institution could later insert a specific symbol inside the circle, 
just like the Paneuropean Union has in later years combined the EU flag with its own 
sun-cross (see below). The circle is sometimes also filled by other actors, when the 
EU collaborates with for instance national institutions in a specific project. The circle 
invites precisely this kind of symbolic practice, and this is also something that was 
approved in the discussions leading up to the adoption of this design.286
Comparisons and commentary
The polysemy of the flag design opens it up to a comparably wide range of 
interpretive conflicts. Two main lines of interpretation may be discerned. On one 
hand, the blue colour, the stars, the number twelve and the nimbus shape all are 
associated with the sacred perfection of Christian inspiration. On the other hand, 
the perfect but open circle of equal stars is a symbolism that connects to classical 
democratic ideas of egality, the public sphere and political life at the agora. In both 
cases, Europe stretches up into the sky, is lifted up to a higher level and spreads a light 
of hope or enlightenment, in either a sacral or secular form of perfection. The open 
void in the middle may or may not invite some kind of dislocation or mobility, but the 
flag still tends more towards fixity and uniformity than mobility or hybridity.
In several senses then, the flag links up to important facets of the Europa myth: 
elevation and a dislocation in the sense that the empty centre suggests that something 
or someone has been taken away or is alternatively invited to step in and make Europe 
a home. On the other hand, it allows very little diversity, and its fixed perfection 
is also easily accommodated to the stress on unity and stability foregrounded by 
Captain Euro.
The Flag of Europe looks familiar but is still unique in many ways. Single stars, or 
a shifting number of stars in various formations (either geometrical patterns or star 
constellations), are combined with other colour elements in a number of national flags, 
including those of China, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
and Vietnam, but nowhere is there a sky-blue background combined with such a 
129
symmetric composition of stars. For instance, Kosovo’s flag is since its independence 
in 2008 blue with six white stars, one for each ethnic group, forming an arc above 
a golden map of the country (Figure 6.8). Turkey has since 1844 a red flag with a 
white crescent moon beside a five-pointed star—a motif going back at least another 
millennium to pre-Islamic symbols of the moon goddess Dianna, perhaps distantly 
related to Europa (Figure 6.9). Though a similar stellar combination of moon and star 
is commonly used in the Arabic region, it has no Muslim origin but rather symbolises 
the land and region itself. The People’s Republic of China since 1949 has a flag with 
five stars on red background (Figure 6.10). While the red colour since nineteenth 
century symbolises communism and socialism in Europe, it has an older resonance 
in China, where it was cherished in the Zhou Dynasty (1045–256 bc), symbolising 
good fortune and joy, and remains widely used in New Year celebrations.287 While the 
European stars are equals, the Chinese form a clear hierarchy with one big (standing 
for the Communist Party) and four small (symbolising the four main social classes: 
working class, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie), expressing an 
hierarchical relation between one dominant ruler and four humble subjects.
United States’ stars and stripes are globally well known, but the formation of those 
stars, equalling the number of states in the federation (while the thirteen stripes 
correspond to the original numer of states), has more an aura of rational protocol than 
of a cosmic heaven, and there are no further official meanings attached to the design. In 
1920, the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League 
(UNIA) adopted the ‘Pan-African’ or ‘Black Liberation’ flag, with three horizontal bands 
in red, black and green, which was also used in African-American movements (Figure 
6.11). The red was supposed to stand for blood (i.e. race) and liberation, black for skin 
(race again), and green for Africa’s natural resources. Compared to many other flag 
symbols, this is a heavily race-oriented one, in line with certain primitivist tendencies 
to focus on the human body, ancestry and links to pre-historic nature. In 2004, the 
African Union (AU) decided to adopt the flag of its predecessor, the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), which existed from 1963 to 2002 (Figure 6.12). It was a green 
flag with a wide white horizontal band in the middle, narrow gold bands separating 
the white from the green, and in the middle the circular emblem of the AU, consisting 
of a golden map of Africa without borders, placed inside two concentric yellow, green 
and red circles, with palm leaves on either side. The AU explains that green stands 
for African hopes, the gold circle for Africa’s wealth and bright future, white for pure 
friendship and red for solidarity and blood shed for the liberation of Africa.288 
This rather complicated design seemed to demand an equally complex interpretation, 
far from the apparent simplicity of many other comparable symbols. No wonder 
therefore that the AU at its meeting on 30 January 2010 decided to instead adopt a 
much simpler design: a green flag with a circle of no less than 53 small golden five-




53 beams each end at one of the stars (Figure 6.13). The green background is said to 
symbolise ‘African hopes and aspirations’, the stars represent member states of the AU 
and the golden circle stands for ‘Africa’s wealth and bright future’.289 It is fascinating 
how colour coding shifts: the green colour is now said to stand for a general principle 
of hope, but was previously supposed to signify Africa’s grand jungle nature, and may 
have in a third interpretation symbolised Islam. The latter reading may have been 
welcomed by Libya’s Muammar El Gaddafi who as outgoing Chairperson of the AU 
had the honour of presenting the new flag to the world, but would surely be rejected 
by Africans with a different confession. Similar redefinitions of colour codings are 
common. For instance, Srirupa Roy shows that for the Indian flag, the green, white 
and saffron colours were either understood to signify the religions of Muslims, 
Hindus and Buddhists or the universal values of hope, purity and sacrifice.290 In such 
cases, however, the old interpretations are hard to obliterate and tend to linger on, 
giving established symbols an increasing richness of meaning. Africa = hope + nature 
+ Islamic religion: each reading has highly different implications, but together they 
add to a dense but polysemic identification of Africa as a developing region serving 
as the Other of Europe and the western first world. It is certainly no mere coincidence 
that the simplified design with the star circle has obvious similarities with the EU 
flag, as the relative success of the EU model is something AU states desperately wish 
to imitate. One may perhaps wonder how to interpret the way the African continent 
seems to shade and darken the sun: presumably the idea has been to show how the 
sun starts shining bright from the heart of Africa, but the image may also (presumably 
unintentionally) hint at the old colonialist metaphors of Africa as the dark continent, 
for instance in Joseph Conrad’s novel Heart of Darkness (1899). The new African flag 
is in any case a more suggestive and evocative emblem than the one it replaced, and it 
will be interesting to see how it is received inside and outside its continent.
A look at some older European flags and previous proposals sheds light on 
continuities but also divergent trajectories. If any symbol was typical of the classical 
Roman Empire and its resurrection as a Holy Roman Empire by Frederick Barbarossa 
in 1155, it was probably the eagle, originally a symbol of Jupiter. However, in modern 
times, it has become most used by continental Europe and finally much associated with 
Germany, and then also been almost monopolised by the United States, making it less 
useful to European unification. The Carolingians never really had a formal emblem, 
but shared with the crusades a variety of crosses, including the so-called Carolingian 
cross, composed of circles and developed from the triangular ‘triquesta’ that was in 
itself a Celtic and pagan symbol that was reinterpreted in Christian terms by relating it 
to the Holy Trinity (Figure 6.14). Besides the cross, there were few symbolic elements 
for the EU to take up from ancient history. Therefore it was no wonder that an intense 
creative process was initiated as the European project started rolling for real in the 
twentieth century.
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Some symbolic elements repeatedly turned up in the various proposals that were 
put forward as the new European community sought to identify itself after World War 
II: (a) One was the capital letter ‘E’ for ‘Europe’, testifying to the identifying power of 
the name itself. (b) Another was the rising sun, which could as well be the descending 
sun, as Europe has from its main point of origin sometimes been identified as the 
land of the sunset or the west. (c) The cross has often been proposed, with a wide 
range of associations, but those to Christianity are hard to avoid and also to accept 
for a secular political rule, which for instance also Turkey should be able to idenfiy 
with. (d) A fourth and today almost forgotten one was the triangle, which supposedly 
represented culture, but with an unfortunate freemason touch. (e) Finally, the coat 
of arms of Strasbourg—diagonal red stripe on white background—as the seat of the 
Council of Europe has sometimes been up for debate, but was deemed as too closely 
linked to a particular place, town and nation.291 It was two main designs that with 
minor variations were particularly much used to signify Europe: on the one hand the 
letter ‘E’ (a), on the other hand a cross in a sun (b+c). Each of them was promoted 
by one of the two leading pan-European movements at that time, and both designs 
differed considerably from what later became the EU flag.
The federalist movement called the Paneuropean Union has since its inception in 
1923 used a blue flag with a yellow sun-cross in the centre, that is, a golden-yellow 
circle that is divided by a thin red cross (Figure 6.15). The blue and yellow colours and 
the stellar associations (only with a sun instead of stars) remind of the EU flag, but the 
difference is large enough to result in rather different signifying implications. 
In a July 1950 memorandum on the European flag, Richard Coudenhave-Kalergi 
proposed that the Council of Europe adopt the flag of the Paneuropean Union, of 
which he was the President.292 His principal criteria was that the flag must (1) be ‘a 
symbol of our common civilization’, (2) present ‘a European emblem’, (3) ‘not provoke 
any national rivalry’, (4) ‘represent a tradition’, and (5) ‘be beautiful and dignified’. 
In his own interpretation, the blue sky was ‘the natural background of the Sun’ and 
‘a symbol of peace’. The sun was ‘the eternal symbol of light, of spirit, of progress, of 
prosperity and of truth’ and the red cross ‘recognized by the whole world, by Christian 
and non-Christian nations as a symbol of international charity and of the brotherhood 
of man’. Coudenhave-Kalergi spent considerable energy to defend the cross as ‘the 
great symbol of Europe’s moral unity’: 
The crushing majority of European Christians will not admit the 
cross being removed from the European flag—while the non-
Christian minority cannot oppose this symbol, inseparable from 
our history and civilization; as the Christian minorities in the Near 
East do not oppose the national symbols of the Crescent and the 




He emphasised that the cross was ‘a pre-Christian symbol of world-harmony, on 
Celtic and Germanic monuments’, and that the red cross was ‘the first European Flag 
at the time of the Crusades’. However, precisely that kind of Christian image was 
clearly not acceptable for the majority who strongly defend the secular basis of this 
political union, not wanting to alienate for instance Muslim immigrants, nor those 
republican nation states for whom a strict separation of politics from religion was 
an essential value. Already in the early 1950s, Turkey was against this design when 
it was discussed in the Council of Europe. The cross symbol in any case signals a 
rather conservative interpretation of European identity, which is also problematic for 
the socialist left, as it connotes conservative institutions such as the church and also 
(since the crusades) the aristocratic nobility. Also the rising sun image itself was a bit 
difficult to reconcile with Europe as the ‘occident’ or land of sunset, which is inherent 
in the name of Europe/Europa, as explained in a previous chapter.
In recent years, the Paneuropean Union has added the circle of twelve stars around 
its ‘sun’, thus incorporating European flag into its own design and emphasising an 
affinity with the EU (Figure 6.16). But already the original sun logo did have a certain 
semiotic proximity to the EU symbol, in the combination of centrally placed and 
symmetric yellow shapes on blue background, indicating some astronomic or cosmic 
phenomenon: something abstract, universal and almost eternal; something high 
and elevated; something grand and powerful; and something luminous that offers 
enlightenment to the earth.
The European Movement, formed at the Congress of Hague in 1948, has on its flag 
a big and geometric green ‘E’ on white background (Figure 6.17). The Congress of 
Hague was organised by the International Committee of the Movements for European 
Unity and witnessed divisions between unionists (who wanted a loose union) and 
federalists (working for a United States of Europe). The flag is sometimes also called the 
‘federalist’ flag. The flag used by the Congress itself had an ‘E’ in red on white, but the 
European Movement changed it to green when they subsequently adopted the design 
at their own first meeting in September 1948 and started using the flag the following 
year. Probably the red colour was perceived to be too closely related to communism 
to be acceptable. The ‘E’ of course stands for ‘Europe’, and the green colour supposedly 
signifies youth and more importantly hope, which in Latin-Romance languages is 
denoted by a word also starting with an ‘e’ (‘espérance’, ‘esperanza’ etc.). The flag was 
intended to symbolise the hope for peace and unity in Europe.293 Associations could 
also be made to ecology and sustainability issues.
This even more abstract and rather anonymous geometric design is hard to associate 
to any specific content, and that was also partly intended. It reminds us more of flag 
signals than of national emblems. Most sources suggest that the design was proposed 
by British Conservative and leading European Movement spokesman Duncan Sandys, 
son-in-law of Winston Churchill, and the design was therefore sometimes nicknamed 
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‘Churchill’s underpants’, which did not exactly invite the respect wanted for the 
European project. The green and white colours were deliberately chosen not to make 
any problematic political associations (such as blue for conservatism, red for socialism 
etc.). However, the symbol had much less mythological or emotive resonance and has 
not at all been taken up by the EU, for a combination of reasons. Green and white are 
not deemed to be practical for flags, since the white tends to get dirty and the green is 
not so easily visible. There was also a general scepticism about using verbal symbols. 
The green ‘E’ also leads to some unwanted risks of misunderstanding. A rather discrete 
association may be made to the Irish colours, and even the three fingers of the letter ‘E’ 
could perhaps remind of the Irish Shamrock. Like the three leaves on the Shamrock, 
used by St Patrick to symbolise the Holy Trinity, the three ‘E’ fingers could then also 
be considered a symbol for magic power and completeness. However, the technical 
design gives little food for such mythical thoughts, and it is most likely that the main 
association is just to the word ‘Europe’ (compare the European road system numbers 
E1, E2, E3, etc.), thus possibly falling back onto the semantics of that name itself, 
analysed above. Another possible reason for avoiding the green colour is that it is in 
many world regions pretty intimately linked to Islam, which would potentially cause 
the opposite political problems from those caused by the cross. The intense usage by 
federalists could finally also have scared unionists away from accepting it, and it now 
stands for a more radical political struggle for a European federation, while the EU 
flag has come to symbolise the real existing European unity of today.
It is also worth having a look at other flags, logos and various identifying visual 
symbols that have been used by pan-European authorities and institutions over the 
years.294 
The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (Commission Centrale 
pour la Navigation du Rhin, CCNR) is the oldest extant European institution, and 
allegedly even the oldest still running international organisation of the whole world. 
It dates back to agreements at the 1814 Congress of Vienna that restored European 
peace after the Napoleonic wars. It is based in Strasbourg, but was originally seated in 
Mainz (1816–61) and then in Mannheim (1861–1920). Its function is to ‘encourage 
European prosperity by guaranteeing a high level of security for navigation of the 
Rhine and environs’, and its five member states are Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, through which the river flows.295 This institution has a 
light blue flag with four horizontal dark-blue lines across the lower half (Figure 6.18). 
A yellow anchor is placed in the centre of the bottom half, while a circle of six yellow 
stars is placed immediately above, in the centre of the top half of the flag. The yellow 
star circle on blue background has certain affinities with the EU logo, though the 
much lighter blue colour of the upper half gives a different overall impression, with 
not so much of that combined royal and cosmic aura that lends weight to the EU flag. 




the overall effect is also to make the flag slightly parallel to the original US flag with 
its thirteen horizontal stripes and a circle of thirteen stars. There are only six stars in 
the CCNR flag, and the naval associations of the anchor and the horizontal water lines 
make it reasonable to understand the stars as navigational aids, so that the states help 
ships to find their way through Europe. The primary meaning of the flag is to represent 
stars, anchor, sky and water; its secondary meaning has to do with perfected guidance 
across difficult waters by wise and harmoniously cooperating states; its third meaning 
being to identify the CCNR as an international institution. The star formation can 
be seen as representing a navigation aid doing service to mankind from above, in a 
span from safe guidance to governance control. The number six transfers this sense of 
power from above onto the collaborating states themselves, forming a protective ring, 
in an articulation of different signifying layers. For today’s Europe, the literal sense 
of navigation is no longer viable, but the sense of giving directions from an elevated 
position may well be. The European flag is sufficiently reminiscent of the CCNR one 
to confirm the circle of stars on blue as a European tradition, since it is not equally 
common outside Europe.
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded through the 
1951 Treaty of Paris, inspired by the Schuman Declaration of 1950 that is celebrated 
on Europe Day. The ECSC got its own flag in 1958 (Figure 6.19), which was used 
until 2002 when the ECSC was finally dissolved and merged into the European 
Community, as an integrated part of the EU, by which it had for a long time effectively 
been replaced.296 Its flag was thus created in roughly the same period as the EU flag, 
so it is little surprise that they have certain similarities in the use of stars on blue. The 
flag depicted over the years six to twelve yellow or white stars centrally placed in two 
rows on a horizontally divided background in blue and black. However, the ECSC flag 
used a divergent background, placed the stars very differently, and also had one star 
for each member state, forcing it to add stars when the number of member states grew 
from the original six in 1958 to twelve in 1986, no further stars were added in spite 
of the continuing enlargement. The corresponding decision had been taken for the 
Flag of Europe that was used by the Council of Europe and other sister organisations 
in the expanding European family, where the choice of twelve was meant to represent 
perfection and unity. At the same time, a modification was made in the colours used. 
The stars that had originally been golden yellow were made white, while the blue of 
the upper half was modified from dark to light blue, making it more similar to the 
colour coding of the CCNR flag than that of the EU. Like the CCNR flag, that of the 
ECSC divided the background horizontally, but the fields had a completely different 
meaning, as the blue upper half stood for steel, the black lower half for coal—the two 
natural resources that had once in a way caused and fuelled the catastrophic European 
wars but were now to form the core of a new and peaceful cooperative effort. Formally 
the colours look somewhat similar, but coal and steel are of course quite different 
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from rivers and skies, the latter two evoking the classical elements of water and air, 
while the former correspond to fire and earth. 
The WEU is a relatively unimportant intergovernmental military association for 
defense and security issues, established on the basis of the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, 
and with ten full member states.297 The original members were Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK; West Germany and Italy joined in 1954, 
Portugal and Spain in 1990 and Greece in 1995. The WEU flag makes another variation 
on the same theme as the preceding ones (Figure 6.20). Its design is derived from the 
Flag of Europe. And even though the WEU is formally independent of the EU, all WEU 
members are also EU member states. The background is dark blue, with a semicircle of 
ten yellow five pointed stars, broken at the top, and with the two official abbreviations 
of the Union’s name in the centre: WEU placed horizontally and UEO (the French, 
Portuguese and Spanish form) vertically across the centre, so that the key letter ‘E’ 
(for Europe!) is shared by both and placed in the centre of the symbol. The similarity 
with the EU flag is evident and deliberate. The current version was introduced in 
1993, before which there were only nine stars (before Greece entered), and the stars 
in the bottom were progressively larger than the upper ones. The change was in line 
with the EU flag symbolism, where equality among stars/states is essential. Initially 
the organisation had a five-links chain forming an upside-down pentagon, with a 
thick red-gold-black-white border, filling roughly half the total area, and referring to 
the colours of the flags of the original member states. The imagery of chain links has 
security/military connotations, as has the pentagon that is reminiscent of the famous 
headquarters of the US Department of Defense in Arlington, Virginia. The WEU by 
necessity cooperated closely with the US-dominated NATO, but the subsequent design 
modifications reflected a growing European wish to be respected as a major and fully 
autonomous world power. Besides combining the (halved) star circle with the name 
of the organisation, the current flag invites many different interpretations, including 
perhaps a telescope or a shield protecting the union, or some kind of starship with the 
acronym as sails, or a bowl or open hand protecting a cross: the way the letters are 
arranged forms a cross shape with religious connotations that are otherwise avoided 
in official European symbols.
There are many other more specific flags and logos used by various European 
institutions, including specific joint forces and operations of EU countries. Today 
these units often use variants of the main EU flag, modifying the composition of the 
stars and/or adding some other design element that connotes the particular area and 
objective of that unit. 
An interesting example is the EU Presidency logos that sometimes experiment 
with combining national and European elements, often with blue as a basic colour. 
For instance, in the autumn of 2006, Finland used an abstract bird wing in green-




Chapter 8). Portugal in the autumn of 2007 had an abstract light blue flower, whereas 
in autumn 2009, Sweden presented a ‘three-dimensional’ blue sphere crossed by a 
flowing yin-and-yang-like yellow ‘S’ (for ‘Sweden’).298 The globe shape could have 
been meant to symbolise the importance of global climate issues in that period, with 
a crucial climate conference to be held during that term.
Other European logos include those of partly independent but Europe-wide 
organisations in various sectors of society. For selective comparison with the EU flag 
rather than offering any comprehensive overview, only a few of these will be briefly 
scrutinised here.
The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) is formally unrelated to the EU, but 
is one of the oldest, strongest and most successfully operating transnational media 
ventures in the world. It was formed on 12 February 1950 by 23 European and 
Mediterranean radio and television broadcasters, and today boasts of 75 broadcasting 
organisations from 56 (mostly but not exclusively European) countries and 43 associate 
broadcasters from another 25 countries (spanning from Canada, Mexico and the 
US to India, Hongkong and Japan). Most of the active members are public service 
providers in the wider geographic area covered by member states of the Council of 
Europe. EBU’s Eurovision Network organises the famous ESC, but also the Eurovision 
Dance Contest, the Junior Eurovision Song Contest and other competitions for young 
creative and media artists. Other areas of cooperation have concerned the production 
of documentaries and programmes for children, the European transmission of the 
Olympics and FIFA World Cup, and the Vienna New Year’s Concert event.299
The first EBU logo was designed in 1954 by Timothy O’Brien of the BBC, and was 
first broadcast on 6 June that year to launch the Eurovision summer season (Figure 
16.21).300 It was based on the then new Flag of Europe with its circle of twelve stars 
on blue, but here the stars were white rather than yellow, and looked like floodlights 
with rays radiating out from each star/light, while the blue background was also a 
little bit lighter than in the European flag. Between each star/spotlight, the letters 
‘EUROVISION’ were spelt out, and in the open centre, each participating national 
broadcaster could enter its own logo (both the sending and the receiving one). It was 
sometimes nicknamed ‘the pine-needle design’, but of course rather aimed to associate 
to footlights or limelight around an open stage, and by extension also the broadcasting 
radiation of radio and television from cooperating national public service units. The 
logotypes of both the sending and receiving company were shown in the middle.
Since 2000, the EBU instead uses a more catchy and modern logo, designed by 
Lambie Nairn of London, and derived from a similar version designed in the 1990s 
by Swiss broadcasting (Figure 16.22). A modern version with 3D-animated treatment 
was launched on 1 January 2009 for the New Year’s concert from Vienna. In either 
version, it almost looks as if it is made by hand: a tilted thin yellow ring where three 
‘V’s (or perhaps flying birds) in shifting blue nuances ‘radiate’ out across a golden ring, 
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or perhaps it is arrows moving into the centre? The abbreviations EBU and UER (the 
corresponding abbreviation in French for L’Union Européenne de Radio-Télévision) 
are placed underneath. A difference from before is that there is no more a blue but a 
white background, and that the colour ordering is almost reversed in that now it is 
blue rays that seem to move across an open space with golden-yellow border. Another 
difference is that the number of elements around the circle is reduced from twelve 
to only three. A third difference is the avoidance of putting any other symbols (for 
instance national broadcasters’ logos) inside the circle, as the new design really does 
not make this possible any more, instead letting the three blue figures fill up most 
of the open space, just like Eurovision broadcasting presumably is supposed to flow 
around and fill up the communicative space opened up by the emergent European 
public sphere. 
The three blue elements create a movement of convergence, joint forces 
focusing on the same goal, the shapes differ slightly symbolising the 
union of different cultures. The colours hint at the European colours 
and the arrangement of the motif suggests a star.301 
Both these EBU logo designs allude precisely to that public-sphere mixture of 
dialogue and dissemination, of agora and mass communication that was also hinted 
at in the Flag of Europe. But the current EBU logo more obviously links to the ‘united 
in diversity’ motto than both the old pine-needle design and the EU flag.
The ESC, initiated in 1956, is nowadays the most well-known EBU activity, unique to 
Europe even though more and more other continents have started to try and organise 
something similar. In this context, the stars of the EBU symbol may well add another 
meaning of not only TV channels’ transmitters but also individual singing stars on 
Europe’s musical heaven. The ESC has each year also had its own, separate logo. They 
were highly varying and only rarely took up elements from the general Eurovision 
or EBU imagery, until the Istanbul final in 2004, when they became standardised, in 
order to display a consistent visual identity for the ESC (Figure 16.23). The logo now 
has ‘EUROVISION’ (or perhaps ‘EUROVISion’) in a free layout with an impression 
of it being ‘handwritten’, stylistically slightly reminiscent of the EBU logo, above the 
words ‘SONG CONTEST’ in strict block letters. The ‘V’ is designed as a heart, which 
each new country that organises the finals fills with its national flag and adds the city 
and year at the bottom. The heart may be read both as the hub of communication for 
the whole European ‘body’ and as a traditional symbol of warm friendship, affection 
and love, but there are otherwise few associations to the EU symbols.  
The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) is another example of a pan-
European institution independent of the EU, being the administrative and controlling 




it has great significance as a public ritual, it is particularly instructive to look at its 
symbolism, in relation to similar logos from other continents.302 UEFA was founded 
on 15 June 1954 and has since then grown from 25 to 53 national associations. It 
is the biggest and probably the strongest of the six continental confederations of 
the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA, for its French name: 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association). UEFA represents its national 
associations, organises competitions and controls prize money, regulations and media 
rights, and not least the latter issue has led to a series of conflicts over regulations with 
the European Commission. As with the media, Europe appears to be an influential 
brandname that attracts borderland nations such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Turkey, Israel, Cyprus, Russia and Azerbaijan to participate in UEFA rather than in 
the Asian Football Confederation (AFC).303 
The UEFA symbol is not rectangular but circular (Figure 16.24). Inside a thin golden 
circle is a thicker red circle with ‘UEFA’ in white inscribed in the upper part. Then come 
two very thin circles, a white outside a golden one. The innermost circle, with a diameter 
roughly half of the whole symbol, is a map of Europe, where the waters are blue and the 
land areas white with a blue checked (or pixelated) screen pattern. The gold, white and 
blue colours and the circular shape may perhaps remind one a little bit of the Flag of 
Europe, but the symbolism is quite divergent. The circle is of course suitable for all ball 
sports, and the design is reminiscent of several older and more recent team badges, not 
least the one used by the German team FC Bayern since the early 1980s. (FIFA also has 
a motto, ‘For the Good of the Game’, and its symbol consists of two footballs with white 
stitches and filled with a world map with land in red and waters in blue.) The red colour 
in the UEFA symbol radiates competitive energy and activity, and in sports, the golden 
colour cannot but signal victory. The map only includes the European part of Russia 
and excludes Greenland for instance. Its pixelated quality could for example remind 
that association football is locally anchored or that television is of key importance to all 
sports in this mediatised era of mediated communications.
The Champions League is UEFA’s annually organised European Cup for association 
football, and it also has its own logo in black and white (or silver), with the main 
element being a ‘football’ or a globe constructed by stars, where eight such stars 
can be seen (Figure 16.25). One might think that it may well take twelve stars in all 
to compose the whole ball, including the invisible backside, but the number eight 
is no coincidence, as precisely eight teams played in the first Champions League 
competition, and eight clubs still count as the leading ones.304 Introducing these stars 
is clearly a way of linking to the Flag of Europe, and it shares with the flag also the 
strict symmetry and unified colour scheme. 
This so-called starball was commissioned in 1991 from UEFA’s commercial 
partner, Television Event and Media Marketing (TEAM), who also came up with the 
‘house colours’ of black and white or silver, as well as an anthem (to be discussed 
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in Chapter 7).305 Interviewed by Anthony King, the TEAM representative Richard 
Worth explained that this design was deliberately chosen as a way to differ from the 
youthful and colourful style that otherwise dominates in sports, and to demonstrate 
that Champions League ‘has tradition, history, and sets itself apart from the ordinary’, 
representing ‘the quality, prestige and heritage of top European football’.306 The silver is 
supposed to stand for something rich, precious and valuable, indicating that European 
football has a long and strong tradition of highest quality, but also for solidity and high 
class that simultaneously connotes sociocultural elites and the fine arts: it ‘denotes 
nobility’.307 King sees this effort as motivated by a need to legitimise some radical 
changes made in the rules and organisation of the game at that time, by convincing 
fans and critics that European football remains true to its traditional heritage in spite 
of these modifications.308 Something similar may be said of the EU too: its rather 
conservative and high cultural symbolic policies may likewise be understood as a 
way to convince the public of the union’s deep rootedness in a long tradition, against 
accusations that it is just a contrived gadget.
King also shows how additional new televised designs used by the Champions 
League from 2000 onwards further confirms this interpretation, as it adds contrastingly 
colourful club badges that are subsumed under the classical European black/silver rule, 
symbolising a mutually beneficial synthesising power balance between the clubs as 
‘dynamic commercial forces’ and ‘the tradition embodied by UEFA and the European 
Cup which are represented by “classical” black, white and silver’.309 The confinement 
of the brash coloured crests within the starball tames these new market forces under 
UEFA’s pan-European hegemony. 
Only allied to the traditionalism of UEFA do the clubs enjoy their 
market power. In turn, the traditionalism of the competition is itself 
invigorated, not compromised, by the clubs and by commercial forces. 
The black, white and silver become more precious in contrast to the 
bold reds, blues and yellows.310
The televised sequence develops the stark contrast between the two sides ‘from 
antagonism into symbiosis’, providing ‘an alibi for UEFA’ by pointing at the need for 
the tradition of which it is the guardian, thus representing ‘an idealized reconciliation 
of the clubs and the federation’.311 
This visual symbol is thus an effort to virtually transform a threatening inner tension 
into a mutually strengthening contrast, almost in the same way that the ‘united in 
diversity’ motto makes a virtue out of necessity and magically transforms threatening 
fragmentation into a unique resource. King’s critical reading of how this symbol 
produces ideology can easily be extended to the EU at large: ‘The starball defuses the 




into nature.’312 At least this may be the intention, but King finds deep contradiction 
under this ideological surface. In spite of such intentions, the symbols do not manage 
to conceal the deep gaps: ‘On the contrary, these symbols signify a continent which is 
in ever greater internal competition with itself.’313
The starball implies that supranational institutions like UEFA can 
provide a broad regulatory framework for this dramatic struggle but 
the future of Europe will be primarily determined by dominant market 
institutions, such as major football clubs. In this way, the starball may 
be a new symbol not only of European football but of Europe itself. 
The European Union may be characterised less by political cohesion 
than by increasingly ferocious market competition.314
It may be discussed whether this inner tension is always traceable also in the symbols 
used. Like the 1991 Champions League logo, the Flag of Europe appears to be quite 
solidly united in its impact. However, by relating it to other European images, elements 
of such inner contradictions may well be discerned.
Many more organisational European logos could be scrutinised, to show how 
certain elements of a shared visual imagery—notably the twelve star circle, often also 
the blue colour, as well as a general symmetric balance in design—are used in shifting 
combinations with area-specific elements. But EU’s core symbol can also be contrasted 
with a couple of alternative and rather different images that have in recent years been 
proposed for the EU and for Europe as a whole. 
In May 2001, after Brussels was by the Treaty of Nice formally made the capital 
of the EU, EU leaders had a series of meetings with intellectuals on how Brussels 
could be made to live up to this eminent task. Among the invitees was the Office for 
Metropolitan Architecture (OMA), an international design firm for ‘contemporary 
architecture, urbanism, and cultural analysis’, running a Rotterdam-based design 
and research studio called AMO.315 Leading Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas was the 
most famous of its six key figures, working with a staff of more than 200 persons and 
35 nationalities. AMO raised the issue of Europe’s representation at large, including 
its symbols and its media presence, criticising the former for being ‘mute, limp, anti 
modern and totally ineffective in an age dominated by mass media’, and suggesting 
that there was ‘a direct relation between the absence of a visual language, described 
as “Europe’s iconographic deficit,” and a widespread ignorance about Europe’s causes 
among the general public’. To inspire the discussions, AMO presented a set of images, 
in particular the so-called barcode (Figure 6.26): 
The barcode merges the flags of current EU member states into a single 
colourful symbol. It intends to represent the essence of the European 
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project, showing Europe as the common effort of different nation 
states, with each state retaining its own cultural identity while sharing 
the advantages of acting together.316
Whereas the Flag of Europe always has twelve stars, the barcode expands horizontally 
when new members join the EU, with one vertical colour line for each national flag 
colour of EU members, presented roughly in a west–east order. It was proposed not 
as an alternative but as a parallel supplement to communicate the European idea 
in new ways and new contexts. The barcode was used as EU Presidency logo by 
Austria in spring 2006 and was thus given at least a semi-official status. It has also 
been printed on various merchandise and used at summit meetings. However it has 
far from replaced the official EU flag, and it should also be noted that not only has 
the barcode been extended when new members enter the union, but the order and 
shape of the previous stripes have also been modified. While serving as a visually and 
symbolically attractive supplement, the barcode is difficult to remember or reproduce 
faithfully. A minor BBC poll indicated a clear preference of 71 per cent people for the 
old flag with only 29 per cent preferring Kohlhaas’ barcode, and all but one of eight 
posted individual comments were also unfavourable to the latter.317 Another negative 
response is from a webpage that argues that the barcode invites parody, and therefore 
presents four satirical variants, including a fussy mix of colours that assumedly ‘speaks 
to the rationality of official EU policies’ and another that ‘signals the clarity of EU 
bureaucratic proclamations’.318
The signifying effect of the barcode is again totally different from all the previous 
logos. Designs related to the Flag of Europe open up an agora, an open space illuminated 
by stars, an elevated stage for performance. The barcode has none of this, but is instead 
a cumulative addition of national contributions to a kind of European web, extending 
indefinitely from left to right, west to east. It is clearly in line with the European 
motto ‘united in diversity’, as the many individual colours mix and blend into one 
colourful whole: an open-ended totality that always welcomes further additions but 
still presents itself as one entity. Both symbols are in a way egalitarian, but the cosmic 
elevation of the former is totally absent in the latter, whose colourful bar lacks any 
vertical dimension, graphically as well as metaphorically. The European Flag seems to 
focus on the institutional frameworks for inter-European communication, while the 
barcode highlights the contents added from each member state (and presumably its 
citizens). Also, the complete uniformity of the EU stars stand in sharp contrast to the 
diversity of the fused flags of the barcode. To the three contrasts between elevation 
and horizontality, form and content, and uniformity and diversity, one may also add 
a fourth polarity, between fixity and dynamics, in that the barcode grows with each 
extension of the EU. The two symbols therefore seem to supplement each other in 




Likewise originating in the Netherlands, ‘Picobelleuropa!’ was the humoristic Dutch 
designer Hans Kruit’s proposal from June 2005, after France and the Netherlands had 
voted against the new Constitution (Figure 6.27). Kruit had designed a couple of the 
previous Dutch banknotes, and was frustrated by the confusing arguments behind the 
failure of the new constitution, arguing that feelings were now more important than 
reasoning: ‘A new élan begins with a new, okay flag’, since the star symbolism is too 
indistinct and vague. His alternative proposal was thus to change the stars into one 
single hollow circle that could also be used as the basis for a hand gesture, inspired 
by Winston Churchill’s V-sign for victory, but choosing the so-called picobello or 
‘all clear’ sign where the thumb and forefinger are joint to form a circle indicating 
top quality. Kruit argued that this would send much more positive feeling to Europe, 
and could possibly be used by ordinary citizens in everyday life, not only by official 
institutions. He emphasised that this was a citizen initiative, ‘not sponsored by any 
government or stakeholder’: ‘Because it’s not only about the money, it’s also about the 
feeling!’ An additional idea was to make it possible to combine it with national flags 
in varying size proportions depending on how much one identified as European. The 
proposal was ironic but in essence positive: ‘That looks much better, a clear symbol, 
a beautiful round eurO, with a hole in the middle. A zero, yes, but who cares. Large 
amounts have lots of zeros. It simply looks good, nice and robust.’319 The combination 
of a simplified image with a well-known positive gesture was thus one of several 
efforts meant to compensate for the lack of grass roots legitimacy for the official EU 
symbols, but also critically hinting at the emptiness of the whole venture. However, 
a further association to the fateful ring motif is a possibility that is never even hinted 
at by Kruit. 
The perfectly symmetric star circle has obviously been a key obstacle to the reception 
of the EU flag. Precisely the harmonious balance and perfection intended by many EU 
politicians has been seen to contradict the motto’s stress on diversity and to conform 
too much to a problematic image of Europe as a closed and rigid fortress. This has 
inspired several counter-images. For instance, Maarten Vanden Eynde’s flag for the 
2006 Europe Day represents the EU’s geographical space by placing one star for each 
member state capital (Figure 6.28). It was part of a larger project called Europe2006–
2014 (2005) consisting of five flags reconstructing the evolution of the EU and intended 
to celebrate its utopian goal of global freedom and equality. The flags were shown in 25 
EU countries on 9 May 2006, as a way to celebrate unification by ‘creating an abstract 
sky full of stars’. The flag for 2006 (Figure 6.28) had one star for the capital of each of 
the fifteen full member states up to the 2004 enlargement, based on the argument that 
the latest newcomers had not yet become fully equals. That for 2008 included all the 
current members, the one for 2010 added all European capitals of potential member 
states and that for 2012 showed all the world capitals, while the last one represented a 
light blue sky. ‘If you zoom out far enough you see no stars anymore, no more capitals, 
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no more borders. What is left is an open sky, the flag of our blue marble, planet Earth. 
It is a visualisation of a unity of diversity and questions both the relevance of closed 
borders and the constant geographical expansion.’ Again, the uniformity of the star 
circle has provoked the artist to this alternative design, intended to better represent the 
diversity and openness of the European project. Instead of Kruit’s ironic joke, and more 
like the barcode, this flag was seriously intended and has actually been used in various 
places, particularly as a pan-European political art event on Europe Day in 2006.320
Since designed by a British lesbian in 2005, a gay European flag colours the stars in 
the six standard colours found on the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) 
movement ‘rainbow flag’ invented in 1978 but with its current design fixed in 2008 
(Figure 6.29). There are many layers of meaning in this colouring, including possible 
references to sexual diversity, to more abstract values such as life (red), nature (green), 
sunlight (yellow) and harmony (blue), or to the colours of the triangles that Nazi 
victims had to wear.321 Like the Picobelleuropa!, this kind of symbol in a positive spirit 
suggests a kind of improvement that adds precisely the element of diversity so clearly 
lacking in the official EU flag. It may indirectly be seen as a critique against such 
uniformity, but the alternative image proposed does not attack European unification. 
Instead, it is in principle loyal to it, and revises its visual symbolism to respond to the 
demands of this movement.
Cartoonists and political movements have at various occasions constructed critical 
versions on the European flag, in order to communicate some kind of counter-message, 
mostly directed against the EU. In 1999, Yugoslavians put a swastika in the centre of 
the EU star circle, in order to protest against EU involvement in the NATO bombings 
there. In 2002, Polish protesters carried the EU flag with the stars crossed over in red. 
In June 2008, there were manifestations in Göteborg against new Internet surveillance 
laws, where the PRC flag with the EU blue replacing the Chinese red was used to 
imply that Sweden and Europe had growing undemocratic traits. The Portuguese 
Público newspaper on 22 August 2002 had a cartoon where the EU stars had eyes 
in them, illustrating a Danish proposal for enhancing electronic communication 
surveillance in Europe. A British cartoon in The Times on 20 May 2005 substituted 
the stars with question marks to hint at the unpredictable post-referendum future 
of the European Constitution; the day after The Economist illustrated the deficient 
integration of Europe’s banks by replacing stars with arrows pointing outwards in 
obvious disunion.322 All these examples show ways to question the target of criticism, 
but also implicitly indicate the symbolic efficiency of the European flag itself.
Also, artists have made pictures that rework the EU flag. Here, the intention is 
often equally critical as in the cartoons, but sometimes with a less clear direction 
and hence greater openness of interpretation. One example is Romanian Vlad Nancă’s 
installation I Do Not Know What Union I Want to Belong to Anymore (2003), with 




circle in yellow on red (Figure 6.30). The constellation seems to express a confusion 
of identity resulting from the EU eastward expansion, whereby West European liberal 
values collide with those of the former communist bloc, creating a strange transfer 
of associations where polarities such as freedom/coercion, individuality/collectivity, 
market/state or civil society/systemic institutions tend to be turned upside down. 
Another similar example is Croatian artist Nemania Cvijanović’s The Sweetest Dream 
(2005), showing a blue flag with seventeen golden stars arranged to form a swastika 
(Figure 6.31). Such a strong symbol is at the same time open to an extreme variation 
of interpretations, depending on the perspective taken, for instance if the idea is that 
the EU institutions have fascist traits or that fascist and neo-Nazi movements pose a 
threat to Europe.
In January 2009, Czech artist David Černý’s art installation Entropa was unveiled in 
the Council of Europe’s building in Brussel, marking the Czech Republic Presidency 
in spring 2009 (Figure 6.32). It showed Europe as a giant DIY construction kit, 
where each bit was one nation, and each nation was presented through some funny 
stereotype. This linked up with a common critique of the EU project as being a failure, 
since the pieces were completely separate and could never join into any coherent 
whole. Entropa caused great debate since some nations protested against the way they 
were depicted. Notably Bulgaria protested against being identified by squat toilets, 
and even succeeded in getting their caricature hidden by fabrics. However, the artist 
argued that the piece was inspired by other satirical art such as the Monty Python 
team or Sacha Baron Cohen, and that with its subtitle ‘Stereotypes are barriers to be 
demolished’, it was fully in accord with the Czech European Union Presidency’s motto 
of ‘Europe without barriers’. 
As argued in the introduction to this study, this artistic critique of the European 
unification project is thought provoking but rather problematic. European identity is of 
course a discursive and highly ideological construction that often covers up deep divides. 
But so are national identities. It is problematic to insist that any other identification 
is more ‘natural’ or ‘authentic’—or ‘better’ in an ethic or political sense. ‘Efforts at 
constructing international identities have had as long a history as the attempts to create 
national identitites’, as Matthias Kaelberer notes.323 Also, even though European identity 
has many flaws and limitations, it still is in many ways effective. Being constructed does 
not prevent it from existing and having a certain influence on history. 
The Danish anti-Islamic EU-blogger Anders Bruun Laursen complains that the 
EU symbols propose ‘a new international identity to replace our ancient, Christian 
national identities’.324 He particularly fears the loss of the Danish flag cross, as explicit 
Christian motifs are consistently avoided in the official EU contexts. More than the 
day or motto, the flag has attracted hostility from EU sceptics and nationalists, not 
least in Britain, where a minor war of interpretation has been waged. There have been 
less of suggestions for alternative images, or debate of its current design, but more 
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of criticism against the EU’s adoption of a flag at all, and its use of it to manifest its 
presence all over Europe. Being much exposed and visible, it comes to symbolise an 
intrusion of federalist ideas into political everyday life, to the annoyance of those who 
want to minimise the reach and role of the EU. A more specific critique has been 
that an ambiguity is built into this flag, as it is both launched as an inclusive symbol 
of all European peoples and at the same time protected as an exclusive property of 
the specific political bodies that control its design, distribution and usage.325 Another 
problematic issue lies in the allegedly Roman Catholic bias or at least inspiration of the 
star halo, which has forced officials to repeatedly emphasise the lack of any religious 
intention behind the design.326
Let me just mention a few examples. In 2006, the Dutch Socialist Party organised an 
‘alternative EU logo competition’, where the winning design by J. Sanders had the star 
circle around a flying duck, with the words ‘United States of Europe’ underneath, to 
illustrate the soft way in which the EU politicians mimic the US with its strong eagle.327
‘What Story Should Europe Tell’ is a website for European debate, organised by 
Timothy Garton Ash. On 22 October 2008, the British administrator and Portuguese 
user Gheryando had a brief but illuminating discussion on European symbols.328 The 
critical voice preferred national symbols to the European ones: ‘The EU cannot have a 
“national” anthem, flag or animal because it is not a nation. These symbols only mimic 
national ones and so are artificial’. The idea was that the only symbols that really count 
are those for nations, supported by full citizenship. ‘The Institute of Directors has 
a flag, the BBC has a flag, BP has a flag, everybody has a flag. These flags mean as 
much to people as the EU flag does, basically nothing, a fluttering logo and that is all.’ 
Again and again, criticisms seem to alternate between denouncing the flag as empty, 
meaningless and irrelevant to European citizens, and fearing that it might take over 
and deteriorate the more historically grounded national symbols of the EU member 
states. Very few arguments are ever made about the specific design and meaning of 
the flag. The main objection seems to be that it is too vague and abstract to attach 
any significant meanings at all, possibly indicating a warning that the interpretations 
elaborated above are far from established by any collective tradition. It is probably still 
an open question how much of the potential meaning range of the flag can ever be 
developed and realised in practice.
Conclusions
With the visual symbol and the additional range of significations suggested by the 
other European icons analysed here, the polysemy of Europe widens. At the same 
time, it also narrows, by adding signifying specifications to those implied by the name, 




symbolism, presented not in linear order (as the name, myth and motto) but as a 
simultaneous, integral totality that can be perceived in a number of different ways, 
and therefore seems particularly rich in protosymbolic content: meanings that are not 
yet fully crystallised but shimmer as a halo around the intended main interpretation. 
It is even harder to pin down the meanings of the various logos than those of the 
motto, but some core elements have at least been discerned so far.329
1.  The symmetric stability of the flag design, and the apparent cosmic timelessness 
of star constellations in general, give an impression more of fixity than of 
mobility. The only element of dislocation may be the empty centre of the 
star circle, which is a marked absence, unclear of what: a void to be filled by 
something unknown, or perhaps left open after something has disappeared—
been dislocated. Still, the main impression is of stability and stasis. The barcode 
is instead to be continually updated and thus mobile, while Entropa is a bit 
unclear, fixing the nations in strict frames but still inviting Europe to be thought 
of in constructivist rather than essentialising ways.
2.  In terms of driving force, the sublime perfection presents a measured, 
‘Apollonian’ pleasure that combines desire and control. The flag design invites 
others to fill its central void and thus calls forth a measure of desire for others to 
enter, while simultaneously offering joy in the rounded and sublime perfection 
of the star ring. In counterpoint to that image, Entropa expresses an unfulfilled 
desire for joining the disparate national pieces into a coherent whole. 
3.  The theme of elevation is strongly supported by the Flag of Europe, as well 
as several of the other symbols discussed here, including Picobelleuropa but 
not the barcode. The stars strongly suggest something high up in the sky, 
pulling Europe up and above more mundane competitors. The nimbus shape 
further adds an aura of sacredness that points in the same direction, as does 
the ‘perfection’ of the symmetric circle as well as the number twelve. There are 
Christian echoes of the nimbus around Virgin Mary and other saintly figures, 
and there is certainly an amount of sublime elevation in conceiving a human 
institution as a perfect star circle. On the other hand origins (and intentions) 
do not determine meanings forever. Many symbols have religious origins, or 
rather religious periods on their routes through history, and not least secular 
republicans and socialists have often reused and reinterpreted such imagery in a 
‘Promethean’ manner, stealing images from the gods and inserting humanity in 
the space previously occupied by divinity. With its abstract and clean style, the 
flag links Europe to high culture and classical aesthetics, rather than to popular 
culture—which was also one reason to experiment with the Picobelleuropa 
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and barcode alternatives. The latter lacks any explicit reference to elevation, 
instead emphasising egalitarianism, but it is also important to note that the flag 
likewise constructs an egalitarian relation between the twelve stars, so that a 
specific combination of elevation and equality is added as a new characteristic 
to the previous symbolic meanings. The critical Entropa instead profanes the 
European puzzle by depicting it as a hopeless childish game.
4.  Finally, Europe’s function as an empty container to be filled by various activities 
and actors evoke a rather vague character of this communicative space, which 
may be deemed to be just formal and abstract, but at the same time evades more 
precise interpretation, escaping out to the pre-semantic or protosymbolic, which 
may also be a condition for symbolic creativity (and civil society interaction) 
inside the formal frames marked out by the twelve stars (or by the European 
institutions). The uniformity and equidistance of the stars may also allude to 
the basic equality needed for a just democratic rule, where the empty inner 
circle would then signify the opening of a space, a stage for actors to enter, 
an agora for interaction, a public sphere to be filled with communication. The 
circular harmony can then indicate a secular kind of democratic egality, and the 
way it is sometimes used in combination with other symbols that are allowed 
in to temporarily fill its centre in practice supports that understanding. This 
arrangement of stars thus has quite different implications than for instance the 
arithmetic filing of the US flag or the hierarchic relation between one ruling star 
and four humble subjects in China’s case. The flag definitely prefers uniformity or 
equality to hybridity. Equality and justice are the foregrounded values, and there 
is no explicit trace at all of diversity. Far removed from the EU motto, the EU 
flag could rather illustrate the caption ‘united in equality’. The abstract design, 
and the void in its centre has been seen as symptomatic of a lack of substance 
in European identity, which Picobelleuropa makes fun of. The empty circle of 
stars represents Europe as a nothingness, a chiasm, indicating that something 
is missing in its centre. The absolute uniformity and equidistance of the stars 
seems entirely to miss the diversity aspect expressed by the motto. Alternative 
designs with rainbow-coloured stars, as well as the barcode and Entropa all 
indicate a desire to balance this tendency.
  As a star nimbus, the European flag sacralises, as Europe stretches up into the 
heavens and is encircled by stars. It implies an elevation, a reliable fixity and an 
egalitarian uniformity among these thus selected nations, lacking any evident 
link to ideas of mobility, transformation, diversity or hybridity, which may be 
one reason why so many efforts have been made to supplement it with other 
images. As the oldest and most well-known functioning EU symbol, the flag 




that its strong expression of almost sacral elevation, fixated stability and strict 
uniformity has obviously been challenging and has provoked many comments 
in the form of other visual symbols that strive to present other images that are 
intended to better represent the fundamental European values, not least the 
diversity that is so much in focus in the motto but totally invisible in the official 
flag. Between these symbols, it is now clear that a kind of struggle is going on 
over European identification: a conflict of interpretations that indicates that the 




One official EU symbol is musical: the European anthem, based on the ‘Ode to Joy’ 
theme from the final movement of Ludwig van Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. This 
has a parallel history to that of the flag, stretching even longer back in time but with 
a rather different position and way of being used. The idea is that people need some 
joint activity when they are gathered to celebrate European unity. Silently waving flags 
is then not enough: this is a classical case where music and singing tends to play a key 
role, just like it has for so many nation states, not to forget ritual chanting, sing-along, 
karaoke, ecstatic moments in pop concerts and other examples of how joint singing 
is used to reinforce feelings of belonging and community, as individuals gathered in a 
space actively express some kind of shared identity in sounds and lyrics. 
What’s in an anthem?
A hymn is a song of praise, the term deriving from the Greek hymnos: a song or ode 
praising gods or heroes, possibly related to hymenaios, wedding song, derived from 
‘Hymen’, the Greek god of marriage. It has from the Middle Ages acquired a sacral 
accent, mostly denoting some kind of religious song or praise. The term ‘anthem’ derives 
from Greek antiphona (against + voice), a song performed in a responsorial fashion. 
In the late fourteenth century, the term came to apply to any sacred composition or a 
song of praise, and became used for the British national song ‘God Save the Queen/
King’. This was the first national hymn, with unknown authorship and a complicated 
genealogy, was published in 1744 and has been in public use since 1745. From there 
the term came to be applied to all subsequent national hymns, without any remaining 
link to its original responsive meaning: ‘a rousing or uplifting song identified with a 




An anthem as well as a hymn is a song of praise made for communal singing. It 
should preferably be reasonably easy to remember and to sing, making it tempting 
or even irresistible to join in singing, and this activity of participation is intended to 
spill over into some level of identification with what the anthem stands for. In this 
way, anthems are constructed to emotionally boost collective identification, through 
the medium of voice and sound. Peter J. Martin sees the unprecedented demand of 
popular music today in the light of its capacity of forming communities: ‘The close-
knit communities of Romantic mythology have given way to the quest for a sense of 
belonging’, where individuals ‘seek to identify themselves with symbolic entities’. Here 
‘popular music becomes a useful commodity’, offering ‘a sense of who you are and 
where you belong’.331 Popular songs help construct a wide range of different collective 
identifications, while anthems are made for underpinning those that have a more 
official character, being supported by formalised institutions, such as nation states.
Malcolm Boyd has analysed a great number of national anthems and divided 
them into five main categories, of which the two first are most common: (a) hymns 
with a solemn pace and melody (for instance the British ‘God Save the Queen’ or the 
European anthem); (b) marches (such as the French ‘La Marseillaise’); (c) operatic tunes 
(exemplified by El Salvador and some other Latin American countries); (d) folk tunes 
(mainly used in Asia, for instance by Japan and Sri Lanka); and (e) fanfares without 
text (found in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and other oil states in the Middle 
East).332 Just like the idea of a nation was established in Europe, this is also true for the 
sound of national anthems. Except for the few, mainly Asian, examples of folk anthem 
category (d) that build upon a Herderian notion of ‘specific musical nationalism’, 
expressing a particular ethnicity, Martin Daughtry has argued that most national 
anthems tend towards a ‘generic’ musical nationalism, as they by musical means signal 
that they are precisely that by adhering to the classical European musical conventions 
that have established musical nationalism as a kind of specific supranational genre, 
where they are perceived as sounding familiarly ‘anthemic’, rather than specific, to a 
particular nation.333
As a mode of communication, music has several peculiarities advantageous for 
communal celebration.334 First of all, it is based on sounds that involve the ear and 
the human voice, but organises these sounds differently than in speech that is based 
on a verbal logic of relatively late origins in the history of mankind. What is seen of a 
person is primarily the outside surface, while what is heard tends to derive from the 
interior of that person’s body, in particular the sonic organs in and around the throat. 
The combination of physiological constitution and genetic origin lends to music an 
extraordinary emotional reach and subjective involvement that have led many to 
understand it as a unique and privileged mode of expression, reaching beyond or 
underneath the more conscious modes of visual and verbal communication. Swearing 
an oath, proposing to a beloved, crying or laughing—such strong subjective expressions 
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normally need to be made orally in order to fully convince of their authenticity and 
sincerity, and music is a way of organising such expressions in a more direct way than 
in the linguistic system built on words. Susanne K. Langer thus characterised music 
as a presentational symbolism, which is experienced in a holistic way, in contrast to 
the discursive one of verbal language, where clearly distinct elements are added in 
a sequence.335 Psychoanalytical theorists have similarly linked music to pre-verbal 
psychic strata, as hearing is developed earlier in the infant than seeing, and thus has 
mental roots that go back to before language acquisition, to more archaic strata that 
are closely linked to deep-seated bodily and pre-rational emotions. Such specificities 
have led some semioticians and cultural theorists to argue that music is a form of 
communication without meaning.336 
This whole line of thought has been brought under critical scrutiny by theorists 
like Jacques Derrida, who questions the linear developmental logic and essentialist 
romanticisation behind the idea that sound and voice are more primordial than sight 
and vision.337 I see no reason to believe that musical sounds are any less meaningful 
than words—only the precise signifying procedures differ.338 The particular kind of 
bodily activity involved in the use of voice and ear in making or listening to music do 
not prevent them from communicating meanings, but may at least partially explain why 
music is so often experienced as a vague and emotional mode of expression. Whether 
art music or popular music, with or without words, foregrounded or for instance in 
film soundtracks—music certainly is able to invoke meanings that are determined by 
interpretive communities of listeners and music makers, in geographically and socially 
situated communities that evolve historically, but it never escapes the cumulated networks 
of signification that constitute the traditions of musical genres. Parallel to verbal and 
visual modes of communication, pieces of music mean something to people in shifting 
contexts, and these meanings are polysemic and negotiable, inserted in the never-ending 
stream of conflicts of interpretation that is extended by every new usage and discourse.
While eyes may deliberately be directed and closed, this is not as easily done with 
ears. Music therefore has an almost intrusive material force on human bodies, and 
can be perceived even when people strive to focus on something else. Music is hard 
to block out but at the same time often out of focus, serving as a background to other 
activities. These qualities also make it difficult to focus on discursively, and most 
people find it much harder to find words to clearly describe music than images.
Music is itself a multimodal form of expression, as a full musical experience does 
not only emanate from abstracted sounds but also involves sight and other human 
senses. Music is further easily combined with other modes, not least verbal and visual 
ones. Music also often exists in combination with lyrics in song and with gestural 
or cinematic visuality in opera or film. Besides such multimodal genres and art 
forms, many people enjoy reading, writing or working with something silent while 




soothes their nerves. They may of course also have a nice picture on the wall, but 
lifting eyes to really look at it demands a break from desk work that is not in the same 
way required, at least on a subliminal level, to enjoy music while working. 
These traits also combine to make music particularly suitable for collective 
interaction, to a higher extent than most other modes of communication, except 
possibly for dance (with which it is as a rule fused, as silent dancing is a rarity). Music 
lends itself to be made collectively not only for but also by groups, in heterophonic 
or polyphonic modes of communal expression, while for instance images or words 
tend to demand exclusive momentary concentration and thus function in a more 
monologic or dialogic way. 
Visual symbols are typically integrated in lots of settings, both solemn and vernacular. 
Flags can be sighted all year round, and logos may appear on car number plates as 
well as on printed and electronic documents, for instance. Anthems are drastically 
different. Few people hum them several times a day: instead they are brought forward 
on festive occasions. They are less ‘banal’ or ‘unwaved’ in Michael Billig’s sense. Other 
kinds of music may well be heard in the background, as soundtracks to everyday life, 
but anthems have too strong a symbolic force to lend themselves to such banalisation. 
Being actively performed at distinct ceremonial events, they are often the focus 
of attention, performing a kind of sacralising function of consolidating a kind of 
communion. Benedict Anderson has talked of ‘a special kind of contemporaneous 
community’ suggested by poetry and songs, for instance national anthems as sung on 
national holidays, when they give rise to ‘an experience of simultaneity’, an image of 
‘unisonance’ and a ‘physical realization of the imagined community’, as ‘people wholly 
unknown to each other utter the same verses to the same melody’, connected by nothing 
but ‘imagined sound’.339 Among the main symbols discussed so far, one may argue that 
the flag is the most integrated and vernacular one, followed by the motto, then the 
anthem, with the day at the other extreme, as the whole point with Europe Day is to 
be a unique annual event supposed to be consciously celebrated, even though it may 
in this respect largely be seen as a failure so far. While a motto can be hinted at often 
in political discourses, and a logo may be integrated in a large number of settings, an 
anthem is more apt to be used on special occasions, when there is cause for a common 
celebration of shared matters, for instance on national holidays. In Klaus Bruhn Jensen’s 
terms, anthems belong to ritualised ‘time-out culture’, while flags can also take part in 
the ‘time-in culture’ that is an integrated part of ordinary everyday life.340 
Music thus has a strong potential for both collectively constituted and emotionally 
charged expression. Being a piece of music, the European anthem has the characteristic 
capacities for emotionally involving and bodily anchored community building, but 
these capacities are typically confined to ceremonial events rather than integrated in 
everyday life.
153
Introducing the European anthem
The European anthem is supposed to be that of Europe in a wider sense, including 
non-EU nations as well, and was first officially adopted by the Council of Europe 
in 1972. Its melody is the core theme of the fourth (final) movement of Ludwig van 
Beethoven’s Ninth Sym phony, composed in 1823. It was set to Friedrich von Schiller’s 
‘Ode to Joy’, expressing an idealistic vision of the human race united in brother hood: 
‘Alle Menschen werden Brüder’. The poem was written in 1785 but published in 
slightly revised form in 1803, which Beethoven compressed and modified to suit his 
purposes (Figure 7.1). However, though the general melodic line and the name ‘Ode 
to Joy’ remain, the official hymn differs from its original source by being compressed 
to two minutes, selecting and reshuffling Beethoven’s melodic elements, and also 
cancels the lyrics. (The reasons and signifying effects of this will be discussed below.) 
‘Without words, in the universal language of music, this anthem expresses the ideals 
of freedom, peace and solidarity for which Europe stands’, says the EU web site, where 
it can also be listened to as an audio file: ‘It is not in tended to replace the national 
anthems of the Member States but rather to celebrate the values they all share and 
their unity in diver sity’.341 
Aside from the name ‘Europe’ and the myth of Europa, and not counting various 
ancient star circles that might have inspired the flag emblem, the anthem has the 
oldest pre-history, as its music goes back at least to 1823 (and the lyrics to 1785), and 
highly different actors have almost ever since used it to celebrate common European 
endeavours. In the post-World War II unification process, many activists called for a 
unifying anthem to supplement the common flag. Many other songs were proposed 
through the years, or newly composed by various enthusiasts, but Beethoven’s hymn 
came to be repeatedly used in this function, and seemed to have a resonance with at 
least how the European elites wished to define themselves.
Several pleas and proposals for European songs, often in several languages, were 
proposed by various citizens to the Council of Europe in the aftermath of the war.342 
Early examples from the autumn of 1949 were ‘Chant de la Paix’ by Mrs Jehanne-
Louis Gaudet, and ‘Hymne eines geeinten Europas/Hymne à une Europe unifiée’ by 
Carl Kahlfuss. In 1955, the Paneuropean Union’s President Richard Coudenhave-
Kalergi, who in 1950 had proposed the Council of Europe to use the movement’s 
sun-cross flag and also had recently pledged for a Europe Day, proposed ‘the hymn 
from Beethoven’s 9th Symphony’. This music had already from 1929 been used by 
that same movement.343 It continued to be sporadically used at European events, for 
instance at the tenth anniversary of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, 20 April 
1959. An increasing number of European events created a need for joint ceremonial 
singing. In the following years, some favoured the last movement of Georg Friedrich 




Figure 7.1. The lyrics of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony; words written by Beethoven are shown 
in italics; Schiller’s original had a handful of more verses inserted before and after the words ‘Ihr 
stürzt nieder, Millionen?/Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt?/Such’ ihn über’m Sternenzelt!/Über 
Sternen muss er wohnen’.
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of European Municipalities in 1962 recorded a ‘European song’ based on Beethoven’s 
music, which had the advantage of being quite well known, though the lyrics were felt 
to be a bigger problem. 
Activities in support of an anthem were particularly lively in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France. It was less surprisingly also often used in Germany, for 
instance as a national anthem in sporting events where the two States entered a joint 
team, for instance at the Oslo Winter Olympics 1952 and the Tokyo Games 1964. 
Germany’s affection for the tune actually went back to the Third Reich, where it 
was played at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, for Hitler’s birthday and in concentration 
camps.344 
The year 1970 was a Beethoven anniversary year, as he was born in 1770, which 
contributed to putting his work the focus of the anthem discussions. Also, early in 
1971, Stanley Kubrick’s movie A Clockwork Orange was released. Like Anthony Burgess’ 
novel from 1962, it placed the final movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in a key 
narrative position, as the tune that the delinquent Alex first likes and then is tortured 
with by playing it together with extremely violent films from Nazi Germany. In spite of 
the very negative associations made with the theme in the story, it became immensely 
popular, not least when the film soundtrack with Wendy (formerly Walter) Carlos’ 
arrangement of the music for Robert Moog’s recently invented electronic synthesiser 
was released in 1972.
Hence the huge popularity of the Ode to Joy, which is now a tune on 
everyone’s lips, a tune, however, which has lost its power to involve 
and unite, having become a soundtrack for films, documentaries, 
advertising spots, sporting events and much else besides.345 
Adding to the pressure from institutions such as the Council of European Municipalities 
and the Committee on Local Authorities of the Consultative Assembly, a ‘Round 
Table for Europe Day’ in February 1971 also concluded ‘it would be desirable for a 
European anthem to be instituted to symbolise the faith of our peoples in the cause of 
European unity’. This was in April 1971 supported by the Consultative Assembly and 
the Committee of Ministers. A Consultative Assembly report in June 1971 considered 
a selection to be made from suggestions received by the General Secretariat, or a 
Europe-wide competition to be organised, but both these options were discarded.
All members were against the idea of a competition for the 
purpose of ‘producing’ an anthem; on the other hand, it was agreed 
unanimously that Beethoven’s music was representative of the 
European genius and was capable of uniting the hearts and minds 




in mind that the tune of the Ode to Joy, from the last movement of 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, had frequently been performed as a 
European anthem by local communities in particular, the Committee 
considered it preferable to give official approval to this incipient 
tradition and to propose the prelude to the Ode to Joy.
 An arrangement of the work was in fact made for the Belgian 
section of the Council of European Municipalities in 1961 and 
published by Schott Frères of Brussels; this could be used for 
reference purposes.
 As regards the words for an anthem some doubt was felt, mainly 
with regard to the words of the Ode to Joy, which were in the nature of 
a universal expression of faith rather than a specifically European one.
 Members also wondered whether any words acknowledged as 
‘European’ could ever be translated into another language and accepted 
as such by the other linguistic groups of the European family.
 The Committee therefore preferred, for the time being, to propose 
only the tune for a European anthem, without words, and to allow 
some time to pass. One day perhaps some words will be adopted 
by the citizens of Europe with the same spontaneity as Beethoven’s 
eternal melody has been.346
While the melody was widely accepted, Schiller’s lyrics were an obstacle. One objection 
was that any words would be bound to a single linguistic community and thus run into 
conflict with the unifying purpose of the anthem. The other main objection was even 
more fascinating, as it questioned the validity of a universalist text to identify Europe: 
Beethoven’s version of Schiller’s words was thus deemed to be too little European and 
too globally inclusive to signify a specifically European identity, whereas the music itself 
appeared to have passed the test as being specifically European enough to serve this 
purpose. Skipping the words altogether became the easiest way out.
The 10 June 1971 Report by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 
on a European anthem from which this long quote derives was thus of the opinion 
that ‘it would be preferable to select a musical work representative of European 
genius and whose use on European occasions is already becoming something of a 
tradition’.347 In a long ‘explanatory note’, the Assembly’s rapporteur, Mr René Radius, 
gave a background to the anthem plans and confronted a counter-argument ‘that to 
propose a European anthem is too bold an undertaking for poli ticians’. He argued that 
this was part of the key task of ‘spreading the European idea’, not least in face of the 
expected enlargement of the European Communities, where ‘the Council of Europe 
is required by its Statute to propagate the ideal of European unity and thus to prepare 
the citizens of Europe to live together in a spirit of solidarity and fraternity’, and ‘to 
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inspire the peoples of Europe, who are still divided in more than one respect, with a 
genuinely European spirit, compounded of generosity, of faith and of fellowship’. The 
Flag and Day of Europe had been steps to this goal, and it was now time to add an 
Anthem to this toolbox:
At this crucial hour in Europe’s search for her identity, the time has 
perhaps come to provide her with what she still lacks in the trilogy 
of symbols by which our States identify themselves: like them, she 
needs her Flag, her Day and her Anthem. These will give her the new 
impetus she needs in order to advance on the road to unity, and she 
will find therein a resounding expression of her driving force and of 
her faith.348
Curti Gialdino finds the political contextualising of the anthem in relation to the whole 
European project elucidative: ‘Thus the feeling of identity associated with Beethoven’s 
artistic heritage was to act as a means of filling the void in terms of a historical basis 
for European integration, which was still lacking, or at best precarious’.349 In resolution 
492 of 8 July 1971, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe decided 
to accept the report’s advice and ‘propose the acceptance by member countries as 
a European anthem of the Prelude to the Ode to Joy in the fourth movement of 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony’ and to ‘recommend its use on all European occasions if 
desired in conjunction with the national anthem’. A few months later, the Committee 
of Ministers also supported this idea.350
The conductor of the Berlin Philharmonics Herbert von Karajan was asked to write 
three instrumental arrange ments—for piano, for wind instruments and for symphony 
orchestra. He also conducted the performance for the official recording. The Council 
of Europe then announced the anthem in Karajan’s arrangement on 19 January 1972, 
and launched an extensive information campaign on Europe Day 5 May 1972.351 The 
‘Ode to Joy’ theme became increasingly popular in many different settings. In the 
1970s it even became the national anthem of Ian Smith’s apartheid rule in Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe).352 
In June 1984, the Fontainebleau European Council set up a Committee on a ‘People’s 
Europe’, the so-called Adonnino Committee, which was a prime motor for establishing 
the European flag. Its second report on a ‘People’s Europe’ to the European Council 
meeting in Milan 28–29 June 1985 argued strongly in favour of the adoption and use 
of a European anthem:
The music of the ‘Ode to Joy’ from the fourth movement of Beethoven’s 
ninth symphony is in fact used at European events. This anthem has 




of the European idea. The Committee recommends to the European 
Council that this anthem be played at appropriate events and 
ceremonies.353 
The European leaders gathered at the Milan summit followed this recommendation 
and thus chose the same anthem for the European Community as that adopted in 
1972 by the Council of Europe. Finally, Beethoven’s music had become the official 
EU anthem in 1985. At the ceremony where the European flag was raised for the 
first time at the European Commission building in Brussels on 29 May 1986, a 
Flemish brass band played the arranged anthem, after which a choral society sang 
its original German setting with lyrics.354 Since that time, the anthem continues to 
be played at official European events and ceremonies, and it is also released in many 
different versions on record and on the web, as sound files or ringtones, arranged 
in many different musical styles and with a variety of traditional and newly written 
lyrics. It continues to accumulate meaning by being used in highly divergent contexts, 
including the 1989 protests at Tiananmen Square in Peking as well as the Japanese 
New Year celebrations.355 
Referring to translation problems and the vast number of languages in Europe, 
Schiller’s words were thus again excluded in 1985, as they had been in 1971. Though 
the original German lyrics thus have no official status, the music’s meaning remains 
indissolubly tinted by Schiller’s poem and not least its title, ‘Ode to Joy’. This immediate 
intertext has to be taken into consideration by any attempt to interpret the cluster of 
meanings that has come to surround this anthem.
Interpreting Beethoven’s Ode to Joy
This is the only EU symbol that is so expressly derived from an existing work, 
picking out a small part of that work and revising it for the new format. Resolution 
492 (1971) of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on a European 
anthem (8 July 1971) stated that ‘it would be preferable to select a musical work 
representative of European genius and whose use on European occasions is already 
becoming something of a tradition’. A deliberate decision was thus not to look for 
a newly composed tune, but to go back in history to find a suitable classical melody 
that was already anchored in citizens’ minds and that also had firmly established 
the solemn aura capable of bearing the overwhelming weight of expressing shared 
European values. No such provision was made concerning any of the other symbols. 
While they also leaned on inherited tropes, they still allowed for a contemporary 
treatment of these, not being content with inheriting something rather finished from 
the past. The flag may for instance have borrowed all its elements from tradition, but 
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it was still presented as a unique and new design, rather than as an adherence to a 
pre-existing symbol. However, for the music, none of the proposed new compositions 
gave any hope of finding anything remotely as attractive as what the European canon 
of classical music had to offer. The implied signifying result was already by such a 
decision to devalue later developments in music and to instead inscribe the anthem in 
a rather conservative classicist tradition. 
This also makes Beethoven’s oeuvre a clearly privileged intertext, in particular his 
Ninth Symphony and Schiller’s poem which he integrated in its final movement. I 
will therefore save comparative references to other intertexts until next section, in 
order to focus on the most obvious contexts for the European anthem, in a concentric 
set of circles from the European anthem, over Beethoven’s Ninth’s fourth movement, 
Beethoven’s Ninth symphony as a whole, Beethoven’s total oeuvre and Schiller’s poem 
to early nineteenth century bourgeois culture and art music and post-revolutionary 
modern capitalism in general. As Esteban Buch has argued, the Anthem functions as 
a metonym for ‘the whole fourth movement, the whole Ninth symphony, the whole 
work of Beethoven, or even the whole Western “great music”, which, in this way, is 
appealed to in order to reinforce the ethical and political legitimacy of the European 
community as a whole’.356
The interpretive analysis could either start with the EU anthem as a separate work 
in its own right or approach it as a reworked excerpt from Beethoven’s symphony. 
While only a minor group of art music specialists know the symphony context in any 
greater detail, many will associate the anthem to Beethoven and thus have some basic 
idea about some of those contextual aspects as well. The EU itself repeatedly makes 
it known that the anthem has precisely that origin. The European anthem as such is 
not yet sufficiently established to have full autonomous work status, even though this 
may possibly change in the future, should the anthem survive and become successful, 
in the way that for instance the Eurovision tune for most listeners has managed to 
cut off its ties to Charpentier’s Te Deum, as will be discussed below. There are many 
different anthem versions of shifting length, sung or instrumental, so that it remains 
a bit uncertain how it goes as such, and in settings where it is used, it is repeatedly 
linked back to Beethoven, so that the melody’s origin in Beethoven’s symphony still 
tends to overshadow its independent existence as EU’s anthem. Therefore, I will here 
start my analysis by relating the Anthem to its original Beethoven context, rather 
than treating it as a completely distinct work. I will first discuss how it has been 
understood in its original context within Beethoven’s own work, and then in the 
following section listen closer to the arrangements of the Ode melody that have been 
presented as the European anthem. Though it may sometimes be difficult to keep 
them strictly apart, I will strive to reserve the term ‘Anthem’ for the EU version of 





The European Navigator finds it crucial to contextualise Beethoven’s work in 
relation to its original political, social and historic setting, as he ‘straddled the end of 
one period of history and the beginning of another’.357 In the aftermath of the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, a new bourgeois order was established in Europe. 
For Beethoven—‘a musician of the internal world, the realm of the mind’—music 
‘was pregnant with meaning and almost always embodied an idea’. ‘Seriousness is the 
predominant feature of Beethoven, but this very seriousness may, even fleetingly, be 
transformed into joy, as in the Ninth Symphony.’
The melody of the Ode to Joy is simple, almost elementary, and of 
an approachable and clear musicality to which it is easy to listen. 
Beethoven’s main concern was to strike a perfect balance between 
unity (and exact repetition) and variety, in a form which was readily 
memorable. In the verses singing of the values of truth, liberty, 
universal fraternity and human happiness, man emerges victorious 
over all his physical and moral oppressions. Throughout his life, and 
even in its happier periods, Beethoven was beset by the torments of 
his deafness, financial straits, unhappiness in love and the agonies 
of life. The Kantian ideals of the enlightenment culture of the time, 
which provided a focus for Beethoven’s knowledge and internal life, 
are brought to life and sublimated through the interweaving of music 
and poetry. It is precisely this exhortation to fraternity and friendship, 
to love and to peace, of which the Ode is a highly figurative symbol, 
that explains why the Council of Europe and then the European 
Communities decided to take as their official anthem a hymn to 
fraternity going beyond the confines of nations and beyond the 
differences between peoples in order to bring about something more 
sublime and exceptional in European society.358
Efforts were made to construct Beethoven as European, for instance by mentioning his 
Dutch ancestors and his move from birth and youth in Bonn to mature achievements 
in Vienna.359 However, these seem rather contrived, as it would have been easier to 
show how composers such as Georg Friedrich Handel, Joseph Haydn or Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart were considerably more cosmopolitan in their life trajectories as well 
as in their musical production—and in the latter respect, even Johann Sebastian Bach’s 
oeuvre appears more obviously a melting pot of highly diverse European elements 
deriving from German, French and Italian sources. However, the choice of Beethoven 
had other causes. Much emphasis was put on his seriousness and the way he was 
engaged in the complex issues of his day: issues of progress and fate, emancipation 
and oppression, destruction and hope, war and peace. It was often argued that he 
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was not just a skilled musician but also a socially responsible thinker, already by his 
contemporaries seen as a true ‘genius’ who regarded music as pregnant with meaning 
and embodying more abstract human values and allegedly universal ideas.360
It is thus no mere coincidence that Beethoven in several compositions used, developed 
and invented themes relating to topical ideas of his time, including expressions of 
universal humanism and heroic anti-authoritarian liberation, for instance in the 
ballet The Creatures of Prometheus (op. 43, 1801), the third symphony (Eroica, op. 55, 
1803) or the opera Fidelio (op. 72, 1814; the original version Leonore was from 1805). 
He consciously linked himself to such leading ideas of what was to become classical 
European modernity, and thus lends himself well to being appropriated by those who 
later seek to express these ideas, either to hail or to problematise them. Beethoven is 
perhaps the most widely known European art music composer. No other composer 
is equally well known and above all respected all over the world, even though Mozart 
and Bach come close.361 Chuck Berry’s ‘Roll over Beethoven’ (1956) is but one example 
of how the serious composer has been used as a generalised symbol for traditional 
high arts, and Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange (1971) being another example.
There is an interesting homology between Beethoven’s time and our own, in that 
his hopes for the Congress of Vienna to estab lish European peace after the Napoleonic 
wars parallel the intentions behind the Coal and Steel Union after World War II to 
finally put an end to the repeated catastrophic hostilities between France and Germany. 
Beethoven’s words sung before Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’, ‘Freunde, nicht diese Töne’, were 
precisely heard as a call against violence, silencing the preceding aggressive chaos. 
This process of civilising domestication of dark forces is also represented in the music 
itself, where chaotic strife is forced into reconciliation, not by expulsion of the brutes 
but through their disciplining integration and submission under a more peaceful and 
happy order, forging unity out of diversity. With the car ni valesque ‘Freude schöne 
Götterfunken’ sung by a mass ensemble to an elevated but joyful dance tune that fuses 
high and low culture, a kind of Promethean aura is established around a secular but 
transcendental humankind, upholding Enlightenment values of human rights and 
dignity. The music therefore is linked to both the Europa and the Prometheus myths, 
and not least to the founding myth of the EU, in which Europe’s economic post-war 
reconstruction is defined as an empowering peace project.
Already before analysing the music as such, the Anthem is clearly placed within 
a classical European high culture tradition of elevation. Gerard Delanty argues that 
the bureaucratic form of EU institutions has ‘a reifying effect’, mirrored in the chosen 
anthem, with its ‘reifying tone’ through which ‘the politics of European identity sought 
legitimation in bourgeois high culture’.362 However, there are interesting complexities 
involved here as well. Using an already existing tune from the classical art music 
heritage, and specifically by Beethoven, has several implications that confirm the 




The tune constitutes the climax in the final movement of a late Beethoven work that 
is generally understood as a high peak in his oeuvre. He was himself the last of the 
big three Vienna classics providing a transition from classical early modernity to the 
Romantics and later the self-critical fragmentation of the Enlightenment impulses. 
His mature period is often associated with seriousness and wisdom. The main tune of 
the final movement thus draws a great work to a conclusion. Romain Rolland regarded 
Beethoven’s ‘immortal Ode to Joy’ as ‘the plan of his whole life’: ‘All his life he wished to 
celebrate Joy; and to make it the climax of one of his great works.’363 In many respects, 
the Anthem bears the mark of age, maturity, finality, rich experience and wisdom. 
However, this stands in opposition to some aspects of the musical composition—as 
well as of the lyrics—that have an almost revolutionary and almost naïvely youthful 
urgency.
The music itself is in the centre of the classical European art music tradition, 
using the twelve-tone equal temperament foundation of major/minor tonality and 
functional harmonics that underpinned new modes of modern musical narrative 
through structural progression and tension development, including verse/chorus 
transitions as well as the sonata form. These creative tools evolved from late sixteenth 
to early nineteenth century Europe and enabled a series of new modes of musical 
expression corresponding to the lifeworlds and outlooks of an emerging modern 
society, with the bourgeois public sphere as an important hub of civil society. 
Big changes took place in the period around the French Revolution, as the post-
aristocratic ruling classes took over the initiative and strived to construct a more 
suitable sound organisation that emphasised individualised emotional development, 
but also lifted up popular expressions in sublimated and refined forms into a more 
elevated sphere of fine arts.
Nicholas Cook has succinctly pointed out that Beethoven’s music is full of 
contradictions and ambivalences: between unity and fragmentation, energy and 
despair, Classicism and Romanticism, seriousness and ironic jokes, sorrow and 
happiness, solemn abstraction and physical force, high art and ‘low’ popular 
earthiness, and universality and subjectivity.364 This music in many respects expressed 
and tried to come to grips with basic contradictions in emergent bourgeois society 
and culture.365 Susan McClary describes this music as juxtaposing ‘desire and 
unspeakable violence’: ‘The Ninth Symphony is probably our most compelling 
articulation in music of the contradictory impulses that have organized patriarchal 
culture since the Enlightenment.’366 János Márothy has argued that the early 
nineteenth century bourgeoisie developed a kind of ‘Dionysian complex’, resulting 
from a basic contradiction of bourgeois society and art: an ‘insoluble duality of the 
citoyen-bourgeois’.367 Modern life had become abstract and private, creating a nostalgic 
longing for public collective experiences. The loss of public experiences of Dionysian 
mass collectivity of antiquity was recovered in romantic events, sparked off by the 
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re-emerging mass experience in the French Revolution, and expressed in aesthetic 
ceremonial forms such as Beethoven’s symphonies, displaying a heroism stylistically 
deriving from the mass dances and marches of the French Revolution.368 Márothy 
shows how the melismatically lengthened rhythm of the ‘Ode to Joy’ melody has a 
sentimental declamation that is stylistically a subgroup of polka rhythm: a series of 
open-closed pairs with ancient roots, much used in medieval plebeian forms.369 
Beethoven’s introduction of a choir and sung words in the symphony genre was an 
innovation with immense influence on later generations.370 Schiller’s ‘An die Freude’ 
had since long interested Beethoven. It was written in 1785 but in 1803 published 
in a revised version where some political elements were softened. Beethoven went 
even further in the same direction, using only half of Schiller’s lyrics and making 
considerable alterations and rearrangements to suit his purposes. He avoided the 
most overtly political attacks at the tyrant’s power, for instance changing ‘Bettler 
werden Fürsten-brüder’ (‘Beggars become Princes’ brothers’) to ‘Alle Menschen 
werden Brüder’ (‘All men will become brothers’). This was not only in order to avoid 
Metternich’s censorship but also to produce the more abstract, utopian and idealistic 
expression that Beethoven himself wished to convey, focusing on the all-embracing 
community rather than the political act of revolution. With the same idealistic 
purpose, he also omitted sections reminding of a drinking song, and reordered 
the choruses to create an unbroken line of development from the terrestrial to the 
divine.371
In its symphonic setting, the ode introduces a popular voice, a steady tune that 
could be heard as ‘natural’ and authentic in contrast with aristocratic forms: a 
song of the people or ‘of the good human being’ (‘des guten Menschen’) in a more 
universal sense. Like so many other commanding marches and fanfares, it starts with 
an upward movement, but instead of swinging rapidly to the sky, it walks steadily 
upwards, starting with two sturdy steps on the same spot before ascending step by 
step, and with even and steady beats reminding more of common people on the move 
than of gallant horses or flying angels. This fusion of highly advanced composition 
techniques with low popular tunes, inspired by democratic and revolutionary 
practices, has great potential for meeting EU’s need for satisfying popular demands 
as well as the cultural and political elites.372 But the further elaboration of this tune in 
the symphony movement has puzzled many listeners, as it enigmatically eludes any 
easy interpretation.
Musicologist Nicholas Cook describes the Ninth’s finale as formally ‘a cantata 
constructed round a series of variations on the “joy” theme’, but it has also been 
analysed as a sonata form, a concerto form or ‘a conflation of four symphonic 
movements into one’ (the latter suggested by Charles Rosen).373 The following outline 





A. Bar 1–207. The movement starts with a three minutes d-minor introduction 
that unfolds a frustrated dialogue between a review of the preceding three symphony 
movements and an instrumental string bass recitative. It is as if the motives from those 
previous movements or times were presented and all lead to strife and chaos, which 
the bass recitative has to interrupt with its rubato speech-like but still wordless voice. 
This leads up to bars 92ff. where the D-major ‘Joy’ theme is first presented by the string 
basses and developed in higher and fuller registers through three variations: first by 
the full string orchestra, then finally with full orchestra and much wind instruments 
Figure 7.2. Graphic overview of the Fourth Movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.
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on top. The last variation is extended in an exalted frenzy, which suddenly quiets 
down around six minutes into the movement.
B. Bar 208–330. The sounds from the d-minor introduction reappear for a 
minute, again with chaotic drums being interrupted by the same recitative as before, 
this time sung by a baritone on lyrics by Beethoven: ‘O Freunde, nicht diese Töne! / 
sondern lasst uns angenehmere anstimmen, / und freudenvollere. / Freude! Freude!’ 
(‘Oh friends, not these tones! / Rather, let us raise our voices in more pleasing / and 
more joyful sounds! / Joy! Joy!’).374 At bar 241, this opens up the D-major vocal ‘Joy’ 
variations 4–6, with the Schiller lyrics of verses 1–3, starting with ‘Freude, schöner 
Götterfunken, / Tochter aus Elysium, / wir betreten feuertrunken, / Himmlische, dein 
Heiligtum!’ (‘Joy, beautiful spark of divinity / daughter of Elysium, / We enter, drunk 
with fire, / into your sanctuary, heavenly (daughter)!’). The first time, a solo voice is 
accompanied by the choir in the last eight bars of the tune, like a chorus. Each of these 
variations adds voices, creating a climactic process. The second repetition involves a 
polyphonic solo song ensemble and a chorus in full choir like before; the third varies 
the melody so that it almost sounds like laughter. It ends with a transitory extension.
The introduction to the movement thus presents three different musical ideas 
that each time ends in chaos (A). They echo each of the preceding three movements, 
so that the finale starts by summing up what has come before, but it is also easy to 
interpret them as symbolising three failed efforts to live together or build a society. 
This interpretation is particularly invited by the words ‘Oh friends, not these tones!’, 
and not least by the following ‘Ode to Joy’ lyrics that immediately forces the listener to 
hear this melody as the only successful way out of the compositional impasse—as well 
as of the interactional impasse for humanity which it has signified (B). At this point, 
the ‘Ode’ tune has the role of a jubilant and in many ways is a simple solution after so 
many efforts to integrate deeply divided forces: a strong and accessible hymn which 
lifts the whole symphony to a new—higher and more solemn but also more basic and 
popular—level.
In Greek mythology, the virtuous heroes had the privilege to rest in the Elysian 
fields of the Underworld.375 Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’ constructed joy as a ‘beautiful spark 
of divinity’ and ‘daughter of Elysium’, that is happiness as a personification of a divine 
spark to humanity from the paradise of eternal rest. This is already a quite complex 
picture. On the one hand, this joy is described as an elevating energy from the gods, 
parallel to how Prometheus stole fire to humanity. This is reinforced by the next line 
that depicts how ‘we enter, drunk with fire’ into the holy place or ‘sanctuary’ of joy. On 
the other hand, the dimension of eternity also makes death and the dead present in 
this joy, and the fire-drunkenness is also not without its dangers: this joy is obviously 
sublime rather than just pleasantly relaxed. The joy could remind of the intense 
desire in Europa and the bull, but surviving fire may also recall the resurrection of 




about how the magic of joy ‘reunites what custom strictly divided’, so that ‘all men 
will become brothers’. The narrative goes from dark suffering to sparks of joy and 
from traditional division to brotherly reunion. Associations include heroes finally 
resting and rejoicing after wars, perhaps reunited with their beloved dead. This could 
be relevant to a post-war experience that was urgent for Beethoven as a new Europe 
was to arise from the battlefields of the Napoleonic wars, and was to become again 
actualised after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1 and the two twentieth century 
world wars, which propelled Robert Schuman and the other EU architects. The 
symbols add up to a kind of palimpsest of meanings on several historical levels.
The next verse invites ‘whoever can call even one soul his own on this earth’ to ‘join 
in our jubilation’, while those who were unable to build any kind of friendship ‘must 
creep tearfully away from this band’. In verse 3, joy is depicted as a natural resource for 
‘all creatures’, ‘all good, all bad’. Indeed, ‘pleasure was given to the worm’ so virtually 
no living being seems excluded in this universal celebration.
C. Bar 331–594. This whole section starts in Bb-major and introduces a highly 
contrasting element, in tone and expression as well as in key, reminiscent of the 
second subject in a sonata form, so that the return to D major in bar 543 feels like 
a kind of recapitulation. The choir exclaims ‘O Gott’ (‘Oh God!’) in a prolonged 
fermata, and a march in Turkish style starts quite softly, with Glockenspiel and 
woodwinds, first instrumental, and then with increasingly loud instrumentation to 
the bass soloist singing ‘Froh, wie seine Sonne fliegen / durch des Himmels prächt’gen 
Plan’ (‘Glad, as His suns fly / through the Heaven’s glorious design’) to an ‘alla Turca’ 
version in ‘Joy’ variation 7, followed by the Chorus 4 lyrics sung to ‘Joy’ variation 8, 
with extension leading to a fugato episode based on the ‘Joy’ theme, ending with the 
more straightforward ‘Joy’ variation 9 sung by the full choir in D-major. This ‘Turkish’ 
variation of the ‘Ode’ theme introduces a new and, to generations of listeners, often 
problematic perspective on its meaning, which will be further discussed below. Its 
chorus words talk about ‘brothers’ running ‘joyful, as a hero to victory’. This introduces 
a male heroism that contrasts to the previous all-encompassing and more passive 
reception of the blisses of nature.
D. Bar 595–654. But the marching Turkish episode is a short parenthesis. The 
music halts and the choir gently sings ‘Seid umschlungen, Millionen’ (‘Be embraced, 
you millions!’) to Chorus 1 lyrics in G-major, partly performed in a kind of dialogue 
between male and female voices, embodying the idea of men and women embracing 
each other. This again ends in a fermata, after which Chorus 3 in g-minor sings ‘Ihr 
stürzt nieder Millionen?’ (‘Do you bow down, millions?’), sounding as if angelic voices 
sail down from heaven to earth. The lyrics of this whole section offer a glimpse up to 
the heavens, as the human brothers are embraced by ‘a loving Father’ who is supposed 
to dwell ‘above the starry canopy’. This is expressed more as a hope and conviction 
than as truth, formulating the religious dimension as a matter of faith rather than 
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of fact. Cook hears the lyrics expressing a belief in ‘the existence of a loving Father 
above the stars’, set to music in ‘a remote, hieratic style’ that evokes ecclesiastical chant, 
sounding like ‘a series of daydreams’, where the repeated notes in bars 647–54 ‘are 
surely meant to depict the twinkling of the stars, it is as if time stood still’.376 
E. Bar 655–762. This section opens with a D-major double fugue based on the ‘Joy’ 
and ‘Seid umschlungen’ themes, thus mixing lyrics from Verse 1 and Chorus 3, ending 
with the ‘Ihr stürzt nieder’ episode of Chorus 3 and finally the Chorus 1 lyrics, so that 
the symphony ends with repeating the frantic ecstacy of joy. Cook sees this double fugue 
as representing ‘a reawakening, a return to reality’, with a concluding, integrating and 
recapitulatory function but also serving as a transition to the next series of codas.377
F. Bar 763–940. D-major ending starts with Verse 1 lyrics sang to coda figure 1 
based on the ‘Joy’ theme, followed by a cadenza and then coda figure 2 with Chorus 
1 followed by Verse 1 lyrics, and finally coda figure 3 again based on the ‘Joy’ theme 
ends the work. These coda sections sound like a rather traditional operatic finale. The 
words ‘Alle Menschen werden Brüder’ are strongly emphasised, until in the final bars 
920ff. everything is united in ecstatic harmony: choir and soloists, strings and wind 
instruments, solemn and military sounds—all joyfully united in diversity!378
Commentators such as Romain Rolland have described the Ninth Symphony’s 
finale as a climactic victory over deep misery: a joy of struggle transformed into 
transcendental ecstacy and finally a veritable ‘delirium of love’.379 Cook describes in 
detail how subsequent listeners have interpreted Beethoven’s symphony differently, 
according to their own agendas. For instance, Wagner chose to read the baritone’s 
words ‘not these tones’ (‘nicht diese Töne’) as referring ‘to the horror fanfare, to the 
first three movements, ultimately to instrumental music as a whole’, so that musical 
time is transformed into ‘dramatic or ritualistic time’, and ‘what began as a musical 
event turns at this point into a social one’.380 
Cook also shows that even quite recent twentieth century critics have generally been 
disturbed by the heterogeneity of the work, in particular having great problems with 
‘the most outrageously foreign element’ of the ‘Turkish’ music in bar 331ff., finding it 
‘almost perverse’ that Beethoven combined this music—with both military and popular 
associations—with lyrics speaking of God’s angels in the sky.381 In this frustration, Cook 
recognises a dominant Romantic strategy of ‘creating meaning out of incoherence’ that 
tends to domesticate Beethoven’s music, reducing its excess of meaning.382 
Romantic interpretations reduce the contradictory elements of the 
Ninth Symphony to a narrative thread or a series of pictures; absolute-
music interpretations reduce them to an architectural plan. And the 





Beethoven’s music is obviously an eminently open text, full of ‘unconsummated 
symbols’ says Cook, borrowing a term from Susanne Langer. He shows how this 
has tempted different listeners to interpret the Ninth in highly contradictory ways, 
letting it support universal peace, western democracy, Nazi rule or even Chinese 
communism.384 Cook instead follows Theodor W. Adorno by stressing the inner 
contradictions in this music: ‘its lack of organic unity, its fragmentary quality, its 
ultimate refusal to make sense’.385 ‘The work that symbolizes the pursuit of wealth 
in Hong Kong and communist orthodoxy in the People’s Republic, that stands for 
Western democracy and forms part of Japan’s social fabric—how can such a work 
be said to mean anything at all?’386 This work is ‘profoundly ambivalent’: the music 
deconstructing Schiller’s lyrics which in turn deconstructs itself, as the Turkish march 
clashes with lines such as ‘And the seraph stands with God’.387 Cook believes that 
Beethoven here detached himself from his own affirmative message.388
Beethoven’s last symphony proclaims the ideals of universal 
brotherhood and joy; that is unmistakable. But at the same time, 
and just as unmistakably, it casts doubt upon them. It sends out 
incompatible messages. And that is why, like Parsifal, the Ninth 
Symphony has the capacity to resist being wholly assimilated within 
any single, definitive interpretation; however it is interpreted, there is 
always a remainder that lies beyond interpretation. But this resistance 
can only be effective it we remain conscious of the incongruities, the 
incoherence, the negative qualities of the music.389
In spite of this, Cook does not at all abandon interpretation but on the contrary argues 
for the need for continued reinterpretation, as ‘the only way to prevent the Ninth 
Symphony from being consumed by ideology’.390
The most scandalous obstacle to any straightforward interpretation of the symphony 
lies in how the ‘Turkish’ march music is positioned in the overall design of the work. As 
Cook has shown, it has been perceived as an ‘outrageously foreign element’. It had since 
the late eighteenth century been common to play with ‘alla Turca’ elements in classical 
music, inserting exotic touches of rough marching rhythms and instrumentation of 
percussion and wind, inspired by the military march music of the Ottoman Empire’s 
janissaries, which had existed since at least the fourteenth century and had a growing 
influence on Europe, as part of an Orientalising vogue for Turkish culture. These 
military bands originally had the function to make maximal frightening noise so as 
to rouse respect when Turkish troops came marching in. When tamed by classical 
composers, with Mozart’s piano sonata no. 11 in A-major K. 331 (c. 1783) as the most 
famous example, the style was reduced to an exotic spice signifying a combination of 
popular and Oriental roughness and rage. 
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When such tones are suddenly heard in Beethoven’s Ninth, they immediately ask 
for some kind of justification and interpretation, and critics have generally baulked at 
their alien character in relation to what has come before. One example of this alienated 
reception is when for instance Walter Riezler hears the Turkish music ‘like a march from 
another world, war-like, but first almost incorporeal, as if it, hardly anymore audible to 
us, emerged from the most distant far of the universe’.391 However, the main provocation 
of these sounds does not lie in the sounds as such, but in their structural position within 
the work as a whole. A contrasting element of otherness could well be accepted if it was 
in some way contained and made intelligible within a totalising meaningful narrative, 
but the first appearance of these noisy and unsophisticated rhythms is combined with 
angelic words that commentators have found inappropriate for it, creating an ‘almost 
perverse’ effect. And when it then returns in the concluding orgiastic feast at the very 
end of the work, this also has caused trouble for those who found it much too unpolished 
and uncivilised to live up to their ideas of heavenly joy in an Elysian paradise. 
As Cook mentions, interpreters have used shifting strategies to deal with these 
apparent anomalies. For instance, the ‘Turkish’ music could either be understood to 
denote the revolutionary mass activity of the common people, or to signify some kind 
of eastern ethnic otherness in relation to the basic western classical idiom of the work 
as a whole, with radical effects on how to understand Beethoven’s ‘message’—if there is 
any to be understood, a fact which Cook’s deconstructive analysis seems to question.
One interpreter has linked this issue to the European unification project. In a 
series of articles from 2006 and 2007, Slavoj Žižek saw the negative results of the EU 
constitutional referendums as expressions of political populism that refuses complexity 
and constructs simple bipolarities of us and them, where the enemies comprise Brussels 
bureaucracy as well as illegal immigrants. He argued that instead of dismissing these 
sceptical French and Dutch opinions as misled, one should dare to abandon the blind 
faith in Europe’s technological modernity and cultural traditions in order instead
to dispel the fetish of scientific-technological progress AND to get rid 
of relying on the superiority of its cultural heritage. […] It is time for 
us, citizens of Europe, to become aware that we have to make a properly 
POLITICAL decision of what we want. No enlightened administrator 
will do the job for us.392
This was the context in which Žižek, leaning on Cook, exemplified with the European 
anthem, ‘a true “empty signifier” that can stand for anything’ and therefore can 
ideologically serve as a musical basis for forgetting all existing inequalities in an 
ecstatic moment of unification. Žižek’s primarily focuses on precisely the problem 




The mode then becomes one of a carnivalesque parade, a mocking 
spectacle—critics have even compared the sounds of the bassoons 
and bass drum that accompany the beginning of the marcia turca to 
flatulence. After this point, such critics feel, everything goes wrong, 
the simple solemn dignity of the first part of the movement is never 
recovered.
 But what if these critics are only partly correct—what if things do 
not go wrong only with the entrance of the marcia turca? What if 
they go wrong from the very beginning? Perhaps one should accept 
that there is something of an insipid fake in the very ‘Ode to Joy’, so 
that the chaos that enters after Bar 331 is a kind of the ‘return of the 
repressed’, a symptom of what was errant from the beginning.
 If this is the case, we should thus shift the entire perspective and 
perceive the marcia as a return to normality that cuts short the 
display of preposterous portentousness of what precedes it—it is the 
moment the music brings us back to earth, as if saying: ‘You want to 
celebrate the brotherhood of men? Here they are, the real humanity’.
 And does the same not hold for Europe today? The second stanza 
of Friedrich Schiller’s poem that is set to the music in ‘Ode to Joy’, 
coming on the heels of a chorus that invites the world’s ‘millions’ 
to ‘be embraced’, ominously ends: ‘But he who cannot rejoice, let 
him steal weeping away.’ With this in mind, one recent paradox 
of the marcia turca is difficult to miss: as Europe makes the final 
adjustments to its continental solidarity in Lisbon, the Turks, despite 
their hopes, are outside the embrace.
 So, when in the forthcoming days we hear again and again the 
‘Ode to Joy’, it would be appropriate to remember what comes after 
this triumphant melody. Before succumbing to the warm sentiment 
of how we are all one big family, I think my fellow Europeans should 
spare a thought for all those who cannot rejoice with us, all those 
who are forced to ‘steal weeping away’. It is, perhaps, the only way 
we’ll put an end to the rioting and car burnings and other forms of 
the Turkish march we now see in our very own cities.393
Žižek thus links Beethoven’s composition to an argument about contemporary 
obstacles for unifying Europe, particularly on its eastern border:
The main sign of today’s crisis of the European Union is precisely 
Turkey: According to most of the polls, the main reason of those who 
voted ‘no’ at the last referendums in France and Netherlands was 
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their opposition to Turkish membership. The ‘no’ can be grounded in 
rightist-populist terms (no to the Turkish threat to our culture, no to 
the Turkish cheap immigrant labor), or in the liberal-multiculturalist 
terms (Turkey should not be allowed in because, in its treatment of 
the Kurds, it doesn’t display enough respect for human rights). But the 
opposite view, the ‘yes’, is as false as Beethoven’s final cadenza. […]
 So, should Turkey be allowed into the Union or should it be let to 
‘steal itself weeping away’ from the EU’s circle? Can Europe survive 
the Turkish march? And, as in the finale of Beethoven’s Ninth, what 
if the true problem is not Turkey, but the basic melody itself, the song 
of European unity as it is played to us from the Brussels post-political 
technocratic elite? What we need is a totally new main melody, a new 
definition of Europe itself. The problem of Turkey, the perplexity of 
European Union with regard to what to do with Turkey, is not about 
Turkey as such, but the confusion about what is Europe itself. The 
impasse with the European Constitution is a sign that the European 
project is now in search of its identity.394
Žižek uses what he hears in Beethoven to reinforce his critical opinions on the EU 
project. His specific reading seems to contradict the ‘empty signifier’ thesis he borrowed 
from Cook, but may also be regarded as an example of Cook’s request for continued 
reinterpretation to prevent the music from being appropriated by ideology. 
Interpreting the European anthem
This whole argument is based on the larger symphony context of the ‘Ode’, but its 
relevance to the European anthem is questionable, as the latter silences all the lyrics as 
well as the Turkish sounds. The European anthem is thus at a significant distance from 
the text that Žižek and Cook analyse. It is possible that the Beethoven context remains 
an absent but still somehow remembered intertext, but one must also consider what 
the anthem expresses as such, in order to see how relevant these echoes from its 
original setting may still be.
It should first be noted that the uses made of the ‘Ode’ melody are not equally 
divorced from the original symphony context. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is the 
most significant context in which the ‘Ode to Joy’ melody is embedded, and from 
which any interpretation of the European anthem necessarily fetches at least some 
elements. But to what extent is it its location in this context that has enabled it to have 
so many different uses, or is it on the contrary its isolation from this context that has 




of the ‘Ode to Joy’ melody certainly cannot be fully explained without considering 
its original link to Schiller’s lyrics as well as its place in the Ninth Symphony. It has 
been praised as a humanist credo to universal brotherhood but also been loved by the 
German Nazis who performed it at big celebrations, including Hitler’s birthday; it was 
the national anthem of Rhodesia during apartheid but has also continued to inspire 
left-wing revolutionaries as well as peace-loving romantics.395 It has been invested with 
immense positive value, but also with suspicion, on the verge of becoming an ‘empty 
signifier’, but precisely in this general function, it at least seems to have a capacity of 
signifying a wish for universal unification between humans in spite of divisions and 
strife: a suitable musical expression of the European motto of ‘united in diversity’. In 
order to get to grips with more of its signifying range, it is time to have a closer look 
at the instrumental anthem as a separate text.
The anthem is not just an excerpt taken directly from Beethoven’s symphony, but 
rather a transformed abstraction of a section from it. There are several versions of this 
anthem itself available at different websites, including a main instrumental version 
composed, recorded and copyrighted by Karajan, but also a vocal variant of this. A 
search through various websites of the EU and the Council of Europe shows that a 
whole range of different versions are available, several claimed to be to some extent 
official. Some build on Karajan’s 1972 arrangement, others on a reworking from 
September 2000 by the French composer Christophe Guyard, ‘specially commissioned 
to illustrate documentaries, news and other programmes covering the Council of 
Europe’.396 ‘A Council of Europe CD, including the first hip hop version of the European 
anthem world-wide, was put on sale to the public in April 2004. Entitled “Variations”, 
it includes other adaptations of the “Ode to Joy”, in particular symphony orchestra, 
organ, piano (classical and jazz), rock guitar, jazz violin, techno and trance versions.’397 
Some versions boosted by the Council of Europe are instrumental, others vocal, and 
with lots of different instrumentations, musical styles as well as lengths, tempos 
and formal compositions. There is for instance a piano version, a hip-hop version 
with a rapper and excerpt from famous politicians’ speeches, as well as four Romani 
variations also released on CD (one with famous singer Esma Redzepova). The choice 
of presenting rap and Romani styles is interesting. While the hip-hop versions testify 
to a will to reach out to young generations, both of these stylistic offers also have 
an ethnic twist, associating the anthem to mobile, migrant people and to immigrant 
populations not least from the south and east. This is in line with the ‘Turkish’ sounds 
in Beethoven’s original setting, and on a musical level seems to respond to Žižek’s 
criticism, as it expresses a willingness to include those ‘foreign’ (stylistic as well as 
cultural and demographic) elements into the larger European ‘we’.
However, no such reworked version—with or without lyrics—has any official status 
at all. The original decision to adopt ‘the prelude to “The Ode to Joy”, 4th movement 
of Ludwig van Beethoven’s 9th symphony’ was not crystal clear, and more recent EU 
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presentations instead just describe the melody as ‘taken from’ Beethoven’s work. It 
is really not in the symphony a prelude to the Ode, but rather that melody itself, 
and could be described as the first, instrumental version of this ‘Ode to Joy’: the 
24 bars 92–115 in Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony finale, following the recapitulating 
introduction and the instrumental recitative. Together with those 91 introductory 
bars, the subsequent three other variations on the same tune (bars 116–207) and a 
following second introduction with vocal recitative (bars 208–240), it comprises a 
very long (240 bars ≈ 7 minutes) ‘prelude’ to the vocal rendering of the Ode melody, 
but it is not all this ‘prelude’ that is included in the anthem. 
The core of both the symphony movement and the anthem is at any rate the ‘Ode 
to Joy’ theme (Figure 7.3). Nicholas Cook describes it as both simple and complicated: 
‘The key to the finale is the “Joy” theme. It sounds as effortlessly natural as a folk 
song. But it gave Beethoven an enormous amount of trouble; there are literally dozens 
of versions of the last eight bars in the sketchbooks.’398 Arguments for choosing this 
melody for the anthem often stress that it is a catchy song, easy to sing and remember, 
almost with a ESC quality. Its stylistic characteristics in terms of melody, rhythm and 
formal structure have roots in revolutionary French songs and marches such as the 
‘Marseillaise’, ‘Ça ira’ or ‘La Carmagnole’.399 
The theme comprises 24 bars in 4/4 rhythm, with a straightforward song structure: 
AA’BA’BA’. In the symphony, when the solo voice first sings the ode (AA’BA’BA’), the 
choir joins in for the last eight bars (BA’). Also in instrumental versions, the last BA’ 
repetition is often performed louder with more instruments. This makes this section 




work like a chorus or refrain, reinforcing the impression of a folk ballad or street song, 
and the repetition itself creates an insistent expression. The melody moves in a number 
of arcs. Each odd bar in the A (and A’) sections climbs up four tones while each even bar 
climbs down three or four tones again, so that a full four-bar A (or A’) section consists 
of two two-bar arcs. In the B parts, each bar instead presents an arc-formed motif with 
three or five tones, adding up to four one-bar arcs. Two syncopations are characteristic 
even in the simplest standard versions. First, the last bar of each A (and A’) section 
starts with a dotted crotchet note ( ). This little dance-like swing breaks off the 
steady 4/4 walk ( ), lending emphasis and energy to each phrase conclusion. 
Second, a syncopation is always made as the first note of the A’ section following after 
a B section starts one unit earlier and is thus prolonged ( ). This twist at 
each transition from B to A’ sections help lending the tune a certain restless and eager 
energy that avoids the otherwise threatening stomping character. 
Rhythmically, Beethoven presents several varieties, some solemnly hymn-
like, other syncopated, energetic and march-like. Similar variations are made in 
instrumentation and harmonisation. In the symphony, its various settings explore its 
wide range of expressive potentialities, from the simple and steady folk-like hymn 
singing, reminding of the Lutheran Reformation tunes that Bach turned into high art, 
to the more urgent march of struggle and optimism in the ‘Turkish’ variation, as well 
as a series of complex fugato treatments. In the symphony movement’s coda, there 
is also a version that is reminiscent of the operatic anthem type, so that Beethoven 
himself in his symphony suggested at least three of Boyd’s main anthem varieties: 
hymn, march and opera.400 The various rap and Roma variations mentioned above 
have a similar function of exploring the signifying potentials of the core melody. But 
certain modifications are made already in the standard versions presented as the 
European anthem at various EU websites.
The French composer Christophe Guyard’s September 2000 arrangement of 
the anthem, supported by the Council of Europe, has roughly the same tempo as 
in Beethoven’s symphony movement (140 bpm).401 Lucidly performed by a small 
orchestra, its 41 seconds just include the main theme without any introduction or 
ending, nor any repetition. It avoids the ceremonial as well as the march-like character 
of other versions and appears more like a kind of relaxed cinematic background than 
a hymn. It is drawn from Guyard’s 6’34” long ‘Rhapsodie sur l’Hymne Européen’, 
where it is surrounded by a fluid rhapsody of intertwined voices. It does not interrupt 
a chaotic torture like in Beethoven, but rather with light hand evolves from a playful 
mix of musical ideas that gently crystallise into the hymn tune and ends with some 
elegantly shimmering brass chords. This arrangement does not at all invite any singing 
or explicitly reminds the listeners of the hidden lyrics, but may perhaps be heard as 
a purely musical illustration of joyful happiness in the merging of different musical 
voices.
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The more well-known original arrangement made by Herbert von Karajan in 1972 
is much more solemn, dark and dense than Guyard’s, with a Romantic nineteenth 
century feel, and definitely leaning towards the hymn type rather than the mid-tempo 
march that is more prominent in Beethoven’s original setting.402 Karajan recorded one 
vocal version and one with wind orchestra; the latter is in focus here. The tempo is 
also considerably slower (115–128 bpm) than in Beethoven’s original version (140–
160 bpm).403 The total time length of 2’14” (in some versions 2’07”) includes four 
introductory bars with the five first notes of the melody performed twice, rising up 
against a G major chord; then the 24-bars anthem melody twice in C major, first piano, 
then forte with full winds and percussion; and finally a 4 bars coda. The first hymn 
performance is presented with soft and quiet woodwinds, the second with louder 
percussion and brass instruments added as well. There is no transition in between, 
but they follow immediately after one another. The second repetition has some very 
slight echoes of Beethoven’s alla Turca version, in the celebratory triangle and flute, 
but not at all in any noisy or rough way, rather adding festivitas to the solemn joy this 
arrangement expresses. The whole arrangement signals an almost sacrally serious, 
ceremonial, officious and pompous art music that seems to invite a reverential 
procession and/or communal hymn singing. Karajan’s arrangement thus effectively 
downplays the Dionysic element, reinforcing the effect of omitting Schiller’s lyrics. 
Some existing 1’00” versions of Karajan’s arrangement only have one verse plus the 
coda. There are also other versions with Karajan’s sound, for instance a 2’27” vocal 
one where the hymn is after a slightly different introduction repeated three times in 
different keys, resulting in a forward-oriented progression with a stepwise release of 
tension (F#BGC), and with shifting transitions between each part, probably 
intended to increase the climactic progression effect.404
Different sources thus offer shifting versions of the anthem, but some elements 
remain roughly constant, compared to its original symphony setting. 
1.  All of them place the tune in completely different context, either without any 
introduction and ending at all, or sometimes with just a couple of bars of brief 
intro and fade-out. Esteban Buch laconically notes that Karajan has made 
a kind of cut and paste exercise from Beethoven’s movement, adding a clear 
beginning and end to keep it within a strictly confined two minutes format.405 
This decontextualisation cancels every hint of the ode as rising from the ruins 
of chaotic aggression that was so crucial for Beethoven as well as for the EU 
founding myth discussed in relation to Europe Day above. 
2.  The musical narrative is linearised, as all musical parameters are accumulated and 
heightened with each repetition, leading up to a unique moment of apotheosis 




grave challenges into a carnivalesque celebration uniting highly contradictory 
musical elements, the EU anthem simply builds up a climax effect, reducing the 
implicit meaning to one of growth and increasing strength.
3.  The anthem is normally performed in a considerably slower tempo and with 
a simplified instrumentation, texture and timbre compared to the symphony, 
resulting in a conventional ceremonial or even sacralised hymn feeling, lacking 
the vivid energy that Beethoven inherited from the late eighteenth-century 
French revolutionary music. 
4.  All anthem versions perform the tune in the simplified and more straightforward 
form it had in the first parts of the symphony movement, with no real polyphonic 
counterpoint and very faint traces, if any at all, of the wilder and noisier 
arrangement Beethoven used for the contrasting ‘Turkish’ section. In one way, 
this aspect tends to diminish the relevance of Žižek’s comments for the anthem 
as such, but on the other hand it verifies that the Oriental representation is 
repressed by official EU policies. 
5.  The devocalising decision to omit the lyrics silences the original narrative element 
and paves the way for the much more simple formal arrangement mentioned 
above. Some European citizens will remember fragments of the lyrics, at least 
the word ‘Freude’ (‘Joy’) that is included in the title of the anthem. Still, the 
avoidance of words has important repercussions on what the anthem signifies.
The symphony movement analysis above showed how Beethoven’s music together 
with Schiller’s lyrics depicted war-like chaos being silenced by a gathering of forces, 
first in tranquility and then developing into a climactic dance: from chaos to harmonic 
union and then carnivalesque joy. The original lyrics and music thus combined to give 
the communion a Dionysian twist of ecstatic happiness. The orgiastic happiness of the 
Promethean ‘fire-drunk’ brothers is much more in line with the self-forgetting desire 
expressed in the Europa myth than with Captain Euro’s perfect efficiency—it actually 
is reminiscent more of the Captain’s main enemy Dr D. Vider’s carnivalesque circus. 
Schiller’s and Beethoven’s praise of universal brotherhood that knows no boundaries 
also hints at the hybridity of the classical myth as well as of the egalitarian theme of the 
European flag and the motto ‘united in diversity’, though here more as a momentary—
liminal or subliminal—ritual than in any permanent institution-building. But all this 
is silenced in the official instrumental version.
It should be remembered that the initial motivation for at all adopting an anthem 
was to get a basis for communal ritual activity on solemn occasions such as Europe 
Day. When the anthem was finally adopted without lyrics, this gave rise to a strange 
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paradox that seriously limited its signifying potentials. Who sings an anthem without 
words? Are citizens supposed to whistle or hum? In practice, the use of an identificatory 
anthem lies in using it, and in particular for crowds to sing it jointly, which becomes 
so much more difficult when there are supposed to be no lyrics to the song! It seems 
obvious that the repressed lyrics will still contribute to how the anthem is perceived 
and interpreted.
While the anthem was selected to celebrate shared values of freedom, peace and 
solidarity, Beethoven found Schiller’s words necessary to adequately express precisely 
these values. Music historians agree that instrumental music did not suffice to express 
Beethoven’s ideas at this specific point in the Ninth Symphony.407 The path-breaking 
decision to introduce a choir and sung words in a symphony was a necessary step in 
order to express the ideas he wished the work to embody. Beethoven himself made that 
very clear, by taking the extraordinary measure to add vocals to a symphony, and also 
by the way he constructed the musical texture of the finale movement. In the 6 minute 
instrumental introduction to the finale, fragments from the preceding movements are 
presented and each time stopped by an increasingly impatient double bass. The ‘Ode 
to Joy’ melody then appears as a kind of alternative solution in a hopeless situation, a 
final rescue in a cul-de-sac of humanity. The melody is first tentatively presented by 
woodwinds that are interrupted again by ‘negotiations’ with the sceptical bass, but then 
the strings start playing it with growing confidence, building up a dramatic crescendo. 
However, this is not the whole story: it is here that the composer seems to betray his 
respect for the necessity of words and human voices to convey his core message. There 
is a new stop, and that is where the bass voice recitative enters (‘Oh friends, not these 
tones!’) to introduce the singing of the ‘Ode to Joy’ lyrics. The melody itself does not 
seem sufficient to stop the chaotic tragedy: human verbal expressivity is a necessity. 
This makes the omission of lyrics in the European anthem even more problematic. 
When the music was adopted as anthem without words, the German lyrics having no 
official status and not being used by the EU, then it remains an open question how 
the music in itself could manage to have that function in the absence of the lyrics that 
Beethoven himself could not manage without. One may seriously doubt if Beethoven 
could ever have agreed with the EU website: ‘Without words, in the universal language 
of music, this anthem expresses the ideals of freedom, peace and solidarity for which 
Europe stands’.408 If so, that would probably be just because those who use the anthem 
will always also remember at least some parts of the original lyrics to which it is sung 
in its original symphony context.
To briefly sum up this last discussion, the omission of the lyrics thus has two main 
consequences. (1) On the semantic level, it represses an element of signification 
that even Beethoven himself found necessary, hiding the verbal narrative away and 
reducing the total expressive force of the anthem. (2) On the pragmatic level, it 




for communal singing that could interactively help forge an emotionally supported 
sense of co-presence with others to a kind of cinematic soundtrack as a backdrop 
for other activities where citizens participate more as consuming audiences than as 
members of a European community.
The words were left aside by a combination of reasons. 
First, though rarely acknowledged, there seems to have been a reluctance to adopt 
a German text that had been loved by Adolf Hitler—and which yet has no really 
established and attractive English (or French) translation either. In any case, it was 
explicitly argued that Europe could not just have a monolingual anthem. Just as the 
motto immediately got translated into all main European languages, the song lyrics 
perhaps also should. This would then however be a much more difficult task than for 
the short motto, and would also risk causing confusion when the anthem is sung by 
transnational congregations. Doubts were expressed whether the words could at all 
be satisfactorily translated to all European languages and accepted by all parts of the 
continent. 
The choice of a German tune with German lyrics had a controversial subtext that was 
sharpened by in 1972 letting the famous Austrian conductor Herbert von Karajan make 
the official arrangement and recording, which was released by Deutsche Grammophon 
and broadcasted on Eurovision on 5 May that same year, together with a message in 
30 languages on images of Karajan, Berliner Philharmoniker and the European flag.409 
Karajan was skilled in marketing himself in the media and had conducted a series of 
admired recordings of Beethoven’s symphonies. As Buch points out, there was also 
a certain logic in letting the new hymn of universal peace and brotherhood be sung 
from the heart of Europe, on the ruins of the Third Reich terrors.410 Yet, the choice 
was highly problematic, as he had been a member of the Nazi party, which Buch 
feels compromises the humanist ethical claims of the EU and its anthem.411 Buch also 
notes that contrary to national anthems and also to Beethoven’s Ninth, which is in the 
common domain, the European anthem legally remains Karajan’s work, for which he 
receives copyright fees.412 The same applies to Guyard’s more modern arrangement. 
It certainly is paradoxical that the EU has agreed to let an anthem that is supposed to 
belong to the whole of Europe remain the private property of living individuals who 
actually have ‘only’ arranged a song taken from Beethoven!
A different argument was also explicitly made when the anthem was to be decided. 
There were sincere doubts that Schiller’s lyrics were actually too universal and not 
specifically European. This is a very interesting objection. One may well argue that 
universal human rights are a key European invention, with the Enlightenment and the 
French 1789 bourgeois revolution as milestones. But if Europe today needs something 
more specific to define itself and distinguish itself from other continents, must then 
universality be avoided and replaced by some kind of regional uniqueness? Is this in 
fact—tending to contradict the ‘united in diversity’ motto—a step back to exclusionary 
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self-identification of the traditional kind that leans heavily on differences between 
Fortress Europe and its surrounding others, the West and the rest?413 The conflict of 
interpretations has not reached any firm conclusion in this respect.
Beethoven’s modification of Schiller’s lyrics was thus deemed to be both too specific 
(German) and too general (universal). Many European officials and politicians 
expressed a hope for some future ‘genius’ to be able to provide a new and acceptable, 
more properly European text in the main European languages. This will remain highly 
difficult due to linguistic and cultural differences within Europe. Meanwhile, in order 
to at all get the tune accepted by all European states, the compromise was to have it 
without words, which makes it difficult to actually sing it jointly, thus paradoxically 
annulling the original motivation behind an anthem in the first place: to occasion 
communal singing. The instrumental anthem silences the collective human voice that 
Beethoven found essential to introduce to convey his intended meaning of the ode, 
and which the whole idea of having a European anthem in many ways continues to be 
dependent upon in order to function as a ritual marker of collective identity.414 
Esteban Buch concludes: ‘Thus, the European anthem will not be vocal music, 
nor instrumental music, but well a song where the lyrics is missing, an unfinished 
symbol.’415 This critical formulation may perhaps open up for a partial rescue of the 
anthem, as the lack of words gives the music a chance to transmit its message across 
linguistic barriers, in a kind of ‘universal language’, which is a widespread (though 
highly problematic) presupposition about music’s innate capacity.416 It was previously 
argued that the open circle of the European flag also in a sense presented an unfinished 
symbol, inviting other actors to step in and fill it with shifting contents. The textless 
tune could likewise be used for karaoke, opening up a sonar space for singers to fill 
with expressive activity.417 What from a critical perspective is an empty void may then 
simultaneously imply an invitation for participation. In any case, the original lyrics 
linger in the background for those who know a little bit about Schiller’s poem or 
Beethoven’s symphony, and at least the anthem title hints at happiness as a core value, 
coinciding with the desire and pleasure of the Europa myth.
Even though the anthem has excluded so much of its original context in Schiller’s 
and Beethoven’s works, it is still full of tensions, paradoxes and contradictions, which 
Buch clearly points out.418 First, the anthem is a musical translation of the universal 
values of joy and brotherhood, but is forced not to explicitly express those same values. 
Second, it is supposed to express collective European democratic principles but is the 
work of a former Nazi. Third, the anthem illustrates the rootedness of the EU symbols 
in the nation-state tradition, but also the wish to be different from this tradition and 
develop truly late modern and transnational symbols. Fourth, it is to incarnate the 
‘voice of the Europeans’ but with its silenced lyrics is impossible to sing. Only the 




The hymn confirms the emblematic position of the ‘Great Composer’ 
Beethoven within a mythology of ‘Great Europeans’. But by excluding 
Schiller’s lyrics from its performance, the hymn refuses the ritual, 
established since the first modern national hymns, of using a single 
voice to express a community of citizens. This paradox has sometimes 
been felt to represent a failure, a sign of the ‘unfinished’ character of the 
symbol. But at the same time it may be taken to suggest the openness of 
Europe. In this sense, the hymn signifies Europe’s refusal to adopt a fixed 
identity, and marks a deliberate break with nationalist discourses.419 
Buch sees two possibilities. Either Europe copies national symbols in defining 
European identity through a gesture of excluding all others: ‘strangers, immigrants, 
other states, other continents, the excluded of all sorts—all that “whole world” that 
was united in the universal brotherhood Schiller and Beethoven sang of ’. Or else, 
Europe could be faithful to the unfinished anthem in striving to remain a land of 
hospitality and openness.420 The whole discussion about this anthem thus links back 
to central and unresolved dilemmas for renewing a transnational European identity. 
There is a great political problem in how to integrate the experience of brutal wars and 
of Nazi genocide in Europe’s historically anchored identity. Beethoven’s Ninth can be 
heard to do precisely that, as did in a way the Europa myth. Whether Karajan’s anthem 
manages to do the same is open to debate.
With Foucault or Adorno, one may perhaps want to step out of the interpretive 
entanglement and refrain from offering any new meaning for this tune, but rather 
respond to it with silence. Cook and Žižek walk another way and instead offer new 
and critical interpretations as their method to go against ideological uses of the music. 
This is also in line with Paul Ricoeur’s recurring hermeneutical argument that the 
only way to react to problematic readings of a text is by proposing better ones, and 
thus to contribute to the unstoppable conflict of interpretations. This is precisely what 
I have strived to do here as well.
A brief look at how the anthem has been received indicates that some voices have 
really found it difficult to accept a song that was venerated by Nazi Germany as well 
as by apartheid Rhodesia under Ian Smith. In 2008 European Parliament, Jim Allister 
(NI, UK) was one of the few who went against both the anthem and the flag:
Ode to Joy which we are going to purloin may be a very nice tune, but 
so is Jingle Bells and like Jingle Bells it heralds a fantasy, the fantasy 
that the EU is good for you. But unlike Jingle Bells, it will damage your 
national sovereignty and the right to control your own destiny. More, 
like code to destroy, than Ode to Joy.421
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A brief mention of the European anthem in the web newspaper Telegraph.co.uk in 
2009 immediately attracted more than 100 comments from predominantly British 
readers, most of them hostile towards the idea of substituting national anthems with 
a European one, for instance at sports events.422 One example was Darby Allen: ‘The 
Franco-German Empire is not a nation, so cannot aspire to a national anthem’; another 
Balor Bericks: ‘the British people are not part of Europe and never will be’ (both 2009-
11-16). John from Finland suggested: ‘If you hate Europe so much then move your 
island to the pacific’ (2009-11-19), to which signature ‘midenglander’ responded: 
‘We Brits cannot accept an EUSSR, a successor to Napoleon’s Continental System or 
Nazi Germany’s Europe’ (2009-11-21). A more balanced view was expressed by John 
Morgan (2009-11-18): ‘A European anthem would have its place in pan-European 
affairs where a national anthem would be inappropriate. It could also be used as a 
salute to the European president on a state visit outside his or her home country, 
followed by the national anthem of the host nation.’ An interesting proposal came 
from tony (2009-11-17): ‘How about changing the anthem every year and using the 
winning entry from the Eurovision song contest as the anthem.’ 
The many lists of comments to YouTube recordings of the European anthem mainly 
contain political debates, but there are also some views on the choice of music. For 
instance, ‘timpani112’: ‘the most prominent reason why I hate the EU so much is 
probably this freaking anthem. It’s originally from Beethoven’s 9th symphony where 
it is played in d. Here however, it’s played in b, dragging the reputation of the song in 
the mud. Why did they have to ruin such a beautiful song?’ Some find it awful (‘Who 
wrote this shit?’), others love it (‘I dont like the eu much but it has a good anthem’). 
‘Waranoa’ is surprised: ‘That’s Beethovens 9th! I didn’t know that was our anthem! 
Harray for Europe, the silliest and most wonderfull place on earth!’ Several also 
comment on the missing lyrics, some finding the German text ‘just beautiful’, others 
like ‘UnbirthXXI’ suggesting to ‘use sentences from several european languages, it 
would contribute to the “european” feeling of this song’. Unintentionally highlighting 
a tension between Schiller’s lyrics and the European motto, ‘vlamara123’ thinks ‘this 
piece expresses the beautiful thought of Europe: together without differences!’
In sum, it is hard to find outside the EU hard kernel any great enthusiasm over the 
anthem, but neither has it stirred up any overwhelming opposition.
Comparisons
Comparisons may fruitfully be made with (1) anthems for other nations or supranational 
unions, including alternative tunes proposed for Europe; (2) tunes for European 




(1) In the discussion at the ‘What Story Should Europe Tell’ website mentioned 
in Chapter 6, it was the anthem that sparked the whole debate. The administrator 
initiated the debate by asking if the anthem could be played at European sports events 
such as the EuroCup or Champion’s League. The critical user Gheryando found this 
idea ‘ridiculous’ since this is ‘an artificial anthem’ that may well be used at political 
‘meetings, or celebrating important EU dates’, but not otherwise.423  He argued that 
‘a symbol must mean something to people’, but people have little attachment to 
European symbols since they have not through a long history been anchored in public 
consciousness and memory and thereby linked to collective identity: ‘Most EU symbols 
are empty’. His counter-examples were the Portuguese National Anthem ‘A Portuguesa’ 
and the French ‘La Marseillaise’, both of which were linked to historical events of 
great and continued importance to the citizens of each country. By comparison, the 
European anthem seemed irrelevant to him: ‘What does the “anthem” of EU mean…?’ 
Therefore, it should not be imposed ‘in all events in Europe’, though it may be useful 
to just celebrate important EU dates.
Like ‘Ode to Joy’ in its slow Karajan adaptation from 1972, the British national 
anthem ‘God Save the Queen/King’ is of the hymn type, though in triple time. It 
has been widely used in other works as well: for instance by Beethoven who in the 
early 1800s developed it into a set of piano variations (WoO 78, 1803) as well as 
in his battle symphony Wellington’s Victory, or The Battle of Vitoria (op. 91, 1813). 
Even if the British and European anthems belong to the same main category of 
rather slow and solemn hymns, Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ actually has more melodic 
and rhythmic similarities with the French ‘La Marseillaise’, which is an anthem of 
the more energetic march type (and which in turn is also related to the socialist 
‘The Internationale’). The melodic structure is more similar, with a rising arch 
ending in a fall back to a stable level, as is the march-inviting 4/4 time. This is not 
surprising, given its inspiration from songs and marches of the French Revolution. 
In the symphony context, it is also performed in a steady quasi march-like tempo, 
though its melodic contour is considerably more calm and limited than the bolder 
‘La Marseillaise’. In comparison to many European national anthems, ‘Ode to Joy’ 
seems to present a kind of common denominator: a strict basic melody of folk-like 
character, avoiding extravagant embellishments that would bind it to any specific 
nation or region. This way, in line with its composer’s intentions, it makes itself 
available for representing transnational humanism, and thus for pan-European 
unity, even aspiring to universality.
There are various ways for national anthems to solve the linguistic problems that 
caused the European anthem to be deprived of its lyrics. There are of course always 
immigrant populations that problematise the idea of a dominant national language 
everywhere, but also prominently bi- or multilingual nation states such as Belgium, 
Finland, Spain or Switzerland still have sung national hymns with lyrics, with varying 
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degrees of acceptance. The original French lyrics of the Belgian ‘La Brabançonne’ 
(The Song of Brabant) from 1830 has continuously been revised to avoid anti-Dutch 
elements, and of course also has a version in Flemish. Given the internal tensions 
between the Vallonians and the Flemish, it is no surprise that the lyrics have no 
official status, but still the song is actually used in practice. Finland’s ‘Maamme/Vårt 
land’ (Our Land) from 1848 was written in Swedish but has a Finnish translation. 
It is again not officially legislated but used in practice. Switzerland’s official anthem 
‘Schweizerpsalm’ from 1841 has its text in all four official national languages, that 
is, translated from the German original to French, Italian and Romansch. Only the 
Spanish ‘Marcha Real’ (Royal March), going back to the mid-eighteenth century, is 
mostly performed without words, and its link to the royalty makes it problematic for 
semi-autonomous regions like Catalunya and the Basque countries. In Kosovo, the 
European anthem is also often played, as an act of respect for EU’s role in assisting the 
process of national independence. Since 2008 it has a conventional national anthem 
named ‘Europe’ that has no lyrics, in order to avoid discrimination of any of its ethnic 
groups, while neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina has chosen to have an anthem 
with lyrics available in both Bosnian and Serbian language. 
There is no officially established anthem for the whole of Asia, North or South 
America, but the African Union has in 2010 adopted an official African Union anthem, 
‘Let Us All Unite and Celebrate Together’.424 It is on various websites played by a wind 
orchestra in a classical European-French slow military march style, but there is also a 
set of lyrics presented both in English and in French:
Let us all unite and celebrate together 
The victories won for our liberation 
Let us dedicate ourselves to rise together 
To defend our liberty and unity
O Sons and Daughters of Africa 
Flesh of the Sun and Flesh of the Sky 
Let us make Africa the Tree of Life
The next verses speak of joint singing for fighting together ‘for lasting peace and 
justice on earth’ and of joint working for Africa as ‘the cradle of mankind and fount of 
culture’. The tune thus seamlessly inscribes itself in the European anthemic tradition, 
but the lyrics recontextualise it into a postcolonial context. Africa is not so much 
elevated to a supreme position (as is the case with Europe) but rather described in 
terms of roots and origins of mankind and culture, with political liberation, cultural 
creativity and unbroken ties to nature as main values, and with a union seemingly 




From the end of the war in 1945 to the adoption of the ‘Ode to Joy’ in 1972, a 
large number of alternative anthems have been proposed for Europe. Here, just one 
example will be scrutinised. On 9 May 1948, at the Hague Congress that was the 
cradle of much of the following European unification measures, a municipal brass 
band supported the participants singing in several languages the anthem ‘Europa 
Één!’ (‘Europe Unite!’), specially created by Dutch composer Louis Noiret and Dutch 
lyrics by H. Joosten, translated also to English, French and Italian.425 The first verse 
lyrics paint a gloomy picture: 
The world of today is overshadowed and grey  
her people have suffered much sorrow.  
And after the tears of the past bitter years  
they pray for a brighter tomorrow; 
But from distant shores there are rumours of wars 
that threaten all Europe’s foundations, 
So this is our call to one and to all, 
Unite! Just as one mighty nation. 
Precisely two years before the Schuman Declaration, uniting is here depicted as a 
safeguard against new dividing wars. The verse melody is in f minor, gently oscillating 
up and down, but the mood slowly evolves into more optimistic sounds, in particular 
when the F major chorus breaks in, with a fanfare-like figure reminding the listeners 
of the opening of ‘La marseillaise’. The call for Europe to unite ‘as one mighty nation’ 
expresses a federalist perspective that would not be supported by the more sceptical 
voices that remain against all efforts to fuse the EU into a new supra-level nation state, 
and also tends to contradict the ‘united in diversity’ motto and other policies later 
developed to safeguard against such a melting-pot strategy. The chorus then defines 
the leading values for this union: ‘Europe unite for happiness and freedom! / Europe 
unite to win enduring peace!’ Echoing the ‘Ode of Joy’, happiness, freedom and peace 
demand a union that is also a matter of ‘strength’ and ‘might’. The second verse calls for 
Europeans to ‘save all our glorious tradition’ in a central position, squeezed between 
‘the East’ and ‘the West’—reminding of west and central Europe’s political wish to 
uphold some kind of sovereignty between the Communist Bloc and the United States. 
The third verse focuses on welfare issues: ‘There are riches to spare for all peoples to 
share’, calling for ‘good, honest labour’ to provide new wealth. Thus, the song illustrates 
precisely the agenda of the formation of modern European unification, combining 
peace and brotherhood with joy and happiness as well as with strength and expected 
new riches. While hybridity is not openly focused in this song, there is obviously 
an expression of desire and pleasure in joining forces. There is also a clear sense of 
elevation both in talking of Europe’s ‘glorious tradition’ and in the image of union as a 
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means to ‘win throught to the light’ after so long suffering in darkness. If there is any 
sense of dislocation here, it is not in geographic terms, but rather an image of Europe 
as not having been at home or at ease with itself, as deeply disturbed but now finally 
wanting to find peace. 
(2) Besides the anthems of other nations and continents, comparisons may also be 
made with songs linked to other and more specific European organisations.
The heroic ‘Grand March’ from Giuseppe Verdi’s opera Aida (1871) and other 
famous tunes of classical music have through the years been used at European sports 
events, not least in football with its particularly strong link to Europe. However, the 
associated sports clubs of UEFA have selected an anthem of the hymn type. This may 
sound surprising for an organisation that deals with such physical practice, but it may 
well be precisely that which motivates the choice of something more elevated, in order 
to add necessary dignity and gravity. Händel’s dignified Coronation Anthem Zadok 
the Priest is always performed at the key moment of British coronations (Figure 7.4). 
Händel himself was German but in his music heavily influenced by the innovative 
and effective Italian styles of his time, and he spent his last and most productive years 
in London. There, his four Coronation Anthems were composed for the coronation 
of King George II and Queen Caroline in Westminster Abbey in 1727. Both of them 
were like Händel also Germans in today’s terms—George belonged to the House of 
Hanover. Like with Beethoven for the EU, this transnational identity is eminently 
suitable for a pan-European association such as UEFA, and considering the old 
English roots of the football game, and the continued strength of English teams, the 
choice of British coronation music has an evident symbolic value. 
Händel’s original work had biblical lyrics: just a brief excerpt from the First Book 
of Kings (1: 39–40), which had been sung on every English coronation since King 
Edgar in 973 ad. The song lines do not immediately present any very clear melodic 
or rhythmic figure, and the setting is simple. In the beginning, a sharply rising violin 
arpeggio over repeated low chords sets the tone, before the choir enters after one 
and a half minute or so, singing ‘Zadok the priest and Nathan the prophet anointed 
Solomon king and all the people rejoiced’. A dramatic suspense effect is created by 
Figure 7.4.  A theme from Georg Friedrich Handel’s Coronation Anthem Zadok the Priest, the basis for 




a continuous crescendo from the gentle beginning up to a full climax with timpani 
and trumpets as the choir sings: ‘And all the people rejoic’d, and said: God save the 
King, long live the King, may he live forever! Alleluia, Amen.’426 These words are then 
repeated in shifting combinations with musical motifs.
Whereas Händel’s Zadok lasts for more than 5 minutes with a 90 seconds 
instrumental introduction and a contrasting middle section, the UEFA anthem is 3 
minutes long, with just 25 seconds introduction. Its final 1-minute chorus is played 
before matches and television broadcasts. It is an adaptation made by Tony Britten 
in 1992, as part of the symbol package mentioned in Chapter 6, commissioned by 
TEAM. The music makes use of several elements from Handel’s original composition, 
but reshuffles and transforms them to suit the new context. The UEFA anthem thus 
differs in melodic detail from Zadok much more than the EU anthem diverges from 
Beethoven’s original work. It was performed by the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra 
and the Academy of St Martin in the Fields chorus, while a remixed version called 
‘Victory’ has also been used, released by Polish trance/dance duo Kalwi & Remi in 
2006.427 Its choir sings simple, disjointed and heavily repeated phrases, alternating 
in UEFA’s three official languages: French, German and English. This multilingual 
montage exemplifies another way of dealing with heterogeneous situations than when 
lyrics are constructed in several parallel translations. The words express the strength 
of the teams and of the sports events: on the one hand ‘These are the best teams’, 
‘The masters’, ‘The biggest teams’ and ‘The Champions’, on the other hand ‘The main 
event’, ‘A big gathering’ and ‘A big sports event’. Together they designate the greatness 
of the national sports teams that fill UEFA with specific competence, and of the pan-
European Champions League that is organised for them by UEFA. The climactic 
moment is set to the exclamations ‘Die Meister! Die Besten! Les Grandes Équipes! 
The Champions!’
It is no coincidence that the German words in the hymn include the word 
‘Mannschaften’, which is the standard synonym of ‘teams’, belonging to the many words 
that tend to link sports to a masculine sphere, mirrored by the persistent privileging 
of male football also in this traditional context. Anthony King’s analysis of UEFA’s 
visual and musical symbols hears the Zadok anthem reinforcing the required aura of 
‘tradition and quality’.
The majestic music which rises to an impressive major key crescendo 
signifies the installation of a new head of state. The baroque music of the 
Zadok anthem associates the Champions League with the monarchies 
of Ancien Regime Europe. The baroque music also interconnects with 
the silver house colours, for the aristocratic connotations evoked by 
the silver are reflected and affirmed in this noble music.428 
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King points at a clear homology between the televised images and the musical jingle: 
‘Music and colours merge together as one dense signifier, communicating a concept 
of silver in both sound and vision.’429
Handel’s music involves a series of lesser chords symbolizing a diverse 
subject population below the monarch but, at its climax, the music 
reconciles these lower chords into a single major key fanfare; a sovereign 
nation is unified beneath a supreme monarch. The Champions League 
Anthem communicates the same message of diverse subordinate 
elements unified beneath a sovereign body; the clubs are represented 
by the lower chords which are brought together in a majestic union 
under UEFA.430
A couple of Zadok clips on YouTube have attracted a lot of discussion where royalists 
and football fans join in expressing their love for Händel’s music, even though the two 
groups sometimes clash, as when ‘bulked’ exclaims: ‘its been reduced to as lowly and 
classless as a football anthem’. ‘PremiumUnleaded’ jokingly finds it ‘appropriate that 
the first part of a piece for a coronation forms the basis for the theme of the world’s 
most prestigious annual sporting competition’. But otherwise the discussion is more 
about monarchy and democracy than about the tune itself or its use by UEFA.
Whereas UEFA has anthem of the solemn hymn type, the televisual EBU has 
favoured a march (Figure 7.5). The Council of Europe radio broadcasts used excerpts 
from Georg Friedrich Händel’s Music for the Royal Fireworks and the Water Music, 
but the EBU for its Eurovision transmissions instead selected a jingle consisting of the 
instrumental ‘Prélude’ to the grand motet Te Deum in D major (op. 146), composed 
in Paris in the early 1690s by Marc-Antoine Charpentier (1643–1704).431 In 1953, the 
French-Belgian musicologist Carl de Nys rediscovered this Te Deum, whose opening 
Figure 7.5 The Marc-Antoine Charpentier theme used as anthem for the European Broadcasting 




‘Marche en rondeau’ was in 1954 adopted by the EBU as a jingle for its newly launched 
disseminations. There seems never to have been any serious discussion of adding any 
lyrics, nor any such need, since nobody expects any viewer/listener to join in singing 
such a televised jingle.
Charpentier composed his most famous Te Deum in D (one of total six) in the Jesuit 
Saint-Louis church in Paris. In the late seventeenth century, the Jesuits were suspected 
of supporting Spanish interests in France. Charpentier had studied with Carissimi in 
Rome, and he brought modern profane sounds into the conservative church music, 
with straightforward and symmetric melodies and charmingly sonorous choruses. 
The only 1.5 minutes long Te Deum prélude is an anthem of the march type, and the 
composer himself characterised it as ‘bright and very warlike’. It starts with an upward 
swing closely reminiscent of ‘La Marseillaise’. However, while the latter continues with 
fanfare motifs calling people to rise against authorities, the former instead continues 
with neatly rounded melodies to conciliatory harmonies. While ‘La Marseillaise’ has 
radical or liberal republican and universalist associations, Charpentier’s march instead 
seems to attract rather conservative and nationalist French royalist fans, judging from 
the many comments like ‘Vive la France!’ and ‘Vive le roi!’ found under recordings at 
various YouTube sites, where for instance ‘darlingelf ’ says ‘I wish that when I die my 
soul is magically transported to the time of the Grand Monarch!’ and gets support 
from ‘Sallieri1’: ‘Heil to the Old Europe! Beautiful! Anthem of christian, strong world! 
Nowadays our civilisation is dead … R.I.P.’432 
A reviewer has described it as ‘a rousing bit of splendor out of which we moderns 
have constructed a musical icon of Louis XIV’s France’, combining ‘martial, dance-like, 
and intimate’ aspects into a piece that ‘evokes the close unity of church and state’.433 
In the twentieth century, the media, headed by television, can be said to have taken 
the place of religion, recontextualising the same music to now instead evoke public 
service’s close unity of media culture and nation states.
With the EU, UEFA and EBU anthems, a wide range of west and central European 
influences balance each other. EU selected the German-Austrian-Dutch Beethoven, 
UEFA opted for Händel with his English basis while importing also German and 
Italian styles, and EBU chose the French Charpentier with some Spanish and Italian 
tints. Together they significantly cover the most influential of the original EU national 
traditions, though less relevant for the eastern and also northern part of Europe. All 
of them manage to symbolically elevate the bodies they represent, but while the 
European anthem has a republican, almost plebeian and modern ring, uplifting not 
by ceremonial brilliance but by quasi-natural, balanced perfection, the two others 
are firmly anchored in a traditional aristocratic and royal context. EU’s hesitation to 
the ‘Ode to Joy’ lyrics for being ‘too universal’ has no counterpart for the other two 
anthems, and it may well be that the republican spirit of Beethoven is less bound 
to Europe than the monarchist mentality found in Charpentier and Händel, though 
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modern elites cannot make this official EU policy. Except for all three having been 
recontextualised from their original uses to their respective new uses, in musical 
or lyrical terms none of them induce any strong sense of dislocation. There are no 
obvious associations to hybridity except maybe in the way the UEFA arrangement 
modifies the baroque style to a rather different expression, but all three may perhaps 
be said to embody some kind of pleasure and desire, at least in a general sense of 
musical luster, and to some listeners even provide sublime shivers of enjoyment.
(3) There are hundreds of other musical symbols of Europe, if counting not only 
tunes representing various European organisations but also programmatic art music 
and popular songs with lyrics that characterise Europe and Europeanness. I will here 
focus on the latter kind, and in particular songs presented in EBU’s ESC. Among 
the more than one thousand songs performed in the ESC finals 1956–2010, five had 
‘Euro’ in their titles and a lyrical topic that explicitly thematised Europeanness—the 
Belgian Telex: ‘Euro-vision’ (1980), the French Cocktail Chic: ‘Européennes’ (1986), 
the Irish Liam Reilly: ‘Somewhere in Europe’ (1990), the Italian Enrico Ruggeri: ‘Sole 
D’Europa’ (1993) and the Spanish Rosa: ‘Europe’s Living a Celebration’ (2002). To 
these should be added the winner of 1990, Italian Toto Cotugno’s ‘Insieme 1992’ with 
its repeated chorus line ‘Insieme, unite, unite, Europe’.434
In 1980, Telex’s ‘Euro-vision’ (by H. Dirks = Jacques Duvall = Eric Verwilghen) 
gave Belgium a seventeenth position (third last) in the Dutch Hague finale. Three 
men in black suits, blue shirts and white scarves—the singer surrounded by two synth 
players performed a kind of comic song, the singer ending by pouring out golden 
confetti (apparently symbolising the European stars, in a double sense) from his 
pockets and then taking out a mini camera to take a photo of the audience/camera, 
while the first two bars of Charpentier’s Eurovision theme is heard played with a thin, 
plastic sound. Both the performance and the (French) lyrics are distanced, ironically 
mocking the whole event in which they take part. The first verse talks of beautiful 
singers nervously getting ready: ‘May the best win / The borders are open.’ The chorus 
just monotonously repeats ‘Eurovision, Eurovision’. The link between stars and media 
is tight: ‘Old Europe cheers the country that wins’; ‘The eyes of the whole world are 
waiting, impatiently / for news flashes / that are going to announce / by satellite and 
by shielded cables / what’s happening in their regions’. The song thus depicts the ESC 
itself as an artificial media event, with only one clear hint towards identifying Europe, 
namely that it is ‘old’, which links to a tradition of seeing Europe as endowed with a 
mature civilisation but can in retrospective also be seen as confirming the western 
confines of how it was then defined.
In 1986 in Norwegian Bergen, France also stood as number 17 (of 20) with Cocktail 
Chic’s ‘Européennes’ (by Michel and Georges Costa). The quartet of female singers were 
dressed in much gold and typical 1980s’ outfit (poodle hairstyle, long wide sweeping 




‘feel like going away / when there’s no more sunshine in the house’. This celebration of 
holiday trips first stays within Europe’s borders, mentioning Amsterdam, Copenhagen, 
Capri, London and Paris as destinations. However, there is then an allusion to the 
globally connecting force of US music culture: ‘We’re European girls / and the things 
we love / we find them here, from London to Paris / even if the music is connected / live 
from Radio L.A.’ Yes, ‘We like the old continent / with background music USA’, and to 
the global outlook is then also added images of ‘Indian summer’ and ‘African sunsets’. 
In fact, there is an increasing ambiguity opening up a rift in the initial Eurocentrism, 
when at the end the words ‘The weather is nice in California / but Saint-Tropez is also 
good’ seem to place Europe as the second best. The song describes Europe as a united 
but diverse site of pleasure, and compares it as an old continent with the youthful 
United States as a given centre of the modern universe.
These two songs thus propose popular music, television media and tourism as 
uniting tools. This unification still only included the good ‘old’ western half of the 
continent. It was no mere coincidence that it was in Zagreb, Slovenia 1990, the year 
after the breakdown of the Communist Bloc, that no less than the two most successful 
tunes explicitly thematised European fraternity. It was evidently a moment where good 
music makers, artists and producers agreed with the wide audience that the European 
project had a renewed urgency. Still none of these two tunes explicitly widened the 
concept of Europe to include also the part that had for so long been confined behind 
the iron curtain.
On a joint second position (with equal votes as France) was Ireland’s Liam Reilly 
with his own ‘Somewhere in Europe’. Singing from his grand piano, dressed in shirt 
and tie but a loose brown jacket and trousers, and backed by two female singers, 
Reilly sang as an ‘I’ to a ‘you’ about having been separated but wanting to reunite: ‘We 
should be together, and maybe we just might / if you could only meet me somewhere 
in Europe tonight.’ The text mentions a wide range of European destinations—Paris, 
Rome, Amsterdam, German Black Forest, the Adriatic Sea and Seville—all of which 
are firmly located in the old, western part of Europe, and again focuses on tourist 
destinations and leisure-time practices. Such nostalgia for happy memories of lazy 
nightlife may be interpreted as a conservative lament for old Europe’s lost innocence, 
rather than a celebration of the recent developments.
Italy won that same year of 1990 with Toto Cotugno’s own composition ‘Insieme 
1992’. It was characteristic that this year the old West European nations favoured 
Ireland while Italy got more high points from the comparably few East European 
countries that had at that time entered the competition. Cotugno was a popular singer, 
performing here in all white, in front of five mixed-gender backup vocals. The song 
has a typical Italian pop sensibility, with melody hooks that are easy to remember and 
sing, and the song builds up an increasing pressure as it rolls along; a real popular hit 
with a symphonic sound on a steady walking beat. ‘Insieme’ means ‘together’, and the 
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song is strongly focused on its repeated chorus ‘Together, unite, unite, Europe’, sung 
in English while the rest of the text is in Italian. Its central lyrics much more explicitly 
relate to current EU policies, though of course with the more intimate and personal 
double meaning needed to make it a real hit:
With you, so far and different 
With you, a friend that I thought I’d lost 
You and I, having the same dream 
Together, unite, unite, Europe
And for you, a woman without borders 
With you, under the same flags 
You and I, under the same sky 
Together, unite, unite, Europe
We’re more and more free 
It’s no longer a dream and you’re no longer alone 
We’re higher and higher 
Give me your hand, so that we can fly 
Europe is not far away 
This is an Italian song for you 
Together, unite, unite, Europe
For us, in heaven a thousand violins 
For us, love without borders 
You and I, having the same ideals, mmm … 
Together, unite, unite, Europe435
The title’s ‘1992’ was the year when the European Communities’ 1986 Single 
European Act planned to launch the EU; in practice the EU was established with the 
Maastricht Treaty in November 1993. Phrases such as ‘We’re uniting more and more’ 
and ‘Our stars, one single flag / We’re stronger and stronger’ directly links the textual 
universe to the EU’s vision of ‘love without borders’, which in turn echoes ideas from 
the European anthem and even back to the Europa myth, as the male Italian ‘I’ flies 
away with the woman to a dream-like Europe in a manner that may well remind of 
how Europa was abducted to Crete by Zeus-as-bull. The union called forth here is 
borderless, but like in the previously mentioned songs, an element of hybridity and 
diversity remains in initially describing the ‘you’ as ‘so far and different’. The several 
times repeated declaration of the song as ‘Italian’ also adds situated particularity that 




In Irish Millstreet the same year that the EU was established, Enrico Ruggeri—
perhaps in an effort to follow up on Italy’s success three years earlier—only managed 
to place ‘Sole D’Europa’ at the twelfth position in the final. Ruggeri, dressed in black 
and white, stood alone with the microphone, singing his own emotional and rather 
melancholic ballad, accompanied first acoustically and in the end by rock drums and 
an electric guitar that gets a brief concluding solo. The Italian lyrics present a poetic 
reflection on the effects of war, with rather complex metaphors and a stretched-out 
narrative instead of concise political hooks. ‘Sole D’Europa’ means ‘Sun of Europe’, 
and the song is like a prayer to the sun to return to a war-stricken and forgotten 
Europe. A sad picture is given of a rather hopeless situation where ‘the days never 
change’ but also ‘the dreams never change’, and the chorus lines beg the sun to finally 
return: ‘Wake up, sun, so we can feel you / Today nobody asks for you / Cover Europe 
with light, do you remember where it is? / Come with me, fly with me, warm me up 
again.’ An undefined ‘they’ is said to ‘change their uniform and colour / but their tired 
souls wait for the sun’, and the final chorus repeats its prayer, but this time collectively: 
‘Wake us up, sun, make us understand […] Rise for us, come up with us, warm us up 
again.’436 There are many echoes here of the Schuman Declaration and even of Schiller 
and Beethoven, but the hope for a redeeming sun as a dues-ex-machina has a religious 
feel that differs from the dominant political tradition where Europe’s awakening is 
instead supposed to derive from its own determination.
A kind of religious awakening spirit returned to Tallin, Estonia in 2002 when Rosa 
from Spain performed ‘Europe’s Living a Celebration’, getting an honourable seventh 
position in the ESC competition. The song had lyrics by Xasqui Ten and music by 
Toni Ten, and sounded like disco with gospel influences, underlined by Rosa’s steady 
voice and energetic performance in sweeping black dress, and with five backing 
vocalists. The song leaves a strong impression, with syncopated call-and-response 
polyphony that creates a sense of an ecstatic congregation. The title words in English 
are often repeated, but all other words are in Spanish and contain no specific reference 
to Europe; instead they celebrate an abstract feeling of togetherness. The ‘I’ feels a 
thrill as a new dream (or illusion; the Spanish term can have both meanings) is born 
inside her, opening a way from ‘me’ to ‘you’: ‘All together, let us sing / Europe living 
a celebration / Our dream—our reality’. The song is about trusting passion and love 
in the heart, singing together and never saying goodbye again. This may of course 
signify again the unified European peoples, but is abstract enough to also cover more 
personal love unions, in the tradition of gospel and soul music where the line between 
spiritual and profane love was always thin.
So far, there seems to be two main topics involved in the ESC songs of Europe. One 
theme that rings in all the songs is a kind of touristic celebration of Europe’s cultural 
density and historical heritage, with urban culture in the traditional western part of the 
continent in focus. A second topic that is most prominent since 1990 is a celebratory 
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depiction of expanded and intensified European integration. Other topical Europe 
songs have also competed in the ESC’s national qualification competitions as well as 
in the ESC semifinals. Let me just mention two interesting examples. 
In the 2008 Swedish finals the ESC included a hit by the popular dance music 
veteran Christer Sjögren, ‘I Love Europe’, composed by Torgny Söderberg and Magnus 
Johansson, with lyrics in English by the veteran Swedish hit author Ingela ‘Pling’ 
Forsman. The song title is a melodic hook that is insistently repeated, often by the 
female chorus in a call-and-response fashion. The song is like a glimmering pastiche 
or parody of traditional German-Austrian Schlager, and the visual performance is 
full of kitschy elements, starting with the flirting interplay between Sjögren (dressed 
in black suit with dark blue shirt), the camera and the can-can choir-dance girls with 
small hats who generously lift their blue skirts and happily dance around the singer 
(Figure 7.6). Sjögren has a deep and warm masculine voice that contrasts with the 
almost metallic voice of female background singers who remind somewhat of the 
ABBA sound. Metallic carillon shimmers reminding of Christmas seem to place the 
tune in the north, but the rhythms of an acoustic guitar and a shining trumpet instead 
add a sunny Spanish spice to the mix, illustrating the love of Europe ‘from the sun in 
the south to the ice in the north’. The trumpeter is a bald musician in white suit that 
contrasts Sjögren’s dark colours, and he also adds several funny gestures to illustrate 
turning points in the music. At a key moment when there is an upward chord lift 
(in fact the second one in this), the women fold their skirts and magically transform 
them into a mix of European flags, completing the symbolism in a combined verbal, 
musical and visual climactic moment of ecstacy. The words speak of dancing and 
romancing in an enchanted Europe where ‘a party’s going on, and we are invited’. 
Being together is what creates the excitement, and it is fun to hear the EU described 
in so enthusiastic terms: 
This is magic! C’est magnifique!  
And all our people are together 
Ciao! Buenos dias! Que tal? Wie geht es dir?
In Paris or in Rome, the same good vibration 
It’s just like coming home, in all of our nations 
I feel it all around, this groovy sensation 
I love Europe, we’re a part of one big family 
Yes, this is the place for you and me, we’re a part of one big family
Again, only ‘old’ West Europe is mentioned, in a touristic approach that had obviously 
already become a strong but also somewhat outmoded tradition, as it did not manage 
to even get a chance to represent Sweden internationally that year. This comically naive 
Signifying Europe
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song is in a way in line with the EU motto as well as the social democratic ‘People’s 
Home’ ideology, where there is room for ‘everyone’. The distance is actually not that 
great from the Europe anthem, except that the moment of high culture elevation is 
totally absent. However, a slight hint of the elevation theme may be heard in the talk of 
a party going on to which only true Europeans are invited. Like some of the other songs 
mentioned above, ‘I Love Europe’ can be heard as an example of how the European 
motto of ‘united in diversity’ has been illustrated, while the desire of the Europa myth 
has here been transformed to just pure happiness, and the diversity factor reduced to 
highly superficial aspects of style, instead emphasising the natural unity in terms of 
being ‘one big family’. With his deep voice and firm body, Christer Sjögren is like the 
Zeus bull enjoying the company of the smiling nymphs, and the falling out of the flags 
could then signify the dislocation resulting in the establishing of Europe. The absence 
of any trace of past wars and pain may be typical for a country that has not since 200 
years on its soil experienced such fearful destruction. 
In 2010, the Lithuanian InCulto’s own ‘Eastern European Funk’ only made it to the 
semifinal, but made an explicit symbolic statement on EU’s controversial expansion 
to the east, in stark contrast to the previously analysed song. Five boys in checkered 
brown trousers, white shirts and black ties, and playing with colourful plastic mock 
instruments, sang and danced on the stage (Figure 7.7). The music was a funky modern 
dance tune with a few Balkan brass elements lending it a mildly eastern sound. Let 
me quote the whole English lyrics, presenting a fresh perspective on unification seen 
from the ‘new’ part of the continent:
You’ve seen it all before 
We ain’t got no taste we’re all a bore 
But you should give us chance 
Cause we’re just victims of circumstance 
We’ve had it pretty tough 
But that’s ok, we like it rough 
We’ll settle the score 
We survived the reds and two world wars
Get up and dance to our Eastern European kinda funk!
Yes Sir we are legal we are, though we are not as legal as you 
No Sir we’re not equal no, though we are both from the EU 
We build your homes and wash your dishes, 
Keep you your hands all soft and clean 
But one of these days you’ll realize Eastern Europe is in your genes
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Until that moment, only West European entries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain) had presented songs with an explicit focus on Europe. Here, Baltic Lithuania 
made a very clear statement that somehow repeats the Schuman Declaration idea 
of rising from war disasters to glory, but transposed onto the post-Communist 
experience and adding an East–West tension to the equation. This had almost two 
millennia old roots back in the division of the Christianised Roman Empire into a 
western and an eastern half. InCulto’s song made explicit the mutual distrust that has 
surfaced both on the general political level and within the ESC, where there has since 
the early 1990s been a recurrent debate on how to balance the taste structures of East 
and West Europe, that came to disturb the already precarious balance between north 
and south European preferences.
Other songs outside the ESC and from other genres of popular music than 
mainstream pop add shifting flavours to the identification of Europe. Some join the 
ESC chorus by giving a positive image of Europe’s historical richness and beauty, often 
with a kind of nostalgic memories of experiencing inter-European encounters. 
German electronic band Kraftwerk’s ‘Trans-Europe Express’ and ‘Europe Endless’ 
were released on the group’s album Trans-Europe Express (1977), with one complete 
version in English and another in German. The imagery of transcontinental trains 
revives futurist and modernist themes of the 1920s’ avant-garde. Typical for Kraftwerk, 
both these songs have minimalistic lyrics, with short catch phrases endlessly repeated. 
Repetitions excluded, the complete lyrics of ‘Europe Endless’ is thus: ‘Life is timeless / 
Europe endless […] / Parks, hotels and palaces […] / Promenades and avenues […] / 
Real life and postcard views […] / Elegance and decadence […]’. The central element 
of urban civilisation links to the theme of aristocratic elevation, while the initial and 
concluding combinatory pairs are highly ambivalent: eternity and repetition, reality and 
image, elegance and decadence. The resulting meaning is deliberately evasive, except 
for the linkage of Europe to classical aristocratic city culture that is problematised by 
the synthetic and repetitive sound structure, transforming infinite grandiosity into 
almost unbearable boredom. ‘This song makes me feel good about being a European’, 
writes a fan on a website for interpreting songs, but is contradicted by another: ‘This 
song is not an ardent ode to Europe. Life is not timeless and Europe is certainly not 
endless, that’s the point.’437 In a way, the two do not directly contradict each other, and 
both readings may well be challenged, as the song’s evaluation of Europeanness is far 
from unequivocal and it is hard to say if timelessness is in this case good or bad.
The same album’s lead song had a similar structure: ‘Trans-Europe Express […] 
/ Rendezvous on Champs-Elysees / Leave Paris in the morning on T.E.E. […] / In 
Vienna we sit in a late-night café / Straight connection, T.E.E. […] / From station to 
station / back to Düsseldorf City / Meet Iggy Pop and David Bowie’. ‘Station to station’ 
is an intertextual reference to Bowie’s song and album from 1976, and to his and Iggy 




style. In spite of esoteric avant-garde references and advanced musical expression, the 
lyrics share many thematic elements with the ESC and other popular tunes that depict 
cosmopolitan travels between the streets and cafés of west and central European 
cities.
Ex-lead singer of the English electronic synthesiser rock band Ultravox!, John Foxx 
(real name Dennis Leigh) in ‘Europe after the Rain’ (1981) speaks of a kind of archaic 
love reunion story: ‘It’s time to walk again / It’s time to make our way through the 
fountained squares’; ‘Your smile is glimmering when I say you’ve hardly changed / in 
Europe after the rain / when the nights are warm and the summer sways / in Europe 
after the rain’. British pop band Suede in ‘Europe is Our Playground’ (1997) declares 
that ‘Europe is our playground, London is our town / so run with me baby now’—‘let’s 
take a chance / from Heathrow to Hounslow, from the Eastern Bloc to France’ and ‘let’s 
make a stand / from peepshow to disco, from Spain to Camber Sands’. Terms differ 
from Sjögren’s ‘I Love Europe’, but there is a celebration of diversity here too. Even 
more programmatic is German heavy metal band Bonfire’s ‘Thumbs Up for Europe’ 
(1999) whose EU-celebrating lyrics remind of ‘I Love Europe’ and Captain Europe: 
There’s a new kind of challenge 
Its colours are gold and blue 
It’s got a circle of stars 
shining for me and you
Let’s all give it a shot 
ready or not 
it’s our destiny
Human blood is one colour 
so let’s make history
It’s just a little step 
in mankind’s dream 
One world united—in liberty […]
Thumbs up for Europe—you and me 
Thumbs up for Germany
This energetic rock tune was released on the album Fuel to the Flames that also 
included tunes like ‘Proud of My Country’ and ‘Ode an die Freude’ (simply a slow 
instrumental version of the anthem for electric guitars). However, most other tunes 
are less apologetic and straightforward. Some are indeed very difficult to interpret 
197
coherently. The UK rock band Psychedelic Furs’ ‘Sister Europe’ (1979) never actually 
mentions ‘Europe’ except in the title, and is a poetic allusion to some kind of decay 
and decline, with sailors drowning, talking, drinking and falling, a broken radio 
playing Aznavour out of tune, and new cars falling to dust. Echoing the song title, the 
chorus line ‘Sister of mine, home again’ may perhaps hint that this is a depiction of a 
gloomy continent where ‘even dreams must fall to rules’ and ‘words are all just useless 
sound’—a suitable phrase to characterise this song itself. A listener thinks the song ‘is 
about the continent of Europe’, and offers a quite complex reading of it:
Europe is seeing all these people doing stupid things and acting out 
their petty, futile dramas. Europe is there the whole time through 
many generations and sees the same mistakes being made over and 
over and how everyone dies with nothing to show for it and everything 
eventually falls to dust. I think the person is calling Europe ‘sister of 
mine’ because he sometimes steps back and sees the big picture and 
starts to identify with things that are less transitory like the land which 
could represent the eternal witness or something. When he does this 
he feels like he’s home.438
The lyrics of American indie rock band R.E.M.’s ‘Radio Free Europe’ (1985) are hard 
to understand or even hear. The ‘I’ seems to get off a ship in Europe (presumably from 
America) and expresses some kind of media critique: ‘Raving station, beside yourself 
/ Calling on in transit / Radio Free Europe / Decide yourself, calling all of the medias 
too fast’. Most listeners seem to agree that while the song touches upon Cold War 
radio propaganda, its precise meaning is deliberately vague and open.439
The meaning of Australian post-punk Birthday Party’s ‘Dumb Europe’ (written by 
Nick Cave and Christoph Dreher, 1983) is equally hard to pinpoint, as it alludes to 
an intoxicated and dizzy state of mind: ‘On this European night out on the brink 
/ the cafes and the bars still stink / The air is much too thick for seeing / but not 
thick enough for leaning’. It then talks of utopia and destruction, catatonia and death, 
possibly referring to Australia’s history of participation in twentieth century European 
wars, but it is far from clear what is meant by the chorus words ‘we could all just die 
of shame / dumb Europe’. 
In ‘Fortress Europe’ (2003), British electronica band Asian Dub Foundation offers 
one of the rare examples of a direct critique of European migration policies. From 
the initial ‘Keep bangin’ on the wall / of Fortress Europe’ to the concluding ‘Break 
out of the detention centers / Cut the wires and tear up the vouchers / People get 
ready it’s time to wake up / Tear down the walls of Fortress Europe’, the song takes a 
clear stand for free movement and against boundary controls: ‘We’re the children of 




This generation has no nation / Grass roots pressure the only solution / We’re sitting 
tight / ‘cause asylum is a right’.
Outside the mainstream pop field represented in the ESC, the topics of war, division 
and death stand out as a dominant thematic cluster in songs with ‘Europe’ in their 
titles, at least in indie rock, metal and singer-songwriter styles. To some extent, this 
supports the previous interpretation of Europe Day, the EU motto and the EU anthem. 
Just to pick an example, Roxy Music’s melancholic ‘A Song for Europe’ (1973) depicts 
how the ‘I’ walks alone in Paris and Venice, remembering lost moments without any 
hope for future redemption: ‘There’s no today for us / Nothing is there / for us to 
share / but yesterday.’ At the end of this truly melancholic song, words are also sung 
in Latin and French. This was written at a time when Europe was still caught between 
the superpowers, with a serious atomic threat looming large. British post-punk band 
Killing Joke’s ‘Europe’ (1985) expresses a deep anxiety over the history and threatening 
future of war: ‘Take up your arms pick up your courage / A black sun is rising as the 
gods of Europe sleep’. Catastrophes and atrocities are mentioned: ‘What have they 
done, what are they doing? / The place I love so butchered, scarred and raped / The 
years have passed us, still we’re fighting’. The song is desperately pessimistic: ‘Glory 
glory how we watch in Europe / the day humanity is over / Let nations east and west 
tremble at the sight’ until ‘reason dead forever—god let it be soon’.
‘Europe after the Rain’ is  the title of a song by John Foxx that has been reused with 
a completely different tune by the German thrash metal band Kreator (1992). It also 
spans a temporal narrative with a problematic past, a paralysed present and an even 
more frightening future. Today’s ‘indecisive government’ with bizarre ‘perversion’ has 
created confusion concerning good and bad: ‘Can’t remember who we are’, ‘Emotions 
paralyzed’, ‘Terrifying industry protect departed nations / Can’t get back together again 
/ Leaving Europe after the rain / Acceptance of neo-fascist / Persecuting anarchists / 
Put the wrong ones on the list’. Meaninglessness and hopelessness rule in a capitalist 
Europe run by ‘materialistic parasites’.
The Swedish melodic heavy metal band Europe was founded as Force in 1979 but 
changed its name in 1982, allegedly inspired by the Deep Purple live album Made in 
Europe.440 The band has never released any song with ‘Europe’ in its title, though it had 
one called ‘America’ (2004), indicative of the direction of identification of the band, in 
spite of its chosen name. However, some 1980s Swedish singer-songwriter tunes paint 
a similar picture as the previous ones. Jan Hammarlund: ‘Jag vill leva i Europa’ (‘I want 
to live in Europe’, 1981), Anders F. Rönnblom: ‘Europa brinner’ (‘Europe’s burning’, 
1982) and Björn Afzelius: ‘Europa’ (1984) all relate not to the wars left behind in the 
past but to a persistent war threat with missiles accumulating on both sides of the 
iron curtain. Hammarlund’s song combines this with the other main theme, that of 
enjoying romantic visits to key continental cities, but in a nostalgic light, expressing 
the risk of loss through nuclear war. This depressing feeling lifted after 1989, and 
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for instance in the Swedish rock artist Tomas Ledin’s ‘Genom ett regnigt Europa’ 
(‘Through a rainy Europe’, 2006—probably inspired by John Foxx’s ‘Europe after the 
Rain’), there is consolation in that ‘I’ and ‘you’ at least can walk together in love even 
though the sun is not always shining. 
However, 9/11 and the subsequent challenges posed by radical Islamists have 
continued to fuel rather dark narratives of a Europe caught in mortal combat on its 
east frontier. Some songs use a dark and violent imagery to defend Europe’s mission 
to stand up against all external threats, thus giving voice to more or less openly fascist 
sentiments. One example is the Belgian black/folk metal band Ancient Rites with 
‘Mother Europe’ (1998) and the rather similar ‘(Ode to Ancient) Europa’ (2001). 
‘Mother Europe’ is a phrase often used in white supremacist debates on European 
issues. This song points out ‘the proud Hellenic civilisation’ as ‘the cradle of Europe 
where it all began’, then adds a series of brave and gallant regions that have added 
to its glory: Flemish, German, French, English, Scandinavian, Italian, Slovenian and 
Celtic contributions are mentioned and each briefly characterised. These ‘knights’ are 
summoned up to stand reunited and proud: ‘Mother Europe born from your womb / 
Mother Europe on Your soil shall be my tomb’. This is reminiscent of Captain Euro’s 
mission, but the song never explicitly clarifies if a new war is expected and who is in 
that case the new enemy. 
The British Nazi punk band Skrewdriver’s song with the same title ‘Mother Europe’ 
(1994) explicitly expresses a xenophobian creed. It mentions how ‘Mother Europe’s sons 
/ faced so many tragedies at the barrel of a loaded gun’ but are now protected by her 
‘guardian angel’, ‘with a flag held high’: ‘Mother Europe stands by our side / Mother 
Europe, we all live for you now.’ ‘So many martyrs’, ‘honest men’ and ‘warriors’ have been 
sacrificed through history: ‘For keeping Europe sacred, will be our fateful quest.’ This 
fascist imagery shares certain aspects with the European flag’s symbolism of sacredness, 
and Skrewdriver continues by summoning to a new war against Europe’s enemies.
For far too long now we’ve sat in apathy  
But just be warned now, before the coming tragedy  
For the power and the glory stand within our reach  
We must prepare the struggle for the victory we seek 
Mother Europe stands by our side  
Mother Europe we will die for you now
Here, the enemies are never specified, but it is not difficult to fill in the blanks 
by thinking of the usual Nazi combination of homosexuals, Muslims and atheist 
Communists as intended targets of this forthcoming battle. And in some ways a more 




project propelled by the lead composer Yoav Goren’s ‘passion for dramatic, epic, 
cinematic music’.441 Goren is also the co-founder of an LA-based production company 
for film trailers, Immediate Music, and Globus’s music has an orchestral and epic 
tone and structure. ‘Europa’ appeared on their debut album Epicon, first released in 
2006 in the United Kingdom. It has a fast but steady ground beat, with a rock sound, 
supplemented by a large choir and orchestra, and with short melodic phrases with a 
British or Nordic folk-ethnic quality that is also found in some heavy metal and black 
metal music. The song is organised in a dramatic flow that reminds the listeners of 
an emotionally dense cinematic experience, with war imagery projected on the walls 
behind the artists. The first verse enumerates a series of historical ‘battlefields of blood 
and tears’, including Agincourt, Waterloo, Gallipoli and Stalingrad: ‘The cruellest of 
atrocities / Europa’s blood is borne of these.’ The second verse prolongs the list:
Bolsheviks and feudal lords 
Chivalry to civil wars 
Fascist rule and genocide 
Now we face the rising tide 
of new crusades, religious wars 
Insurgents imported to our shores 
The western world, gripped in fear 
The mother of all battles here
The choir chants ‘Heaven help us in all our battles’ and in the chorus longs for 
‘glory’, ‘honour’ and ‘victory’. The new ‘rising tide’ soon locates the new threats coming 
from the east: 
Descendants of the dispossessed 
return with bombs strapped to their chests 
There’s hate for life, and death in hate 
emerging from the new caliphate 
The victors of this war on fear 
will rule for the next thousand years
The message is ambiguous and may be interpreted either as a call for peace (‘Europa, 
Europa / Find better days before us / In kindness, in spirit / Lead us to a greater calling’) 
or for a final blow against the Islamic menace: ‘Drop the bomb, end this fight!’ In a 
similar double reading, the concluding exclamation ‘Never again!’ may remind of Käthe 
Kollwitz’s famous 1924 pacifist drawing ‘Nie wider Krieg’ (‘Never again war’) but is also 
the slogan of the Jewish Defense League, which has been characterised as a right-wing 
terrorist group for its violent actions against Muslims. A YouTube site where ‘Europa’ is 
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published had also by June 2010 attracted 3000 comments that mostly express fear and 
hate against alleged enemies: ‘islam is a danger to Europe’, ‘russia&putin will fuck europe’, 
etc.442 The dramatic song succeeds in stirring up strong emotions, as when ‘ayrond091’ 
sighs ‘I’m asian but tottaly love this song and dream of being a european I hate asia’, or 
when ‘Mordercabrudasow’ ominously declares: ‘I mean there should never again be a 
war in europe, but there will be, a fight of christs an muslims, an We christs will win. 
But it will be a Fight of Brothers. One european against another, not beacouse of Land 
but religion!! I will fight on the front an cleanse Europe!!’ Others protest that ‘religion 
only brings war and hatred betwen nations’, while many post short lines like ‘Proud to 
be German [or French, Finnish etc.] and European’. The song’s ambiguity is sensed by 
many, including ‘borsza2’ (‘it’s very contradictory, ranging from utter extremism to total 
pacifism’), ‘cptfursten’, who sharply pinpoints why it is so ‘confusing’ and even ‘false’, 
and ‘CountArtha’: ‘Epically xenophobic …’. The confusion clearly manages to spark off 
substantial debate, as the song itself can evidently be interpreted in highly contradictory 
ways, expressing very strong emotions but leaving the question of how they are to be 
directed open-ended, thus inviting a racist and ‘Islamophobic’ reading.
The musical styles and expressions of these songs cannot be reduced to any common 
denominator. Traits either from European ethnic folk music or from the European art 
music tradition are often used to hint at a shared legacy, just as is the case with the 
European anthem. However, within these wide frames, the songs can make considerably 
diverging statements. Like the ESC entries, the other most ‘mainstream’ tunes express a 
joyful pleasure of sharing happy experiences across borders, which is close to the message 
of the official EU symbols. The more artistically ambitious ones tend instead to focus on 
painful memories and fears of alienation, strife or even destruction, constructing Europe 
as something deeply problematic and filled with unresolved tensions. Many tunes are 
quite open in their interpretations, merely pointing at the risks of new conflicts, but 
some are more politically explicit: either problematising the ongoing developments 
from leftist positions that question the new power structures that marginalise various 
weak others, or a right-wing position of traditionalist nostalgia for strong nations, 
emanating in xenophobic, tending towards even racist and fascist discourse. What most 
have in common is an idea that Europe is selected for a particularly important task and 
challenge, again confirming the centrality of the theme of elevation.
Conclusions
The flag analysis in the previous chapter ended by underlining how the different 
visual symbols proposed indicate an ongoing conflict of interpretations of what 
Europe means. Adding an auditory symbol to the previous verbal and visual ones, 




polysemy of officially defined Europeanness. The complex relationship between the 
wordless anthem, Beethoven’s symphony and Schiller’s poem gives ample evidence of 
an ongoing conflict of interpretations in this symbolic sphere, involving a confusing 
(palimpsestic) superimposition of different historical layers. Comparisons with other 
explicitly European songs further underline the ambiguities and contradictions 
apparent in this identification process. 
1.  Beethoven’s composition is full of dislocating elements. Its introduction moves the 
listener restlessly between unbearable remembrances of the preceding movements, 
and then follows a breathtaking journey through sharply contrasting moods, from 
the rumbling Turkish march to the crisply glimmering stars and finally the mixing 
of all these seemingly disparate elements in the operatic finale. In contrast to this, 
Karajan’s EU anthem manages to delete almost every trace of such mobility, instead 
presenting a fixed world of solemnity. Even the mixed roots of the ‘Ode to Joy’ tune 
itself, having transferred a melody with a popular and French revolutionary aura 
to become the backbone of a quasi-sacral hymn within the highest of the high arts, 
have effectively been played down by the slow and even tempo and the majestic 
arrangement. Several of the other official anthems have a similarly fixed and stable 
character, while the popular songs expectedly vary in this respect.
2.  There are plenty connotations of desire in Beethoven’s and Schiller’s fused works. 
Many agree that Beethoven’s Ninth represents a contradictory ‘combination of 
desire and destruction’.443 A similar tension may actually be traced all the way 
back to the Europa myth, where violent rupture and erotic lust were closely 
intertwined in both the main actors. It is this destructive side of Europe’s history 
that has led to the quest for control and security that supplements and is meant 
to protect the living out of joint desires, but also tends to threaten these same 
desires, in a negative dialectics. However, the anthem makes a deliberate move 
away from this ambiguity, by removing all hints of the initial chaos as well as 
of the Turkish march noises blurring the final apotheosis. Instead, it chooses to 
conform to the flag’s expression of harmonious balance and thus control. Some 
of the analysed songs, not least Christer Sjögren’s ‘I Love Europe’, stand closer to 
Beethoven in this respect, whereas others tend more to express the destructive 
aspect of the European heritage, as a kind of desire for disaster, often wedded to 
a mortally magnified desire for control.
3.  Both the music and the (repressed) lyrics of ‘Ode to Joy’ strongly contribute to 
the previous symbols’ emphasis on some kind of elevation. On the one hand, the 
choice of classical music, borrowed from the ultimately high-ranked composer 
Beethoven, and taken from one of his most mature and complex works, clearly 
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states a will to define Europeanness as having top quality and status. Also, both 
the lyrics and music contain several markers of uplifted, solemn or even divine 
attributes. On the other hand, they both also present a temporal narrative moving 
through initial troubles upwards towards a jubilant climax—and this applies to 
the short anthem versions as well as the full symphony movement. The same is 
true for several of the other examples, including the Eurovision and the UEFA 
anthems, as well as for some of the popular songs with European titles, where 
Europe is described either as a particularly happy and lovable place, or as selected 
for a fateful world battle against evil forces. The few dystopic songs that instead 
describe Europe as a particularly nasty and doomed place are critical exceptions 
to the by now well-established rule, but even they tend to define Europe as 
something special (even if bad), that is, they reproduce the trope of selectedness.
4.  Finally, there are plenty of hybrid structures in Beethoven’s original work—
so much that Nicholas Cook and others have concluded that all its internal 
contradictions make it impossible to interpret it in any coherent fashion. 
Schiller’s reference to humanity as becoming ‘brothers’ in combination with that 
to ‘daughter of Elysium’ immediately combines the two main genders, and the 
music then also adds different ethnic flavours, particularly the Oriental flavour 
of the central march section. Here again, the EU anthem carefully avoids all 
such complications and presents a sanitised version of Europeanness as white 
and (with the brass instruments) male. Uniform homogeneity rules, with only 
faint traces of any kind of diversity. This is also true for the other organisational 
anthems, while it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions from the popular 
songs. However, EU authorities’ parallel release of anthem variants in a wide 
range of styles, from rap to romani, have again opened it up for recognising 
diversity, in a similar manner as the barcode has supplemented the official flag 
with its missing element of vital pluralism and difference.
All in all, the anthem basically confirms the main message conveyed by the 
flag, with a certain affinity to that from Captain Euro, depicting Europe as a rather 
controlled, fixed and unitary entity. However, its various contextual neighbours 
provide contesting identifications, and in particular the anthem’s origin in Beethoven’s 
Ninth Symphony, which still remains hard to repress as even the omission of the lyrics 
is not always respected when the anthem is performed at EU-related events, casts a 
shadow reminding the listeners of the heritage expressed by the Europa myth of a 
Europe full of dislocation, desire and diversity. As with all other official symbols, the 
idea of some kind of selectedness and elevation remains a constant element that in a 
naturalising way places Europe in the centre of its own universe, as if its status as the 






The final, most recent and also in many ways the most effective and important 
official European symbol is monetary: the euro.444 Money is an economic tool but also 
a cultural medium, reaching deep into citizens’ pockets and circulating in everyday 
life—in a unique manner among the symbolic modes discussed here. It is truly a kind 
of banal symbolism of time-in culture, fully integrated in ordinary practices rather 
than isolated in any separate ritual sphere. Crucial to its function as identifying symbol 
is the way it is used but also the way it is designed, since it is this visual and material 
design that links Europe to yet another set of multiple meanings.
What’s in a currency?
American industrialist Henry Ford is credited for declaring: ‘I am not interested 
in money but in the things of which money is the symbol’. He probably meant a 
combination of economic wealth and social bonds, but real money signifies more 
than that, or perhaps it signifies in other ways than just through serving as a means of 
exchange of economic values. Money is also a medium of symbolic communication 
of meanings, not only of value.
Since the thirteenth century, the term ‘money’ referred to mint, coinage or metal 
currency, but from the early nineteenth century it also included paper money. In 
ancient Rome, money was coined by the temple of Juno, who bore the title moneta, 
possibly deriving from monere (advise, warn, monitor). ‘Currency’ derives from 
Latin terms for running and flowing, and is since the seventeenth century used 
for the circulation of money, divided into specific monetary systems that are often 
linked to nation states.445 Money is a system of material tokens used for facilitating 




with the rise of nation states became guaranteed and organised by them, in a smilar 
way that verbal language was differentiated into specific languages that much later 
became adopted by nations. The institution of money, in general, is virtually universal 
in today’s globalised world, but the national currencies invite specific sets of money to 
be linked to some kind of national identification practices.
As a means of value measurement and exchange, money abstracts from the 
peculiar use-values of individual commodities. In Karl Marx’ terms, money is a 
‘real abstraction’, a general equivalent that levels all other differences in interhuman 
exchange than those of economic value.446 It has been suggested that this practical 
abstraction may have been instrumental in the contemporaneous development of 
abstract thinking, for instance in the general use of personal pronouns.447 At the same 
time, money always has some kind of physical existence, as pieces of metal or paper, or 
at least as electronic configurations in banking networks. The design of those tokens 
tend to carry an excess of meaning, by not only signifying an amount of value but 
also necessarily contextualising that sum by denoting for instance the issuing country 
which guarantees that value as well as the year of issue. Actually the material money 
citizens have since centuries used in everyday life also includes many other aspects 
that serve to identify the community whose state authorities guarantee its validity. A 
difficult balance needs to be kept in order for money to function well as such, since if 
for instance coins are too specific they may become collector items and be withdrawn 
from money circulation too early. The current transfer to electronic money marks a 
decisive step in the direction of abstraction, but it appears coins and paper money will 
remain in use yet for a while.448 The dialectics of abstraction and concretion remains 
crucial to an understanding of how money functions in society, and their successful 
combination enables money to serve to support the formation of communities across 
both geographic and social distances.449
These etymologies and characteristics remind that the functioning of money relies 
on a precarious combination of trust and stability with mobility and fluidity. Georg 
Simmel has suggested that the roundedness of coins that make them roll symbolises the 
rhythm of movement required for money to function in society as a means of exchange 
and thus of communication binding trading communities together. While stressing 
that money is the most transient thing, both symbolising and effecting movement 
(comparable to Marx’ real abstraction), Simmel at the same time saw money as 
embodying the most enduring content of value.450 Money is therefore the focal point of 
a dialectics of mobility and stability, linked to that of abstraction and specificity. 
A third contradiction or at least tension is that between individuality and 
community. On the one hand, money is typically used by individuals (persons or 
companies) for transferring private ownership. Much economic theory begins with 
the individual human being who needs to exchange goods with other individuals, and 
where the macroeconomics of corporations or even states are treated as aggregations 
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of such intraindividual relations. But, as Marx, Simmel and others have all agreed, 
money is on the other hand at the basic level a social relation; an institutionalised 
social mechanism for binding collectives together. The explicit purpose of the euro 
has been from the start to serve as both a practical means of and a symbol for the 
identification of Europe as a common good, at the same time as the monetary 
discourse continues to stress its role for individual users, reflecting the basic tension 
in the market economy between individual and collective interests. The dialectics of 
abstract/concrete, mobile/stable and collective/individual are mutually interlinked in 
ways that affect money’s role in the formation of identities and communities. In the 
words of Suzanne Shanahan, 
identities and currencies share a set of logical parallels that make 
the agency of money particularly powerful in forging identity. […] 
Currencies are the daily, ritualistic expression of popular trust in the 
political regime. To use money is to pay homage to community. 
At the same time ‘money, like identity, invariably takes on a different meaning for 
each individual’, opening a scope for diversity to develop across unification. Money’s 
power as a real abstraction makes it able to socially forge the same collective identities 
that it symbolises through its very usage and design.451 
The institution of money is an organising and regulating tool for the circulation 
of goods and services, for mediating ex change values and binding society together. 
Coins and banknotes can only fulfil these economic functions of signifying and 
transferring exchange value if they have clearly identifiable material traits that ensure 
their authen ticity and univocally represent their value, nationality and date of issue. 
They are means of communication intended for the combined use as unit of account, 
means of payment and store of value. In order to function as such, they must contain 
texts, images and patterns that make them interpretable as money. They thus not only 
signify ‘fro zen desire’, but also forms of identification. Symbolic functions are extra-
economic use values of money, indispensable if the primary functions of coins and 
notes as means of exchange are to be fulfilled. Many British pound notes and coins 
carry the inscription ‘Decus et tutamen’—‘An ornament and a safeguard’, from Virgil’s 
Aeneid. This is emphatically true of all money designs: they are at once aesthetic and 
economic, carriers of meaning as well as of financial value. Money has a secondary 
function as media texts, and issues of currency design therefore deserve to be taken 
more seriously by those who seek to understand the meaning of money.452
In One-Way Street, Walter Benjamin described letters and postcards as windows to 
the world—magical connections forged between daily life and the big world outside—
and stamps as ‘calling cards that large states leave behind in the nursery’.453 Coins 




large states and supra-states place in each little citizen’s purse. But, as Hymans argues, 
currencies have the advantage of being at the same time universal (issued by every 
state), selective (focusing a more narrow number of designs compared to stamps) 
and regularly updated (un like flags or anthems), making them a preferred case for 
studying the dynamics of national identification.454
The economic, social and cultural aspects of money are inter woven, and presuppose 
each other.455 Monetary functions are increas ingly often carried out digitally, but 
the use of the specialised arte facts of coins and banknotes still remains remarkably 
stable, since they are free of cost and relatively simple for the individual user.456 They 
communicate a certain amount of abstract exchange value, but also introduce other 
meanings into daily life circulation. The ways in which to display and safely guarantee 
their value can be varied and elaborated in response to a wish to make them more 
visually ap pealing, or add other layers of meaning that reflect how economic values 
and the country of origin are understood by its monetary authorities and ordinary 
citizens. Produced by the international sys tem of state national banks, they circulate 
condensed images of na tional identities and sociocultural value hierarchies through 
their carefully chosen design. Thus, they are widely spread media com municating 
collective identifica tions when being used by virtually everyone on a daily basis. Their 
design and thus semantic content is heavily regulated by political state institutions, 
making them com munications media under strict control by the cooperating state 
and market systems of modern societies. However, as with other mass media, the 
mostly unconscious interpretation of their symbolic meanings by the citizens who use 
them is not fully contained by those systemic institutions, and is to a certain degree an 
object of negotia tion and transformation. There is always a surplus of meaning in all 
kinds of textual production, as texts are open to imaginative inter pretation. 
Though money is an economic tool, it is also a cultural phenomenon: a vehicle for 
constructing and sharing meanings. George Herbert Mead has compared money to 
language and other forms of communication: 
As taught in economics, money is nothing but a token, a symbol for a 
certain amount of wealth. It is a symbol for something that is wanted 
by individuals who are in the attitude of willingness to exchange; and 
the forms of exchange are then the methods of conversation, and the 
media of exchange become gestures which enable us to carry out at 
vast distances this process of passing over something one does not 
want, to get something he does, by means of bringing himself into 
the attitude of the other person. The media of these tokens of wealth 
are, then, in this process of exchange just such gestures or symbols as 
language is in other fields.457
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Money is thus a symbol and a means of communication—perhaps even a ‘medium’, 
in a double sense. First, its economic function is itself a kind of strategic coordinating 
action, mediating between people. Second, besides this kind of mediation, money also 
through designs mediates symbolic forms and meanings among users. If media are 
broadly conceived as mediating agents between humans, money certainly fulfils such 
a function already as a purely economic instrument, and has been discussed as such 
a systemic medium.458 Matthias Kaelberer points out that ‘the European Monetary 
Union itself establishes something of a European public space’ where the euro ‘serves as 
a tool of Europe-wide communication’.459 However, the sense of ‘communication’ and 
‘medium’ here need to be qualified in order to distinguish money from telephones or 
television. Jürgen Habermas differentiates between on the one hand money and power 
as media of coordination and steering which substitute for language, and on the other 
hand those forms of generalised communication effected by mass media technologies 
that do not substitute but rather condense face-to-face interaction.460 While the latter 
are inseparably integrated in the lifeworld, the former are organised as differentiated 
systems by the market and the state. Their autonomy still remains relative, as it is 
still based on an element of loyalty and trust among citizens, and thus can never be 
fully cut off from the signifying practices that weave the nets of culture. According to 
Habermas, the historical trend towards increasing systemic differentiation has induced 
a late modern crisis of legitimation for the social order of state and market. Sociologists 
like Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have in similar terms diagnosed a late modern 
problem of upholding trust in societal institutions, including state authorities as well as 
markets. The recurring crises in the monetary systems, including that of the euro and 
the EMU, may be seen as typical for what Beck has called the ‘risk society’.461
Kaelberer underlines that ‘money is based on trust’, but also that modernisation 
processes have made this cohesive trust increasingly ‘abstract and institutionalised’, so 
that ‘identity does not necessarily have to rest on deep affective feelings of belonging 
in order to support a modern relationship of trust’. Therefore, the trust needed for the 
euro to work needs only to be of the diffuse and polydimensional type typical of late 
modernity. The euro cannot rest on any naturalised deeply affective sense of shared 
belonging, but only on a constructed, diffuse and hybrid pan-European identity that 
is always combined with other (including national) identifications. But this may 
still well suffice, and Kaelberer does conclude that with reference to some elements 
of a shared history of cherishing welfare-state values of social solidarity, ‘there is a 
sufficient level of Europeanness—as part of evolving hybrid identity structures—to 
support an effective functioning of the euro’.462 Also, what unites a collective entity is 
often more evident from the outside than from within, and some European analysts 
may be blind to common traits since internal differences make it hard for them to see 
the wood for the trees. Based in his historical study of European banknote designs, 




commonality may not be out of reach, for the content of collective 
identities in Europe has been both more changeable across time and 
more uniform across space than identity scholars typically assert. […] 
European national currencies at any one point in time have expressed 
a remarkable commonality of values.463 
In Ferdinand Tönnies’ terms, Europe may well function as primarily a Gesellschaft 
(a complex association built on instrumental and institutional processes of indirect 
mediation) rather than a Gemeinschaft (like a family or a kinship, based on mutual 
bonds and deep feelings of togetherness).464 The euro has survived its phase of 
establishment, and if EU’s monetary crisis does not lead to a total breakdown—in 
which case the money designs are not to blame—this functioning seems to indicate 
that Kaelberer might be right. 
Introducing the euro
Money thus has an advantage over the previously mentioned symbols, namely to 
be present in every citizen’s daily life, serving as the basis for an ‘unflagged’ or ‘banal’ 
(supra-) nationalism enacted by unfocused ‘time-in’ rituals that underpin imagined 
community, at the opposite end of the scale of for instance commemoration days or 
anthems.465 Almost every one deals with money on a daily basis, but few ever think 
much about it or have a closer look at the coins and bills they touch. The tangible 
immersion of money in everyday life is in this particular case limited by the boundaries 
of the EMU area, since not even all of the EU countries use the euro, and also by 
the gradual transition from cash to electronic means of payment.466 The other EU 
symbols have at some point also been acknowledged by the Council of Europe, which 
makes them more easily acceptable as general European signifiers. It is in economic 
terms only valid for a core group of European states, but little is yet known about how 
the euro has been perceived and interpreted as a symbol of Europe at large, within 
or even less outside of the EMU area. Still, many people both inside and outside of 
Europe do encounter the euro, whether as visiting tourists or when in various contexts 
encountering the € sign, the word ‘euro’ or images of euro coins or banknotes. 
The euro was installed as a materially effective mechanism that could simultaneously 
be designed in a symbolically striking way, in order to further strengthening 
identification of and with Europeanness. In general, this new identity is not intended 
to substitute for national identifications, but just to add a new, transnational level, as 
the EU is not intended as a federation that would replace nation states. All the other 
key symbols mentioned were never intended to replace the corresponding national 
days, mottos, flags or anthems, but to be added as yet another facet of citizens’ complex 
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identifications. However, this is slightly different with the euro, as it actually must 
replace the previous national currencies. This makes it more controversial, and can be 
seen as one factor limiting its use to the EMU area that is only a part of the whole EU. 
This lends to the euro an exceptional status among these symbols.
A presentation text on ‘The Currency of the European Union’ in European Navigator 
acknowledges that ‘money has always been a powerful means of communication’:
Money talks, and its message is federating, as it is the lowest common 
denominator of the group using it. This makes it a highly effective and 
important instrument of identity which has become so customary, 
through its continuous use for 2400 years, that its role has been more 
or less forgotten. […] Money is also a strong symbol of social ties. 
It carries with it faith, solidarity and expectations of guarantees; 
every currency reflects the trust of citizens in the role of the state as a 
guarantor of national cohesion, of the protection of citizens and of the 
improvement of their standard of living.467
The currency is explicitly treated by the EU itself (for instance in the draft constitution 
from 2003) in terms of an identifying symbol, and not only (or even primarily) as a 
practical tool for economic value transfer.468 Indeed, the euro does signify one of the 
four fundamental ‘free movements’ of the EU—goods, services, people and money—
but none of the other three has in any similar way been transformed into a key symbol. 
On the one hand, this testifies to a certain ‘commercialisation’ of the European project: 
an explicit acknowledging of the central role of capitalism and the market economy 
in the union, not a hidden linking mechanism but  a cherished and almost sacralised 
idol of worship—a currency that has a declared role in signifying the shared identity 
of the European nations. On the other hand, it may simultaneously also be seen as an 
expression of a parallel culturalisation of the economy, acknowledging the fact that 
even money as aestheticised material objects (coins and banknotes) become part of 
an ‘experience industry’, while they do to some extent lose part of their traditional 
economic importance due to the increasing role of e-money. 
On 1 January 2002, the seven different values of euro banknotes and eight values 
of coins were introduced in twelve of the EU member states, to be daily used by 
some 300 million Europeans in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Through a special 
agreement, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City connected to the euro and issued 
their own coin designs, in spite of not being EU members. Other countries have 
continued joining EU and the eurozone: Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, 
Slovakia in 2009 and Estonia in January 2011, so that the ‘eurozone’ has then grown to 




Outside the EU five territories also use the euro: the British colonial fragments of 
Akrotiri and Dhekelia plus four French areas—Clipperton, the French Southern and 
Antarctic Islands, Mayotte, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon. Andorra, Montenegro and 
Kosovo also use the euro without any formal arrangement. Neither of all these issue 
their own money, but use the euros that are produced by the seventeen member states 
of the inner eurozone.469
The introduction of the euro had been prepared by a concerted information effort, 
including for children the Captain Euro superhero website analysed in the myth 
chapter above. The first coins were actually already minted back in 1999, when the 
currency was formally established, even if they weren’t released for use until 2002, 
when in all 50 billion coins and 14.5 billion banknotes were released, with a total value 
of over €664 billion. 
The banknotes look the same throughout the EMU area, while the coins have the 
front side (obverse) common to all euro countries and a rear side (reverse) specific to 
each country (but no less valid in all other euro nations). Each national set dominates 
the circulation of money in its respective country, but through travel and tourism, the 
national circuits leak into each other, so that even though most citizens will mainly 
see coins from their own countries, they will from time to time in their daily life also 
encounter images from elsewhere. Measuring how national euro coins mix in various 
countries would thus indicate dominant patterns in international contacts. 
The name ‘euro’ (official three-letter abbreviation EUR) for the monetary unit 
of the pan-European currency was adopted in 1995 as a successor of the previous 
‘ecu’ which was both an abbreviation of ‘European currency unit’ and the name of a 
currency used in France and Italy from 1260.470 For Germans, the ecu sounded like 
‘ein Kuh’ (a cow) and therefore was hard to take seriously. The euro has a strikingly 
variable pronounciation in different languages, compared for instance to the dollar. 
In Greek it is ‘ev’ro’, in French ‘ø’ʁo’, in German ‘’ɔʏʁo’, in English: ‘’jʊə:rəʊ’, while for 
instance Swedes tend to waver between the Greek and the English variants, reflecting 
a contested anglification of its national language, which especially in the introductory 
phase induced some confusion. After all, the name is unique, short and clear, and with 
an evident link to the name of the continent.
The € symbol is based on the Greek epsilon letter, according to all official sources 
meant to refer to both the word ‘Europe’ and ancient Greece as ‘the cradle of European 
civilisation’, and with the two horizontal bars symbolising the intended stability of this 
new currency.471 One may also compare it with the famous signs for the pound (£) 
and the dollar ($), both of which include such (horizontal or vertical) strokes across 
some kind of letter. (The ‘libra sign’ £ derives from the Roman weight unit ‘libra’, a 
Latin word for balance or scales. The $ sign was first used for the peso and may derive 
from some Spanish coat of arms engraved on silver coins.) The € sign has also rapidly 
become acknowledged and integrated into the global core of monetary symbols. On the 
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banknotes, the € sign only appears hidden within the vertical security bands, while it is 
altogether absent from the coins. This is not unique to the euro, as for instance US$ bills 
do not prominently feature the $ sign. However, the € sign is of course very common 
elsewhere, wherever the euro is mentioned in texts or images and used in practice.
In 1995 the European Monetary Institute (EMI), forerunner of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), selected two themes for the euro banknotes, based on the preparatory 
work of an advisory group of art historians, graphic designers and marketing experts: 
‘Ages and styles of Europe’ and a broader theme of ‘abstract/modern design’. For the 
first theme, the features to be depicted on each of the seven banknote denominations 
(€5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200 and 500) were to represent a specific period of European 
cultural history: Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque and Rococo, 
the age of iron and glass architecture, and modern twentieth century architecture. 
It was also decided that the designs should incorporate the European flag as ‘a 
universally accepted symbol of Europe’. A Europe-wide competition followed in 1996, 
with a jury of experts in marketing, design and art history, selected by EMI from 
candidates proposed by the national banks. The jury selected five versions of each 
theme, based on criteria of ‘creativity, aesthetics, style, functionality, likely public 
perception and acceptability (in particular the avoidance of any national bias and 
the achievement of a proper balance between the number of men and the number 
of women portrayed on the banknotes)’. The latter problem was in the end solved 
by excluding all humans from the designs, and by letting the motifs be completely 
abstracted from any geographical location. Efforts were then also made to test their 
‘public perception’ by making qualitative interviews with 1896 individuals throughout 
Europe: professional cash handlers and members of the general public. In 1997, the 
revised banknote designs could then be created (Figure 8.1).
It was the Austrian graphic designer Robert Kalina of the Österreichische 
Nationalbank who designed the banknotes.472 Apart from basic information such as 
the value and the name of the currency in the Latin and Greek alphabet, they include a 
value-spe ci fic combination of the twelve EU stars with a set of windows and gateways 
from seven architectural periods: Classical (€5), Roman es que (€10), Gothic (€20), 
Renaissance (€50), Baroque and Rococo (€100), iron and glass style (€200) and 
modern twentieth century architecture (€500). All these architectural elements have 
been deliberately designed in order not to signify any particular building from any 
specific country, but are meant to synthesize features that unite the whole continent. 
They are scrupulously presented in official EU sources, explaining that the windows 
and gateways are intended to symbolise ‘the European spirit of openness and co-
operation’, while the twelve stars represent ‘the dynamism and harmony between 
European nations’. To complement these designs, the reverse of each banknote features 
a bridge, symbolising ‘the close co-operation and communication between Europe 




large-enough extra-European colonial territories of France, Portugal and Spain that 
also use the euro.473 The visual representation of Europe as a spatial territory is thus 
complicated by its colonial past.
The obverse sides of the eight values of euro coins have a motif created by Mr Luc 
Luycx of the Royal Belgian Mint, who won a Europe-wide competition (Figure 8.2). 
They depict the value, the name ‘EURO’ and different variants of the EU map and 
twelve stars linked by parallel lines. The one, two and five cent coins supposedly show 
‘Europe’s place in the world’, by having a map of the entire globe with Europe in the 
centre. The ten, twenty and fifty cent coins depict ‘Europe as a group of individual 
nations’ by showing each country as a separate island (including also the EU member 
states who did not join the eurozone: Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, but 
excluding all others, even those who soon were to become members). ‘A united Europe 
without frontiers’ is represented on the one and two euro coins, with an ordinary EU 
map. These three variants are also clearly differentiated in colours and general design, 
so that the coin series consists of three different value groups with three, three and 
two sizes in each.
Reflecting the EU enlargement, a new design was introduced in 2007, retaining 
the key elements as well as the three lowest denominations, but modifying the others 
so that the interpretation was totally changed. The three mid-values no longer show 
‘individual nations’ but rather roughly the same map as the highest coins, only (as 
before) placed to the left of the value figures. This means that all the five highest coins 
now show Europe as a rather unified continent. Efforts were also made to normalise 
Europe’s contour on all these five high-value coins by including the non-EU member 
Norway, extending the continent to the east and adding Cyprus (though it had to be 
radically moved to the north-west in order to become visible). The Council of Europe 
rejected the European Commission’s proposal to include Turkey on the map.474
The three original design variants together thus told a narrative starting with entering 
Europe from afar, noting its place in a global context, then focusing on its internal 
diversity, and finally watching it unite into a coherent entity. In the later version, the 
second step was eradicated, resulting in a less elaborate story, moving from the globe 
to the continent and then just shifting it from the left to the right hand of the surface 
(Figure 8.3). The lines between stars imply a kind of unique and holy ‘star quality’ of 
each state with an emphasis on the linking work of their union. This interpretation is 
supported when both sides of the coin are acknowledged. Romano Prodi, President of 
the European Commission, has explained the coin sides as expressing the EU motto 
of ‘united in diversity’. In this ‘preferred reading’, the common obverse side symbolises 
the unity of the European Commission, whereas the national reverse sides represent 
the diversity of the European Parliament. The two sides thus together symbolise the 
centre of economic and political power versus the nationally divided periphery. The 
obverse sides symbolically also emphasise pure financial value (a number for the euro 
215
Currency
amount in question), whereas the rear sides present symbolic and cultural aspects of 
identity. 
The national reverse sides have to be framed by a twelve star circle and give the year 
of issue, but are otherwise pretty free for each country to design, and the countries 
have indeed made quite varying choices (Figure 8.4). New issues must also add the 
issuing nation’s name. All ‘national’ coins may be used in all EU countries, resulting 
in a circulation of national signs between the EU states as well as to all other countries 
where the euro may be used, for instance through tourism and other travel. This 
means that a whole range of national symbols will possibly be found in any single EU 
citizen’s wallet, reminding of the coexistence within the boundaries of this union of 
regions that might feel rather exotic.475 These complexly evolving sets of euro designs 
will be further specified and discussed in the following section.
Interpreting the common euro designs
As explained above, each banknote and coin clearly presents the respective monetary 
value and the name of the currency, together with various other identifying security codes 
needed for it to serve as a trustworthy currency. The rest of the common designs are 
consciously abstract, in order to avoid the internal envy and competition that might have 
occurred if localisable and nationally biased motifs had been used. It was decided early 
not to depict people (in order to avoid the tricky identity politics of fair representation) or 
specific buildings (so as not to marginalise any non-selected region). Kaelberer regards 
this deliberate abstractness of the euro bill designs as typical of the ‘process of abstraction 
and dematerialisation’ that is inherent in the monetary system, with the transition to 
electronic money as the latest step.476 The harmonious twelve interconnected stars and 
the map emphasise the cohesion of the union, but in an abstract and unspecific manner. 
The whole set of bridges, doors and windows on the notes likewise have a deliberately 
abstract character, in an effort to avoid any specific national bias, and also to steer clear 
of the androcentrism that so predictably dominated the national coin faces. That kind of 
abstract unity may well be problematised as an ideological or magical re-enchantment 
of a continent that is in reality little more than a purely instrumental economic project, 
and whose symbols are void gestures that contribute little to a possible future European 
identity formation. The abstract symbolic patterns and architectural details shown on 
the euro confirm this tendency, possibly testifying to a failure to anchor the EU project 
in deep-seated popular sentiments. On the other hand, it may also be argued that the 
abstractness is a necessary and positive trait: ‘Successful symbols need to be vague and 
multi-layered, so they can appeal to and act as signifiers for all kinds of different groups 
and opinions.’477 This is for instance also true for much of popular culture that is popular 
because the relative abstractness of its plots and characters make it possible for different 
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audiences to invest them with shifting meanings, filling the signifying gaps with aspects 
relevant to one’s own life, and thus invite rather than repel identifying readings.
There is an explicit continuity between the euro and the flag, since a small version of 
the latter is depicted in the upper left corner of all banknote fronts, and both banknote 
sides also integrate a section of a larger star circle into their main motifs. On the coin 
fronts, the stars are instead presented in two groups of six stars each, forming two 
tilted bows along the perimeter, with parallel straight lines connecting them two by 
two: vertical to the right on the two highest denominations (€1 and 2), to the left on 
the three middle ones (¢10, 20 and 50), and diagonally on the three smallest coins 
(¢1, 2 and 5). An interpretation may be to signify how money transfers normally are 
between two individual actors, and that the common European market is constructed 
out of a dense network of such bipolar transferences. All the national coin reverses are 
further framed by a more or less symmetric version of the star circle, and as the edge 
of the €2 coins are nationally determined, they sometimes also include the star circle. 
The euro is therefore a prime example of how the basic logo is reused and integrated 
in new contexts, to ensure European identification and transfer to such new contexts 
the same values that were analysed in Chapter 6.
Secondly, all banknote rears include a standard map of Europe, which as mentioned 
earlier also includes tiny representations of the colonial territories that still are 
controlled by EU member states. No national boundaries are visible, and the eastern 
border of the continent is characteristically diffuse, including the western half of 
Turkey, the Black Sea region and Russia. (This differs from the coins, as explained 
above.) Together with the value figures and the stars, maps are also the focal motif 
on the coin fronts. The three smallest denominations depict a whole globe showing 
Europe surrounded by west Asia and almost all of Africa. This is supposed to refer 
to ‘Europe’s place in the world’. In the original series, the three medium values show 
‘Europe as a group of individual nations’ by having pulled each of the 2002 EU member 
states slightly apart from each other. The two € coins have a similar ‘ordinary’ map as 
on the banknotes, supposedly representing ‘a united Europe without frontiers’, which 
is thus by extension the highest stage of Europe’s development, in accordance with the 
leading EU narrative as expressed by the Schuman Declaration, as well as Europe day 
and the anthem, where the current unification crowns a teleology in which Europe 
passed through disastrous division to achieve the present will to integrate. All in all, 
these maps present a bird’s eye view of the European territory from above, offering a 
sense of control and perspective by drawing boundaries that combine protective outer 
limits with respect for internal national differences.
Besides these elements that confirm the core imagery interpreted in previous 
chapters, the banknotes’ main motifs contribute important new aspects for identifying 
Europe, in the form of doors, windows and bridges from seven architectural periods, 
from the classical period to modern twentieth century. Together, these ‘ages and 
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styles of Europe’ tell a ‘money-story’ (a term used by Vida Zei), of two millennia of 
architectural styles from Roman antiquity to a future-oriented present.478 This story 
is meant to symbolise dynamism and progress, in constructing a linear hierarchy 
typical of western modernity and Enlightenment thinking, where history is conceived 
as future-oriented progression rather than as retrospective continuity or decay. The 
reliably progressing continuity makes a solid impression that anchors the current EU 
in a long line of cultural history. Skipping periods of chaotic decay reinforces an image 
of Europe as always improving and developing, but also respecting its traditions and 
varying its rich heritage into the future. A variant of this trustworthy progressivism is 
inherent in the EU project since the Schuman Declaration, for which World War II was 
an ultimate crisis and catastrophe from which all roads must lead to improvement, if the 
collected achievements of western culture is finally to be applied in a peaceful manner. 
Matthias Kaelberer has acknowledged the ideological force of such storytelling:
The imagery on the euro banknotes attempts to establish links to a 
common European tradition. It refers back to the classical ancestry 
of Europe and deliberately constructs a common European historical 
memory. […] The chronological ascent in artistic styles also reads 
history in conventional European teleological fashion as the story 
of progress. While German banknotes visibly emphasised historical 
discontinuities, the euro can conveniently ‘forget’ uncomfortable 
aspects of European history—such as war and imperialism—in the 
name of an optimistic and progressive vision of Europe. It ‘romanticises’ 
history as easily as national currencies do.479
Chris Shore likewise concludes that all the architectural banknote motifs symbolise 
‘transition, mediation, movement and the promise of a brighter future’.480 It is true 
that the paper money-story does not explicitly allude to Europe’s colonial past, nor 
to any of those wars that through centuries have continued to violently damage those 
same buildings that are here shown as almost eternally solid. The former forgetfulness 
adheres to the leading EU foundation myth, while the latter deviates from its narrative 
of resurrection after internal strife. Rather, the chronological narrative here is one of 
steady progress through the centuries, which is a form of historical consciousness 
that may itself since at least the eighteenth century Enlightenment be understood as 
typically European.
The precise choice of architectural styles offers more signifying cues, besides their 
teleological succession in general. The other conti nents—North and South America, 
Africa, Asia and Australia—would certainly have made different choices. The time span 
would for instance have differed: only in Europe could precisely the last two millennia 




chosen for the lowest (€5) notes happen to be Roman rather than Greek. Whereas 
the € sign is based on a Greek epsilon supposed to refer to the cradle of European 
civilisation in classical Greece, the banknotes instead place Europe’s narrative origin 
in Rome around year 0. The signifying effect of this choice is at least twofold. Spatially, 
it avoids placing the origin of Europe to its southeast corner. Temporally, it implies a 
start around the point zero of modern chronology. Taking a step back behind the magic 
year 0 would contradict a recurring trope of Europe as a Christian continent, and open 
the gate to a possibly endless series of previous Neolithic civilizations. Starting with 
Rome places the birth more in the centre of the continent, and coincides reasonably 
well in time with the emergence of its dominant religion, which still retains a focal 
point in papal Rome. The effect is to place the cradle of Europe centrally in Rome and 
contemporary with Christianity, thus bracketing Greek and other ‘previous’ cultures 
as pre-history. Its potentially decentring connections to the Middle East, Athens and 
Ancient Greece appear to imply an ambiguous identity as both European and Oriental, 
potentially destabilising the East/West polarity and endangering the self-sufficient 
idea of Europe as its own product. It is true that the euro symbol € with its basis in 
a Greek epsilon retains that liminal origin, but in a more hidden and general form, 
elevating this pre-Christian Greek culture above the mundane flow of history into a 
kind of universal sphere of pure and eternal origins and foundations for European 
civilisation. The € sign thus places the Greek origin outside of the historical narrative 
itself, in pre-history, in line with the idea of European civilisation as ‘eccentric’ as 
well as with the Europa myth’s theme of dislocation. It is also significant that only 
some of the Greek coin motifs go further back than Christian times, reconfirming 
that the symbolisms of all the other member states agree to situate the birth of the 
European project in the year 0 ad and the Roman Empire, which is geographically 
ideally positioned, with its great land areas may seem more appropriate for the claims 
of a continent than the seafaring group of islands and coastlines that constituted the 
aquatic network formation of ancient Greece. 
Roman culture also fits better with the fusion of engineering technology and 
humanist ideas that underpins the whole money-story on the banknotes. The choice 
of depicting buildings (rather than for instance people or artworks) has several 
implications. The architectural metaphor of ‘building Europe’ is often used to describe 
European unification in terms of planned political construction rather than for 
instance organic growth, revolutionary leaps or free market forces.481 Choosing hard 
and stable human-made buildings further implies an emphasis on the accumulable 
(rather than ephemeral) aspects of human culture (rather than nature): fixed rather 
than variable capital, heritage rather than the fleeting present, products rather than 
processes, collective rather than individual works, combinations of harmonic aesthetics 
and practically useful engineering technology rather than any other artefactual genres 
or human faculties. The construction metaphor may be seen as a tribute to gradual 
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reforms and also to the modern ideal of makeability: the omnipresent possibility of re-
creation. A European Navigator introductory text on ‘The Currency of the European 
Union’ argues that these monumental motifs signify the stability of the currency and 
‘the capacity of human labour to create great works and to improve them over time’. 
This would then indicate that the unification process can always be further improved 
and redesigned, and that nothing is ever given once and for all. On the other hand 
the stability of the depicted monuments (and hopefully of the euro itself) would 
according to the same source testify to a ‘desire to construct a solid and lasting whole, 
of stone and iron, which is not dependent on economic and political contingencies 
and mirrors the eternity linked to the motifs of classical culture’. Even the ‘absence 
of people and geographical references’ is in this sense read as expressing a money 
economy allegedly ‘based on universality and intertemporality’.482
The specific choice of building elements—bridges, doors and windows—prioritises 
infrastructural frameworks rather than meaningful contents, practices of vision among 
the senses, and movement over stasis (e.g. habitation). The latter creates a certain 
tension to the stability of the constructions themselves, but this is more of a dialectics 
than a paradox, since it is this very stability that ensures the confidence that enables 
mobility. Again, this imagery confirms the perception of Europe as a fundamentally 
land-based entity in the tradition of the Roman Empire. Instead of ships and harbours, 
airplanes and airports, or modern media technologies, there are archetypical windows 
and doors for people to look and walk through, and bridges for people and land-based 
vehicles to cross. But this focus on infrastructures for communication at the same 
time harks back to Europe’s traditional strength in mobility, travel and intercultural 
interaction, sharply distinct from the fixity of for instance the older high cultures 
around the Pharaonic Nile, the Mesopotamian (Sumerian, Akkadian, Assyrian and 
Babylonian) Euphrates and Tigris, the Indian Ganges or the Chinese Yellow River. 
While those were relatively static, Europe was always more dynamic, historically 
unstable, and crisscrossed by mobile populations. The very wish to mediate, link and 
communicate may therefore possibly itself be interpreted as typically European. The 
doors and windows supposedly symbolise ‘the European spirit of openness and co-
operation’, while the bridges stand for ‘the close co-operation and communication 
between Europe and the rest of the world’. In one sense, values such as openness and 
cooperation are extremely unspecific and would presumably be universally suitable 
for any kind of association in the world.483 Still, there is something specific in how this 
imagery is developed here. These motifs are in a sense homological with the ‘united 
in diversity’ motto, as they depict architectural resources that serve to connect while 
also respecting difference. 
Bridges, doors and windows are classical symbols for a deep-seated European 
dialectics of unity/difference, closure/opening and border/transgression. The focus 




the transitions over thresholds in passage rites and liminal phenomena, the current 
interest in borderlands, hybridity, third spaces and intermediarity—all this testifies to 
a deep-seated obsession with communication across boundaries that might possibly 
be universally human but where European thought and political practice have been at 
the forefront—for better and for worse. For Georg Simmel, analysing the metaphorical 
dialectics of bridge and door, ‘the human being is the connecting creature who must 
always separate and cannot connect without separating’—‘the bordering creature 
who has no border’; to Gaston Bachelard, ‘man is half-open being’.484 This aspect of 
European self-identification can on the one hand be understood in Habermasian terms 
as a capacity for communicative action, but on the other hand also in Foucauldian 
terms as a power/knowledge effect related to panoptical supervision and a constant 
urge and coercion to communicate and be open, in line with late modern capitalism’s 
demand for flexibility and with the surveillance trends fuelled by terrorist movements 
and states.
The European Navigator text mentioned above also associates the euro to Simmel’s 
metaphor of bridge and door, adding that this is valid for every man-made institution. 
In its own impersonal and abstract way, the euro offers European citizens a ‘sense of 
belonging’ within a common border but also opens out to ‘an unknown world, an 
uncertain future’.485
The dominant image of Europe as a unity tends to be that of something deeply 
divided, but striving to overcome internal divisions by conscious efforts of mediation 
and communication, with a capitalist market system, democratic forms of governance, 
civil society and an open public sphere as implicit—but often contradictory—tools. 
‘United in diversity’ may thus truly imply unity through and by difference. The internal 
differentiation of this continent may be its perhaps most distinguishable characteristic. 
This conforms to the Schuman Declaration and recent debates, according to which the 
historical experience of mutual extinction has resulted in a possibly abstract but still 
to some extent efficient will and ability to develop forms and models for mediating 
between opposites, enabling exchange without forging unitary identifications. This 
is one way to read the bridge and door symbols on the euro banknotes. According 
to the Dutch writer Cees Nooteboom, ‘national identity is itself a melting-pot of 
cultural influences that transcend nationality and Europeanism consists simply in the 
recognition of unity in difference’.486
The bridge motif can be interpreted in two directions. On the one hand, it does 
construct Europe as open to the surrounding world, on the other hand, it also contains 
expansionist potentials. The inclusion of Turkey in the EU is a relevant example. With 
cosmopolitan Istanbul as prime symbol, Turkey is often depicted as a crossroads between 
Asia and Europe: a bridge between the East and the West. If such a bridge is left outside 
the EU, Europe’s borders may be defended as a fortress wall around a relatively unitary 
Christian mainland. But homogeneity is then bought at the cost of losing control over 
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this particular bridge, leaving its interface between Europe and the East outside the 
control of the EU. There are many—including leading politicians—who prefer this 
purist solution, in order to reinforce Europe’s cultural unity. Others instead argue for 
integrating Turkey, as a way of increasing the richness and openness of the European 
project. This clearly supports a politics of multiculturalism or hybridity, but there may 
also be an aspect of control in this wish. Including such ‘bridges’ implies a certain control 
of them, reflecting many Europeans’ wish for the border regions to become modernised 
or civilised according to a European grammar, for instance in terms of human rights, 
welfare provisions, democratic institutions and free markets. The choice of the bridge 
motif on the euro banknotes may thus imply both communication and control.
It is instructive to consider absences. Potential signs of division are consistently 
avoided, such as subcultures of all kinds or religious and political symbols, except for 
the most general and vague ones (like the Celtic harp). There are maps over the EU area, 
but the decision not to include any flags of member states on the notes or indeed on 
any of the national coin sides may perhaps be read as a post-national commitment.487 
Nowhere is there any representation of specific countries outside the EU, except for 
the indirect Greek reference to Turkey as adversary. Norway, Switzerland and the 
Eastern bloc, now gradually integrated into the EU, remain invisible on this first set of 
coins and notes, as do the surrounding continents as well as the transatlantic relations 
that have had such impact on the formation of Europe. The map on some coins are 
said to show Europe’s place in the world, but this external world remains vague and 
hidden. There is a general talk of openness to other parts of the world, but no specific 
symbolisation of east/west or north/south relations, of European colonialism or 
American imperialism, besides the microscopic traces of colonial territories left as 
strangely placed dots on the maps. National symbols are downplayed to some extent 
(there are no flags for example), but so are specific regions, including those that 
cross intra-European national borders (like the Basque countries). Women remain 
marginal, and there is no representation of children or of the working classes. One 
key feature of modern Europe is particularly absent: mass migration. There are some 
possible references to border-crossings in the Finnish swans, the Greek independence 
men, the pilgrimage site of Santiago da Compostela and the pan-European class of 
royalties, but no clear symbol for the movements of refugees and workers into Europe 
and between its regions. The euro imagery does not care to represent the new Europe, 
by excluding any reference both to its recently integrated eastern half and to the many 
new immigrants from the Middle East, Asia, Africa and South America.
Think of possible alternatives. Natural motifs (plants, animals or landscapes) would 
be either too specifically bound to one place or too vaguely confined to Europe, and, 
more importantly, they would not enable a narrative of civilization and progress. Human 
portraits or situations would again be too specific, but the selection of infrastructural 




project for communication between nations. Artworks would lack that technological 
and utilitarian aspect that architecture offers, and which applies so well to the EU, 
being a tool and a mechanism as well as a work and a symbol. Unlike human beings 
and some other art forms, the selected buildings are enduring artifices that seem to 
stand for the stable and trustworthy quality that the Union itself also strives for. 
There is also an inherent parallelism between money and the kinds of buildings depicted 
on the banknotes, as both are means of communication, circulation and mobility; at the 
same time both are also leaning on fixed infrastructures that guarantee a sense of solidity, 
stability and trust that is needed for these dynamic exchanges to take place. 
The historical progress told by the paper money-story is thus traced through 
monumental but utilitarian public buildings, bearing witness to a harmonious 
combination of aesthetics and technology, with a practical use for communication 
purposes. The identifying narrative of the banknotes declares Europe to be a western, 
Christian unity focused on historical progress, enduring stability, a seamless fusion of 
aesthetics and technology, boundaries and the processes of communication that cross 
them. There are aspects of identity, community and unity in this imagery, but more 
dominant are themes of transport, communication and diversity. So, again, diversity 
remains the basis also for the unity that can be discerned here: as with the EU, the unity 
of the euro is constructed out of differences. Europe has many historical experiences 
in common, but is one of the most internally differentiated world regions, with its 
old and established nation states, its many divergent languages and its many national 
and regional myths. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the wall, it does 
not appear as  deeply internally divided as many other continents. It has all kinds of 
minorities but no longer any clear bifurcation, partly due to the EU project of uniting 
north and south, east and west. This project joins forces with parallel unifying efforts, 
such as the ecumenical rapprochement between the Christian churches. Christian 
religion is a unifying factor, but its role in political and economic life is held back 
by secularising counter-forces and by the efforts to better integrate non-Christian 
minorities, in particular the growing Muslim populations in many states.
Precisely how these new collective identifications of the euro designs will change 
over time, with the inclusion of more member states and the addition of later editions, 
is another question. More studies are also needed of how these money signs are read 
by those who use them, make them or regulate them. The emphasis on abstract forms 
in a high art formalist style and on images of technocratic infrastructures is typical of 
the increasingly problematic EU project from above. The Union needs to reconnect 
to popular images of more specific histories of interhuman and trans- rather than 
supranational encounters. Some such potential might lie hidden in European football 
and in the Eurovision Song Contest, or more importantly in transnational currents 
of everyday civic communication and a long history of movements for social justice. 
But similar traces of interhuman relations and transgressive identifications remain 
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absent in the euro designs yet, both on banknotes and coin fronts. The former do 
display resources for communication but offer few hints of concrete diversities of 
content. Their dehumanised abstractness rather suggests universal uniformity, in line 
with the inseparable flag stars. It is up to the users of these symbols to imagine how 
communication across borders could be concretised—or in living practice populate 
the anonymous communication resources with meaningful contents.
Interpreting the national euro coin designs
Specific contents only appear on the national coin reverses, which circulate tiny 
illustrations of the plurality that Europe unites and that move through its symbolic 
doors and windows. The decision to let each country design its own set of national coin 
sides is in line with the motto. In the whole euro area, one may encounter coins that 
express values of any other EMU member state, which offers a tangible illustration of 
how Europe is both united and diverse. Both by its contrast to currencies elsewhere and 
by its multiple coin reverses, the euro currency is a way of ‘symbolising boundaries’.488 
The national coin sides aim to make national populations feel a sense of belonging 
to Europe while at the same time showing how Europe is internally differentiated. 
Thus, they express a similar core idea as the motto of ‘united in diversity’, namely that 
European identity can only exist as a hybrid and multi-layered one.489 
In order to see the patterns of difference between the twelve initial euro nations, it is 
necessary to scrutinise the coins designed in each country. In order to get hold of the 
historical dynamics, these will for the original twelve eurozone states also be compared 
to the currencies that circulated in the EU immediately before the introduction of the 
euro in January 2002.490 The associated euro designs and the ones added after 2002 
will be more briefly presented after the initial twelve sets.
Immediately before the introduction of euro, Austria had banknotes primarily 
depicting great composers, artists and scientists, while old coins had a vast range of 
motifs, including heraldic eagles, coats of arms, horsemen and flowers, buildings, 
towns and regions, images of phases of Austria’s history or of its various peoples, 
cultural personalities, Olympic sports and the House of Hapsburg, but also symbols of 
Europe and the Wiener Secession. For the euro, Austria decided to produce a complete 
series of different coins, dedicated to plants, architecture and historical personalities, 
all designed by one artist (Josef Kaiser). The smallest coins contain typical flowers: 
an Alpine primrose (¢1), an edelweiss (¢2), and a gen tian flower (¢5)—with the 
purpose to remind of ecological issues concerning Austria’s contribution to a shared 
policy for protecting the natural environ ment. St. Stephen’s Cathedral in gothic 
style (consecrated 1147) is a tourist must-see (¢10). The Belvedere Palace (1714–23) 




the treaty of its sovereign constitution was signed there in 1955 (¢20). The Wiener 
Secession building (1897–8) is an exhibition house sig ni fying the birth of the art 
nouveau style in Austria, as a symbol of the dawn of a new era (¢50). The composer 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–91) was already on the old coins (€1). So was the 
pacifist Bertha von Suttner (1843–1914), a symbol of Austrian peace efforts (€2). 
Austria euros thus form a money-story moving from nature (plants) through material 
artefacts (buildings) to living human spirit (celebrities), in line with a secularised view 
on historical progress. Plants may be geographically located and culturally identified 
with a certain region or even nation, but are still not strictly limited to them. Whereas 
nature is presented as timeless, the cultural motifs point specifically at four periods: 
the twelfth and the eighteenth centuries, c. 1900 and 1955. The buildings chosen are 
associated with religion, politics and the arts—three key spheres of modern societies. 
As such, they have a universal touch, while still being anchored in a national context 
and in European culture: the cathedral is visited by tourists from anywhere, the 
constitution was a product of European negotiations after World War II, and art 
noveau was a widespread style. Mozart as cultural personality travelled a lot to Paris 
and to German, Italian and Czech cities, and his work soon became a keystone of 
‘universal’ art music heritage. Bertha von Suttner secures an even gender balance and 
adds a political aspect that again emphasises international cooperation in Europe. The 
transition to the euro made no sharp break with the previous schilling motifs, but the 
selection clearly seems to imply Europeanness as a transnational endeavour, evolving 
from natural resources depicted in the lower denominations up to cosmopolitan 
culture and politics, echoing core values of mobility, enjoyment and elevation.
In Belgium, pre-euro banknotes depicted artistic creators or the royal couple, with 
coins mainly having royal motifs.491 The Belgian euro coins opted for continuity with 
pre-euro money, and all the coins were designed by the director of the Turnhout 
academy of arts, Jan Alfons Keustermann. As a monarchy, Belgium presents on all 
its coins the face of King Albert II, with a monogram ‘A’ with a crown above, placed 
between the European stars. These coins focus on a very traditional aspect of the 
present: monarchy, in continuity with the past—an aristocratic form of rule that 
today has more representational than political functions. An international network 
of monarchies ties the royal families together by marriage and other relationships, 
and since monarchies are today a primarily European tradition, this could be seen 
to confirm European integration. Still, leaning just on royalty is a very narrow and 
conservative identification. Sticking to the ancient tradition of letting an image of the 
sovereign ruler guarantee the money value is a strikingly anachronistic, quasi-feudal 
practice in today’s democratic parliamentary Europe. The fact that kings nowadays 
are more personas of popular culture than any real rulers gives an extra twist to that 
symbolism. The same royal portraits that two centuries ago represented real political 
power today rather stand for media fame, in an anachronistic marriage between 
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premodern aristocracy and late modern commercialism. The single design also halts 
any narrative progress through the coin values, strengthening the impression of 
ahistorical stasis. These kinds of coins may therefore be placed in a similar category 
as for instance the Eurovision and UEFA anthems discussed in the previous chapter, 
emphasising hierarchic stability and uniformity more than anything else.
Finland’s preceding mark banknotes fronted Finnish cultural celebrities from the 
last centuries, each surrounded by a suitable environment, while the coins had motifs 
from nature. The three different Finnish euro coin motifs were built on these older 
designs. A heraldic lion was placed on all the six smaller values. Two swans flying 
above a lake are found on the €1 coin; cloudberries and cloudberry flowers adorn 
the €2. The Finnish euro motifs do not explicitly denote any particular historical 
period, though a Finn may well connote them to specific tales and myths of Finland, 
for instance the coat of arms to the independence from Russia in 1809. The lion as 
such is far from a Finnish animal, but a traditional heraldic exoticism, common 
all over Europe, thus with a transnational edge to it, even if it is also integrated in 
an aristocratic or royal heritage of power symbols which is somewhat at odds with 
Finland’s republican constitution and absence of domestic aristocracy. Cloudberries 
are specific to the northern hemisphere, and Finland is sometimes called a land 
of thousand lakes, frequented by migrating birds, which can be seen as a kind of 
border-crossing nomads. There is thus continuity with the past, but also an amount 
of transnationalising Europeanism, especially if one regards the narrative sequence 
from mythic nation symbols to a kind of ‘natural communication’ where the local is 
wedded to the translocal and transcontinental mobility is again acknowledged.
In France, the last edition of franc banknotes also depicted famous Frenchmen 
from arts and science. Coins contained the words ‘République Française’ (or ‘RF’) with 
the the motto ‘liberté—égalité—fraternité’ and one of the stock republican symbols: 
an ear of corn, a branch with leaves, a tree and a hexagon, the symbolic Républic 
woman in profile, the Spirit of the Bastille, the Mont St-Michel or the Panthéon. A 
national competition chose the euro designs, all of which are based in the traditional 
republican symbols from the French Revolution. A young and determined Marianne 
is embodying the desire for a strong and lasting Europe in the smallest coins (¢1, 
¢2, ¢5). A sower in modern and timeless design, symbolising France integrated in 
Europe but remaining independent, adorns the next level (¢10, ¢20, ¢50). A tree 
symbolising life, continuity and growth, inscribed in a hexagon and sur round ed by 
the republican motto ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’, is found on the highest level (€1, 
€2). All these universalist and classicist motifs go back to the late eighteenth century 
French Revolution. Mythical (but not religious) and human figures, a tree and a verbal 
motto point towards France’s role in planting the seed of Enlightenment, in which 
the EU project often inscribes itself. Its dissemination has universalistic pretensions 




cultural and scientific personalities, have been excluded in favour of this thematic 
sphere, strongly favouring unity, not diversity. The sequence from low to high values 
reinforces this impression by telling the story of a youthful newborn nation who then 
disseminates its message like a missionary of reason and democracy, resulting in the 
organically tree-like growth of a global society where all have their fixed positions. 
This reconciliation or fusion of nature and culture is typical of modernity, where the 
new is permeated by the archaic: ‘the new in the context of what has always already 
been there’, that ‘is always citing primal history’, to quote Walter Benjamin.492
Germany’s last series of mark banknotes showed cultural personalities in front of 
historical buildings of particular cities, with related objects on the rear sides. In order 
to express West Germany’s integration into (western) Europe, almost as an invitation 
to the Schuman Declaration two years later, a 1948 5 DM note actually featured 
Europe and the bull.493 The lower values of the old coins had a girl planting a tree 
and an oak twig, while the highest showed the Bundesadler and ex-Bundeskanzler 
Willy Brandt, with the inscription ‘Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit’ (‘Unity and 
Justice and Freedom’) on the edge. On the German euro coins, the oak twig echoes 
a motif from the old Pfennigs (¢1, ¢2, ¢5). Brandenburger Tor is a symbol of the 
split in and but also the reunion of Germany—the view through the arch is meant to 
underline the unification of Germany and of Europe (¢10, ¢20, ¢50). The federal eagle 
(Bundesadler) is a traditional symbol of German sovereignty (€1, €2). Like several 
other countries, Germany has thus maintained a clear continuity, with a widespread 
plant with traditional national connotations, the frightening bird that is reminiscent 
of authoritarian periods of German history (Bismarck or the Third Reich) and, more 
interestingly, the building that has such a complex history. It was ordered by Frederick 
the Great and built by Carl Gotthard Langhans, inspired by the Propylaea of Athens. 
At first it was called the ‘Gate of Peace’, but after its topping quadriga was stolen and 
taken to Paris by Napoleon in 1806 and returned in 1814, it became a ‘Gate of Victory’, 
and established as a symbol of Prussia. As such it was the site for celebrating the 
victory over France in 1871, and used in similar ways during World War I and by 
the Nazis. In the Cold War, it became part of the Berlin wall and a symbol of divided 
Europe, but after the 1989 reunification, its opening on the Unter den Linden avenue 
has made it a symbol of the reuniting of Germany and of East and West Europe at 
large. It is thus a traditional symbol of Berlin and of unity across deep divides, thus a 
suitable symbol for the European project, too.494 As a whole, however, the coin series 
embeds this split/reunion dialectics in a rather conservative and authoritarian story 
by starting with nature and ending with the eagle as both naturalised and mythified 
symbol of national power, making the German euro series rather ambiguous and 
open to contradictory readings.
In Greece, the last drachma banknotes each developed a specific theme that tended 
to link ancient mythology with historical heroes and societal spheres. For instance, 
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on the lowest note value, ‘Letters—Education and their contribution to the nation’s 
independence’ was the idea behind Goddess Athena, backed by the translator and 
educator Adamantios Korais, who went to Paris in 1788 and was important in the 
Greek struggle for independence, while the highest value note thematised ‘health’, with 
twentieth century pathologist George Papanicolaou and the God of medicine Asclepius. 
The watermarks showed either a charioteer of Delphi or Alexander the Great’s father, 
King Philip of Macedonia of the fourth century bc. Coin motifs included ships, an olive 
tree branch, sports championships, classical gods, Homer, Democritus and Aristotle, 
as well as more recent national heroes, political activists and intellectuals. The three 
lowest Greek euro coins are devoted to ships: an Athenian trireme from the time of 
Komon, fifth century bc, for more than 200 years the largest warship afloat (¢1); a 
corvette, used in the Greek War of In de pendence 1821–7 (¢2); and a modern seagoing 
tanker, reflecting the innovative spirit of Greek shipping (¢5). The next three show 
heroes in the Greek struggle for independence, mainly from the Turkish empire: Rigas 
Velestinlis-Fereos (1757–98, national hero and poet during the Ottoman occu pa tion, 
exile in Constantinople, Bucharest and Austria, inspired by the Enlightenment, French 
Revolution and Napoleon, martyr in the war for independence 1789) (¢10); Ioannis 
Capodistrias (1776–1831, Greek political leader in independence struggle and prime 
minister, striving to get general European support, assassinated in 1833) (¢20); and 
Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936, modernising Cretan liberty leader against the Turks, 
head of Crete 1899 and first prime minister of Greece in periods from 1910 to 1933) 
(¢50). The highest values carry mythic motifs: the owl as a symbol of wisdom, from an 
ancient Athenian 4 drachma coin, fifth century bc (€1) and a Spartan mosaic of the 
myth of the abduction of Europa by Zeus in the shape of a bull (€2), directly linked to 
the European myth discussed earlier. Greece thus has a focus on its long history and 
its myths based in classical antiquity. The historical periods referred to are the fifth 
century bc, the struggle for independence during the decades around 1800 and in the 
early twentieth century, and the post-war period of economic expansion and oil trade. 
The ships both connect to Greece as a traditional seafaring nation and to the inherently 
transnational or even global character of the seas and of trade in general, and thus to 
the euro and the EU as transnationalising forces. The three freedom fighters refer to 
Greece as an independent nation, but also connect with other European forces in their 
struggle for this autonomy, confirming the ‘united in diversity’ concept. If Turkey ever 
finally becomes an EU member, it will appear somewhat remarkable that Greece has 
chosen to identify through men who mainly fought against that future union partner.495 
It is also notable that all three historical persons are male, while women are instead 
represented by the abducted Europa, who connects the EU to a Greek myth, but in a 
rather passive and not so glorious manner, since Europa is shown as mastered by the 
potent male Greek god. Many motifs connect back to the previous drachma coins, but 




at the same time confirms Greek macho pride. As a narrative whole there is a progress 
from artefacts and persons to mythical symbols with natural elements. Nature thus 
does not come first in Greece, and the highest level cannot refrain from returning to 
classical antiquity, even though the temporal progress in each of the two first subseries 
move the ordinary modern way from past to present.
Ireland before 2002 had banknotes depicting great Irish historical figures, from 
Catherine McAuely who founded the Sisters of Mercy to James Joyce and heroes from 
the Irish struggle of independence, each combined with relevant houses, writings 
and artefacts. The Celtic harp was the standard element on Irish £ coins, matched by 
various animals from traditional Irish inscriptions (bull, fish, horse, deer). The Irish 
government decided to let all euro coins have identical design: the Celtic harp as a 
traditional symbol of Ireland, with the word ‘Éire’. This mythic and national motif 
stresses Celtic specificity, though popular fantasy fiction has spread such symbols 
widely. A musical instrument is in itself a peaceful aesthetic symbol, but with complex 
levels of association added through the violent Irish history. The lack of change between 
value levels resonates with the choice of the harp as a musical instrument, as music 
(and in particular folk music) is so often regarded as an eternal and universal language 
binding people together across all historical, geographic and social distances. Even 
though such ideas are in reality often false when it comes to existing musical genres, 
this harp may well in a general way invite being interpreted as an elegant visual shape 
linked to a mild and pleasant sound that many would easily appreciate.
In Italy, the lire banknotes had historical cultural heroes from science and arts, while 
coins mainly reproduced classical subjects in the shape of rather unspecific bodies 
and faces. For the Italian euro coins, the viewers of RAI television programme chose 
between a series of design proposals. Each value got its own motif, all related to key 
Italian artistic works: Castel del Monte castle near Andria in Ampulia, built in 1240 as 
residence for Emperor Fredric II (¢1); Mole Antonellina tower in Torino by Alessandro 
Antoeli (1863; originally conceived as a synagogue but built as the largest tower of 
Italy and now the key symbol of the town) (¢2); the Flavius amphitheatre Colosseum 
in Rome, begun by Emperor Vespasian c. 75 bc, inaugurated by Emperor Titus in 80 
ad (¢5); Sandro Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus (c. 1485) (¢10); sculpture of forms of 
movement by leading Italian futurist Umberto Boccioni (1882–1916) (¢20); Emperor 
Marcus Aure lius equestri an statue at Piazza Capitolium, Rome (1538) (¢50); Leonardo 
da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man, Italian Renaissance (1513): human body, harmony between 
man and the universe (€1); Raphael’s portrait of Dante Alighieri (1508–11): symbol 
of virtues, goodness and beauty (€2). Italy is thus the country whose coins are most 
dedicated to cultural history, with subjects from the first century bc to the thirteenth, 
fifteenth, sixteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ad. They are lined up in 
no particular chronological order, but the three highest coins all have sixteenth century 
motifs, hinting at a rather backward-looking view of that golden Renaissance era, thus 
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evading or even contradicting the progressivist banknote story. Buildings come first, 
then visual arts, and the most symbolically charged motifs in the end. The only female 
subject is the goddess of beauty, whereas the final male figures stand for grand human 
values, significantly with the more ‘physical’ Vitruvian man placed slightly lower than 
the universal mind of Dante—all reinforcing conservative dichotomies of male/female 
and soul/body. Compared to before the euro, Italy has developed a new set of subjects 
with a wide scope and with a sharper focus on supposedly universal values, with the 
sphere of aesthetics in focus, avoiding the more divisive associations to politics.
Luxembourg franc banknotes depicted the Grand Duke Jean in front of various 
palaces, while the modern European Centre of Luxembourg-Kircherg or the cities 
of Luxembourg and Echternach on the reverse. The old franc coins also depicted the 
Grand Duke. Luxembourg’s euro coins have identical motifs but in three variants, 
following the obverse groups. All depict Grand Duke Henri, who inherited the throne 
from his father in October 2000, with the domestic country name ‘Letzebuerg’. These 
coins can be interpreted in the same way as those of Belgium, though there is more 
continuity here in that even the previous notes were equally narrow in focus.
In the Netherlands, the guilder banknotes did not depict the Queen but instead 
had themes related to nature and were designed in a rather modern, abstract style: 
kingfisher, robin, sunflower, owl, lighthouse and lapwing. The immediate pre-euro 
Dutch coins had Queen designs with geometrical patterns, but there had also been 
various commemorative coins, as well as a final ‘goodbye to the guilder’ coin issued 
in 2001, with a funny troll-like figure drawn by a twelve-year-old school boy. For 
the euro, the Netherlands also chose to have an almost identical design on all coins: 
Queen Beatrix, in two variants (the €1 and €2 with a different layout than the rest), 
with the words ‘Beatrix, Koningin der Nederlanden’, and framed by the twelve stars. 
This third Benelux nation has chosen the same coin genre as its two neighbours, but 
only with a more contemporary artistic design that speaks of a wish to be stylishly 
‘modern’. These coins are similar to the pre-euro coins, while the wider and more 
artistic themes of the old banknotes have been lost completely. 
Portugal’s last escudo banknotes celebrated the great world explorers and colonisers, 
together with sailing ships or warrior knights, while the last pre-euro coins had the royal 
coat of arms on one side—the word ‘escudo’ (like ‘schilling’) actually means shield and 
refers to that coat of arms. Euro designs were chosen in a graphic competition, won 
by Manuel Fernandes dos Santos with three seals of the first Portuguese King, Dom 
Afonso Henriques: the first royal seal from 1134 with the word ‘Portugal’ (¢1, ¢2, ¢5); 
the royal seal from 1142 (¢10, ¢20, ¢50); and the royal seal from 1144 surrounded by 
some of the country’s castles and coats of arms within the European stars, supposedly 
symbolising dialogue, value exchange and the dynamics of the EU (€1, €2). In 
continuity with its past coins, the set of Portuguese images is very narrow, with its 




ten years in the twelfth century. It is the birth of the nation state that is celebrated, 
though the highest value coins add some elements that possibly signify some kind of 
opening up to the world. Portugal has thus refrained from the old exploration motifs, 
thus bidding farewell to references to an era of brave but violent efforts to go around 
the world in the name of capitalist trade and imperial power.
The last pesetas banknotes of Spain depicted the (in)famous conquistadors, 
explorers and scientists who helped Spain colonise the Americas. Earlier coins had 
the King or the royal couple, with coat of arms, stylized flame with branch of leaves, 
man and bull, castle, church doorway or water wheel. The last series of pesetas had a 
great variety of motifs, changing every year, and dealing with different topics related 
to the autonomous regions, personages from the Spanish culture and history, or 
commemorating important events. Spain divided its euros into three main series: the 
Romanesque cathedral of Santiago de Compostela (eleventh century), world famous 
pilgrimage destination (¢1, ¢2, ¢5); author Miguel Cervantes (1547–1616), father of 
Spanish literature (¢10, ¢20, ¢50); and King Juan Carlos I de Borbón y Borbón (€1, 
€2). Like Italy, Spain is a deeply subdivided nation with many regions that have a 
large degree of autonomy. This may be an explanation why the king alone has not 
been allowed to dominate all coin sides—and this was true also before the euro. 
Basque and Catalonian subjects have also been left aside. Instead, it is the relatively 
less controversial Galician outpost and the central area of Madrid and La Mancha that 
is represented. Read in a sequence, the coins go from past to present, from national 
periphery to centre, from buildings to people and from religion and literature to 
politics. The choice of the world-famous tourist and pilgrimage site of the cathedral, 
as well as of Cervantes whose Don Quixote is regarded not only as a literary point 
of origin for Spain but also as the global birth of the novel, indicates a willingness 
to emphasise transnational links in each dimension. The dynastic and the religious 
institutions were dominant organisers of political power before the era of the nation 
state, and both of them tend to transgress national borders: through the pan-European 
network of royal houses and through the global network of churches.496 The same is 
true of culture, not least literature and the novel, which is today a global genre. Spain’s 
royal face and cathedral façade, as well as its knight-errant of the woeful countenance, 
can all therefore be said to transcend Iberic boundaries. And even more so than 
with Portugal, the abandoning of the conquistador era may be interpreted either as 
forgetfulness of the colonial past or as a true step beyond and away from it. Desire, 
border-crossing mobility and in Cervantes’ case also a kind of hybridity are therefore 
apparent themes found in these Spanish euro coins.
Non-EU members Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican State have issuing 
rights too. 
Monaco has on its euro coins the coat of arms of the Sovereign Princes of Monaco 
on all six lower values, topped by a double portrait of HSH Prince Rainier III and HSH 
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Hereditary Prince Albert (€1) and HSH Prince Rainier III (€2). Its generic choice thus 
remains close to that of the Benelux monarchies. 
San Marino features three towers on the low level coins: first tower La Guaita (¢1), 
Statue of Liberty (¢2) and third tower Il Montale (¢5). The mid-series presents the 
Basilica of San Marino (¢10), Saint Marino on a canvas of the Guercino school (¢20) 
and the three towers La Guaita, La Cesta and Il Montale (¢50). The republic’s official 
coat of arms is on the €1, the Palazzo Pubblico government building on the €2 coin. 
Being a republic, this tiny nation has avoided the head of state and instead chosen old 
buildings, a combination of art and city, and a national symbol. 
The State of Vatican City has let its sovereign, His Holiness Pope John Paul II, reign 
on all its five coins (only ¢1, ¢2, ¢5, ¢20 and €1 were issued). This connects to the 
most traditionalist monarchies. When the Pope died his portrait was replaced also on 
the coins by that of his successor, Benedict XVI. The religious theme of course is not 
surprising here.
During 2007–11, five more countries joined EU and the eurozone, all issuing their 
own euro coins. Cyprus joined in January 2008 with three motifs: two wild sheep of the 
old mouflon species (¢1, ¢2, ¢5); the fourth-century bc Greek merchant Kyrenia ship, 
uniquely preserved since classical Greece and a symbol of lost home for many refugees 
(¢10, ¢20, ¢50); and the Idol of Pomos from sometime around thirtieth (!) century 
bc—a female fertility figure that strangely enough holds out her hands in cross shape 
and with a little cross amulet hanging around her neck (€1, €2). The ship combines 
with the Greek coins to reproduce their underlining of an old history of mobility and 
exile, linking today’s migration with those transformed into the Europa myth, while the 
ancient amulet offers an even much older reference to what European culture might 
have been long before the classical Greek “cradle of civilisation” had been formed.
Estonia issued its euro in January 2011—all of them showing a map contour of 
Estonia. 
Malta in 2008 started using its three motifs, divided in the same way as Cyprus: the 
megalithic Mnajdra temple altar from the fourth millennium bc; the coat of arms of 
Malta; and the Maltese cross, used by the Knights of Malta from the fifteenth century 
ad, but with roots back to the eleventh century crusades. Again, there is thus a 
combination of very ancient roots with the much later and quite aggressive Christian 
frontier to the Muslim world.497
Slovakia issued in 2009 likewise three motifs: Kriváň, a High Tatras mountain 
with great significance for ethnic and national movements since the early nineteenth 
century; Bratislava Castle with its long and winding history; and the coat of arms 
of Slovakia, showing a double cross on three hills. The Christian topic goes back to 
Slovakia’s historical role as border to the Byzantine Empire.
Slovenia in 2007 came up with a unique design for each value. The lowest ¢1 coin 




Prince’s stone, a Roman column base that was in the Middle Ages used for installing 
Carinthian dukes. Some Austrians questioned this coin, since Carinthia was divided 
after the World War I. The ¢5 coin shows Ivan Grohar’s painting A Sower sowing stars, 
which of course nods at the EU flag as well as the famous sower reproduced on French 
coins. On ¢10 is found Jože Plečnik’s draft for a national parliament looking almost 
like the tower of Babel, with the inscription ‘Cathedral of Freedom’. ¢20 shows a pair 
of Lipizzaner horses; and ¢50 has the Triglav mountain, the constellation of Cancer 
and lines from Jakob Aljaž’s song ‘O Triglav, My Home’. On the €1 coin is Primož 
Trubar, Slovenian Protestant reformer, and the inscription ‘To Exist and Persevere’. 
The highest €2 value represents Romantic poet France Prešeren and the first line 
of the seventh stanza of Slovenian national anthem ‘Zdravljica’. Both Slovakia and 
Slovenia thus introduced mountains as a motif, strongly suggesting stability and fixity, 
in opposition to ships and other motifs of mobility.
To this overview should be added that each eurozone state may each year release one 
commemorative €2 coin, which almost all have also done. Some for instance celebrate the 
European Constitution, the 2004 EU extension, the 2007 Portuguese and 2008 French 
EU presidencies, the Olympic Games, the United Nations, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as well as a large number of individual celebrities or national events 
and buildings. Germany will from 2006 to 2021 each year issue one coin for each of its 
16 Bundesländer (states), while Spain will from 2010 to 2050 honour UNESCO World 
Heritage sites, thus having determined its commemorative coins for a longer period. 
There have also been made two joint commemoration issues for all eurozone countries 
(Figure 8.5). One such coin in 2007 celebrated the 50 years anniversary of the Treaty 
of Rome, depicting the treaty signatures as an open book under the word ‘EUROPE’, 
surrounded by Michelangelo’s geometrical paving on the Piazza del Campidoglio in 
Rome where the treaty was signed in 1957 (and which also forms the background to 
Italy’s own ¢50 coin). In 2009, another commemorated the tenth anniversary of the euro 
itself. Its design was selected by electronic voting and was made by a sculptor at the Bank 
of Greece. It depicts some kind of primitive (or childish) man in cave art style, united 
with the € sign, almost like a shield or a bow and arrow, thus underlining the euro’s role 
as an extension of man and something to trust for the individual citizen. These special 
issues are produced in a limited number, but may on the other hand receive increased 
attention as collector items. This applies even more to gold and silver coins (with a face 
value between ¢25 and €100 000, with €10 as a common level) that are not so much 
intended for circulation as means of payment as for collecting. 
The detailed investigation of this plethora of euro designs could expand indefinitely, 
as their number and variety expand at an accelerating pace. In this context however, 
it seems more fruitful to start looking for dominant patterns in the main designs 
mentioned above, focusing on the original set of common sides plus the main twelve 
sets of national reverses.
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Overall, there is no uniformity in how the countries have divided the coins into sub-
series. Austria, Greece and Italy (as well as San Marino) have eight different designs, 
though often grouped in internally related subsets in parallel to the obverse groups. 
(Monaco presents four designs, following the obverse groups but also differentiating 
between the one and two euro coins.) The most common solution, chosen by France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, is to create three back designs, one for 
each main type of obverse design (though Luxembourg is a border case since all its 
coins have the same Grand Duke, only in three variants). Finland also has three types, 
but with individual designs on the one and two euro coins and the rest identical with 
each other. The Netherlands has two main designs (one and two euros differentiated 
from the lower values). Belgium and Ireland (as well as the Vatican) have only one 
design each. One might say that the common obverse designs tend to favour a ‘3+3+2’ 
tripartition, which a majority of the nations have decided to break away from in one 
way or the other, though the largest ones have followed the main rule. It is hard to see 
any clear trend when it comes to the motifs chosen for lower or higher currency values. 
Different countries have made very different ‘money-stories’, based on contrasting 
hierarchies, but a common story goes from a basis in nature and technology up to 
culture, myth and ideas on the highest values, reflecting a possibly typical European 
dualist hierarchy of body/soul or base/superstructure, which has both materialist and 
idealist versions, depending on whether the low material basis is seen as founding or 
subordinated.
Motif statistics vary depending on whether all twenty euro countries are counted, 
or just the seventeen EMU member states, or the original twelve; and also whether one 
counts the total number of coins (in all 8 x 20 = 160) or just the number of genuinely 
different motifs (in all 74 designs). Classification is also difficult since several motifs 
fill double functions. This said, around 40 per cent show human figures, 2/3 of which 
are male. Buildings, human artefacts and natural motifs are three categories with 
each a roughly equal share of the remaining designs. Some general patterns appear, 
forming main genres and country groups.
Summarising the national coin sides, some main iconical genres may be 
distinguished:
1.  Rulers are shown by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain, but 
also the three affiliated states. (The three yet non-euro nations Denmark, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom also belong to this category, but none of the 
later added euro states Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia or Slovenia.) All the 
monarchies—and only these—display their rulers, leaning towards an ancient 
tradition of authorising money values by showing the ruling head of a clan, 
empire or nation.498 In modern republics, that practice has become less useful, 




little degree an egalitarian spirit of democracy that shuns displaying such clear 
symbols of state power as national symbols. (However, the fact that presidents 
may well appear on stamps contradicts this somewhat optimistic interpretation.) 
Hereditary monarchies have stable heads of state, at the cost of stripping these 
anachronistic institutions of all essential instruments of real political power. It 
is slightly paradoxical that these monarchs nowadays have almost no political 
power, being reduced to purely symbolic signs for their nation states. But 
precisely this makes them doubly useful as money motifs, and perhaps the most 
easily accessible and in a way uncontroversial choice. Faces of state rulers are 
symbols of power and one of the few undisputedly nationalist symbols. They 
fuse aristocratic historical roots with late modern entertainment business and 
popular culture, and offer a simple solution for countries to avoid the work of 
finding other ways to signify their relation to the world. If the specific monarch 
depicted has had no personal role as transnational bridge-builder, this motif is 
bound to the old European system of nation states out of which international 
systems like the UN and the EU were once born, but else contains no other, 
more innovative or up-to-date transnational significance. However, a kind of 
transnational bridging is inherent in the monarchic institution, as the royalties 
of different countries, particularly in Europe, have always tended to blend 
through intermarriage, thus contributing a key force of unification that may 
partly explain why the royal symbolisms (think of the royal blue colour of the 
flag or the EBU and UEFA hymns discussed in previous chapters) continue to 
be attractive in today’s European contexts as well, even within republics.499
2.  National symbols are selected by Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and Portugal. 
(This is also true for Malta, Slovakia, Monaco, San Marino and probably also 
Sweden if it ever issues a euro.) Heraldic animals, coats of arms and other 
traditional symbols that have been monopolised by certain states have similar 
functions as the rulers’ faces, and are equally old as money symbols. They do 
avoid the anthropomorphisation of power that inheres in the royal face, instead 
showing the nation state in a more abstract and superhuman form. But again, 
they also tend to reproduce feudal roots of the narratives of nation building 
that became so popular as a way to legitimise and historically anchor the 
imagined communities born in the modern, bourgeois nationalist movements 
of the nineteenth century. Again, all national symbols to some extent do have 
transnational roots and routes: they have travelled and branched off in various 
directions, and are never undisputedly local. Benedict Anderson (1991) has 
pointed out that being much older than nation states, churches as well as royal 
houses remain particularly promiscuous in that respect, even when the latter are 
subsumed under national authorities and bound to their names—the King of X 
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is often closely related to the Queen of Y. Such interconnections are generally 
successfully suppressed within each national context, but may come out into 
the open as these coins circulate also in other regions where similar symbols 
may well be used with a completely different sphere of meaning. For an Irish 
citizen, the Celtic harp probably is a univocal and deep-rooted image for the 
Irish nation, but in Wales, Britanny or Galicia it might well intersect with other 
local traditions, in Jewish tradition it rather is reminiscent of King David of the 
Old Testament, and for a Greek or a Finn who gets such a coin in her purse, it 
may well be understood as just a nice old instrument that shows the universal 
reach of music. The question is which kinds of such lines are drawn through the 
choice of such symbols: political, military, commercial, cultural, etc. Whereas the 
harp implies harmony and communication, crowns and seals signify power and 
authority, eagles and lions like coats of arms connote violence and military force, 
and plants have naturalising meaning-effects of growth, care, boundedness to 
the soil, etc. In some cases, notably France, national symbols also have explicitly 
universalistic overtones—at least for the inhabitants of the countries in question. 
In the classical French imagination, ‘liberté, égalite, fraternité’ is a truly universal 
motto, as it has also to some extent become due to the combination of colonialism 
and the global spread of republicanism, emphasised by the US constitution and 
later the UN declaration of human rights. 
3.  History, in the form of cultural or political artefacts and individuals, appears on 
coins from Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. (This also holds for San 
Marino, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia.) There are many subtypes in this 
category, as history contains many things with highly divergent implications. 
Political events, leaders or buildings may of course relate to key moments of 
nation-formation, in which case the signification of such motifs come close to the 
previous ones. Social, scientific or aesthetic heroes or works mostly have a more 
crossover status, as they tend to move across borders and become important 
all over the world. They are chosen because they have some special connection 
to the country in question, and they do of course bring honour to this specific 
country, but they tend to stress its positive links to the surrounding world rather 
than its separation from others. A range of other differences appears depending 
on whether persons, events, buildings or other kinds of artefacts are depicted. 
Buildings are more fixed to a place than paintings or people who can travel 
across boundaries, but they may on the other hand easily be visited by many 
and become widely known and loved, not least through modern mass tourism. 
Historical motifs tend to be selected to represent various regions within the 
nation, ages of national splendour and kinds of achievement, so that they taken 
as a whole represent the moral, intellectual and cultural strength of a country. 
Signifying Europe
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Euro coins display two political freedom fighters (the Greeks Capodistrias 
and Venizelos), one peace activist (the Austrian von Suttner), who also is the 
sole woman honoured in this way by the EU, three literary authors (the Greek 
Velestinlis-Fereos, Italian Dante and Spanish Cervantes) and one composer 
(Vienna’s Mozart). This slight dominance of the cultural domain is increased 
when buildings are added, with three mainly political (the Austrian Belvedere 
Palace, the German Brandenburger Tor, the Italian Castel del Monte) against 
five cultural—mostly religious—ones (the Austrian St. Stephen’s Cathedral and 
Wiener Secession building, the Italian Mole Antonellina and Colosseum, and 
the Spanish Santiago de Compostela cathedral).500 Greece’s three ships express 
economy and trade but also transports of other kinds, military as well as civil. 
Adding other human artefacts further emphasises the cultural face of Europe, 
with Italy’s wide range of monuments and artistic works (Botticelli’s Birth of 
Venus, Boccioni’s futurist movement forms, Marcus Aurelius equestrian statue, 
Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man, Raphael’s Dante). It should also be noted that the 
Spanish Santiago da Compostela cathedral as well as Cervantes are of course 
as much rooted in specific Spanish regions as is the king, and thus may well 
be less relevant to other Spanish regions. A Basque nationalist in Bilbao might 
feel them to be irrelevant to his agenda, or even despicable symbols of what 
he wants to dissociate himself from. On the other hand, that cathedral is a 
site of pilgrimage for all of Spain and its surrounding countries, thus lending 
itself well to symbolise transnational connections, and Don Quixote is after all 
no particularly heroic figure. Also the Italian series of great artworks makes 
certain definite choices: there are for instance no motifs located in Palermo or 
Sicily. On the other hand, their beauty have historically to a large extent come 
to transgress geographic borders and been appropriated as national artistic and 
intellectual treasures—or even keystones in a pan-European heritage of the 
type that proponents for a shared European identity tend to applaud. (Estonia 
is alone in showing a national map, which does not clearly fall into any of these 
categories, but may perhaps be seen as a result of political history.)
4.  Myths are used by France and more obviously Greece. There might well be 
mythical elements in many of the motifs discussed so far, as nation can be 
regarded as a kind of myth, and local myths and tales may well be implicitly 
evoked in many disguises. Myth is thus ever-present, but only in a few cases 
is this presence obvious as the main aspect. The French republican figures of 
Marianne and the sower are modern myths, once deliberately constructed in 
order to break with previous traditional ones. They refer back to a classical 
antique heritage that is explicitly invoked on the two highest Greek coins. 
The owl of wisdom seems to emphasise the character of the EU project as an 
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intellectual construction, a wise decision for cooperation instead of conflict 
that has some way to go before it gets anchored in the emotive sentiments 
of its populations. The abduction of Europa by the bull may be interpreted 
as kind of a national wet dream, as this animalistic Greek god with his virile 
force conquers his beautiful female loot, object of his male erotic lusts. Had a 
comparatively influential nation like Germany chosen a similar symbol, this 
might have awakened some hostility among its neighbours, but as Greece does 
no longer seem to pose any real threat to its north-western partners, such an 
allusion can only produce a smile. After all, as a goal for millions of EU charter 
tourists, Greece has already since long won the hearts of us all. Still, as the name 
‘Europe’ means ‘the West’, and this bull myth connects to a historical process of 
culture imported from the East, there is a potential decentring element in such a 
self-identification of this continent.501 The relative scarcity of explicitly mythical 
subjects on these coins might partly be caused by the reluctance to found the 
union in the only reasonable narrative: that which acknowledges its deep debt 
and sustained links to its great Asian neighbour.
5.  Nature is depicted in Austria, Finland and Germany. (Cyprus, Slovakia and 
Slovenia also use such motifs.) Plants and animals like the Austrian gentian, 
edelweiss and alpine primrose, the Finnish flying swans and cloudberries, and 
the German oak twig all offer ambivalent implications. On the one hand, they 
may contribute to a naturalisation of nationalist constructions by illustrating 
a kind of Blut-und-Boden philosophy of people, nations and cultures bound 
to the very soil of a specific geographic area. On the other hand, nature rarely 
respects fixed boundaries—at least not political ones. Swans are eminently 
migratory birds, and such nomadism can hardly be contained within the 
confines of a single region, be it Finland or even Europe. Plants do thrive in 
certain conditions, and may culturally be associated with some specific region, 
but even such identifications are notoriously unreliable. Sound of Music 
famously made the song ‘Edelweiss’ a prototypical symbol for the Alpine 
region, but not only is it hard to distinguish Austria from Switzerland in this 
respect (though one is and one is not at all in the EU), the film was also a 
typical Hollywood product and the plant can be found in lots of places, and not 
only in botanical gardens. A German coin tradition has used the symbolism of 
oak groves as ancient places of Germanic worship, but oaks are holy symbols 
also for Zeus, Jupiter and Kybele, as well as in Christian, Jewish, Indian and 
Chinese myths.
  In practice, the boundaries between these main generic types are fleeting 
and permeable. National symbols may integrate natural or mythic elements, 




varies between contexts. Strong national symbols may or may not have clear 
transnational or even globalising aspects, whereas plants or animals are also 
shiftingly bound to a specific national soil.
One may further tentatively discern four main groups of countries, depending on 
the general and dominating patterns in their euro coinage.
A.  Nationalists: Half of the initial twelve euro countries clearly lean towards the 
national side, representing themselves by symbols that primarily point out 
their specificity in relation to European neighbours. (This is also valid for the 
three associated members, the three non-euro EU members, and for Estonia 
and Slovakia.) It is the monarchies that have generally taken this road, showing 
the faces of their kings and queens, but there are a few exceptions—in both 
directions. The three BeNeLux monarchies (as well as Monaco) all depict their 
monarchs on all their national coin sides.502 The Vatican State with its Pope also 
fits in this category, and it seems as if the remaining EU nations of Denmark, 
Sweden and United Kingdom will eventually make a similar choice. It might 
be no coincidence that the populations of these latter monarchies have felt it 
particularly difficult to take the full step into the EMU.503 The Iberian Peninsula 
offers interesting exceptions. The Spanish monarchy has its king only on the 
largest value coins, and I will therefore place it in another category. On the other 
hand, Portugal is nowadays a republic, but still has gone the nationalist way and 
chosen to use the old royal seal and coat of arms used since the birth of Portugal 
as a nation in the twelfth century—not a royal head but still a royalist form of 
national symbol. 
B.  Universalists: France and Ireland have national symbols that invite global 
interpretations of a much less separatist kind than the previous nationalist 
ones. Republican symbols are parts of a universalistic discourse and practice, 
expressly appealing to supposedly universally applicable human values. The 
figure of the sower associates to divine creativity and human culture in general, 
perhaps also to the Christian Sermon on the Mount and thus to missionary 
activities, but primarily secularised ones in the spirit of Enlightenment, with 
its own reverse side in form of colonialism. Anti-imperialist, postcolonial and 
postmodernist critiques today have attacked and relativised any such claims, 
but the EU project itself is only one example of the many renewed efforts 
to accept their specific location while still defending their universalistic 
potentials. The harp makes a non-verbal claim of a similar kind, building on 
the force of instrumental music to move hearts across linguistic and national 
boundaries. Again, this can be criticised as an ideological illusion, covering 
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the fact that musical life fuels the divisive borders between people or cultures, 
only along different lines than those of verbal culture. Still, the harp does 
at least not have a fixed semantic link to any particular territory or state 
apparatus, at least not to those EU citizens who are not very well informed 
about Irish mythology, and it may therefore be seen as a kind of universalist 
statement.
C.  Culturalists: On Austrian and Italian coins, cultural history clearly dominates. 
This may be a way to boost one’s own grandeur by claiming copyright for the 
treasures of cultural creativity in historical heritage. Anyhow, the effect is one 
of historicisation and culturalisation. Human artefacts from various epochs 
are lifted up as crucial for collective identification, implying at least a potential 
for relativisation of values. Pointing at aesthetic perfection as the ultimate key 
to values puts more dangerously divisive political issues in the background, in 
favour of taste issues that may certainly be controversial but usually less violently 
so. This is particularly true for the most classical of subjects, but due to the way 
that art history tends to de-politicise and universalise artworks, even for instance 
the Boccioni movement image is easily appropriated as a kind of UN-protected 
‘world heritage’, in spite of the somewhat problematic nationalist war cult of 
some of the proponents of Italian Futurism. Also the more political persons 
and buildings chosen by these two countries tend to emphasise peaceful and 
cooperative efforts rather than national separatism, notably Bertha von Suttner. 
A curious exception is the Marcus Aurelius statue, since it originally stood on 
the column in Rome that was inaugurated in the year 193 to commemorate the 
victory of this emperor over the Germans. However, even this and all his other 
martial deeds are today easily forgotten in favour of the rumour of his being 
a noble and self-reflecting secular thinker, depicted in that famous statue as a 
prince of peace. Another one may be the Colosseum, where many European 
slaves to the Roman empire were once mercilessly slaughtered. Yet none of 
these motifs are tightly knit to any particular national project, since they mostly 
predate the birth of Italy’s modern nation state. Many artefacts and buildings 
have been created by exploitation of foreign workers or cultures, but the ones 
chosen in these cases today seem not to exclude transversal identifications. Being 
included in heterogeneous series, they show artefacts from different historical 
epochs as a rather arbitrary chain of gems that could be wilfully extended by 
others, with a slightly different meaning, adding to the historicity and thus 
secularising relativity of culture.
D.  Chameleons: As has been argued here, most motifs have potential for ambiguity—




nations present themselves in series of images of highly divergent kinds, 
combining the previous positions and adding yet others. Thus, Finland, Germany, 
Greece and Spain use similar national symbols as the first groups (royalties, 
heraldic animals and coat of arms), but mixed with efforts to transcend borders 
by adding consciously transnational motifs, either culturalist or naturalist ones. 
(Something similar may be said of Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia.) Many of their 
chosen motifs are often also in themselves ambiguous. Take for instance the 
Greek Velestinlis-Fereos, who was an intellectual and a creative poet but also 
an activist of national liberation, and all the three Greek individuals associated 
national liberation from some foreign powers (that is, from Ottoman Turkey) 
with coalitions with other European countries. If Turkey will eventually join the 
Union, this separatist symbols will seem to some extent to run against the main 
rhetoric of peaceful collaboration between the member states. Likewise, the 
Greek ships combine many different functions, from classical Mediterranean 
trade cosmopolitanism through warfare vessels to global oil distribution. And 
with the mythical subjects on top, Greece certainly presents a quite open and 
ambivalent series. Finland and Spain likewise combine national symbols with 
cultural or natural themes with transnational implications, as has already been 
discussed. Germany is an equally divided case, with the dark heraldic eagle and 
the oak twigs framing the intermediary motif of the Brandenburger Tor which 
is itself an extremely ambiguous one. It is a symbol of German unity, from 
Prussia to the reunited Bundesrepublik of today, but it also serves as a reminder 
of first the struggles between Germany and France and then the Cold War 
divide between East and West Germany (and Europe). The official explanations 
of this motif repeatedly stress this tension, emphasising that from having been 
a celebration of anti-French war and then a heavily fortified point of division, 
it has today become a gate for intense crossings. This is said to be underlined 
by the specific pictorial perspective used on the coins, emphasising the road 
through the gate rather than the wall in which it once was a closed door. As 
Gerard Delanty optimistically states, ‘Berlin is no longer the symbol of a divided 
Europe but the capital of a united Germany’.504
It is not only the ‘chameleons’ that offer ambiguous identifications. The categories 
often blend, as for instance even the most innocent flower is apparently chosen for 
its associations with a national identity, and the boundary between mythology and 
nature is permeable. Many of these multifaceted national symbols have historically 
developed in fierce struggles against other (surrounding) nations, though in some few 
instances there are implications of some kind of inter-European cooperation. 
In all, there is a slight tendency to a north/south division line with wider sets 
of images down south than in the Lutheran and possibly more iconoclastic north. 
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This pattern is superimposed on and partly coincides with a political differentiation 
between constitutional systems—monarchies and republics—most of the remaining 
monarchies today being found in the north. The respective age of each national 
formation, as well as other and more specific historical experiences, also contribute to 
the numismatic style developed in each state. Simple generalisations are hard to make, 
however. For instance, Maurice Roche argues that societies ‘based on immigration’, 
on ‘acts of revolution’ or on ‘science-based technological production and/or risk-
taking capitalist markets necessarily locate and explore their collective identities in 
terms of their common presents and futures rather than their pasts’.505 This seems 
mainly to serve as an explanation for the United States, but the diagnosis halts when 
comparing EU members. It is not quite evident whether this is confirmed by the euro 
or not, since many nations are awkward mixtures. UK money tended to cling on the 
ancient royal past even under neoliberal Thatcherism, as does the Swedish krona 
in spite of its strongly science-and-technology based production. Another line of 
interpretation is suggested by William Johnston, who argues that national differences 
between European countries in terms of forms of celebration can be related to a 
kind of ‘civil religion’ used to justify and legitimate the various regimes. Different 
European countries celebrate different kinds of memories. In France, the French 
Revolution is almost always the focal point. In Germany, there is a ‘civil religion 
of Kultur’, with cultural personalities in focus: artists, philosophers, musicians and 
writers. Austria relies heavily on the culture of the Hapsburg empire, with music and 
theatre as important elements. Italy is said to have a weaker national identity, instead 
leaning towards city or regional identifications, in addition to the persistent role of 
the Catholic Church and its saints. Britain’s civil religion circles around the monarchy. 
Johnston sums this up in a main dichotomy between a French and a German model, 
stressing either political ramifications or apolitical creativity.506 
The Brandenburg Gate thus expresses a historical transition from division to 
unification. However, most countries have chosen stability rather than innovation in 
their euro designs. There are few examples of notable shifts with the introduction of 
the euro, as most nations lean heavily towards their pre-euro traditions.
Spain and Portugal both gave up the usual themes from their old colonial history, 
which might have been problematic in relation to the European project. Classical 
colonialism was a violent competition between European states, which contradicts 
the present efforts of peaceful cooperation. The colonial imperialism in the Third 
World certainly resulted in strengthened global interconnections, but in an extremely 
unequal and coercive manner that hardly is good marketing for Europe in relation to 
Africa, South America or Asia today. Their old motifs showed men who opened up 
the world for Europe’s exploitation, undoubtedly with many civilisational gains but at 
the cost of so much blood, human suffering and uneven economic exploitation that it 




While Portugal retracted to a more inward-looking nationalist stance, Spain—singular 
among traditional monarchies—dared to expand its image in transnational and even 
self-ironical directions, including artistic, architectural, literary and religious themes 
in its self-image. On the other hand, this modernising tidying-up effort conceals the 
colonial aspect of Europe’s history that has been essential to its very formation and 
self-understanding as a continent in contrast to its others.
Most other nations have stuck to their respective conventional range of symbols, 
but in some cases made selections and minor refinements that underline common 
European values and international links, thus showing how each country contributes 
with its own voice, while interplaying with the surrounding others. The Austrian, 
German and Finnish plants have some regional specificity but may also allude to the 
issues of global ecology that are one of the reasons for transnational cooperation. 
Finland lets aggressive heraldic lions be accompanied by migratory birds that know 
no boundaries and may symbolise the late modern age of mobility. Buildings and 
artworks have been crucial to the history of each country, but also for international 
relations and visiting foreigners. Many of the depicted individuals have been 
cosmopolitan in their lives and work, and are well known across the continent. The 
French republican themes intend to unify the world, and da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man 
has a similarly universal intent in signifying the Renaissance focus on humanity 
abstracted from all characteristics—except gender, where masculinity continues to 
rule.507 And while the German Brandenburg Gate has a painful history of division, the 
reopened road running through it gives hope for new encounters between the East 
and West. The BeNeLux and other monarchies have given more meagre contributions 
to this process, reducing their collective identifications to one single and in many 
ways marginal aspect. 
The recently added EU member states east of the old iron curtain have tended 
to use the occasion of introducing their new currency to stage efforts to develop a 
greater awareness of their role and function in pan-European cooperation. For 
instance, already in autumn 2004, Estonia let its citizens vote among ten coin designs, 
more than half a dozen years before it finally entered the eurozone in January 2011. 
A spokesman of the National Bank of Hungary has declared that they will choose 
‘symbols that are near to the heart of Hungarians and are interesting’, and that they 
‘would like to put them for social discussion in as wide circles as possible’, through the 
several competitions that have been launched, as a kind of ‘social dialogue’.508 In this 
way, the euro transition is made to resonate with wider processes of societal change. 
In comparison, in a country like Sweden, with considerably more ‘euro-skepticism’, 
the National Bank has declared that it will only place the royal portrait and the symbol 
of three crowns on its euros, should there ever be a Swedish one.
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Comparisons
The ‘What Story Should Europe Tell’ website discussion on European symbols has 
already been mentioned, and it is interesting to note that the only EU symbol that 
was accepted by the critical voice was that of the euro: ‘The only true EU symbol that 
means anything is the € symbol’.509 Unfortunately, no explicit argument was given for 
this position, except for telling how it can be typed on a computer keyboard, which 
links to the web chat context, but that opinion supports the many other indices of the 
relative success of this symbol. 
One of the most oddly shaped coins ever was the 2002 issue of a $10 silver coin 
from the Republic of Nauru, a minor island republic in the Pacific Ocean, mainly 
known in Scandinavia for its profitable Internet suffix ‘.nu’ (‘now’) (Figure 8.6). It was 
shaped as a map of West Europe, in order to celebrate the ‘first issue of the euro’.510 
Three EU member states decided not to introduce the euro in 2002. There is on the 
web considerable speculation about their possible future euro designs, with images of 
‘concept coins’ or ‘what-if coins’, and even proposals from the national banks. 
Denmark chose not to join the EMU and has thus kept its old krona currency. 
Banknote motifs include author Karen Blixen (1885–1962); composer Carl Nielsen 
(1865–1931); actress Johanne Luise Heiberg (1812–90); atom physicist Niels Bohr 
(1885–1962) with yin-and-yang vignettes from his coat of arms: and painters Anna 
and Michael Ancher (1859–1935 and 1849–1927). Rear sides show various old stone 
reliefs from Danish churches. Their coins show royal motifs: the Queen’s monogram 
and an abstract pattern inspired by Viking age decoration styles on the lower values; 
the Queen and the national coat of arms with three lions and nine hearts under a 
crown on the higher ones. Rumours on the Internet assume that as Denmark will 
sooner or later enter the EMU, their euro coins will most probably also depict their 
Queen, thus lining up with the traditional monarchies and leaving out the cultural 
personalities they now have on banknotes. 
Sweden also stuck to their old krona, and their national bank (Riksbank) offers 
detailed information on its website. Since this is my home country, I will therefore 
also present it in a somewhat more detailed manner. The 20 krona depicts the author 
Selma Lagerlöf (1858–1940) in front of her home region Värmland landscape (forest 
and lake), with the manuscript introduction to her first novel Gösta Berling’s Saga and 
a horse carriage with Lagerlöf as passenger, plus a microtext from same novel (‘The 
lake has its sources far up in the north, and the country is a perfect country for a lake. 
The forest and the mountains are always collecting water for it; tiny rivers and brooks 
stream into it the whole year around. It has fine white sand.’). On the back appears 
a passage from Lagerlöf ’s Nils Holgersson’s Wonderful Journey through Sweden, with 
Nils and Mårten goose flying over the flatlands of Skåne, in southern Sweden. Next, 




Vincenzo Bellini’s opera Norma, Stockholm’s old opera house and microtext quotation 
from composer Arnold Schoenberg (‘Music conveys a prophetical message, which 
reveals a higher life form towards which humanity is developing. And it is because of 
this message that music appeals to people of all races and nationalities’). On the rear 
is a silver harp, its tonal range and an excerpt from the score of modern composer 
Sven-David Sandström’s Pictures for Percussion and Orchestra over a stylised Swedish 
landscape. The 100 krona displays the famous naturalist Carl von Linné (Linnaeus, 
1707–78) with pollinating plants from his early work Præludia Sponsaliarum 
Plantarum and botanical gardens in Uppsala, where he was director, plus his motto in 
microtext: OMNIA MIRARI ETIAM TRITISSIMA (‘Find wonder in all things, even 
the most commonplace’). On the rear is a bee pollinating flower (which Linné himself 
never realised the role of), pollen grains, the lobes of a stigma and the result, a germ 
and a reconstruction of how a flower looks through the multifaceted eye of a bee—
all motifs taken from pictures by photographer Lennart Nilsson. The 500 krona has 
Karl XI (1655–97), King of Sweden 1672–97, during whose reign Sveriges Riksbank 
was founded in 1668, in front of the first Riksbank building in Stockholm, with the 
Riksbank’s motto HINC ROBUR ET SECURITAS (‘From here comes security and 
strength’) in microtext. On its back is the engineer Christopher Polhem (1661–1751) 
in front of the large gear wheel from his industrial plant at Stjärnsund in Dalarna, 
with mathematical calculations from his notebooks and Falu copper mine with one of 
his ore hauling plants. The lesser values leave the royalties behind. The highest value, 
1000 krona, shows Gustav Vasa (1496–1560), who founded the Swedish hereditary 
monarchy and united Sweden into a state with a central government. Following the 
reformation in 1527, he also incorporated the young Lutheran church, making it into 
a Swedish state church. He is depicted with oil painting in the Stockholm Cathedral 
showing an atmospheric phenomenon 1535 (the parhelion picture) and a microtext 
quotation from Gustav Vasa: SCRIPTURAM IN PROPRIA HABEANT LINGUA 
(‘Let them have the holy scripture in their own language’). The rear shows Description 
of the Northern Peoples from 1555, written by Olaus Magnus (1490–1557), who was 
the last Swedish Catholic archbishop and a scientific author on Swedish geography 
and cultural history, together with an image of harvest being gathered and threshed in 
radiant sunshine. Swedish coins are consistently royalistic, with various combinations 
of the King Carl XVI Gustaf, his crowned monogram, the lesser national coat of arms 
and the King’s motto ‘For Sweden—with the times’.
The Swedish national bank has on various occasions expressed an intention to stick 
to the royalist tradition, thus confining their euro designs to only the Swedish King 
and possibly the lesser national coat of arms, deriving from the fourteenth century 
and consisting of three crowns, deriving from medieval times and supposedly inspired 
by the three New Testament kings (or holy men) in combination with more or less 
mythical conceptions of the foundation of the Swedish nation through some kind 
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of merger with three older kingdoms, though this is highly uncertain. The Swedish 
monarchy is like all others in itself, in a way, transnational, since the king’s ancestor 
was a French general who immigrated in the early nineteenth century, and since 
it has had marital ties with other European nations, including the present queen 
who met the king when she worked as a kind of tourist hostess in Germany. This 
transnational interpretation is not the dominant or preferred one, since the king as 
a formal head of state—a ceremonial symbol without real political power—is one of 
the very few possible choices that undisputedly point towards the Swedish nation 
state, neither more nor less. As for the three crowns insignia, they might perhaps 
also be read as a vague sign of ‘united in diversity’: plurality and diversification but 
also synthesis and totality. However, the similarity of the crowns strongly favours the 
unity side, avoiding any real sign of diversity. After all, three crowns may also be at 
least thrice as strong as one, implying a very strong and united central state authority 
where all constituents are made equal and have to conform to the overarching rule. 
According to the will of the national bank, the Swedish euros will thus side with 
those of the most traditionalist other monarchies, stressing an anachronistic symbol 
of the nation state as the only, meagre face of Sweden to the outer world, though 
there have been voices (including mine) asking for a more Spanish solution, adding 
some other motifs as well. 
Britain’s banknotes all have Queen Elizabeth on the obverse side, while the rear 
sides depict social reformer Elizabeth Fry (1780–1815) with a group of women and 
children (£5); naturalist Charles Darwin (1809–82) with a humming bird (£10); and 
composer Sir Edward Elgar (1857–1934) with patron saint of music St. Cecilia and 
Worcester Cathedral (£20). Almost all coins are related to the history of the United 
Kingdom. Lower values have the seated figure of Britannia, the badge of England in 
form of the royally crowned Tudor Rose, part of the Crest of England with a crowned 
lion, the Scottish crowned thistle badge, the Prince of Wales badge comprising three 
ostrich feathers enfiling a coronet of crosses pattee and fleurs-de-lys with the motto 
‘Ich dien’ (‘I serve’), and a porticullis with chains royally crowned—an adaption of 
King Henry VII’s badge. A series of ten different £1 coins all have on the front three 
lions—heraldic symbol for England, and the edge inscription ‘Decus et tutamen’ (‘An 
ornament and a safeguard’). On their backs are a series of ten different designs with 
symbols for Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, England and the United Kingdom, 
different heraldic symbols (thistle, leek, flax plant or oak tree with royal diadem, UK 
shield of royal arms with crown, Scottish lion royal arms, Welsh dragon badge, Celtic 
collar with cross and pimpernel flower or three English lions) and inscriptions: ‘Nemo 
me impune lacessit’ (‘No none provokes me with impunity’), ‘Pleidiol wyf I’m gwlad’ 
(‘True am I to my Country’), ‘Decus et tutamen’ (‘An ornament and a safeguard’, from 
Virgil’s Aeneid). The £2 coin is an exception, with its symbolic representation of the 




the inscription ‘Standing on the shoulders of giants’ on its edge. The design of possible 
future British euro coins is a strict secret, though most web sources seem to bet on the 
monarchist choice of Queen faces there, as well.
In A Flutter of Banknotes (2001), Brion and Moreau survey the motif history of 
European paper money. Dominant motifs have been antique gods or predominantly 
female allegorical figures representing human virtues or aspects of activity related 
to the idea of progress: commerce, industry, agriculture, science and art. Symbols of 
permanence or vigilance were meant to inspire confidence: anchors, hives, towers, 
open eyes, lamps or cocks. Other banknotes depicted national symbols: coats of arms, 
heraldic beasts, portraits of monarchs, or more indirectly motifs relating to folklore, 
local landscapes or place-bound mythology. Portraits in a realist style have dominated 
since the World War II, and national figureheads from art, philosophy and science 
became prominent features from the 1960s. In general, banknotes tend to reflect main 
values of the issuing societies: ‘faith in progress, the virtue of work, social harmony, 
the greatness of a nation’, offering an insight into ‘the great founding myths of Western 
society’.511 
A study by Jacques E. C. Hymans investigates currency iconography as indicator of 
collective identities in Europe since the early nineteenth century, using a database of 
1368 notes from all the fifteen member states. Its main finding is that time (period) 
appears more decisive than space (nationality) for paper money images, indicating that 
states express a transnational spirit of the times rather than unique national identities. 
Inspired by Ronald Inglehart’s theories of cultural shifts, Hymans discerns in these 
fifteen countries an overall trend for the social focus to move from state through 
society to the individual and of basic norms to move from tradition through material 
goods to post-materialist values.512 Hymans sees the paper euro as confirming these 
trends, but in this case the focus on banknotes hides away the national differences 
that may only appear on coins. It is also in practice often difficult to decide whether a 
specific symbolic motif should be understood as a state, societal or individual actor, 
or reflecting traditional, materialist or post-materialist values. 
Currencies on other continents of the world to some extent share similar 
iconographic traits, but affected by the specific national history and context. It is for 
instance instructive to compare the euro with money from the United States, Russia 
and South Africa who all have a history as federations. Each of them also has a size 
and a degree of global influence that can be compared to that of Europe, which is also 
true of mainland China (Figure 8.7).
The US dollar coins show the Statue of Liberty in New York: a well-known national 
symbol that was a gift from France and links classical myth and heritage to secular and 
universalist republican Enlightenment values. US dollar bills front past presidents, while 
reverse sides have the motto ‘In God we trust’ together with historic federal buildings 
(Lincoln Memorial, White House, the Capitol etc.). This raises the question why the 
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euro does not show the European motto, since that would have increased coherence 
between the symbols and boosted the fame of the ‘united in diversity’ slogan. There is 
no single existing artefact that may stand for all of Europe in the same way as does the 
Statue of Liberty for the US, nor any given and limited set of key figures who could 
have been honoured to represent European history. No wonder thus that Europe and 
the United States differ so much in their respective currency iconography.
Almost the same goes for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where the yuan 
banknotes of the renminbi currency have on the obverse side Chairman Mao Zedong, 
the founder and first president of the PRC. On the reverses are various landscapes, 
parks or buildings with symbolic importance for China. A centralised dictatorship 
nation like the PRC is even farther removed from European diversity than the ethnic 
melting pot of the United States.
Russia is both geographically and historically a closer neighbour, and its rubles 
have been continuously revised to reflect recurrent political shifts. Coins front either 
Russia’s national protector Saint George or the two-headed eagle emblem. Ruble 
banknotes show various constructions (a fortress, a hydroelectric plant, a stock 
exchange and a theatre, monuments, sculptures, churches, monasteries, bridges 
and ships) from different Russian cities and referring to different historical periods. 
While identifiable personalities are not as prominent as before, in line with the euro 
banknotes, the identification of key cities and buildings invites contestation from 
excluded ones, which was precisely what the EU wanted to avoid by not allowing 
specific buildings or people on euro banknotes.
In South Africa, rand coins show coat of arms and animals, while banknotes 
obverses have heads of the Big Five game (rhinoceros, elephant, lion, buffalo and 
leopard), all confirming a traditional image of natural African wildness. Banknote 
reverses either show smaller animals or images of new constructions in science, 
technology and industry, in an effort to show a way forward to modern development. 
The latter remind of the high-value euro bridges and windows, but wildlife species 
as key money icons is peculiar to Africa and could never have been chosen for the 
euro—not even if one could imagine certain other species as typical for this northern 
continent.
In sum, the euro imagery seems pretty original compared to these competitors. 
The star circle remains unique, even though China and the United States have 
(differently configured) stars in their flags and coats of arms and the Chinese also 
depict them on their money. While some Russian rubles also happen to show a bridge 
and a ship, these do not systematically build up any lead motif of communication 
constructions as with the euro banknotes. None of the others mentioned here have a 
particular focus on doors, windows or bridges—on the contrary, they tend instead to 
display mountains or monumental buildings of a closed and closing kind, perhaps to 




maps play a much more central role in Europe than elsewhere, possibly reflecting 
a need to explain and underline the (expansive) boundaries of this relatively new 
geopolitical entity. Russia’s way of displaying key places in various cities may to some 
extent be compared to the national euro coin reverses, in that they also give space 
for showing off internal diversity, but Moscow does this with much firmer stress on 
unity than on diversity.
The euro design seems so far to have been favourably received. There are certainly 
many critics against the euro as a payment instrument, even though fewer and fewer 
argue for returning to the previous national currencies. However, the look of the 
banknotes and coins has rarely been seriously criticised, even though there have been 
caricatures and ironic alternative designs. For a G20 meeting in spring 2009, Freaking 
News—a website for comic photoshop manipulation—organised a competition 
for creating a new global currency by combining existing currencies. One entry, 
‘Bilderberg Note’, mixed a $100 with a €100 bill and with Henry Kissinger’s portrait 
in the middle. The ‘Doleur’ looked a bit like the €500 but US dollar green and with a 
$10,000 denomination. The ‘Pooro’ fused $20 and €20 with a bag man in the centre, 
and on the back side a peek under a bridge where homeless people squatted, unveiling 
the coarse realities beneath all lofty slogans.513 
Conclusions
The euro currency is a potent symbol of this economically anchored new community. 
It is present everywhere in private and public life, as key part of and tool for the inter-
European circulation of values and exchanges between people in everyday life. The 
symbolisms selected add to the more abstract one of the flag by specifying the kind of 
connections conceived between the states/stars.
Currency symbolisms often intertextually link to other symbols, mostly to flags. 
The common euro images explicitly refer to the star circle but not clearly to any of 
the other EU symbols. The national coin reverses also integrate the stars and also 
implicitly thematise the ‘united in diversity’ motto, whereas the day and the anthem 
are not evidently present anywhere, perhaps reflecting the dividing lines between time-
in and time-out culture and between visual and aural symbols. Only one Greek euro 
coin nods to the Europa myth, whereas geopolitical maps are prominently present 
everywhere. On US banknotes, the motto is also boosted, but else it is mainly flag 
symbols that are given space in money designs, no doubt because of their immediately 
recognisable visual character that make them serve as prime identifiers.
Once more, the four main identity themes are further developed in the pan-
European money facets. 
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1.  The networking need may be seen as an effect of previous dislocation, adding a new 
dimension to that theme. In a sense, the many wars have dislocated populations 
and given birth to mutual distrust and alienation, which in turn has bred a longing 
for re-unification through communication rather than through violent force. In 
a more specific sense, the constructions for communication form a synthesis 
between stability and mobility, which is also in line with the previous symbols. 
The functioning of money in general is built upon an ideal conjunction of stable 
trust and free mobility, and the European project demands a similar balance to be 
stricken. The banknote motifs do their best to illustrate this dialectic.
2.  The theme of desire is likewise not immediately apparent in the currency design. 
Any stylish layout can of course communicate a sense of aesthetic pleasure, but 
it is at first difficult to find any obvious representation of joy or attraction in the 
content of these designs. Nor is there any clear alternative presence of control 
or destruction, which were found in some of the previous symbols. The euro 
instead has a rather cool appearance, avoiding any strong emotional impact, 
which may be one reason why it has also not provoked any reactions of intense 
distaste. However, one may well interpret the communicative constructions 
as inviting communication. In this sense, windows, doors and bridges could 
be seen as expressing a desire for opening up and connecting to the other: to 
interact among member states as well as with the surrounding world. This would 
further support the flag symbolism where the circular void was seen as an agora 
inviting communicative action between citizens. Indeed, a desire for contact is 
central to the European unification process, and the invitation to member states 
to design their own coin sides to participate in this economic public space is 
another confirmation of this quest for networking and communication.
3.  The theme of elevation is at first sight not as prominent as with the other 
EU symbols. It returns through the star circle with its sacred and stellar 
connotations, but not as clearly in the building motifs. It is true that the money-
story of historical progression does indicate a movement from primitive, low 
and heavy stone edifices to the high-rising contemporary style, promoting 
an understanding of history as an elevation from dark origins to the brightly 
shining present. Still, this is the symbol where this theme is weakest.
4.  The construction of the two coin sides again implies hybridity, where the 
common obverses stand for coherent unity while the national reverses add a 







All official EU symbols strive to promote an image of Europe as strong, united and 
beneficial for all. A closer interpretation, guided by comparing these symbols with 
other and sometimes oppositional symbols, has disclosed a series of inner tensions 
and contradictions in this signifying process. The cumulation of interpretations 
has resulted in a rich symbolic web of signification with a number of main themes 
that point at key facets but also tensions in European identity. One such tension 
runs between the strong hopes that shared symbols would strengthen the European 
project and their striking lack of success so far. In view of Europe Day 2010, in 
the midst of the turbulent eurozone crisis, EU President Herman van Rompuy 
published an article defining the core essence of the EU in ‘welfare, security and a 
shared fate’, but at the same time demanding nobody ‘to be enthusiastic and wave 
EU flags or join the peace choir’.514 It is not uncommon for officials to downplay 
the importance of the same symbols that were originally motivated by a wish to 
reinforce the public awareness of precisely the shared values that they at other times 
are felt to problematise. 
No symbols stand for themselves. They are interpreted in contexts of use bringing 
them together in intersymbolic interaction. The anthem is sung and the flag colours 
are publically displayed on Europe Day, while the € sign is sometimes used not only 
to identify money but also other things that are European. The symbols sometimes 
cooperate, and there is also a transfer between some of them, notably from the flag to 
the currency.515 To further complicate things, the neat set of five EU symbols is just a 
rather arbitrary selection from a much wider and fuzzier cluster of different symbolic 





Lots of other symbol genres could also be investigated, even though they have no 
equally official EU legitimacy. Some of them have actually been discussed and even 
institutionalised by European authorities, though have not entered what might be 
called Europe’s ‘Big Five’ league.
Maps are as such very important tools of identification, in particular for geopolitical 
units such as this one. They are also eminently present on all euro currencies. Europe 
has notoriously slippery geographic borders, not least to the east where the borders 
to Asia have never been quite clear. The history of Europe’s visual mapping is highly 
intricate and informative in relation to the issue of identification.516 This map has 
been continuously redrawn according to both changing inner divisions and global 
power balances, and the choice of cartographic projection method, colouring and 
ornamentation will inevitably also have signifying impact. For instance, the Council 
of Europe has always defined Europe very widely, reaching into what otherwise is 
often seen as West Asia and the Middle East, whereas the EU countries are fewer and 
also exclude central nations such as Switzerland. 
Vehicle number plates have already been mentioned as locations for flagging the 
star circle. The EU does not issue passports, though this would have been a strong 
symbol for a pan-European citizenship. There are only common rules for member 
states’ national passports, which have to be burgundy red and contain the words 
‘EUROPEAN UNION’. European stamps have at least since 1956 been issued jointly 
by larger sets of European countries, often celebrating anniversaries or events with 
motifs referring to peace and welfare. Still, they have not in the last decades been 
added to the core set of official symbols, and remain of secondary importance in this 
respect, as even fewer people than those who are familiar with the Big Five would 
remember to have seen any such stamp or even know them to exist.
Buildings such as those of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe in 
Brussels and Strasbourg, or more generally buildings of a ‘European’ character, have 
also sometimes been discussed as of symbolic importance. Just like the modernist UN 
building in New York once was a well-known icon of political globalisation, efforts 
are made to make these buildings attractive as concrete and functional emblems of 
international cooperation. Still, few can actually recognise any of these buildings, and 
they play little role in identifying Europe. It is often hard to find even any images of 
these houses on the websites of their respective organisations. No single building seems 
yet able to stand for the whole of Europe, even though several nations certainly have 
easily identifiable constructions such as the Eiffel Tower in France or the Brandenburg 
Gate in Berlin—and it is no coincidence that the latter also appears on German euro 
coins, and that many other national coin motifs also include buildings, just as is the 
case with other national currencies.
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A whole city may well also serve as a symbol standing for a nation or a continent. 
In Europe’s case, it was once suggested that the coat of arms of Strasbourg could serve 
as a European flag, but this never got sufficient support. Today, since the 2001 Treaty 
of Nice formally made Brussels the capital of the EU, it is that city that is—both as a 
name and as a real material city—often used as a metaphor for the EU, in particular by 
sceptics who wish to express how EU power is located far away from ‘common citizens’ 
in their home countries. ‘It is decided in Brussels’ is then a way to locate Europe at a 
distance from oneself, implicitly stating that the speaker is not really European or that 
the EU is just a matter for distant elites. The AMO firm that created the EU barcode 
also had been asked for ideas of how to enhance the visual profile of Brussels, from 
architecture to graphic design on documents etc.
Again, Europeanness may of course also be signified by combinations of other 
cities, and again the euro coins offer ample evidence. In a more organised manner, this 
has been institutionalised as the ‘European Capital of Culture’ (first named ‘European 
City of Culture’), as conceptualised by Greek Minister of Culture Melina Mercouri 
in 1983, and with Athens as the first such city 1985. Until 2000, there was just one 
cultural capital each year, but since then the number has varied. This is an occasion 
for cities to market themselves internationally, but further research would be needed 
to discern in what way these activities have perhaps contributed to the symbolic 
identification of Europe.
A Europe Prize ‘for the best, and most inspired, literary work and film of the year, 
outstanding in form and furthering the idea of European unity’ was proposed to the 
Council of Europe in 1951 but failed to be adopted.517 It was then instead taken up as 
an encouragement to the local municipality that had ‘done most to propagate the ideal 
of European unity’, and has been annually awarded since 1955. 
As for languages, English is most commonly used as a lingua franca within Europe, 
in spite of the fact that most native English speakers live outside Europe—in Australia, 
Canada, South Africa and the United States—and also the great majority of European 
citizens do not have English as mother tongue. It is therefore difficult to describe 
English as signifying Europeanness any more than French, German or Finnish. 
Perhaps what signifies Europe most is the polyglot diversity that is so central to the 
self-understanding in the EU motto. 
As was seen with both some national euro coins and South African banknotes, 
animals can be used for identifying a community, and so can plants, landscapes or 
other natural phenomena. Many countries have national animals, plants and trees 
that are sometimes more beloved, recognised and used than the pompous national 
personifications, and used in parallel to them, without any specific regard to their 
mutual coherence. For instance, the Irish have Hibernia but more importantly the 
shamrock; France has the fleur de lis and the Gallic rooster (representing the history 




bear; and a whole range of European countries make use of various heraldic designs 
of eagles or lions—even though the latter were always exotic rather than domestic 
phenomena. Inanimate objects used for national identification include the Irish Celtic 
harp, Sweden’s three crowns and several nations’ manifold varieties of crosses. Some 
such symbols are incorporated in flags or depicted on stamps and coins, as will be 
discussed in later chapters. Finally, there are also a series of national patron saints 
such as the Irish St Patrick or Norwegian St Olav, but these have several disadvantages: 
they are linked to the Catholic Church which makes them problematic for secularised 
political purposes and not least in predominantly Protestant countries, and there are 
often also several different saints of prominence in each country.
A Californian blog discusses the issue of iconography and asks why it is so hard to 
think which animal could represent Europe, compared to the easiness with which this 
may be done for the other ‘superpowers’: the US eagle, the Russian bear, the Chinese 
dragon and the Indian elephant.518 The blogger suggests a number of possibilities. 
A lion is common in European national iconography but there are no wild lions in 
Europe since Roman times. An eagle is also common, but it is already used by the 
United States. A griffin—half eagle, half lion—could be a compromise, but there 
is then again a competition with cities or countries that already use it. This is also 
true for other national symbols containing animals such as roosters, horses, owls or 
rams. Another blog mentions that ‘a French newspaper’ has found two most popular 
candidate animals among EU politicians: the dove and the bull, where one connotes 
Europe’s intended ‘soft power’ (the ability to obtain a goal not by coercion or payment 
but by attraction, making others ‘want what you want’) and love of peace, while the 
bull has stronger historical connotations, thanks to the Europa myth.519 However, 
a problem with the bull is that it is Europa and not Zeus who symbolises Europe. 
Another website jokingly suggests that a chameleon might be a suitable animal for 
the undefinable aspect of Europe, and the satirical proposal of a flying duck was 
mentioned in the flag chapter, meant as an ironic comment to European soft power in 
contrast with the tougher US eagle.520
It appears impossible—and politically hazardous—to select one single animal or 
plant to fairly represent the whole of this heterogeneous continent. Animals are mobile 
creatures and there is no species that is limited only to Europe while also existing in 
all European countries and regions, and roughly the same also holds for plants and 
inanimate objects. It might be easier for the relatively more coherent Australian or 
Antarctic continents, but Europe’s biological diversity effectively prevents any such 
effort. One might perhaps try and select some species that has been particularly 
important to European culture and history, but even that is difficult, and as animal 
symbolisms are rarely officially sanctioned anymore, and play no particularly strong 
role compared to other symbolic realms, the will to invest energy and work in such a 
project is limited. Future will tell if popular signifying practices will ever result in such 
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a choice of animal or plant symbol for Europe, but given the great differences between 
climate, flora and fauna across the continent, this may be seriously doubted.
One could also add dances, cinema, artworks, culinary cultures and so much else 
where there is some kind of discourse around what is typically European. However, 
there are yet no fixed and officially recognised symbolisms in any other sensory mode 
than those discussed in previous chapters, and they are all bound to verbal, visual and 
aural communication: motto, flag, anthem etc. Some perfumes or food dishes may 
for instance commonly be identified with a region or a country, and individuals may 
associate a smell, a taste or any other bodily experience with a collective belonging. 
One might for instance imagine that it might in a distant future become common to 
eat a special cake or some other specific dish on Europe Day, so that a culinary taste 
becomes articulated with European identity. Still, these associations remain quite fluid 
and are not officially acknowledged and organised in the way that the symbolisms in 
words, images and music analysed here are.
Things are a little bit different with saints, where the Vatican has given St Benedict 
of Nursia official status as Europe’s main patron saint. The Italian San Benedetto da 
Norcia lived during 480–547, was the founder of western Christian monasticism and 
was canonised in 1220 by Pope Honorius III. He founded twelve monasteries but no 
religious order: the Order of St Benedict is a later construction. On the fourteenth 
centenary of St Benedict’s death, Pope Pius XII in 1947 called him ‘the father of 
Europe’, and Paul VI in 1964 officially declared him ‘Patron Saint of all Europe’. 
Sharing his papal name, Benedict XVI in April 2008 argued that ‘with his life and 
work St Benedict exercised a fundamental influence on the development of European 
civilization and culture’ and helped Europe to emerge from the ‘dark night of history’ 
that followed the fall of the Roman empire.521 The Carolingian Empire some 250 
years later was an evidence of this new importance of Christianity for European 
reorganisation. Among existing saints, the choice of St Benedict as Europe’s patron 
saint was thus not far-fetched. However, the series of post-WWII activities by the 
Vatican to construct a ‘Vatican Europe’ that would resurrect a kind of Medieval Holy 
Roman Empire elicited fear and condemnation among socialists, and with the lesson 
learnt, the EU has chosen to rather consistently avoid such overtly Christian elements 
in its symbolic policy. No serious discussion seems to have taken place for recognising 
the Vatican’s initiative on a formal EU level, but this has remained the expression of a 
special interest of the Roman Catholic Church, with no particular influence even on 
the other main Christian confessions in Europe.
Pope John Paul II almost caused inflation in naming patron saints for Europe. 
The Greek brothers St Cyril (Constantin, 826–69) and St Methodius (815–85), who 
had mainly been active in East Europe, were in 1980 declared co-patrons of Europe, 
together with St Benedict. On 1 October 1999, the same Pope went on to name three 




of Sweden (Birgitta, 1302–73, canonized by Pope Boniface IX in 1391); Catherine 
of Siena (1347–80, canonised in 1461 by Pope Pius II); and St Teresa Benedicta of 
the Cross (St Edith Stein, 1891–1942, canonised in 1998—she came from a Jewish 
family in Poland and was gassed in Auschwitz). The same John Paul II had in 1997 
also canonised St Hedwig (Jadwiga, 1374–99), who had been Polish monarch, and 
described her as a patron saint of a ‘United Europe’. This would imply that there are 
actually at least seven Catholic patron saints for the whole of Europe, headed by St 
Benedict. However, none of these saints is venerated by Protestants or other non-
Catholic confessions, and outside their home countries and congregations they are 
little known among the general public.
Four facets
It is not possible to present a comprehensive inventory or cultural map of symbolic 
motifs, since there are too many dimensions to consider, since each symbol relates to 
too many others, and since this symbolic field continually and subtly changes on all 
levels. Still, some comparative observations may be made of intermedial homologies 
and other patterns of similarity and difference between these symbolic genres, 
summarising some main interpretive directions of European identification today.
The symbols favoured by the EU are modelled upon national standards, but strive 
to add some transnational twist. All nation states have established national flags, often 
inscribed in their constitutions. Official mottos are less common for nations, but almost 
all countries have national anthems, and most also a national day and a characteristic 
currency with similar symbolic status. Flags and money are involved in vernacular 
contexts where they are seen and used by ordinary citizens, as integrated in time-in 
culture. Mostly unfocused, they engage in a kind of ‘banal Europeanness’. Anthem 
and day, on the other hand, demand a deeper engagement in order to function at all, 
and have so far therefore also been less successfully integrated in Europeans’ lives, 
even though such ritual practices of time-out culture may well anyway be important 
to identification. The flag easily lends itself to continent branding, whereas the anthem 
is considerably less suitable for such purposes. The motto has a kind of mid position: 
rarely used in everyday life but underlying much policy discourse, as a leitmotif of 
how integration is to be organised the European way. The symbols used by other 
organisations, individual activists or artists, presented as serious alternatives or as 
critical comments, likewise circulate through various channels, some in the vernacular 
underground, others framed by museums or other specialised institutions.
All such symbols have to be polysemic and ambiguous, charged with a surplus of 
meaning, in order to be capable of recontextualisation and articulation with endlessly 
new sets of values in new contexts. It is therefore no surprise that none can therefore 
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be pinned down to one single line of interpretation: they simply must have multiple 
meaning potentials in order to fulfil their functions as key identifying symbols, 
since the identities they are meant to signify are also multifaceted and in flux. In the 
hermeneutic spiral movement of conflicting interpretations, there is no fixed starting 
point, as collective identities are always in the making, while each symbolic design is 
at the same time also understood in relation to a transient set of other symbols that 
co-determine its meaning. A star circle may for instance in one moment be seen as 
respectful veneration of a suprahuman power but in the next moment understood 
instead as a bold declaration that worldly humans dare compete with the old gods; 
an empty circle, for some, signals a shameful void while to others serves as a stage 
inviting actors to enter. In this way, symbols present a set of structural and formal 
frameworks that are then in shifting contexts through history filled with varying or 
even contradictory contents by actors who represent different interests. This makes it 
so hard to pinpoint the precise significance of each such symbol.
In vaguely recalling the Europa myth and unreflexively using its own name, Europe 
links up to an imagined origin in a transgressive union between gods, humans and 
animals, and of adventurous and forced dislocation and mobility from east and south 
towards west and north. Based on historical experiences, it has in the motto made 
a promise to make its own inner diversity the basis for its unified integration. By 
performing an anthem and organising joint activities on a special annual day, it strives 
both to reflect upon its past and future trajectory and to explore ways of being European 
in the present. The values extracted from the oldest, mythic symbol are developed in 
different directions by the others: the official as well as the unofficial ones.
In a more qualified sense, many of these symbols construct Europe as lifted up to 
a higher level, in a historical movement marching through the greatest difficulties 
towards a privileged destiny. Europe’s centrality is not an innate condition but a result 
of development, of rising from disaster, through suffering to greatness. This may ring 
of sacral overtones, from Zeus disguised as bull to the star circle as saintly nimbus, 
but it also has a secular interpretation, from the Prometheus myth to Schiller’s and 
Beethoven’s dance on the Elysian fields, which would be almost blasphemic if taken 
literally, but making more sense as metaphors of the Kantian dictum of sapere aude, 
the pledge for humanity to make use of its own reason rather than rely on divine 
authorities. There is a difficult ambiguity in this imagery. What was here described 
as the EU founding myth can for instance be regarded in at least two different ways. 
Either Europe is seen as primarily a suffering victim of its own destruction, temporarily 
occupied by evil forces but finally released to rise to true grandiosity and wealth, or 
Europe is at least as much a guilty perpetrator of those historic atrocities, in which 
case the final elevation is more of an ethical quest for finally abandoning hatred and 
evilness. In one case there are dreams of heroic revenge and competing for world 




others. Traces of both these readings may be found in the Schuman declaration as 
celebrated on Europe Day, making the theme of elevation difficult to assess, as it has 
both authoritarian and critical potentials.
1.  The geopolitical and demographic origin and positioning of Europe is since 
the beginning haunted by a sense of horizontal dislocation. This is most clearly 
expressed in the Europa myth, but, as noted by Todorov, Brague and others, there 
are faint echoes of this original eccentricity elsewhere too, balancing the initially 
noted theme of elevation. Europe derives from elsewhere and has a deep-seated 
desire for reaching out to its imagined point of origin and to the whole world, 
while its centrality is conceived as the result of its own achievements rather than 
a given essence. Stability and fixation is thus a task more than a starting-point, 
and a strong element of mobility and transience remains at the core of European 
identifications. Europe once was a marginal outpost but is now the centre of its 
symbolic universe, and far from being easily granted, this centrality needs to 
be continually deserved by intensifying efforts of global communication. The 
United States has in a much later and shorter time-span also understood itself as 
rising from a peripheral colony to the world-leading empire of science, wealth 
and entertainment, and today Asian regions signal their readiness to take over 
the initative. 
  However, several of the later symbols tend to fix Europe, evoking a stability, 
fixity and rootedness that more or less desperately tries to counteract the sliding 
and fragmenting that always threatens such unified solidity, from internal as 
well as from external pressures. This centring effort may be understood as a 
kind of response and reaction to continuing decentring historical events, from 
the Renaissance through the Enlightenment to the great twentieth century 
geopolitical shifts. This results in an unresolved competition between centrifugal 
and centripetal forces.
2.  The main driving force behind this collective movement is depicted in terms 
of desire. The moment of desire was particularly evident in the Europa myth 
and in the original Beethoven-Schiller version of the anthem, but could also be 
found in the more recent symbols. It is possible to find secret streams of desire 
also underneath the metaphors of control, stability and harmony. Europe seems 
driven by a precarious combination of two key desires. One is the desire for 
perfection, linked to the next theme of elevation, and particularly prominent in 
the flag’s star circle, but also lurking here and there among the other symbols 
as well. The other is the desire for contact with others, across boundaries, 
running all the way from Europa to the euro, and linked to the previous theme 
of dislocation and eccentricity. Such a wish is also ambivalent. There was an 
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irresistible mutual curiosity between Europa and the divine bull, and a similar 
communicative urge drove the great explorers to discover ‘new’ continents in 
order to accumulate knowledge, power and wealth. In the crusaders’ desire for 
the Oriental region or colonial imperialism, selfish exploitation and oppression 
initated a spiral of destruction, but also contributed to build bridges not only 
for troops and goods but also for people and ideas, in a dialectic where the evil 
aspects dominated but where there was also a kind of emancipatory potential 
hidden, which even Karl Marx acknowledged. While Michel Foucault has 
highlighted the close interdependence of knowledge and power, this does not 
imply that all communication is always a kind of violence. Postcolonial critics 
have sharply problematised the Eurocentric tendency to conflate universal 
values with European interests, ‘grounded in egocentrism, in the identification 
of our own values with values in general, of our I with the universe’. In Todorov’s 
formulation:
Since the period of the conquest, for almost three hundred and fifty 
years, Western Europe has tried to assimilate the other, to do away 
with an exterior alterity, and has in great part succeeded. Its way of 
life and its values have spread around the world.522 
 Still, Todorov insists that ‘it is possible to establish an ethical criterion to judge 
the form of influence: the essential thing, I should say, is to know whether they 
are imposed or proposed’.523 
We need not be confined within a sterile alternative: either to justify 
colonial wars (in the name of the superiority of Western civilization), 
or to reject all interaction with a foreign power in the name of one’s 
own identity. Nonviolent communication exists, and we can defend 
it as a value.524
 This is in line with Habermas’ distinction between strategic and communicative 
action. The European desire for communication has repeatedly been married to 
a will to power and domination, but at the same time also contains germs of self-
critical openness to others. This quest for communication is far from an innate 
essence of Europe, since European history is equally full of non-communicative 
acts of violence and oppression. Still, the many formulations of communication 
and translation as a key theme—from euro banknotes to scholars like Todorov, 
Ricoeur and Balibar—indicate that this has developed into an increasingly 
focal orientation, deriving from specific historical experiences combining 




  Focusing on the concept of ‘European cultural identity’ Jacques Derrida also 
insists on the acknowledgement of difference and alterity for a ‘Europe still to 
become’, while Étienne Balibar gives Europe the task of being ‘the interpreter of 
the world, translating languages and cultures in all directions’.525 In the article 
‘Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe’, Paul Ricoeur discusses ‘the future of 
Europe in terms of imagination’, outlining a series of models for a ‘post-national 
state’ to combine identity and alterity at different levels.526 His first model is that 
of translation, where he argues for a ‘translation ethos’ of hospitality that would 
be capable of mediating between different cultures. His second model is that of 
the exchange of memories, whereby people take responsibility for ‘the story of 
the other’ in mobile identifications through readings that constitute narrative 
identities. Here, he warns that a ‘rigid and arrogant conception of cultural 
identity’ makes it difficult to revise inherited stories:
What really prevents cultures from allowing themselves to be 
recounted differently is the influence exercised over the collective 
memory by what we term the ‘founding events’, the repeated 
commemoration and celebration of which tend to freeze the history 
of each cultural group into an identity which is not only immutable 
but also deliberately and systematically incommunicable. The 
European ethos which is sought does not of course require the 
abandonment of these important historical landmarks, but rather 
an effort of plural reading.527
  It is necessary to allow different recountings of the past, from different 
standpoints, and to open up communicative space for such dialogical or 
contesting counter-narratives. Europe needs not only a linguistic hospitality 
but also a ‘narrative hospitality’ in order for its traditions to develop their 
‘dialectical dimension’, where transmission allows for innovation. Ricoeur puts 
this in terms reminding of Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch:
Indeed the past is not only what is bygone—that which has taken 
place and can no longer be changed—it also lives in the memory 
thanks to arrows of futurity which have not been fired or whose 
trajectory has been interrupted. The unfulfilled future of the past 
forms perhaps the richest part of a tradition. The liberation of this 
unfulfilled future of the past is the major benefit that we can expect 
from the crossing of memories and the exchange of narratives. It 
is principally the founding events of a historical community which 
should be submitted to this critical reading in order to release the 
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burden of expectation that the subsequent course of its history 
carried and then betrayed. The past is a cemetery of promises which 
have not been kept.528 
 Ricoeur’s third model is that of forgiveness, understood as a form of mutual 
revision of entangled life stories, resulting from the exchange of memories. 
Europe’s violent history makes such forgiveness (that is not the same as 
forgetting!) necessary, as a form of charity, a shattering of debt and ‘lifting the 
burden of guilt which paralyses the relations between individuals who are acting 
out and suffering their own history’. This is only indirectly applicable to the 
political sphere ‘whose principle is justice and reciprocity, and not charity and 
the gift’, but the boundary between these spheres is not quite impermeable, and 
Ricoeur talks of ‘some wonderful examples of a kind of short circuit between 
the poetical and the political’. Like the founding fathers of the EU, Ricoeur thus 
finds forgiving and compassion necessary between Europe’s peoples.529 ‘From 
beginning to end we have held to the blueprint of “mediations”. In this sense, 
the proposed models may be seen as contributing to the crucial ongoing debate 
between the right to universality and the demand of historical difference.’530 
Europe Day, the European motto and anthem as well as some of the euro designs 
at least offer faint glimpses of such a communicative ethics of translation and 
forgiveness, though there are also opposite examples in other symbols. 
3.  There is a direction of vertical elevation in a great majority of these symbols. 
The European flag is a good example, with its symmetric star circle pulling 
Europeans up among the skies in perfect mutual harmony. In one sense this is 
trivial, since any European symbol of course puts Europe in focus, lifting it up 
from the stream of the ordinary that temporarily steps back and serves as its 
context. But other symbols such as the barcode, where the theme of elevation is 
at least insignificant, show that the theme of elevation is more than trivial here. 
All regions tend to see themselves as the centre of their own local universes, 
but while Europe’s symbols make her the unquestioned centre of the human 
world, other continents mostly have some sense of being positioned in a specific 
direction, for instance Latin America, Africa and Australia in the south, Asia as 
eastern or North America as a western frontier. There are of course European 
actors who see themselves as representing for instance the northern hemisphere, 
but it is striking how the symbols analysed here tend without hesitation to place 
Europe in the centre of their combined geopolitical and sociocultural universe. 
The Europa myth is the outstanding exception, but almost every later symbol 
tends to organise its worldview so as to distribute its others around its own hub. 




of the human world, symbolically placed on top of the world. The Europa myth 
placed it in a dislocated position to the north and west of the world’s centre, and 
this self-understanding has to some extent survived in the sense that Europe 
identifies itself as part of the global north and west: on top of the world rather 
than in its centre. 
4.  The resulting texture of Europeanness is likewise repeatedly punctuated by 
hybrid diversity, even where efforts are made towards creating an integrated 
unity. The double-sided coins testify to this complexity that is also pointedly 
expressed by the motto. Some of its key aspects have already been discussed in 
relation to the desire of communication under the second point above, since 
there is an intrinsic dialectic between external and internal exchanges. An 
unresolved tension remains between diversity and equality. While the myth, 
motto and currency all have strong elements that support diversification and 
make plurality a main strength of Europe, the flag and several lesser symbols 
make a virtue of equality. This is no polarity, as equality may well be understood 
as a matter of equal value between those who are radically different, in spite of 
their difference. In fact, equality is a key value only for those who are strongly 
diversified, since between those who are from the beginning similar, mutual 
equality is no very significant goal. This dialectics is what the motto strives to 
express. In practice, however, it is not always that easy to deal with this balancing 
act, and the EU again and again tends to underestimate the importance of fully 
acknowledging its internal variety.
In conclusion
Symbols are hard to manage: they are unruly and always open to reinterpretion, 
for several reasons. On the one hand, that which they signify changes. In this case, 
Europe itself—as an idea and a community project—evolves: what it means today 
must therefore differ greatly from what it meant in the nineteenth century, before the 
final dissolution of the great colonial empires (the Ottoman as well as the European 
ones) and before the disastrous fascist rules. Another motor lies in the symbolic 
field itself, where signifiers can change meanings due to events that affect completely 
different phenomena that happen to use similar symbolic forms. Socialism has 
added a particular significance to the red colour, and the Nazis made it impossible 
to use swastikas as ordinary ornamental elements. The complex interrelations of 
all such transitions cannot be safely predicted, but result from evolving conflicts of 
interpretation. Symbols are therefore hard to use as tools for pre-defined goals. Their 
fate is the result of myriads of big and small acts of interpretation involving an unlimited 
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number of actors and situations. Symbols are in this respect like a language. Precisely 
for that same reason, they are at the same time good for reading and understanding 
their times, just like with languages, artworks or lifestyles. 
Standardised symbols can never by themselves constitute sufficient grounds for 
a shared civil society-based European identity of the kind that has been discussed 
as necessary to underpin the political, economic and institutional aspects of the EU. 
Such a collective identity project is emerging only slowly, perhaps too slowly, creating 
difficult tensions in the relations between citizens and the political establishment in 
Brussels. Jürgen Habermas, Dieter Grimm and others have repeatedly stressed that as 
a political community, Europe must express itself in the consciousness of its citizens 
in more ways than through the euro. They have stressed the role of media in shaping 
that public sphere that is the condition for democratic participation, as integral part of 
an intermediary area between parliaments and citizens, together with political parties, 
associations and social movements. Hitherto, this mediating process malfunctions in 
the EU, where such intermediary structures are to a great extent missing, though there 
are shifting views on the chances for such a Europeanised communication system to 
grow that could be the basis of a truly European political discourse, making the EU 
‘a sphere of publics’ by letting national circuits of communication open up onto each 
other—united in diversity.531 The modern European identity project has emerged from 
the bitter experience of not only great internal differences but also extreme violence. 
From this, Europeans claim to have gradually developed methods and institutions for 
dealing with conflicts by ritualising them, using them for social innovations in dialectical 
strategies for solving problems through acknowledging ‘reasonable disagreements’, in a 
history that has lead to increasingly abstract forms of ‘solidarity between strangers’.532 
The 2007 Lisbon Constitutional Treaty claims that European history has given rise 
to ‘the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’; that the EU is ‘founded on the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’, 
values that are ‘common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail’; and that the union’s aim is ‘to promote peace, its values and the well-being 
of its peoples’.533 This raises a series of questions that can only be answered by a 
critical examination of much more than only these symbols as such. One may on the 
one hand question the empirical and pragmatic truth of such declared values. Can 
Europe—and its union—in practice be said to live up to these values? If so, how are 
they operationalised in all policy domains? On the other hand, one may semantically 
ask whether these values are really expressed by prevailing representations of Europe. 
In what way do European symbols signify—or contradict—the dominant aims and 




Symbols alone are far from sufficient. Still, they do mean something. Flags, anthems, 
mottos and celebrations are used in rather specific places, but still have a certain effect 
on how people conceive of what Europe is about. European identifications emerge in 
everyday interactions among people, but are supported by specific public channels and 
symbols afforded official status. Each such symbol may in itself appear trifling, but in 
combination and context, they etch an image of what Europe is for its own politicians 
and citizens—and for those of other continents. The fact that the final chorus from 
Beethoven’s Ninth—‘Freude schöne Götter funken’ with its androcentric call for 
brotherhood and holy joy—is used as the musical Leitmotif of Europe does produce 
a meaning-effect, not necessarily as an immediate representation of what Europe is, 
but of how it wants to be. The European anthem has suppressed the original words 
of the theme, but their memory lingers on and resonates with the universal claims of 
uplifting human peace and solidarity, in the Schuman declaration and other EU texts. 
In this way, the chosen symbols cement Europe’s self-assumed role as standard-bearer 
in the modern project of enlightenment, with its problematic as well as emancipatory 
sides. The symbols combine to keep alive the world wars memories as founding tales 
and myths of the EU. While erasing the colonial as well as the migration issues, they 
concentrate on the peace-loving praise of diversity and communication as the antidote 
to Europe’s past guilt.
Two concluding reflections could be made.
First, there is a struggle going on over the identification of Europe and Europeanness. 
This means that there is yet no fully hegemonic identity construction, so that it is 
possible for oppositional voices to enter the ongoing negotiations with new symbols 
and new interpretations.
Second, there is a persistent ambivalence in how Europe is identified in all symbolic 
fields, and between the symbols analysed here. This tension is sometimes a hidden 
undercurrent opening for alternative readings, at other times an open tension or even 
clash between contrasting identifications. One may tentatively identify some dominant 
axes of tension and negotiation. One is the precarious combination of unity and diversity, 
with homogenous conformity on the one hand and on the other inner conflicts, 
fragmentation or even dissolution as threatening extreme cases. Another is stability 
versus mobility, with rigid stagnation and homeless alienation as dangers. Negative 
control and positive pleasure also need to be balanced in some way, in order to ensure 
justice, equality and efficiency as well as a sense of goal and direction, with uncreative 
boredom and sectarian Euro-fanaticism as the corresponding risks. New research is 
needed to refine contextualising interpretations of a wide set of circulating symbols, and 
to approach many different settings in which these symbols are made and used.
The Captain Euro comics and Černý’s Entropa artwork represent two opposing 
extreme points, whereas most other current symbolisms are more ambiguous, 
reflecting a rather open situation where the identity—and boundaries—of Europe is 
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yet far from permanently fixed. Neither Captain Euro nor Entropa covers what Europe 
means today. Both of them correspond to facets of Europeanness—the enclosed 
fortress on the one hand and the impossibly fragmented puzzle of discrete nation 
states on the other. But it is between them that the much more interesting symbols 
move and project contested and ambiguous identities: ambivalent and sometimes 
contradictory, dialectical or mediating identifications that continue to transform and 
challenge us who live (with and through) them.
There is not just one meaning of and for Europe. European identity is not fixed 
and not univocal. Instead, there are negotiations between various positions, full 
of inner tensions and ambivalences. Europe’s identity is neither void nor totally 
arbitrary. Instead, historically and socially specific sets of meanings stretch out a field 
of polarities and polysemic interpretations and identifications. There is a struggle 
going on over the identification of Europeanness, a conflict of interpretations where 
different actors construct Europe differently, but with some emerging intersectional 
and intermedial patterns. Europe is an emergent, open and ambiguous project, which 
can neither be reduced to an ideological façade for the self-sufficient hegemony of a 
colonial superpower, nor to the celebration of values of peace, freedom and solidarity. 
Symbols are core nodes in the cultural field, whose role in constituting social 
identities and communities should not be underestimated. They are used in conflicts 
of interpretation to express a shifting balance between elevation and egality, unity and 
diversity, stability and mobility, and control and pleasure. 
If I would, finally, make an effort to synthesise in one single formula the main 
identifying meaning the combination of all these symbols tend to construct for 
Europe, I would confirm the ideas of Europe as eccentric, decentred and translational: 
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Adonnino, Pietro 78
Africa 17, 93
African Union (AU) 94, 129-30, 183
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 in coin design 240-2
 Europa myth 41-2
 and symbols 264
America 18 see also USA
AMO 140-1
An die Freude (Schiller) 163
Ancient Rites 199
Andorra, and the euro 212
Andros, Adam 29 see also Captain Euro
animals, as symbols 145, 221, 234, 237-8, 
240, 247, 253-7 see also individual 
animal names
Index
anniversaries, and community 87
Antarctica, naming 18
anthem 77, 78, 153-8, 264
 adoption 157-8, 172-3, 176-7
 alternative suggestions 181, 184
 arrangements 157, 174-6, 178
 and Captain Euro 176
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 desire and destruction 202
 dislocation 202
 and diversity 203
 elevating effect 161-2, 202-3
 and Europa myth 176, 202, 203
 hostility to 180-1
 hymn types 182
 and identity 150, 156-7, 180
 and inclusion 172
 influences 188-9
 intepretation 171-81
 and language 178, 182-3
 linearisation 175-6




 musical structure 173-4, 175, 176
 national 149
 and Nazi Germany 178
 and Ode to Joy 159, 173, 182
 official status 172-3
 oriental references 176
 purpose 150, 152, 176-7, 179, 182
 styles 172
 as symbol 256
 see also Ode to Joy
Arbuthnot, Dr John 19
architecture, and currency design 216-22, 
236, 242, 247, 249, 252-3
Arctic, naming 18
Armenia, and UEFA 138
articulation 54
Asia, naming 17




 EFTA membership 74
 and the euro 211, 223-4, 233, 235-6,
  237-8, 239, 241, 242
 motto 111
 national identity 241
 Presidency logo 141
Azerbaijan, and UEFA 138
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 future designs 222-3
 historical progression 217, 222
 omissions 221-2
 symbolism 215-16
 see also coin design; currency design
Barbarossa, Frederick 130
barcode 140-1, 146, 147, 261
bear, as symbol 18, 254
Beethoven, Ludwig van 24, 153, 160-1, 182
 musical contradictions and  
 ambivalences 162, 165-6, 168
 see also Ninth Symphony; Ode to Joy
Belgium, 
 anthem lyrics 183
 and Congress of Vienna (1814) 133
 and the euro 211, 224-5, 233, 238
 and Europe Day 96-7
 Eurovision Song Contest 189
 flag 116
 monarchy 224-5




borders 33, 48, 64, 75, 220-1, 252
Bosnia and Herzegovina 98-9, 183
Brandenburg Gate 22, 240, 241, 242, 252
branding 3, 104 see also motto
Briand, Aristide 67
Britain, 
 currency 207, 245-6
 and the euro 212, 241
 national identity 241
 see also England; United Kingdom;




 Political Congress (1949) 70
 Treaty (1948) 135
Bulgaria 74, 144
bull see Europa myth
C
calendars, and ritual 85-8
Capitan Italia 27
Captain Euro 27-37, 212, 264-5
 and anthem 176
 and control 40
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 and dislocation 39
 and flag 128
 and gender 38
 and unity 42
Carolingian Empire 66, 130, 255
Cave, Nick 197
Central Commission for Navigation on the 
Rhine (Commission Centrale pour la 
Navigation du Rhin (CCNR)) 133-4
Černy, David 1, 144
Chaban-Delmas, Jacques 89
chain links, as symbol 135
chameleon, as symbol 239-40, 254
Champions League 138, 186-7
Channel Islands, national day 93
Charlemagne, motto 109
Charpentier, Marc-Antoine 187
China 116, 129, 247
Christianity 11, 66, 155
 in Captain Euro adventures 35
 and banknote design 218
 and the flag 124-6, 128, 146
Churchills underpants 133
circle, as symbol 123-8, 147 see also star 
circle
cities 78, 104, 115, 196, 198, 224, 226, 247-8, 
253-4
citizenship 75
A Clockwork Orange (Kubrik) 155
CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance/Comecon) 74
coal production 70-1
coats of arms 116, 118, 131, 223, 229-31, 
234-5, 238, 240, 243-4, 253 see also 
heraldry
Cocktail Chic 189-90
coin design 214-15, 223-42
 ambiguity 240-2
 commemorative 232
 iconical genres 233-42
 interpretation 215-23
Index
 music depicted 227, 228, 236-7
 nationalist 238
 star circle 216
 unusual coins 243
 see also currency design
Cold War 68, 70, 226, 240
College of Europe 70, 76, 118
colonialism 67, 73, 241-2
colours, symbolism 132-3, 138, 143
Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance/CMEA) 74
Committe on a ‘People’s Europe’ see 
Adonnino Committee
Committee on Local Authorities 155
Committee of Ministers 155
communication 2, 45, 219-20
 and currency design 208-9, 211, 222,
  249
community 1-2, 52
 and anniversaries 87
 and currency 206-7, 222
 and symbols 55-6
Constitutional Treaty (2004/2005) 62-3, 75-6, 
78, 89
Consultative Assembly 88, 155-7
control, 
 and Captain Euro 40
 and flag design 146
Copenhagen Summit (1973) 77
Cotugno, Toto 189, 190
Coudenhave-Kalergi, Richard 131-2, 153
Council of Europe 70, 74, 76-7, 89, 252
 Fontainbleau 77-8, 157
 Milan 78, 91
Council of European Municipalities 155
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA/Comecon) 74
critical hermeneutics 46-7, 51
Croatia, EU flag 144
cross, symbolism 131-2 see also Christianity
crown, as symbol 124-6, 224, 235, 242-5, 254
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cultural identity 50 see also identity
culturalisation 24
culture, and money 208-9
currency 205-10
 and identity 206, 207, 208, 211, 222,
  246
 and monarchies 233-4, 238, 241, 243,
  244-5
 and mottos 248
 non-EU 243-8
 as symbol 256
 see also currency design; euro;
  money 
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 alternative 248
 and communication 208-9, 222, 249
 and desire 249
 and Europa myth 237, 248
 and hybridity 249
 reception of 248
 symbols 212-13, 216-22, 236, 244,
  247-9, 252-3
 see also banknote design; coin
  design; currency
Cvijanović, Nemania 144
Cyprus, 
 and the euro 211, 231, 233, 235-6,
  237-8, 240
 and UEFA 138
Czech Republic 111, 144
Czechoslovakia, and Warsaw Pact 74
D
de Nys, Carl 187




 EEC membership 74
 EFTA membership 74
 and the euro 238
 flag 116, 143, 144
 national day 93
Depoux, Yves 89
desire, 
 and anthem 155-6, 202
 and currency design 249
 and Europa myth 39-40, 258-61
 and flag design 146
 and founding myths 258-61
 and motto 113
 and symbols 258-61
dislocation 22
 anthem 202
 and Captain Euro 39
 and Europa myth 38-9, 42
 and Europe Day 100-1
 and founding myths 258
 and money 249
 motto 112-13
 and myth 15-16
 and symbols 258
diversity 69, 106
 and anthem 203
 banknote design 222
 and equality 262
 and flag 147-8
 and motto 262
 and symbols 262
 and unity 106-8, 110
Doktor Faustus (Mann) 25
dos Santos, Manuel Fernandes 229
dove, as symbol 254
dragon, as symbol 30, 116, 245, 254
Dreher, Christoph 197
duck, as symbol 145, 254
Dumb Europe (Birthday Party) 197
E
E, letter as symbol 133
eagle, as symbol 130, 143, 223, 226, 235, 240, 
247, 254
Eastern European Funk (InCulto) 194-5
EBLUL (European Bureau for the Lesser 
Used Languages) 105
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EBU (European Broadcasting Union) 136-7, 
187-9
ECB (European Central Bank) 213
economic cooperation 70-3
ECSC (European Coal and Steel 
Community) 72, 74, 134-5
ecu 212 see also euro
EDC (European Defence Community) 74
edelweiss, as symbol 223, 237, 253
Eden/Eaden, Professor Donna 29, 30-1 see 
also Captain Euro
EEC (European Economic Community) 73
EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 74
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Cooperation) 70
elephant, as symbol 247, 254
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 anthem 161-2, 202-3
 and Europa myth 40-1, 262
 and Europe Day 101
 and flag design 146-8, 261
 and founding myths 258
 in lyrics 202-3
 and money 249
 and motto 113
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elitism, in Captain Euro adventure 34
EM (European Movement) 70, 76, 117, 132
EMI (European Monetary Institute) 213
England, flag 116 see also Britain; United 
Kingdom
Enlightenment 20, 22, 24-5, 39, 60, 65-6, 
126, 161-2, 217
Entropa (Černy) 1, 146, 147, 264-5
equality, and diversity 262
ESC see Eurovision Song Contest 
Estonia, and the euro 211, 231, 233, 236, 238, 
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ethnicity, in Captain Euro adventure 34
EUCD (European Union of Christian 
Democrats) 70
euro 207, 210-15
 and colonialism 241-2
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Europa myth 8-10, 19, 26, 37-42
 ambiguity/ambivalence 41-2
 and anthem 176, 202, 203
 and currency design 237, 248
 and desire 39-40, 258-61
 and dislocation 38-9, 42
 and elevation 40-1, 262
 and ESC 191, 194
 on EU residence permits 16
 and flag 128
 on Greek coin 227
 hybridity 41-2
 and migration 38-9
 and mobility 39, 42
 and Ode to Joy 161
 see also myth
Europe, 
 emergence 1-2, 64-76
 as ‘home’ 91
 image 2, 251
 origins of name 4, 8-9, 11
Europe (Swedish band) 198
Europe 2006-2014 142-3
Europe After the Rain (Foxx/Leigh) 196
Europe After the Rain (Kreator) 198
Europe Day 78, 85-8
 aims 91-2, 99-102
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 and elevation 101
 flag 142
 idealist aspect 89
 interpretation 90-2
 mood of 101
 and motto 108
 and myth 100-1
 origins 88-90
 religious affiliation 89
 survey 96
 and unity 101-2
Europe Endless (Kraftwerk) 195
Europe is Our Playground (Suede) 196
Europe (Killing Joke) 198
Europe Prize 253
European Broadcasting Union (EBU) 136-7, 
187-9
European Bureau for the Lesser Used 
Languages (EBLUL) 105
European Capital of Culture 253
European Central Bank (ECB) 213
European Centre for Culture 70, 76
European Charter on Human Rights 70
European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) 72, 74, 134-5
European Conference on Culture (1949) 70, 
76
European Conference on Local Authorities 
88
European Court 70
European Defence Community (EDC) 74
European Economic Community (EEC) 73
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 74
European League for Economic Cooperation 
(ELEC) 70
European Monetary Institute (EMI) 213
European Monetary Union 209
European Movement (EM) 70, 76, 117, 132
European Parliament, building as symbol 
252
European Union of Christian Democrats 
(EUCD) 70
Europeanness 4, 38, 60, 75, 99-100, 203, 224, 
253, 262 see also identity
Européennes (Cocktail Chic) 189-90
Europe’s burning/Europa brinner (Rönnblom) 
198
Europe’s Living a Celebration (Rosa) 189, 192
Eurovision, anthem 187-9, 203
Eurovision Dance Contest 136
Eurovision Network 136
Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) 64, 136
 East-West tension 194-5
 and Europa myth 191, 194
 European themes 189-203
 logo 137
 and motto 194
 winner as anthem 181
eurozone 211-12, 231
F
F C Bayern 138
fascism, in lyrics 199
Faust 25, 26
FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association) 138
Finland, 
 anthem lyrics 183
 EFTA membership 74
 and the euro 211, 225, 233, 234-5,
  237-8, 240, 242
 and Europe Day 96
 flag 116
 Presidency logo 135-6
fixity 258 
 of flag 128, 141, 146-7
 motto 112-13
 of national day 101, 102
flags 76-8
 adoption 117, 118-19
 on banknotes 216
 and barcode 141
 and Captain Euro 128
 Christian subtext 124-6, 128, 146
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 colours 120-1, 129-30, 132-3
 and control 146
 cricitisms 143, 144-5
 definition 115-17
 and desire 146
 and diversity 147-8
 egalitarianism 147
 and elevation 146-8, 261
 and equality 147-8
 and Europa myth 128
 Europe Day 142
 federalist 132
 fixity of design 146
 history 116, 117-19
 interpretations 120-8, 143-4
 and monarchies 116
 and motto 147
 rainbow 143
 and ring motif 126
 and stars 121-4, 127
 symbolism of 120, 128
 symbols 118, 130-3, 256
 and transport 119
 uniformity 147
 uniqueness 128-9
 use 115-17, 119
flag families 116
Fontainbleau European Council (1984) 77-8, 
157 see also Council of Europe
Fontaine, Nicole 105
food dishes, as symbols 255
football 137-40, 185 see also Champions 
League; FIFA; UEFA
Fortress Europe (Asian Dub Foundation) 
197-8
founding myths 8-9, 68, 91, 257-8
 and desire 258-61
 see also Europa myth; myth
four freedoms 75
Foxx, John (Dennis Leigh) 196
France, 
 anthem 150, 182
 and Congress of Vienna (1814) 133
 ESC 189-90
 and the euro 211, 212, 225-6, 232,
  233, 234-5, 236, 238-9, 241, 242
 and Europe day 95
 flag 116
 motto 111
 national day 93
 national identity 241
 national symbols 253
 Revolution 116, 162, 163
 and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
Franco-Prussian War 67
Frankenstein 23, 24-5, 26
Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus 
(Wollstonecraft) 23
G
Gaddafi, Muammar El 130
Gaudet, Jehanne-Louis 153
gender, 
 and Captain Euro 38
 and Greek coinage 227-8
 and interpretation of flag 125
 and myth 14
gender stereotyping 33, 38, 121, 125, 203, 242
Genova, flags 116
geopolitical concept 6, 12, 40, 66, 82, 258, 
261
Georgia, and UEFA 138





 and Congress of Vienna (1814) 133
 and the euro 211, 226, 232, 233,
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 and the euro 211, 226-8, 233, 235-6,
  236-7, 240
 flag 116
 and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
Greece (Classical) 8, 16, 65-6, 218, 231
griffin, as symbol 254
Guyard, Christophe 172, 174, 178
H
Hague Congress (1948) 70, 132, 184-5
Hammarlund, Jan 198-9
Händel, Georg Friedrich 153, 185, 187
Hansson, Per Albin 91
harp, as symbol 228, 235, 238-9
Heitz, Arsène 118, 124
Helvetia 19
heraldry 116, 117, 254
hermeneutics 47 see also critical 
hermeneutics
Holy Roman Empire 66, 130, 255
horse, as symbol 163, 228, 232, 254
Human Rights, European Charter 70
Hungary, 
 and the euro 242
 flag 116
 and Warsaw Pact 74
hybridity, 
 and currency design 249
 Europa myth 41-2
 and motto 113-14
I
I Do Not Know What Union I Want To Belong 
To Anymore (Nancǎ) 143-4
I Love Europe (Sjögren) 193, 202
I want to live in Europe/Jag vill leva i Europa 
(Hammarlund) 198-9
Iceland, EFTA membership 74
identifiers 52-6, 59
identity 2-3, 15-17, 50-2, 60, 61, 144, 260, 265
 and anthem 150, 156-7, 180
 and critical hermeneutics 51
 cultural 50




 fragmentary nature 53-4
 and meaning 43
 and narrative 51
 oppositional character 51-2
 and symbolism 220
 and symbols 61-3, 263-4
 see also Europeanness
imperialism 67 see also colonialism
InCulto 194-5
India, flag 116, 130
individual/community, and currency 206-7
Indonesia, motto 109
industrial cooperation 70-3
industrial revolution 22, 23
Insieme 1992 (Toto Cotugno) 189, 190-1
integration 61-3, 74-5
intentionality, and agency 104
International Committee of the Movements 
for European Unity 132
invented tradition 86
Ireland, 
 EEC membership 74
 ESC 190
 and the euro 211, 228, 233, 234-5,
  238-9
 national day 93
 national symbols 253, 254
Israel, and UEFA 138
Italy, 
 and the euro 211, 228-9, 233, 235-6,
  239, 241
333
 national identity 241
 and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
J
Japan, anthem 150







Kalwi & Remi 186
Kazakhstan, and UEFA 138
Keustermann, Jan Alfons 224
Killing Joke 198
Koolhaas, Rem 140






La Prairie, Patrick 105
Lady Liberty 19
language 64-5, 253
 and anthems 178, 182-3
 and lyrics 186
 and symbols 45-6, 49
Laursen, Anders Bruun 144
League of Nations 67
Ledin, Tomas 199
Leigh, Dennis (John Foxx) 196
Liechtenstein, flag 116
lion, as symbol 225, 235, 242, 243, 245, 247, 
254
Lisbon Treaty (2007) 76, 78-9, 263
logo, criticism 145
Luxembourg, 
 and the euro 211, 229, 233, 238
 flag 116




 elevation theme 202-3
 fascist sentiments 199
 and language 186
 universality 178-9
 see also anthems; Ode to Joy;
  Eurovision Song Contest
M
Maastricht Treaty (1993) 74, 75-6, 191
Macedonia, and Europe Day 98-9
de Madariaga, Salvador 118
Malta, and the euro 211, 231, 233, 234-5, 
235-6, 240
Mann, Thomas 25
maps 216, 248, 252 see also symbols
Marianne 19
Marlowe, Christopher 25
Marseillaise, La 150, 173, 182, 184, 188
Marshall Plan 73, 74
meaning 44-6
 construction 48
 and identity 43
 and symbols 54-5, 256-7
Mercouri, Melina 253
migration 2, 16
 absence from banknote design 221
 and Europa myth 38-9
 see also mobility





 and currency 206
 Europa myth 39, 42
 as force for good/evil 36
 and stability 264
 see also migration
modernity 86-7, 92
Monaco, 





 and currency 233-4, 238, 241, 243,
  244-5
 and flags 116
money 205-11, 249 see also currency; euro
money-story 217-18, 223-4, 233, 249
Mongolian invaders, flags 116
Montenegro, and the euro 212
Morocco 75
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 and desire 113
 dislocation 112-13
 and diversity 262
 and elevation 113
 in ESC 194
 and Europe Day 108
 fixity 112-13
 and flag 147
 and hybridity 113-14
 interpretation 106-8
 and myth 104, 108
 as symbols 256
 use 103-4
music 150-2
 anthem structure 173-4, 175, 176
 depicted on coinage 228, 244
 see also Eurovision Song Contest;
  Ninth Symphony; Ode to Joy
MSEUE (Socialist Movement for the United 
States of Europe) 70
Music for the Royal Fireworks (Händel) 153, 
187
myth 5-17 
 coin design 227, 228, 236-7
 defined 6-7
 and Europe Day 100-1
 interpretation 13-14, 27
 and motto 104, 108
 and nation states 18-19
 and Ode to Joy 161
 purpose 7, 15
 and unification 10-11
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 of countries 17-18
Nancǎ, Vlad 143-4
narrative
 EU master narrative 26-7
 and identity 51
nation states, and myth 18-19
national days 93, 256
national identity 86-7, 241 see also identity
national icons/personifications 19, 253-5
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 
74, 135
natural phenomena
 on currency 244, 247
 as icons 253-5
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Nazi Germany 68, 172, 178




 and Congress of Vienna (1814) 133
 and the euro 211, 229, 233, 238
 flag 116
 national day 93
 and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
New International Teams (NEI, Nouvelles 
Équipes Internationales) 70
Nice Treaty (2001) 140, 253
Ninth Symphony (Beethoven) 155
 analysis 163-8
 contradictions 162
 desire and destruction 202
 and musical tradition 162-71
 and Nazi Germany 172
 romantic interpretations 167-9
 Turkish influence 166, 172, 174, 176,
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 see also Ode to Joy
Noiret, Louis 184
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
74, 135
Norway, 
 EFTA membership 74
 flag 116
 national day 93
 national symbols 254
Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI, New 
International Teams) 70
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(Ode to Ancient) Europa (Ancient Rites) 199
Ode to Joy 153, 171-2
 and anthems 159, 173, 182
 contradictions 203
 dislocating elements 202
 effect 264
 elevation in lyrics 202-3
 in film 155
 interpretation 158-71
 lyrics 154, 163, 165-6, 177, 202-3
 and myths 161
 variations 166, 167, 168-71, 174, 176
 see also Ninth Symphony
Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) 
140
Olympic Games 155
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140
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 94, 
129-30
Ottoman Empire 168, 227, 262
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105 
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owl, as symbol 227, 229, 236, 254
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Paneuropean Union 67, 76, 117, 118, 131-2
Paris Treaty (1951) 134
passports 75, 252
patron saints 68, 254, 255-6
pentagon, as symbol 135
People’s Europe 77-8
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phoenix 20-2, 25, 26
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plants, as symbols 221, 223-5, 235-8, 242, 
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 EEC membership 74
 EFTA membership 74
 EU flag 143
 and the euro 211, 229, 232, 233,
  234-5, 238, 241-2
 motto 111
 national identity 241-2
 Presidency logo 136
 and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
power, 
 and myth 8, 14
 and symbols 47
presidency, symbols 111, 135-6, 141, 144
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Radio Free Europe (R.E.M.) 197
Radius, René 156-7
Redzepova, Esma 172
Reilly, Liam 189, 190
R.E.M. 197
Renaissance period 15, 20, 21, 65-6, 213, 228, 
242
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 and currency design 225, 231, 233-5,
  241, 243, 246-7
 flags 116, 132, 146
 mottos 225
 and myth 236
 symbols 238, 242
residence permit 16
Resolution 492 157, 158
responsibility 75
resurrection 21-2
Rhapsodie sur l’Hymne Européen (Guyard) 
174, 178
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), anthem 157, 172
ring motif, and flag 126
ring myths 35
ring narratives 26
ritual, and calendars 85-8
Roman Empire, 
 currency design 205, 218
 flags 116
 and motto 108-10
Romania, and Warsaw Pact 74
Rome Treaty (1957) 74, 232
Rönnblom, Anders F. 198
rooster, as symbol 253, 254
Rosa 189, 192
Round Table for Europe Day (1971) 155
Roxy Music 198
Ruggeri, Enrico 189, 192
Russia,
 currency 247
 national symbols 253-5
 and UEFA 138
 see also USSR
S
St Patrick’s Day 93
San Marino, 






Schuman, Robert 73, 88, 166
Schuman Declaration 26, 70-2, 90-1, 94, 99, 
100, 134, 192, 216, 220
settlement, and myth 15
Shelley, Percy 22-3
signs 44, 45, 48, 59 see also symbols
singing, communal 149, 150
Single European Act 191
Sister Europe (Psychedelic Furs) 197
337
Sjögren, Christer 193-4, 202
Skrewdriver 199
Slovakia, and the euro 211, 231, 233, 234-5, 
235-6, 237-8, 238
Slovenia, 
 and the euro 211, 231-2, 233, 235-6,
  237-8, 240
 motto 111
social change, and symbols 58
Socialist Movement for the United States of 
Europe (MSEUE) 70
Sole D’Europa (Enrico Ruggeri) 189, 192
Somewhere in Europe (Liam Reilly) 189, 190
A Song for Europe (Roxy Music) 198
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South Africa 109, 247
Spain, 
 anthem 183
 and the euro 211, 232, 233, 235-6,
  238, 240, 241-2
 flag 116
 national day 93
 national identity 241-2
 and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
Sri Lanka, anthem 150
stability, 
 and mobility 264
 and symbols 258
stamps 13, 78, 94, 207-8, 234, 252, 254
star circle 142, 257
 on currency design 216, 247-8, 249
 see also circle
starball 138-40
stars, 
 in the flag 121-4, 127
 symbolism 134-5, 147
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 EFTA membership 74
 EU flag 143
 and the euro 238, 242
 and Europe Day 96-7
 Europe as ‘home’ 91
 flag 116
 motto 111
 national day 93
 national symbols 254
 Presidency logo 136
The Sweetest Dream (Cvijanovič) 144
Switzerland, 
 anthem 183
 and Congress of Vienna (1814) 133
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 flag 116




 in Captain Euro adventures 35
 and currency design 214-16, 248
 and euro 212-13, 214-15
 and flag 120, 128






symbols 43, 44-5, 48-50, 252-6
 and ambivalence 264
 choice of 3, 76-83
 and community 55-6
 comparison 48
 conventional relationships 59
 criticism/discussion 145
 defined 59-60, 63
 and desire 258-61
 and dislocation 258
 and diversity 262
 elaborating 56-7
 and elevation 261-2
 and euro 212-13




 and identity 61-3, 263-4
 interpretation 46-8, 49, 55, 57-8,
  262-5
 key symbols 56-8, 59-60
 and language 45-6, 49
 and meaning 54-5, 256-7
 mediation 59
 and numbers 123
 and power 47
 purpose 80-3, 257
 scepticism 79
 selection 256
 and social change 58
 and stability 258
 summarising 56-7
 see also animals; anthem;
  architecture; bear; chain links;
  chameleon, circle; colours; cross;
  crown; currency; dove; dragon;
  duck; E; eagle; edelweiss; elephant;
  flag; food dishes; griffin; harp;
  horse; lion; maps; money; motto;
  national days; numbers; owl;
  pentagon; perfumes; plants;
  rooster; signs; star circle; stars; sun
T
Te Deum (Charpentier) 187-8
TEAM (Television Event and Media 
Marketing) 138-40, 186
Telex 189
Ten, Xasqui and Toni 192 
Third Reich 68 see also Nazi Germany
Through a rainy Europe/Genom ett regnigt 
Europa (Ledin) 199
Thumbs Up for Europe (Bonfire) 196
The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus 
(Marlowe) 25
Trans-Europe Express (Kraftwerk) 195-6
transport, 
 banknote design 222
 and flag 119
 vehicle number plates 119, 152, 252
Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
Treaty of Lisbon (2007) 76
Treaty of Maastricht (1993) 74, 75-6, 191
Treaty of Nice (2001) 140, 253
Treaty of Paris (1951) 134
Treaty of Rome, commemorative coin 232
Tricolour 116
triquesta 130
trust, and money 209-10, 211
Turkey, 
 EU Membership 170-1, 240
 flag 118, 129
 inclusion 220-1
 motto 111
 and UEFA 138
U
UEF (Union of European Federalists) 69-70
UEFA see Union of European Football 
Associations 
UEO see Western European Union
UER (L’Union Européenne de Radio-
Télévision) 126-7 see also EBU
Ukraine, and Europe day 95
Uncle Sam 19
UNIA (Universal Negro Improvement 
Association and African 
Communities League), flag 129
unification 10-11, 68, 106, 184
Union of European Federalists (UEF) 69-70
Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA) 137-40
 anthem 185-6, 203
 colours 138-40
 logo 138
L’Union Européenne de Radio-Télévision 
(UER) 126-7
United Arab Emirates, anthem 150
united in diversity see motto
339
United Kingdom, 
 anthem 149, 150, 182
 EEC membership 74
 EFTA membership 74
 EU flag 143
 and the euro 238
 flag 116
 and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 135
 see also Britain; England
unity, 
 and banknote design 222
 and Captain Euro 42
 and diversity 106-8, 110
 and Europe Day 101-2
unity in difference see motto
Universal Negro Improvement Association 








 national day 93
USSR 69, 74 see also Russia 
V
values, in Captain Euro adventure 32-3
Vanden Eynde, Maarten 142
Vatican City, and the euro 211, 231, 233, 238
Vatican Europe 68, 255
Venice, 
 in Captain Euro adventure 31-2
 flags 116
Verdi, Giuseppe 185
vexillology 116 see also flags
Victory  (Kalwi & Remi) 186
Victory Day 92-3
Vider, Dr D./David Viderius 29, 30-2 see also 
Captain Euro
von Karajan, Herbert 157, 172, 175, 178
W
Wallström, Margot 97, 101
Warsaw Pact 74
Water Music (Händel) 187
Welsh myths 30
West Germany, and Treaty of Brussels (1948) 
135
Western European Union (WEU) 74, 135
Wollstonecraft Shelley, Mary 23
World War I 67, 226




Yugoslavia, EU flag 143
Z
Zadok the Priest (Händel) 185-7
Zeus see Europa myth
Index
Signifying Europe
340
